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ESSAYS, REVIEWS AND ADDRESSES

ESSAYS, REVIEWS

AND

ADDRESSES.

JAMES MARTINEAU,

HON. LL.D. HARV., S.T.D. LUGD. BAT.,
D.D. EDIN., D.C.L. OXON.

SELECTED AND REVISED BY THE AUTHOR.

III.

THEOLOGICAL: PHILOSOPHICAL.

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PREFACE.

THIS volume brings to a close the series of Reviews selected for reproduction. Among the many memories revived in preparing them for the press was a piece of advice once given me by my late friend, William Rathbone Greg, when I was an editor of a Quarterly Journal: "Remember that an Editor is *ex officio* a Censor too: and he cannot do his duty on the mass of nonsense that is published, unless he selects a victim for his pillory in every number." I replied, that having once been seized upon myself for that distinction, I was not inclined to play the part of Executioner. For, in truth, I could never be moved to give account of a book by pure antipathy, any more than by monotonous assent; "Anathema," in the one case, "Amen," in the other, exhausting all that one would be impelled to say. The whole interest of literary intercourse, like that of all quickening friendship, is conditional on crossing veins of likeness and unlikeness in thought and character, deepening the zest of sympathy by the need and the possibility of more. And true criticism seems to me the recorded struggle of the reader's mind into closer relations with an author, whose intermittent bursts of light, helpful as they are, still do not enable him clearly to see his way. In revising the following studies, I have felt myself replaced in presence of a group of intellectual benefactors, to whom I could show no more fitting gratitude than by simply reporting where I have learned from them, and where their guidance has not yet availed. I trust that, in doing

so, no criticism has escaped me that wrongs either the living or the dead, or that might not have place in a dialogue of philosophic friends, freely exchanging plea and repartee.

The discussions in this volume may be regarded as the tentatives which gradually prepared the way for the more systematic expositions of the "Types of Ethical Theory" and the "Study of Religion," and, in some measure, of "The Seat of Authority in Religion." Reproached as I am with "destructive criticism," I may perhaps be pardoned for pointing out that my difference from the authors whom I here review consists, in every case, in my rejection of their *negative positions*, and my claim for an extension of the sphere of knowledge beyond the limits which they assign. So that if, in relation to them, I were called "a Gnostic," it would be a happier opprobrium than the nickname of "Agnostic" now so freely given.

June 7th, 1891.

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I.

PHASES OF FAITH.*

THIS book is a necessary Appendix to the author's former Treatise on the Soul. In that work he presented a scheme of positive Religion, founded essentially on psychological experience, and asking for no data beyond the mind's own consciousness in the exercise of its highest affections. Its object and method were constructive: and in evolving an adequate faith from the inner life of the human spirit, he could spare only an incidental notice for doctrines and modes of procedure at variance with his own. He there unfolded the truths which respect our spiritual relations according to the order in which, as he conceives, they ought to be thought out. This, however, is not the order in which he himself has actually reached them; still less does it agree with the ordinary path of approach to them. All Christians conceive themselves indebted to an historical revelation, concurrently with the intimations of their own nature, for their most inspiring convictions: and with Mr. Newman himself, they are not a fresh acquisition won by his present mode of thought, but a residue left uncancelled by the mental changes through which he has passed, and provided by an afterthought with their new title to continued possession. The present publication describes the processes by which the author, from a commencement in Calvinism, reached at

* "Phases of Faith: or Passages from the History of my Creed." By Francis William Newman, formerly Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. London: Chapman. 1850.—*Prospective Review*, 1850.

length the religion of "The Soul." It contains his apology for dispensing entirely with all external aids,—miracle or prophecy, Bible or Church,—in the establishment of a Faith; and for limiting himself to sources purely subjective. It defends his isolated position by tracing the involuntary encroachments of scepticism, as reflection and knowledge increased and imparted a freer action to his mind; till the ever-narrowing circumference of his ecclesiastical and Scriptural belief drove him at last upon his own centre, and left him as a point alone amid the infinitude of God. As the course of change was exceedingly gradual, and every stage of it is successively vindicated, the book is necessarily a kind of running criticism on almost every Christian creed, and the whole circle of Christian evidences; and elicits in each case a negative result. By this aggressive process nothing is brought out of which Mr. Newman's previous book had not given ample notice. Yet to most of his readers this wholly destructive character will assuredly be painful; and many who, with ourselves, have been penetrated with affectionate admiration for his transparent truthfulness and elevation of soul, will feel it a sorrow to lose the sympathy of such a mind in some of their most cherished persuasions. The earlier treatise so abounded in passages of solemn and tender devotion, that the reader was borne on the wing over the chasms in its faith, and no more felt its doubts than he would pause upon a heresy let fall in prayer. But the present work cannot, from its very nature, bespeak the affections by any such pre-engagement. It is rigorously logical: and though the author's fearlessness is manifestly the simple inspiration of a pure and trustful heart, yet the relentless way in which he follows out a single line of thought, and hurries you along it as if it were the whole surface of the truth, provokes something of natural resistance. You feel yourself in the presence of a mind wholly incapable of the least moral unfairness or ingenious self-deception, and devoted with absolute singleness to the quest of the true and the good; but, at the same time, too

much distinguished by intellectual impetuosity, and the intense flow of sympathies in one particular channel, to attain a judicial largeness of view. Hence the work produces all its effect at once: and while many will utter warnings against reading it at all, our counsel would be to read it *twice*. For ourselves at least we must confess that, where our admiration and even reverence are so strongly enlisted, we are apt to be carried away at first beyond the bounds of our permanent convictions; to take over-precautions against our own prejudgments; and yield ourselves too freely to the hand of a guidance felt to be generous and noble: and it requires time and calm review to recover from the mingled self-distrust and sympathy with which such companionship as our author's inspires us.

To the earlier part of this book singular freshness is given by its autobiographical form, and the perfect simplicity with which it lays open every state of mind bearing on the subsequent developments of opinion. The sketch so slightly given of the thoughtful and serious schoolboy, derided by hearts yet free from the claim of God, and comforted by the kindly clergyman who could read the spirit at work within; of the youth at Confirmation, chilled by the dry questions of the Examiner, and repelled by the sleeves and formality of the Bishop; of the Freshman at Oxford, signing the Articles in all the joy of passionate belief, and then finding that among companions they were objects of general indifference; will wake in many a heart affecting memories of life's most fervid and fruitful hours. How far his religious life might have found a less troubled development, had it commenced under a simpler scheme of doctrine, we will not pretend to decide. But it is evident that so active an intellect, inclosed within the complicated economy of Calvinism, gave his faith no chance of long repose: and during his undergraduate course many questions had arisen, on the imputation of Christ's righteousness, on the obligation of the Sabbath, on the ground of difference between the Mosaic sacrifices and the Christian Atonement, on the

meaning of the words "One" and "Three" in the Athanasian Creed, all of which he had answered in an unorthodox sense. But, above all, he had given up the doctrine of Infant Baptism, and on this account was almost deterred from the re-signature essential to his Bachelor's degree. Though he overcame his scruples thus far, they exercised a most important influence on the subsequent course of his life; deterring him from entering the Church; determining (we imagine) the class of Christians (the Baptists) whose communion he was afterwards to join; and bringing out for the first time that strong contrast between the brothers Newman, which has become so striking in its results. We have often heard the remark, that the radical characteristics of these two men are essentially the same; that the great problem of faith presented itself under like conditions to both; that their solutions, opposite as they seem, exhaust the logical alternative of the case, and are but the positive and negative roots of one equation; and that, but for accidental causes, or the overbalance of a casual feeling, their paths might never have diverged. Upon the evidence of their writings, this estimate has always appeared to us curiously false; and a passage in the present volume, which exhibits the divergence at its commencement, corrects the opinion in a manner deeply instructive. Speaking of his crisis of difficulty respecting Baptism, our author says:—

"One person there was at Oxford who might have seemed my natural adviser: his name, character, and religious peculiarities have been so made public property, that I need not shrink to name him:—I mean my elder brother, the Rev. John Henry Newman. As a warm-hearted and generous brother, who exercised towards me paternal cares, I esteemed him and felt a deep gratitude; as a man of various culture and peculiar genius, I admired and was proud of him; but my doctrinal religion impeded my loving him as much as he deserved, and even justified my feeling some distrust of him. He never showed any strong attraction towards those whom I regarded as spiritual persons: on the contrary, I thought him stiff and cold towards them. Moreover, soon after his ordination, he

had startled and distressed me by adopting the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration ; and, in rapid succession, worked out views which I regarded as full-blown 'Popery.' I speak of the years 1823-6 : it is strange to think that twenty years more had to pass before he learnt the place to which his doctrines belonged.

"In the earliest period of my Oxford residence, I fell into uneasy collision with him concerning Episcopal powers. I had on one occasion dropped something disrespectful against Bishops or a Bishop, something which, if it had been said about a Clergyman, would have passed unnoticed ; but my brother checked and reproved me,—as I thought very uninstructively,—for 'wanting reverence towards Bishops.' I knew not then, and I know not now, why Bishops, *as such*, should be more reverenced than common clergymen ; or Clergymen, *as such*, more than common men. . . . . I was willing to honour a Lord Bishop as a Peer of Parliament, but his office was to me no guaranty of spiritual eminence. To find my brother thus stop my mouth, was a puzzle ; and impeded all free speech towards him."—p. 10.

Whence this incapacity for sympathy between two minds, both noble, both affectionate, trained in the same home, enriched by the same culture, intent upon the same ends? With reasoning powers equally acute, and equally uncorrupted by passion or by self, they could not have found concurrence impossible, had it been within the resources of logic or of faithfulness. The difference, we are persuaded, ascends behind these, and lies in the original data from which each inquirer proceeded as his primary conditions of belief: and we conceive that difference to be one which radically separates Catholic from Evangelical Churches, rendering their approximation intrinsically impossible, and limiting each to the range of one class of minds. A passing remark of our author's unconsciously opens to us the seat of this difference.

"For any one to avow that Regeneration took place in Baptism, *seemed to me little short of a confession that he had never himself experienced what Regeneration is.*"—p. 15.

The new birth,—that is to say,—is something which must be *felt*, and felt under riper conditions than those of the infant Soul; felt as a lifted weight of sin, a broken bondage of self, a free surrender to the will of a forgiving God. This reconciliation of heart, this joyful spring of free affection into the infinite arms, is a fact in the history of thousands; and to him who knows it, it is vain to speak of any other Regeneration. To tell him that the sprinkled babe, in whom he sees nothing supervene, and who is evidently conscious of nothing but the water-drops, undergoes the stupendous change of a Divine adoption, seems to him to degrade the economy of Heaven to a level with the arts of conjuring. When God breaks into the human soul, shall it be without a trace? Must he not shake it to its centre? and as he obliterates its guilt, shall there be no sense of clearness, and no tears of joy to make a fruitful place for every seed of holiness? Thus the Evangelical insists on *consciousness* as an indispensable evidence of a divine change; and can accept nothing as *spiritual* except what declares itself within the human spirit, and exalts its highest action: and further, the kind of experience for which he looks is not possible to every mind, but is incident especially to passionate and impulsive souls. Not all good men, however, are formed in this mould: many who devoutly seek a union with God, and who believe a new birth to be the prerequisite condition, are never vividly conscious of any Divine irruption for the emancipation of their nature: and for the erasure of guilt and the visitation of grace they must look back beyond the period of memory to the cradle of their life, and its earliest consecration: when they were born of water, they were doubtless born of the spirit too. True, the saving touch was reported to them by no feeling: but are there not secret workings of God? and shall we deny him because his approach is gentle, and his spirit, instead of tearing us in storm, spreads through us insensibly like a purifying atmosphere? What hinders him from redeeming and improving

a nature that knows not its benefactor except by faith? If his presence lurks throughout unconscious Nature, and is the unfelt source of all the beauty, life, and order there, by what right can we affirm that his Spirit cannot evade our consciousness? According to this view, which dispenses with the evidence of personal experience, the Soul, in the reception of grace, is regarded externally, as a natural object submitted to the disinfecting influence of God: and the Divine Spirit is treated as a kind of *physical* power of transcendent efficacy,—or at least as an agency permeating physical natures, and so refining them as to transfigure them into spiritual life. No exact boundary is here drawn between the realm of sense and that of spirit,—between the material energy and the moral interposition of God;—they melt into one another under the mediation of a kind of spiritual chemistry, descending into organic force on the one hand, and rising into the inspiration of holiness on the other. This appears to us to be the conception which underlies the peculiarities of Catholicism. Hence the invariable presence of some physical element in all that it looks upon as venerable. Its rites are a manipular invocation of God. Its miracles are examples of incarnate divineness in old clothes and winking pictures. Its ascetic discipline is founded on the notion of a gradual consumption of the grosser body by the encroaching fire of the spirit; till in the estatica the frame itself becomes ethereal, and the light shines through. Nothing can be more offensive than all this to the Evangelical conception; which plants the natural and the spiritual in irreconcilable contradiction, denies to them all approach or contact, and allows each to exist only by the extinction of the other. They belong virtually to opposite influences,—of Satan and of God. They follow opposite methods,—of necessary law and of free grace. They are cognizable by opposite faculties,—of sense and understanding on the one hand; of the soul upon the other. This unmediated dualism follows the Evangelical into his theory as to the state of

each individual soul before God. The Catholic does not deny all divine light to the natural conscience or all power to the natural will of unconverted men: he maintains that these also are already under a law of obligation, may do what is well-pleasing before God, and by superior faithfulness qualify themselves to become subjects of grace; so that the Gospel shall come upon them as a divine supplement to the sad and feeble moral life of nature. To the Evangelical, on the contrary, the soul that is not saved is lost; the corruption before regeneration, and the sanctification after it, are alike complete and without degree; and the best works of the unconverted, far from having any tendency to bring them to Christ, are of the nature of sin. So, again, the contrast turns up in the opposite views taken of the divine economy in human affairs. The Evangelical detaches the elect in his imagination from the remaining mass of men, sequesters them as a holy people, who must not mix themselves with the affairs of Belial. He withdraws the Church from the world, and watches lest any bridge of transition should smooth the way for a mingling of their feelings and pursuits. The more spiritual he is, the more will he abstain from political action, and find the whole business of government to be made up of problems which he cannot touch. The Catholic, looking on the natural universe, whether material or human, not as the antagonist, but as the receptacle, of the spiritual, seeks to conquer the World for the Church, and instead of shunning political action, is ready to grasp it as his instrument. As the Gospel is, in his view, but the supplement to natural Law, so is the Church but the climax of Government,—a Divine Polity for ruling the world in affairs of Religion. It was for want of this view that the younger Newman, while able to honour a Bishop "*as a Peer of Parliament*," (irrespective of the legislative faculties of the individual,) could pay no homage to his *Church functions*, but, the moment he turned to these, looked only at the personal qualities of the man. The elder brother, preserving the

analogy between the temporal and the spiritual constitution of the human world, recognized a corporate rule for both relations; and saw no reason why, if *office* were a ground of reverence in an earthly polity, it should have no respect in a divine. We might carry this comparison of the two schemes into much greater detail, without any straining of its fundamental principle. But we must content ourselves with the summary statement that, while (1.) the worldly and unreligious live wholly in the natural and ignore the spiritual; and (2.) the Evangelical lives wholly in the spiritual as incompatible with the natural; (3.) the Catholic seeks to subjugate the natural (as he conceives God does) by interpenetration of the spiritual. The tendency to the one or the other of these religious conceptions marks the distinction between two great families of minds. The more impulsive and loving natures, whose good and evil are alike remote from self,—who find it an ill business to manage themselves, but can do all things by the inspiration of affection,—who detest prudence and are perverse against authority, but are docile as a child to one that trusts them with his tenderness,—are necessarily drawn to the Evangelical side. Where the Will, on the other hand, has a greater strength, and the Conscience a minuter vigilance; where emotion is less susceptible of extremes, and persistent discipline is more possible; there religion will appear to be less a conquest of the soul by Divine aggression, than a home administration quietly propagated from within; and the Catholic (which is also the Unitarian) conception will prevail. Intellectual power may attach itself indifferently to either side. But, if we mistake not, the imaginative faculty can scarcely coexist in any high degree with the Evangelical type of thought. Its tendency on this side is always to *romance*, which is the invariable sign of feeble imagination; inasmuch as it totally separates the real from the ideal, and keeps them apart like two worlds to be occupied in turns,—the dull and earthly,—the glorious and divine. In the Catholic

theory, where the perceptive powers are less despised, and the natural and physical world is deemed not incapable of being the receptacle of God, the sense of Beauty has free range: it mediates between the spheres that else would lie apart, detects the ideal *in* the real, and, like a golden sunset on the smoke-cloud of a city, glorifies the very soil of earth with heavenly light. We are convinced that to some want of fulness in this department of our author's mind must be attributed many of the most questionable sentiments characteristic of his book;—especially his impatience at the historical details of the life of Christ, and his eagerness to hide the mysterious Jesus behind the clouds of heaven. Describing his impressions on first making the acquaintance of a Unitarian, he says:—

"I now discovered that there was a deeper distaste in me for the details of the human life of Christ than I was previously conscious of; a distaste which I found out by a reaction from the minute interest felt in such details by my new friend. For several years more, I did not fully understand how and why this was; viz. that *my religion had always been Pauline.* Christ was to me the ideal of glorified human nature, but I needed some dimness in the portrait to give play to my imagination: if drawn too sharply historical, it sank into commonplace and caused a revulsion of feeling. As all paintings of the miraculous used to displease and even disgust me from a boy by the unbelief which they inspired; so if any one dwelt on the special proofs of tenderness and love exhibited in certain words or actions of Jesus, it was apt to call out in me a sense, that from day to day equal kindness might often be met. The imbecility of preachers, who would dwell on such words as 'Weep not,' as if nobody else ever uttered such, has always annoyed me. I felt it impossible to obtain a worthy idea of Christ from studying any of the details reported concerning him. If I dwelt too much on these, I got a finite object; but I yearned for an infinite one: hence my preference for John's mysterious Jesus."—p. 102.

We are far from asserting that the Unitarians are a pecu-

liarly imaginative people : and the disposition, criticized by our author, to magnify small and inexpressive traits, is a sure indication of defect in that feeling of proportion which imagination always involves. But the tendency to unbelief in looking at pictorial representations of miracle ; the inability to find an ideal unity in the real Jesus of Nazareth, or to see in that gracious and majestic form the spiritual glory for which the heart craves ; and the apparent admission that *any thing* realized, any thing "too sharply historical," thereby must "sink into commonplace and cause a revulsion of feeling" ; appear to us curiously to illustrate the un-idealizing character of the Evangelical mind, and its tendency to run into romance. We have not hesitated to dwell on the distinct mental bases of the rival systems of religion, because, without reference to them, many of the experiences recorded in the volume can scarcely be interpreted, or its conclusions estimated aright. If the subject has brought us too near to personal criticism, our apology must be, that, where great questions of faith are discussed in the form of self-revelations from an individual mind, the idiosyncrasy of the narrator is necessarily drawn in among the elements of the argument.

The close of his Oxford course left Mr. Newman fresh from the impression of Paley's Horæ Paulinæ,—an enthusiastic and somewhat exclusive disciple of the Pauline Christianity. He was thus prepared, on his removal to a tutorship in Wicklow, to fall under the powerful influence of a devoted Evangelical missionary, of whom, under the designation of "the Irish Clergyman," a striking picture is presented. Negligent of his person, careless of his health, casting down in service of the cross the wealth of intellect and culture, this crippled devotee acquired, by force of will and high faithfulness of life, an ascendency, like that of an apostle, over our author's mind. As the theory of this saintly man led him to scorn every pursuit that withdrew him from prayer and missionary toil, and to discard every book except the Bible, so, by the exercise of voluntary

poverty and an unsparing self-sacrifice to the spiritual interests of the peasantry, did his practice severely realize his belief. It was doubtless this solid and absolute sincerity which led captive a soul like Mr. Newman's,—so profoundly truth-loving, yet at that time tremulous perhaps with the consciousness of intellectual tastes and social interests at variance with the spiritual concentration required by his creed. The overpowering impression of this new friend's character at once inspired him with a wish to engage in a mission to the heathen, and deepened in his mind the conviction, that the great instrument of conversion must be sought, not in conclusive arguments, but in persuasive lives; that the critical and learned evidences on which the miraculous claims of Christianity are made to rest are too unwieldy to be generally efficacious; and that the *moral* appeal of the Gospel to the conscience must be the main reliance for evangelizing the world. To embody this appeal in an actual church or fraternity planted upon Pagan soil, and silently appearing there in all the expressiveness of Christian purity, patience, and loving self-denial, became our author's single desire: and in 1830 he went out to Bagdad to join himself to a community of Evangelical emigrants already established there with similar views under the influence of Mr. Groves. During a two years' residence in Persia began the series of corrosions upon the strict orthodoxy of his creed, under which, after another period, the whole system of Calvinism collapsed. The logical activity of his intellect worked, for the present, entirely *within* the limits of the Evangelical scheme, and in complete submission to the letter of Scripture. The first weakness detected,—the only one during absence in the East,—affected the doctrine of the Trinity. He found it impossible to reconcile the manifest subordination of the Son to the Father in the theology of Paul and John with the definitions of the Athanasian Creed. The considerations and the texts which forced this conviction upon him, like most of the trains of thought by which he passed to ulterior re-

sults, are familiar to all who have any acquaintance with the Unitarian controversy, and need not be presented here. Our author rested for a while in the Nicene doctrine of the *derived* nature of the Son, yet his homogeneity with the Father. While this dogmatic direction was prominently engaging his attention, it is plain that an under-current of thought, charged with most momentous tendencies, was already in motion ;—a course of reflection on the logic of religious evidence, and the unmanageable nature of external proof in relation to spiritual truth. The following incident is rich in suggestion :—

"While we were at Aleppo, I one day got into religious discourse with a Mohammedan carpenter, which left on me a lasting impression. Among other matters, I was peculiarly desirous of disabusing him of the current notion of his people, that our Gospels are spurious narratives of late date. I found great difficulty of expression ; but the man listened to me with much attention, and I was encouraged to exert myself. He waited patiently till I had done, and then spoke to the following effect :—'I will tell you, Sir, how the case stands. God has given to you English a great many good gifts. You make fine ships and sharp penknives, and good cloth and cottons, and you have rich nobles and brave soldiers ; and you write and print many learned books (dictionaries and grammars) : all this is of God. But there is one thing that God has withheld from you, and has revealed to us ; and that is, the knowledge of the true religion, by which one may be saved.' When he thus ignored my argument (which was probably quite unintelligible to him), and delivered his simple protest, I was silenced, and at the same time amused. But the more I thought it over, the more instruction I saw in the case. His position towards me was exactly that of a humble Christian towards an unbelieving philosopher ; nay, that of the early Apostles or Jewish prophets towards the proud, cultivated, worldly-wise, and powerful heathen. This not only showed the vanity of any argument to him, except one purely addressed to his moral and spiritual faculties ; but it also indicated to me that ignorance has its spiritual self-sufficiency as well as erudition ; and that if there is a Pride of Reason, so is there a Pride of Unreason. But

though this rested in my memory, it was not long before I worked out all the results of that thought."—p. 52.

The love among saintly hearts is deep: but in the same proportion their jealousy is quick. No detective police has a vigilance so keen as the instinct of orthodoxy. On Mr. Newman's returning to England in hope of swelling the numbers of the Persian Mission, he had not performed his quarantine on board the ship before he found that rumours of his unsoundness in the faith had preceded him. The usual results followed: for in these cases, where there is nothing to be forgiven, Christians never forgive. Having spoken at some religious meetings,—unordained as he was,—he was cut off by his brother. Writing to the Irish clergyman to acknowledge his Nicene tendency, and to ask for an Athanasian explanation of the text, "To us there is but one God, the Father,"—he was peremptorily, and on pain of alienated friendship, desired to confess that "the Father" meant "the Trinity."

"The Father meant the Trinity!! For the first time I perceived, that so vehement a champion of the sufficiency of the Scripture, so stanch an opposer of Creeds and Churches, was wedded to an extra-Scriptural creed of his own, by which he tested the spiritual state of his brethren. I was in despair, and like a man thunderstruck. I had nothing more to say. Two more letters from the same hand I saw, the latter of which was to threaten some new acquaintances who were kind to me (persons wholly unknown to him), that, if they did not desist from sheltering me, and break off intercourse, they should, as far as his influence went, themselves everywhere be cut off from Christian communion and recognition. This will suffice to indicate the sort of social persecution through which, after a succession of struggles, I found myself separated from persons whom I had trustingly admired, and on whom I had most counted for union; with whom I fondly believed myself bound up for eternity; of whom some were my previously intimate friends, while for others, even on slight acquaintance, I would have performed menial offices, and thought myself honoured; whom I still looked upon as the blessed and excellent of the

earth, and the special favourites of Heaven; whose company (though oftentimes they were considerably my inferiors either in rank or in knowledge and cultivation) I would have chosen in preference to that of nobles; whom I loved solely because I thought them to love God, and of whom I asked nothing, but that they would admit me as the meanest and most frail of disciples. My heart was ready to break: I wished for a woman's soul, that I might weep in floods. O Dogma! Dogma! how dost thou trample under foot love, truth, conscience, justice! Was ever a Moloch worse than thou? Burn me at the stake; then Christ will receive me, and saints beyond the grave will love me, though the saints here know me not. But now I am alone in the world; I can trust no one. The new acquaintances who barely tolerated me, and old friends whom reports have not reached (if such there be), may turn against me with animosity to-morrow, as those have done from whom I could least have imagined it. Where is union? Where is the Church which was to convert the heathen?"—p. 58.

So bitter an experience cannot befall a sensitive and trusting soul, without driving it with sadness in upon itself, and shutting it up in a kind of lonely love, amid the sufficing sympathy of God. A heart of noble faith cannot, indeed, like the worldly who have nothing in them that will *keep*, be soured by such disappointment; and will even turn into a fruitful sorrow what to the others is an acrid poison eating to the very pith of life. But still, cruelty and injustice cannot go for nothing, or, by the miraculous touch of ever so divine a spirit, be transmuted into *only* good. And there is a *religious* type of the unhappy influence produced by mortified hope,—a resolute isolation of soul, lofty towards men, that its tenderness may be reserved entire for God; a jealous zeal against the idols of the mind;—and too quick an apprehension of thraldom from every affection that comes with offers of mediation between earth and heaven. Some traces of such a mood we do think apparent in Mr. Newman's later course of thought,—an excessive resolve not to be imposed upon by conventional or got-up feelings,—a prosaic, not to say embittered, estimate

of human nature,—and a slowness to lay the heart freely open to reverential admiration. If it be so, it is but too high-strained a faithfulness to this noble vow and sweet submission :—

"The resolution then rose within me, to love all good men from a distance, but never again to count on permanent friendship with any one who was not himself cast out as a heretic. Nor, in fact, did the storm of distress which these events inflicted on me subside, until I willingly received the task of withstanding it as God's trial whether I was faithful. As soon as I gained strength to say, 'O my Lord, I will bear not this only, *but more also*, for thy sake, for conscience, and for truth,' —my sorrows vanished until the next blow and the next inevitable pang. At last my heart had died within me, the bitterness of death was past. I was satisfied to be hated by the saints, and to reckon that those who had not yet turned against me would not bear me much longer. Then I conceived the belief, that, if we may not make a heaven on earth for ourselves out of the love of saints, it is in order that we may find a truer heaven in God's love."—p. 63.

The consciousness of unjust treatment had the salutary effect of raising in our author's esteem the simple virtues of the good natural heart; the kindly presence of which would have protected him against the social persecution brought to bear upon him. He knew that the friends who were casting him off were persons of deeply devout minds. He knew that they did him cruel wrong. And this combination forced upon him the certainty, "that spirituality is no adequate security for sound moral discernment." A kindlier disposition grew up towards the common world of men, in whom the moral sentiments had not exalted themselves into religion: and a course of new thought arose, merging at last in the perception that Religion is but the culminating meridian of Morals, and God approachable only by the aim at infinite excellence. It was plain, too, that those who did violence to their amiable nature in fancied obedience to the requirements of the Bible, easily fell into crooked

and narrow ways: so that, be the Scripture rule ever so unerring, it needs either an infallible guide, or a right mind, to interpret and apply it. No inroad, however, had yet been made upon our author's reliance on the sacred writings, as oracles of supreme and perfect truth; or upon any portion of the Calvinistic economy of salvation. The new force given to the moral sentiments revived an old aversion to the doctrine of reprobation, and rendered him so dissatisfied with the appeal to Sovereign Might in answer to objections springing from the sense of justice, that even Paul's authority, "Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" could not stifle his repugnance. In an understanding thus disposed, in which Arbitrary and Infinite Will has ceased to afford a solid basis, it is plain that the whole Genevan system is undermined; and accordingly it rapidly became a mass of ruins. First, some stealthy glances at (we presume) Dr. Southwood Smith's Treatise on the Divine Government, in the library of an orthodox friend, opened up the question of eternal punishment; and the doctrine was discarded on grounds both critical and moral. Next, the Deity of Christ was lowered another step, from the consideration that a *derived* being must be derived *in time*, and cannot be co-eternal with his Source: and then another step again, in order to save some doctrine of Atonement, and obtain a *dead* Christ on Calvary,—which could not be if his nature were beyond the Arian measure. Finally, the entailment of moral corruption on the posterity of Adam is discovered to be without support from Scripture, and intrinsically absurd; and the depravity of human nature is reduced to the historically attested fact of wide-spread moral evil. Upon all these topics the narrative abounds with terse and animated reasonings. Their freshness, however, is mainly due to the directness with which they proceed from the independent action of our author's mind. In themselves they are not new to persons so far gone in heresy as our readers are likely to be: we therefore quit this part of our work with one citation. It contains an important

testimony on behalf of an opinion, exceedingly startling to Unitarians, but, as we have long been convinced, radically sound. Mr. Newman is speaking of his state of mind when he had resolved the riddle of the Trinity, and become,—in worship,—Unitarian :—

"After all, could I seriously think, that morally and spiritually I was either better or worse for this discovery? I could not pretend that I was.

"This showed me that, if a man of partially unsound and visionary mind made the angel Gabriel a *fourth person* in the Godhead, it might cause no difference whatever in the actings of his spirit. The great question would be, whether he ascribed the same moral perfection to Gabriel as to the Father. If so, to worship him would be no degradation to the soul; even if absolute omnipotence were not attributed, nay, nor a past eternal existence. It thus became clear to me, that Polytheism, *as such*, is not a moral and spiritual, but at most only an intellectual error; and that its practical evil consists in worshipping beings whom we represent to our imaginations as morally imperfect. Conversely, one who imputes to God sentiments and conduct which in man he would call capricious or cruel, such a one, even if he be as Monotheistic as a Mussulman, admits into his soul the whole virus of Idolatry."—p. 89.

This crisis in Mr. Newman's course of thought, when his orthodoxy was gone, but his faith in the authority of Scripture remained intact, was highly favourable for his introduction to the Unitarian conception of Christianity: and it so happened that just then he made the acquaintance of a professor of that faith, evidently qualified, by tenderness and piety of spirit, as well as by familiarity with the theology of his church, to represent the system in its most attractive form. It had, however, no charm for our author, whose training had been too exclusively Pauline to remove its Holy of Holies into the Gospels; who could not take up with the Judaical Messiah of Matthew, especially with the loss of the first chapters, by which alone the human Jesus could show title to be Lord of the living and the dead, and competency to stand forth as the moral image of God. So

ıe passed this sect by, and pursued his way; taking up ıow a new set of researches: no longer trying dogmas by he test of Scripture; but trying Scripture by the test of History, Science, Criticism, and all the relevant fixed points n human knowledge. The question had long been strug-ling for attention in his mind, what was the just boundary ›etween the authority of the letter and the rights of the pirit,—between revealed and natural religion. The *prin-iple* on which, while yet a student, he had provisionally lecided it, is the only one of which the case admits: he ıad consulted the *competency* of the human reason and :onscience in matters of religion; and only beyond the imits of that competency had allowed miraculous attesta-ion to possess oracular rights. In the *application* of this ›rinciple, however, lay the real difficulty: and here, as he reely allows, he had fallen into some vacillation and incon-istency. As the process of Evangelical *conversion* begins vith appealing to the sense of sin, and relies on the fears ınd despair incident to conscious alienation from God, his :reed had obliged him to assume, among the data of the natural mind, a perception of right and wrong, a knowledge of God as Holy, and an anticipation of retributive justice. From this it would seem irresistibly to follow, that *the whole* of the *moral* elements of religion are within the reach of the ıuman apprehension: for the consciousness which reports o us our alienation cannot be insensible to its removal; nd if in the one case it forecasts the shadow of penal uffering, it cannot but throw forward in the other the pro-ıissory light of immortal joy. Yet this brighter half of he truth,—comprising the scheme of human *recovery*,—Mr. Newman had set down as beyond the ken of all our facul-ies; regarding the Atonement, the Reconciliation, and the ife Eternal, as *outward facts* of the supernatural kind, ognizable only by miraculous media of attestation. The wo lists of truths, professedly separated from each other as espectively internal and external,—subjective conditions nd objective facts,—by no means answer to this classifica-

tion. The peace and hope of a reconciled mind are as truly matters of spiritual experience as the fever and terror of guilt: and on the other hand, the existence and Providence of God are no less objective facts than the life after death. Moreover, while in theory the only function reserved for revelation was the communication of "external truths,"—the internal and spiritual being left to nature,—the main practical reason for clinging to the miraculous had been a distrust of the *depraved moral perceptions* of man. Thus they are first set up as our sole reporters of internal truths, and then put down as untrustworthy; and, to check and correct them, we are referred to an informant whose cognizance is limited to the external. Whether some lingering traces of this logical confusion, which besets almost every scheme of Christian Evidences, may not even yet be found in our author's creed, we will not here pause to decide. For some time it continued to entangle him. The habit of distrusting the *moral* judgment, and of placing strong confidence in the results of inductive science and historical criticism, led him to test the infallibility of Scripture, in the first instance, by its verdict on matters clearly within the range of the common understanding,—of Geography, Physiology, Natural History, Language, &c. For one prepossessed with the demand for an unerring record, —one whose early faith had taken into its very essence the myths of Genesis, no less than the story of Gethsemane,—one who, under guidance of the systematizing Paul, had worked his way back with one idea through all providential history from the Ascension to the Creation, and who expected, on retracing his steps, to find it all a drama, with the opening in Eden, the development among the prophets, and the catastrophe on Calvary; it is easy to foresee the result. Bibliolatry was replaced by Iconoclasm; and the Scriptures lost by degrees, not simply their supernatural authority, but their natural credit. The course of discovery was so little different from the usual one, that it is needless to dwell upon it in detail. Beginning with the genealogies

in Matthew and Luke, so evidently faulty and irreconcilable in their contents, and inconclusive in result, Mr. Newman soon found that no such thing as a harmony of the Gospels could be made, and that they must be severally treated (the first three constituting practically only one) as human and fallible records. The same criticism, when applied to the Old Testament, invalidated the legends of the Fall and the Deluge, and brought to light the composite structure of the Pentateuch, out of various pre-existing materials. The direct sanction of Jehovah to the iniquities of early Israelitish history is found to be too distinctly claimed to be explained away by any theory of development or accommodation. The demonology of the first three Gospels seems so completely an integral and even a principal part of their evidence for the Messiahship, that the misconceptions involved in it affect, in our author's estimation, their whole case, and destroy all confidence in their narrations. One reliance after another thus giving way, he rests for a while on a consolatory suggestion of Dr. Arnold's,—that the Gospel of John stands alone and unassailable among the materials of primitive Christian history. The sober-minded Paul, too, had borne his witness to the risen Christ; and Peter had referred to the Transfiguration. Not even this narrow footing retains its firmness long. Without pronouncing against the authenticity of the fourth Gospel, Mr. Newman is so much impressed with the colouring evidently thrown over all its contents by the author's own mind, as well as by the negative evidence against the public and stupendous miracles which, half a century after their alleged occurrence, he exclusively reports, that he renounces the book as unhistorical. There remains, however, the dear and venerated Paul. Alas! he descants upon the gift of tongues! and our author, having fallen in the way of the Irvingite pretensions to this endowment, had learned at once to despise it, and to believe it identical in London with the apostolic phenomena at Corinth. This, with the good apostle's easy faith in trance or vision, betrays such

eccentric notions of the logic of evidence, that no high estimate can be made of his testimony to the resurrection. He held himself indeed somewhat proudly independent of all natural sources of information respecting Christ, and declared his Gospel to be a separate and personal revelation. Unless we know something of the *process* which Paul interpreted into divine communication, and could assure ourselves that it was not wholly subjective, we should not be justified in accepting objective history on his word. So the Apostle of the Gentiles, revered for his spiritual greatness, is allowed, as a witness, to pass dishonoured away. One only hope yet remained. The main and central personage might be divine, though inaccessible through the unskilful reports of companions and followers. There was a message worthy of God to send, and, if the intended object of faith at all, needful for man thus to receive,—the tidings of an immortal life: perhaps, after all, Jesus was invested with the Messiahship to be the bearer of this truth. Was he then the Messiah?—For an answer to this question we need not depend entirely on the evangelical records. We know in outline both the history of the Founder of Christianity, and the course run by his Religion. We know also whence the picture is drawn of the Ideal Personage fore-announced as the Messiah. By comparing the preconception with the facts, we can pronounce whether a realization has taken place. Mr. Newman's examination dissipates the Messianic prophecies altogether; and he concludes that the last claim on behalf of Jesus vanishes with them. Finally, he digresses into a collateral discussion of the claims of Christianity on the gratitude of mankind for its beneficent influence on civilization: and he gives it as his judgment, that neither the woman nor the slave has any clear reason for looking on the Gospel as an emancipating agency: and that we owe the Reformation less to the disinterred Scriptures and the energies of Luther, than to the Heathen moralists and the revival of letters. Thus, with relentless perseverance, does

our author wage war with every objective support of Religion, and not rest till, by sweeping off every medium, he has left a clear space between the individual soul and God. That, with one so rich in devout and lofty sentiment, this may all take place, and cause "no convulsion of mind, no emptiness of soul, no inward practical change," we fully believe: we think the time is come when the whole series of external questions noticed by Mr. Newman should be discussed without expressions of holy horror, as if the ultimate essence of religion were profanely touched; and ere we proceed to declare our strong dissent from the most important of the author's negative conclusions, we desire to accept, upon his own terms, the claim of spiritual fellowship preferred in these admirable sentences:—

"I know that many Evangelicals will reply, that I never can have had 'the true' faith; else I could never have lost it: and as for my not being conscious of spiritual change, they will accept this as confirming their assertion. Undoubtedly I cannot prove that I ever felt as they now feel. Perhaps they love their present opinions *more than* truth, and are careless to examine and verify them: with that I claim no fellowship. But there are Christians of another stamp, who love their creed *only* because they believe it to be true, but love truth, as such, and truthfulness, more than any creed: with these I claim fellowship. Their love to God and man, their allegiance to righteousness and true holiness, will not be in suspense, and liable to be overturned by new discoveries in geology and in ancient inscriptions, or by improved criticisms of texts and of history; nor have they any imaginable interest in thwarting the advance of scholarship. It is strange indeed to undervalue *that* Faith, which alone is purely moral and spiritual, alone rests on a basis that cannot be shaken, alone lifts the possessor above the conflicts of erudition, and makes it impossible for him to fear the increase of knowledge."—p. 201.

When we say that with by far the greater part of Mr. Newman's criticism on the Old Testament we are disposed to agree, and that we would by no means ask equal and indiscriminate admission for all the contents of the New, it

will be plain that we are no Bibliolaters. But in simple obedience to the feeling of literary justice, we must profess our opinion, that the primitive Christian records do not receive fair treatment at his hands. The flaws which he enumerates, even if all admitted to be there, would not invalidate the large masses of history which he treats as worthless on their account: nor is it well to throw away wholesale such fruits of a tree of life,—reproductive seed and all,—in offence at the spots upon the skin. Whether, when the necessary deductions have been made, what remains be worth preserving,—whether it be essence or only accident,—must certainly depend on our preconception of what we have a right to expect from the document. If we must find evidence enough to prove the book an oracle, and to establish all the sentiments, precepts, and beliefs therein attributed even to its chief personage in the place of obligatory rules or incontrovertible truths, we freely own that the enterprise is hopeless. But that Revelation can be made only in the shape of orders imposed upon the will, or information communicated to the understanding, is a postulate which we cannot allow. God may speak to us,—in preternatural as in natural providence,—through our moral perceptions and affections,—according to the manner of Art, by creation of spiritual Beauty, rather than after the type of Science, by logical delivery of truth. In this case, all that can be required of the vehicle is, that it be an adequate and preservative frame-work for the Divine image presented before the human soul. In the Gospels, taken with relation to the Pauline writings, this requisition appears to us fully met. Whatever uncertainty there may be, in this or that detail, as to what Christ *did*, there is surely no reasonable doubt as to what he *was*: and if this be left, then, so far from all being lost, the essential power of the Christian religion is permanently safe. To our author's strictures on this conception of Christianity we shall hereafter advert: at present we postpone the dogmatic to the Biblical question, whether in the Evangelists' writings we

possess an authentic and divine picture of character. The tendency of Mr. Newman's mind to external observation is so strong, that he rarely resorts to the higher moral criticism which affects this point. While he repeatedly intimates his opinion that the reverential estimate of the character of Christ is a baseless exaggeration, we remember only two direct apologies for this opinion. The first is stated in the following passage, where, after justly vindicating the position that miracles cannot turn aside the common laws of morality, he adds,—

"But if only a *small* immorality is concerned, shall we then say that a miracle may justify it? Could it authorize me to plait a whip of small cords, and flog a preferment-hunter out of the pulpit? or would it justify me in publicly calling the Queen and her Ministers 'a brood of vipers, who cannot escape the damnation of hell'? Such questions go very deep into the heart of the Christian claims."—p. 151.

The cleansing of the Temple "a small immorality"! an offence against politeness! Yes: the prophetic spirit is sometimes oblivious of the rules of the drawing-room; and inspired Conscience, like the inspiring God, seeing a hypocrite, will take the liberty to say so, and to act accordingly. Are the superficial amenities, the soothing fictions, the smotherings of the burning heart, which are needful for the common usages of civilization and the comfortable intercourse of equals, really paramount in this world, and never to give way? and when a soul of power, unable to refrain, rubs off, though it be with rasping words, all the varnish from rottenness and lies, is he to be tried in our courts of compliment for a misdemeanour? Is there never a duty higher than that of either pitying or converting guilty men,—the duty of publicly exposing them? of awakening the popular conscience, and sweeping away the conventional timidities, for a severe return to truth and reality? No rule of morals can be recognized as just, which prohibits conformity of human speech to fact, and insists on terms of civility being

kept with all manner of iniquity. Offensive as may be the *expression* "brood of vipers," it is hardly so offensive as the *thing;* and when corrupt and venomous times have not only generated it, but brought it to coil around the altar, and hinder the approach of hearts too pure to worship it, can any law of God forbid to crush it with the heel of scorn? There are crises in human affairs, when the sympathies of noble minds, like parties in a convulsed and struggling nation, cannot avoid vehement contrast and disruption; when compassion for a deluded people involves open denunciation of the deceivers who ought to be the guides; and when scalding invective,—the *ultima ratio* of speech,—becomes as much a necessity of justice and as little a violation of any worthy love, as an appeal to the sword by the redeemers of an injured Commonwealth. The presumed analogy between Mr. Newman's infliction of personal castigation on a clergyman in the pulpit and Christ's act in driving the sheep and oxen from the Temple courts is not fortunate. Indeed, we must say, in reference to this whole stricture, that Criticism, in its lashing moods, has seldom, in our opinion, plaited a whip of *smaller* cords.

The other moral charge against the Author of Christianity is rather implied than directly stated, and is necessarily mixed up with other considerations not properly *moral*. He gave himself out as the Messiah; and he was evidently *not* Messiah: he must have been conscious of his inability to support the character; yet to the last he refused to quit the pretension. Now we admit, in a certain sense, every one of these propositions: yet maintain that they establish no point whatsoever against the perfect truth and sanctity of Christ. This statement will cease to appear paradoxical, when due allowance is made for the vague and ambiguous meaning of the word "*Messiah*." It is needless to say, that this term denotes no real object *in rerum naturâ*, but a wholly ideal personage, the arbitrary product of Jewish imagination. As in all such cases of mental creation, the attributes assigned to him, being free from all restraint of

fact, were exceedingly numerous and indeterminate,—involving features personal, political, and religious: nor was the type so rigorously fixed as not to yield, with adequate pliancy, to the plastic pressure of each believer's individual temperament and thought. The Messianic characteristics needed to satisfy the compilers of the first three Gospels were different from those demanded by the writer of the fourth; and yet another set were requisite for Paul. How are we to apply a conception so shifting as a criterion of the reality of a divine mission, and of the sincerity of one professing to be charged with it? It would be easy, in every imaginable case, to find out attributes in the national preconception which would be missing in the individual realization; the concrete combination of all being simply impossible. True it is, that, conversely, the cases were proportionably frequent in which *some* features were sufficiently present to allow of plausible pretensions to the character. But this only proves how unfit is an ideal image like this to serve as a test of spiritual claims. What are the decisive marks which are indispensable to the assertor of Messiahship? Mr. Newman seeks them in the Hebrew prophecies which furnished the first lineaments of the conception; and protests that to these representations there is little in Jesus which truly corresponds. But does he forget that, in trying the pretensions of Isaiah and the Hebrew bards, he had already condemned these very passages as empty of all prediction, and justifying no such expectation as was afterwards based upon them? He thus withdraws the national ideal from the Old Testament; and then puts it in again for the refutation of the Christian claims: and makes it a charge against Jesus, that he *did not realize certain non-existent prophecies*. The discrepancy between the historical picture in the New Testament and the pseudo-prophetic in the Old, might reasonably be urged by a Jew; but to Mr. Newman it should rather afford an evidence that the Evangelical narrative is a sketch from the life, and not a mythical fancy-piece imitated from David

and Isaiah. No doubt Jesus, by the very act of appealing to the Hebrew Scriptures, assumes their Messianic import, and so betrays his participation in the common misconstruction of their meaning. But this implies no more than such fallibility in matters of intellectual and literary estimate, as every theory must allow which leaves to the inspired prophet any human faculties at all, or any means of contact with the mind of his age and nation. Inspiration in matters of textual criticism and exegesis can be demanded only by a theology beneath contempt; and least of all by our author, who so widely separates the functions of the intellect and the soul, and protests against all qualifying of spiritual perceptions by learned judgments. No *moral* charge is established, until it is shown, that, in applying the old prophecies to himself, Jesus was *conscious* that they did not fit. This, however, is not shown and cannot be shown. The absence in him of some of the prophetic lineaments was so compensated by the intensity of others, that no suspicion can be thrown upon the purity and sincerity of his claim; especially as it was in the accidents of external power that he was wanting, and in the essence of spiritual light that he abounded. He claimed to be "Messiah," it is said; and "Messiah he was *not*." True; and if he was *less* than this, we can reverence him no longer. But if he was *more*, only could find no other language than the Messianic in which to interpret to himself and others the feeling of his Divine call, then was the national formula the mere vehicle furnished by history for an essential fact, the modest costume disguising a divine reality; and the only error in the account which Christ gives of himself lies in its affirming far less than the truth. In the theocratic faith which occupied Palestine, two distinct elements coexisted,—the political and the religious: the former promising external glories according to the type, but transcending the limits, of the united monarchy; the latter intent upon the realization of a spiritual Ideal, including the restoration of pure worship and the establishment of men in a saintly fraternity in

immediate communion with Heaven. As the first of these elements supplied natural materials to the ambition and vanity of pretenders, so did the second offer a receptacle to which the holiest mind and the highest inspiration would not shrink from resorting. So was it, as we believe, with Christ. The political functions of Messiah he never positively denied, or absolutely cleared out from his mere speculative representations of the future. But an infallible moral perception, and affections spiritually preoccupied, detained him from every tendency to realize them; made him regard their practical occurrence to his mind as a diabolical Temptation; and drove him into mountain solitudes, when eager multitudes would set him up for king. Whether, according to the account in the first three Gospels, he dealt with the political part of the Messianic scheme, when it obtruded itself, by *putting it off* into the future; or whether, according to John, he got rid of it by *melting it* absolutely and immediately away in the spiritual; either method is so true to the instinct of a mind too clear and holy to touch what it is not sceptical enough to disbelieve, that we wonder at the preference shown for the vulgar imputation,—"Depend upon it, Jesus would have raised an army if he could; and only talked about religion, because there was nothing else that he could do."

The fact to which we have adverted,—the investiture of a spiritual mission with a Messianic form,—explains a phenomenon in John's Gospel to which Mr. Newman applies (p. 146) some severe criticisms. That Gospel betrays great vacillation in its estimate of the logical value of miracles: representing Christ sometimes as reproving the demand for a miracle, and blessing those whose faith can dispense with such support; sometimes as appealing to miracle as a just basis for belief. The fact of this mixed appeal is indisputable: and to us it seems in every way suitable to the mixed character sustained by Jesus, as *human* or universal prophet, and as *national Messiah.* The miracles to which he appeals were regarded as the

proper *signs* of theocratic *power;* the faith without miracle was the just demand he made on the spiritual sympathies of good hearts. They were severally insisted on in behalf of different positions: the one to prove his Jewish Messiahship; the other, his insight into Divine things hidden from the possible apprehension of no pure soul. In the latter, we are concerned with the permanent life of Christianity; in the former, with its mere door of entrance upon the theatre of human affairs.

The absence of this distinction appears to us a frequent cause of unconscious unfairness in Mr. Newman's strictures. The rules of estimate which you would apply to a philosophical system are very different from those by which you appreciate an historical development:—in the one case, they are *absolute*, furnished by your conceptions of what is abstractly true in itself; in the other, they are *relative*, and have regard to actual human conditions, admitting or excluding what was better or worse. In a philosophical theory, every blemish and omission is justly held to detract from its merits: but in an historical development, such imperfections may be due, not to the new, but to the old,—to the irremovable data of feeling and belief which the young agency finds in occupation of the field given for its work. This difference is not annihilated, when we have to do with supernatural instead of natural affairs. Revelation may assume the form either of a divine philosophy, professing to furnish unconditioned truth; or of a divine influence cast into the midst of the world's development, and weaving a pattern of more than human art and beauty into the texture of history. It is in the former aspect that our author contemplates the religion of Christendom; and he is thus led to charge upon it many things that cannot justly be laid to its account. Christianity, as presented in the Scriptures, is a composite fabric;—the woof of Christ's personal spirit thrown across the warp of an antecedent Judaism: and it is not fairly answerable for flaws and stains in that which it found already

stretched upon the loom. Thus, when Mr. Newman imputes to the New Testament the doctrine, that God punishes men "for holding an erroneous creed" (p. 168), he states what is partially true, yet leaves on the whole an impression quite false. Such a sentiment is entirely foreign to the religion of Christ, as distinguished from the previous Hebrew theology: and every thing which resembles it is an uncancelled remnant of the earlier system. From the very nature of the case, every theocratic scheme is necessarily exclusive. The Gospel, born within the limits of such doctrines, could not, in taking all their grandeur, escape at once the whole of their severity. But its entire tendency was to destroy the previous narrowness; and to throw open, as well as purify, the terms of communion with God. For exclusion by *race* and other arbitrary external disqualifications, it substituted exclusion by *spiritual condition alone.* It may be said, that the required spiritual condition involved a creed. Even this, however, though undeniably true, is not a characteristic description of the fact. It was reverence for a Person, not reception of Propositions, which constituted the Apostolic test; an allegiance of soul to the heavenly Christ, not an affirmation by the intellect of metaphysic dogmas. And may it not be reasonably doubted whether, under the then condition of the world, any other test could have effected a truer moral partition of that portion of mankind with which the Apostles came in contact? If our modern doctrine,—of God's indifference to men's creed,—had been propagated in an age when creed was no affair of conscientious private judgment, but was mixed up inseparably with moral and social causes, and if the Apostle of the Gentiles had preached at Ephesus and Corinth out of the "Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions," how would the Divine crusade have prospered against the zealotry of Jerusalem and the idolatrous corruptions of the Roman Empire? Paul, avowedly expecting an end of the world, proclaimed a divine classification of mankind in regard to that great

catastrophe,—a classification involving probably no such incorrect moral estimate after all. If, by an absurd Bibliolatry, men have imported a division, similar in sound but not in sense, into a stage of the world and conditions of human character never contemplated by him, with what justice are his writings made answerable for the folly and narrow-heartedness of his readers? The same refusal to take any account of historical conditions influences our author's judgment as to the doctrine of demoniacal possession. That this superstition embodied in the Scriptures has been the cause of many evils, is incontrovertible. But causes anterior to Christianity created the superstition: a Bibliolatry, of which Christianity is independent, prolonged it. It is easy to expatiate upon the mischiefs of this or any other error left uneradicated by the new religion; but, unless we take into comparison the state in which the case had been *before*, or would have been *without* Christianity, we shut out the conditions of all rational judgment. For ourselves we are convinced that the Dualistic belief expressed in the doctrine of *possession* is truer and more favourable to moral progress than any theory of unreduced evil accessible under the same conditions of the human intellect. To ask for the religious fruits of physical science, before that science exists, appears to us in the highest degree unreasonable.

The immense extent of ground traversed by our author's Biblical criticism renders it impossible for a Reviewer to follow him in detail. We would gladly have said something in defence of the Pauline logic, and the peculiar sources of the Pauline Gospel, as well as in correction of Mr. Newman's verdict respecting the fourth Gospel,—a verdict which appears to us far too positive, and to some extent resting on fanciful grounds. But these topics cannot be fairly treated without a minuteness of discussion of which our readers would justly complain: and we confess our inability, from consciousness of the real difficulties attending them, to deal with them in any very confident

tone. We are not sure, however, that the Apostolic "logic" which our author so much slights was not, on some points, sounder than our own; and we cannot share his unqualified distrust of all subjective impressions as media of revelation. We are the less able to discuss these questions with him, because we cannot make a consistent whole of his own logic of evidence in relation to them. He distinctly lays it down (p. 152), that "it is *in the spirit* alone that we meet God, *not* in the communications of sense"; yet objects to Paul's ἀποκάλυψις, that we know not whether "he saw or heard a sound" (p. 148), and that "he learned his Gospel by *an internal revelation*" (p. 181). He admits that it "was to the *inward senses* that the first preachers of Christianity appealed, as the supreme arbiters in the whole religious question" (p. 156); and that "all evidence for Christianity must be *moral* evidence" (p. 217): yet his complaint is always of the want of *external* guarantee. If all the evidence must be moral and spiritual, then all matters not included in this category leave the evidence untouched; and the religion remains unaffected by the errors in history, geography, construction of miracle, and logic, which our author discerns in its first records. In short, the *proof* is allowed to be exclusively moral and spiritual: yet the *disproof* alleged is historical, scientific, and metaphysical.

In his criticism of Doctrine, Mr. Newman comments on the theory of Christianity, to which we have already referred with approval, viz., that the religion is embodied in the Life and Spirit of Christ, who is a perfect man and the moral image of God. He assigns "many decisive reasons" why it was impossible "that such a train of thought could recommend itself to him for a moment." The first of these reasons is, that Religion would still remain a problem of literature; for, beautiful as the picture of Jesus may be, how but by a refined and elaborate criticism can we tell whether the portrait may not be imaginary instead of real? We reply, Religion may fitly remain thus

far a problem of literature; nor is it apparent how we are ever, except through the medium of preservative records, to be placed in mental contact with the objects of just reverence that have visited our world; yet are these objects the grand agencies for the devout education of individuals and nations. So long, indeed, as it is asserted that faith in Christ is the *condition of salvation* and the *essential to the Divine favour*, it is grossly inconsistent to make it at the same time contingent on a trembling balance of critical evidence; and against the exclusive scheme of orthodox churches, this objection presses with irresistible weight; for there the propositions to be accepted are of infinite intricacy, and the results of mistake, a hopeless and eternal ruin. But in the theory now before us, the burden of consequences is reduced to the ordinary freight of truth and error; and the critical problem,—whether such a being as Jesus Christ really lived, and was such as the Gospels and Paul represent,—is so simple, that no serious uncertainty can be pretended in respect to it. Mr. Newman appears to us to strain till it breaks the principle that religion must ask for nothing beyond the individual spirit of the ignorant human being. To insist that it shall owe nothing to the Past, and be the same as if there were no history; to demand that each shall find it for himself *de novo*, as if he were the first man and the only man; to rely, for its truth or its progress, on its perpetual personal reproduction in isolated minds,—is to require terms which the nature of man forbids and the Providence of God will disappoint. Transmitted influence from soul to soul, whether among contemporaries, or down the course of time, is not only as *natural*, but as *spiritual*, as the direct relation of each worshipper of God. Indeed, traditional faith,—communicated reverence,—is that which distinguishes the nobler religion of civilized and associated nations from the egotism of Fetish worship; and it cannot be that a tendency which only a few lonely minds are capable or desirous of escaping, is without any proper function in the

world. Nor is it right to judge those Unitarians who are the objects of Mr. Newman's strictures as if their doctrine were "new," as if they went back on a general excursion through history, and fetched up thence, by their private selection, a person fit to be the moral image of God. They merely attempt to state the essential spirit of a ready-made fact. They observe a past and present Christendom, actually worshipping a God who is the glorified resemblance of Christ. They have not to establish the habit, and make good the whole series of antecedents from which it has arisen; but, finding it in possession of the field, to make a just estimate of its intrinsic truth and excellence. Looking at it thus, they simply say, "This is good, this is the truest and divinest of which we can think; the moral instinct of Christendom is right." It will be time enough to present complaints on behalf of the poor and uneducated, when the majesty and sanctity of Christ's mind have practically become as liable to doubt, as the reality of some of the miracles, and the authorship of some of the books. Meanwhile, we believe the intuitive feeling to be perfectly well-founded, that superhuman goodness *cannot* be feigned by any act of free imagination; and to be fully justified by that "vast moral chasm between the Gospel and the very earliest Christian writers," which left upon Mr. Newman himself a "sense of the unapproachable greatness of the New Testament." And after all, come what may of the possibility of critical verification, the Divine Image furnished by the life of Christ is now secured to the soul of Christendom,—presides in secret over its moral estimates, directs its aspirations, and inspires its worship. In proportion as this *educative* function of historical reverence is protracted and complete, does it become of less moment to verify its sources in detail. The eye, once couched and trained to the usages of vision, does not relapse into the dark, when the traces are lost or the knowledge is wanting of the process and instrument of recovery. And when called upon to quit its estimate of the holiness of Christ,

by critics who say, "Give God the praise; we know that this man is a sinner"; Christendom, like the disciple blind from his birth, may be content to reply, "Whether he be a sinner or no, I know not: one thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see."

To the form of Christianity which we are considering, Mr. Newman further objects that the asserted perfectness in the character of Christ is wholly imaginary; and, if he were physically human, intrinsically incredible. As the first of these allegations is simply an expression of the author's personal distaste, and is not otherwise supported than by the statement, that, for his part, he prefers Fletcher of Madeley (himself, we presume, a disciple) to Jesus of Nazareth, it admits of no reply beyond an expression of surprise at an estimate so singular. Even the vagaries of Rousseau led him to no such eccentricity of scepticism; and amid doubt of every authoritative claim, he closed the Gospel with the acknowledgment that Jesus "lived and died like a God." Certainly, if Dr. Fletcher of Madeley does really appear to our author a *perfect man*, he must and will (whether the fact be recognized or not) so far assume in his mind the function of Christ, as to furnish the richest moral elements to his conception of God. But for ourselves we must confess a difficulty,—unfelt perhaps by Mr. Newman, but common to all dependent minds,—in standing quite alone in admiration, and trusting our absolutely solitary perceptions, as we should those in which thousands of brethren joined with us, and declared the light of heavenly beauty to lie upon the very spot which it paints for us. The established power of a soul over multitudes of others,—its historic greatness,—its productiveness, through season after season of this world, in the fruits of sanctity, *must* inevitably enter as an element into our veneration; and scarcely do we dare, by free homage of the heart, to own the trace of God in another's life, till we find our comrades in sympathy with us. Till then, we feel as though we might be magnifying our idiosyncrasies, and throwing over

the universe the speck or tint of our own eye. Therefore it is that no private person, even though he more intensely stirs the distinctive affections of our narrow individuality, can ever come into just comparison with Christ, or become the object of that broad and trustful reverence which rather draws the soul out of itself, than drives it more closely inward. We know there must be a limit to this dependence; and we honour from our hearts those who, from clearness of eye and courage of soul, can be *first* disciples of any prophet of God. But even they do not contemplate remaining alone: they live on the concurrence of the future, though not of the present and the past, and attest the ideal need of sympathy to faith. Between the boldness of him who interprets the future exclusively by himself, and the dependent temper of those who correct and confirm themselves by reference to the past, we will not attempt to adjust the balance. But Fletcher of Madeley does not tempt us to sever ourselves from the common consciousness of Christendom. Mr. Newman, in treating of this topic, advances a logical criticism to which we can by no means subscribe:—

"It is not fair to ask (as some whom I exceedingly respect do ask), that those who do not admit Jesus to be faultless and the very image of God, will specify and establish his faults. This is to demand that we will *presume* him to be perfect, until we find him to be imperfect. Such a presumption is natural with those who accept him as an angelic being; absurd in one who regards him as a genuine man, with no preternatural origin and power. If by sensible and physical proof the orthodox can show that he is God incarnate, it will be reasonable to assume that he is a perfect specimen of moral excellence, and after this it will be difficult to criticize. But when sensible proof of his immaculate conception and of his Godhead is allowed not to exist, and maintained to be abstractedly impossible, I have no words to express my wonder at that logic which starts by acknowledging and establishing his simple manhood, proceeds to *presume* his absolute moral perfection, *throws on others the task of disproving the presumption*, and

regards their silence as a verification that he is God manifest in the flesh."—p. 211.

In spite of these startling expressions of wonder, we must persist in presuming Jesus to be perfect till shown to be imperfect. We derive our estimate of him wholly from the picture presented in the Gospels,—purified certainly by some critical clearances, defensible by canons of internal evidence,—and so long as this picture presents no moral imperfections, we must decline supplying them out of the resources of fancy. In *presuming* Christ to be perfect, we simply refuse to suppose a drawback on what we see from what we do not see, and insist on forming our judgment from the known, without arbitrary modification from the unknown. No doubt Jesus, as a being open to temptation, was intrinsically capable of sin: but this, as a set-off against the positive evidence of holiness, no more proves *actual* imperfection, than the mere capacity for goodness in the wicked proves their actual perfection. How can character ever be estimated but by the phenomena through which it expresses itself in the life? and how can these be set aside by abstract considerations respecting the rank and parentage of the moral agent? According to our author, we are to distrust our own moral perceptions, and believe apparent beauty to be real deformity, until a *physical* proof of Godhead is superadded: and we are, in this instance, to contradict his own rule, that spiritual discernment requires no voucher from external miracle. We are at a loss to conceive in what way a superhuman physical nature could tend in the least degree to render moral perfection more credible. The classifications of Natural History are not to be obtruded upon Religion, and gradations of excellence to be merged in distinctions of Species. Christ had the *liability* to sin, not because he was *human*, but because he was *free*; and whatever presumption of imperfection arises hence, would have arisen no less, had he been an angel of the highest rank. All souls are of one species: or rather,

are lifted above the level where diversity of species prevails, so as to range, not with Nature, but with God. The same Laws, the same Love, the same Will, the same Worship, pervade them all, and make them of one clan; nor is there any portion of the series whence a perfect sanctity might not be evolved wtth equal possibility and with similar result. It is strange that Mr. Newman should stipulate for the immaculate conception, as a condition of believing any exalted character in Christ; and should forget that the Gospel which makes him diviner than all the rest (that of John), knows nothing of the miraculous birth, and teaches, apart from all physical conditions, the very doctrine now the object of remark. That the Apostle Paul never dwelt on the earthly life of Christ; that no relics, no *holy coats*, and other results of tender and human affection for an historical personage, appeared in the first age, proves no more than that the expectation of the near Advent withdrew the mind of the early Church from the Past to the Future, and kindled a faith too dazzling for quiet retrospection. The personal object, however, though placed in the imaginary scene before, instead of among the realities behind, was still the same. And as soon as the anticipation of his reappearance faded away, the eye of the Church, unable to quit the image, changed its direction, and sought him where alone he was to be found, in the fields of Palestine and the courts of Jerusalem; and thenceforth enthusiastic hope was replaced by historic reverence. Indeed, the stories of the Birth and Infancy with which two of the Gospels open, show that the retrospective attitude of faith had already been assumed. It is vain to quote Paul against this view, and in favour of an estimate which reduces the earthly life of Jesus to "commonplace." If to him the Christ above was the "Ideal of glorified human nature,"—heavenly before his birth, heavenly after his death,—how, in the intermediate ministry on earth, could Paul, like Mr. Newman, suppose him quite common and undivine? If the history of that ministry failed to support

the impression of the Pauline ideal, how could the Apostle's theory escape the most formidable difficulties? It was the same Jesus that had presented himself in both spheres: and the unity of the character must be preserved by those whose veneration is directed towards them in either. Paul's imagination *descended* from Christ in heaven to Christ on earth; ours *ascends* from Christ on earth to Christ in heaven; and ends with enthroning him where Paul first knew him. Whichever path of transition be taken, the moral conception of the Person must be the same; having on him the traces of that ideal perfectness in the faith of which both theories terminate. The acceptance of Christ, therefore, as the moral image of God, appears to us to be strictly involved in the Pauline Gospel, and to be quite as compatible with a human as with an angelic rank.

Mr. Newman objects in conclusion against this version of Christianity, that it attempts to combine incompatible conditions,—to save free Criticism without sacrificing Authority; and that there is "something intensely absurd in accepting Jesus as the Messiah, and refusing to acknowledge him as the *authoritative teacher*, to whose wisdom we must pay perpetual, unlimited, unhesitating homage" (p. 212). Now we fully concur with our author in rejecting all notion of an absolute oracle, to whose *dicta* we are submissively to bow: nor do we know of *any* general proposition which we should think it right to accept *merely* on the word of Jesus. We further allow, that this withdrawal from him of the oracular function probably *is* at variance with the Jewish conception of Messiah's office. But we deny that it is at variance with the Christian conception of a moral type of Divine Perfectness. The most faultless administration of life, the most saintly communion with God, the divinest symmetry of soul, may surely coexist with limited knowledge; and sinlessness of Conscience does not require Omniscience in the Understanding. To be no great scholar in Chaldee, and ill-read in the Court-annals of the Seleucidæ, and consequently make mistakes about the

book of Daniel, and not see what is invisible in the destinies of the Roman empire,—how does this hinder the exercise of pure affection and life of the holy faithfulness? Goodness is qualitative; knowledge is quantitative; and throughout every variety in the quantity, immaculateness is possible in the quality. In the power natural to the higher soul over the lower, in the silent appeal which the beauty of its holiness makes to the struggling and feeble will, there is indeed an exercise of *authority*, and of the only kind that is ultimately possible: but it involves no intellectual dictation, and is indeed consistent with none: it gives not a true proposition to our assent, but a divine object to our perception; and while the moral and spiritual intuition are reverently engaged upon the person, leaves the logical understanding free play among all ideas. Mr. Newman is fond of drawing the distinction between the spiritual and the intellectual in the case of ordinary men. No one demonstrates more convincingly the independence of religious insight on all conclusions of the scientific judgment and states of objective knowledge; protests more strongly against every demand of *right belief* in matters external as a test of nearness to God; or better shows the open communion of the Father of Lights with his children in proportion to their purity of heart, irrespective of the culture and correctness of the mind. Why is this to be true of the disciples, and false of the Master? With what consistency is the Spirit of God made indifferent to intellectual conditions in the one case, yet tested by infallibility in the other? Our author has only to extend to the Founder the conception of inspiration on which he insists in the Church; and he obtains the completest answer to his own demand for an oracular Christ.

The reaction of our author's mind against his early belief does not affect merely his views of the *sources* of Christianity. He criticizes also its *history*; and denies its beneficent agency, even in directions wherein it has hitherto been regarded as scarcely open to challenge. It has done

nothing, he thinks, to improve the condition of the woman or the slave: its spread, no less than that of Mohammedanism, has been the work of the sword; and it has rather restricted, than produced, the benefits of the Reformation. Nothing in this volume has so much amazed us as the disproportion between the magnitude of these propositions and the slenderness of the grounds on which they are made to rest. First, as to the condition of woman: he urges that "the real elevators of the female sex are the poets of Germanic culture, who have vindicated the spirituality of love and its attraction to character" (p. 165); that the Apostle Paul, far from reaching any such sentiment, discourages marriage, except as a means of escaping the temptations of passion; and that in the South of Europe, where Germanic feeling has taken no root, the relative position of the sexes is not improved. In relation to this question, as to many others, we protest against the identification with Christianity itself of the personal views of this or that Apostle: we are not to seek in the crude germ of the religion for that which belongs to its full and developed fruit. It is enough (and this surely is incontrovertible) that Paul's doctrine on this subject was a vast *improvement* on the Gentile morality which it replaced; that the rules which he imposed on the administrators and members of Christian communities were the only ones which could give scope for the spontaneous growth of the best sentiments; and that his treatment of the case, having exclusive reference to the end of the world supposed to be imminent, was never intended to serve for all time, and owed to its provisional purpose whatever is questionable in it. And after all, unjust as it is to measure the ultimate tendency of an historical influence by its incipient phenomena, there does appear to us a manifest trace, in the first age itself, of an ennobling influence from the recognized spiritual equality of the sexes. The women of Galilee and the sisters of Bethany, the helpers of Paul in Macedonia and Corinth, the martyred deaconesses of Lyons and Carthage, were surely

lifted by their faith into a consciousness of the claims of the soul, to which nothing in Pagan antiquity can present a moral parallel. We have no desire to derogate from the just merits of German sentiment; or to establish any competition of pretension between its influence and that of Christianity. But is it too much to say that, for the production of their beneficent results, the two agencies had to concur; and that if, on the one hand, the religion was comparatively barren till it struck upon the German soul, so, on the other, that soul had but the latent capacity for nobler development till quickened by reception of the religion? We certainly believe that the chief function of the first eight centuries of the Church was to hand over the religion to its proper receptacle in the Teutonic mind, —there for the first time to exhibit on a large scale its native vitality and find its appointed nourishment. Still, if we remember right, the chivalric poetry arose, not in the Germanic race, but among the Romanesque tribes of Spain, France, and Italy; and flourished most where the Albigensian spirit had freest way and the power of the priesthood was most weakened. Sismondi remarks the coincidence, in the Romance literature, of an elevated sentiment towards woman, with bitter satire upon the clergy; and we apprehend it was a true instinct which led the poet, inspired with any delicate and noble love, to turn his antipathies upon the sacerdotal system. That system it is which to this day prevents the sanctity and lowers the dignity of domestic life in the South of Europe; and makes the difference between the love which figures in an Italian opera, and that which breathes in the strains of Tennyson. It cannot be pretended that the Papal and priestly institutions, at whose door the evil is to be laid, afford any true representation of the religion of Christ. Wherever the characteristic sentiments of Christianity have had free action, wherever the faith has prevailed that life is a divine trust, committed to souls dear to God, equal among themselves, and each the germ of an immortality, there, and there alone, has

domestic affection been so touched with reverence and confidence, as to retain its freshness to the end, and afford a chastening discipline through life. The doctrines about the "Rights of Woman," which have sprung from theories of political equality, and disowned the partnership of religious sentiment, have invariably produced great moral laxity; and, in spite of high imaginative talk, fascinating to excitable natures, yield nothing truly noble, but only the monster greatness of mingled intellect and passion. The man and the woman can never learn each other's infinite worth, except in the absence of the priest, and in the presence of their God. Who can deny that this secret has been learned among the lessons of a Christian civilization?

The credit assigned to Christianity as the foe of slavery is also, in our author's opinion, unmerited. No Apostle denounces the system; which receives indeed a sort of sanction from the silence of the New Testament respecting it, and from Paul's act of sending back Onesimus to his master Philemon. Good Pagan Emperors of Rome softened the rigours of slavery, but during the several centuries in which Christianity acted in the empire, it produced no opposition to the system. In modern times, serfdom was abolished by the kings in their desire to raise the chartered cities as an arm against the barons. And black slavery received its first act of abolition from atheistic France; its next from England, impelled by that one among her sects which least regards the letter of Scripture.

This style of criticism is so evidently founded on the conception of Christianity as an oracular system, bound to pronounce distinctly on all considerable matters, human or divine, that, in simply treating the religion as an historical development through the influence of reverence for a person, we have already suggested the reply. The operation of such a cause was necessarily gradual, and could not produce the sudden and general protests demanded by Mr. Newman. Its action was not through any revealed

economy of social life, but through the introduction of men, one by one, into spiritual relations incompatible with the sentiments of the slave. That Christianity opened its arms to the servile class at all, was enough: for in its embrace was the sure promise of emancipation. In proof of this we need no other witness than our author himself, who says :—

"Zeal for the liberation of serfs in Europe first rose in the breasts of the clergy, after the whole population had become nominally Christian. It was not men, but Christians, that the clergy of the Middle Ages desired to make free."—p. 167.

What more emphatic expression could the religion give of its hostility to slavery than this, that all men were to become Christians, and that no Christian should remain a slave? Is it imputed as a disgrace, that it put conversion before manumission, and brought them to God, ere it trusted them with themselves? To our mind this is the true and divine order,—a new life within to rule the new lot without,—Conscience, Lord of the Soul, invoked to succeed the feudal lord of the soil. If Christianity were patient of Heathenism, if it had no generous propagandism, it might be charged with narrowness in only redeeming its own. But its missionary spirit forbade its ever providing itself with slaves from the Pagan class, while its own children had their liberty. It created the simultaneous obligation to make the Pagan a convert, and the convert free. That this tendency exhibited but faint traces in the earliest age of the Church is due, not merely to the small comparative numbers of the disciples, but no less to their expectation of an immediate close to this world's affairs. The only reason why Paul sanctioned contentment with his condition in the converted slave was, that, for so short a time, it was not worth while for any man to change his state; he that was free was already the Lord's bondsman; and he that was bound, the Lord's freeman. In proportion as this anticipa-

tion retreated, society began to feel the tendency of the new religion. Doubtless the condition of the servile class was ameliorated by the legislation of good Pagan emperors: and not only the precepts of Seneca, but the edicts of Hadrian, Trajan, and Antoninus attest the growth of just and humane sentiments. But the steady agency of Christianity availed incomparably more than the happy accident of wisdom and virtue in a prince. All its ordinances were open indiscriminately to bond and free; nor was servile birth any disqualification for the discharge of Church functions,—from the humble office of the two slave-girls mentioned in Pliny's letter to Trajan, to the dignity of the Episcopate itself. This rule stands in strong contrast with the Roman law, according to which no public office could be held by a slave. The exercise of the sacred duties suspended the rights of the master, and in case of the permanent assumption of the monastic habit, or the appointment to a bishopric, entirely abolished them. The Christian indissolubility of marriage seriously curtailed the owner's established rights, though it was long before it openly took the *legal* place of the previous *contubernia*. The influence of the Church was vigorously exerted against the barbarous treatment of the servile class: and Clement of Alexandria enjoins the bishop to reject the offerings of masters, "qui fame, verberibus, acerbo dominatu, familiam suam vexarent." And when an ill-used slave fled from the persecution of his owner to a Christian altar, he found a powerful protection in the officiating ecclesiastics; who were bound to intercede actively on his behalf, and, failing of success, to permit to him the usual shelter of the sanctuary. Constantine was the first to enact laws against separating the members of the same servile family; justifying his edict by the words, "Quis enim ferat liberos a parentibus, a fratribus sorores, a viris conjuges segregari?" Mr. Newman mentions, among the horrors of Roman slavery, that "young women of beautiful persons were sold as articles of volup-

tuousness": but he does not mention that the first Christian Emperors authorized the clergy to redeem from the *Lupanaria* the wretched victims who had there suffered the fate of St. Agnes; or that, by a law of Theodoric, the seducer of a slave-girl was not only bound to her thenceforth, but subjected for life to her master's service. An indication of the direction which was assumed by the sympathies of the new religion is afforded by the fact, that, from the time of Constantine, the process of manumission was for the most part transferred to the Church, and formed part of the ceremonies at Easter, and the other ecclesiastical festivals. And under the auspices of Christian Emperors, the facilities for manumission were so greatly increased, that, after the impediments removed by Justinian, freedom became the rule, and slavery the exception, among the poorer subjects of the empire.* So clear, indeed, is the tendency of Christianity on this matter, that if our author had made his attack from the opposite side, and contended that its doctrines *proved too much* against servitude, and assumed with too little qualification the capacity of each man for self-rule, we should have felt more hesitation in expressing our dissent. We certainly feel that the religious impulse under which, in Christian times, every assault upon slavery has been conducted, requires for its wise and efficient operation a larger admixture of worldly moderation and economical forethought, than zeal and generosity are willing to allow.

* See Plin. Traj. Imp. Lib. x. ep. 97. Justinian's Novella, cxxiii. 4. v. 2. Clem. Alex. const. apost. iv. Cod. Theodos. ii. tit. 25. Gibbon, Ch. 44, and Blair's Inq. into the State of Slavery amongst the Romans, *passim*; especially pp. 127, 168–174; and 247, where it is shown that "St. Paul would, under any circumstances, have had no choice, but to send Onesimus to his master. The detention of a fugitive slave was considered the same offence as a theft, and would, no doubt, infer liability to prosecution for damages, under that head, or under the rules with regard to corrupting slaves,—or the Aquilian law, respecting reparation of injury done."

But few words will be needful in reference to our author's theory of the Reformation. In his view, this great event is due, not to the *Bible*, but to *Free Learning*, especially to the moral works of Cicero and Boethius, which "effected what (strange to think) the New Testament could not do" (p. 158). He inclines to think that the change would have been better brought about, if Luther had never lived; and, while crediting the Pagan writers with the recovery of Europe, convicts the Scriptures of inefficiency, for not having prevented its previous lapse into barbarism and superstition.

The Reformation arose, *not* from the Bible, *but* from Free Learning! This appears to us like saying that the harvest comes, not from the seed-corn, but from good farming; or that the ship makes its voyage, not by the wind, but by navigation. Would our author have had the Bible produce the Reformation *without* Free Learning,—that is, without being applied to the European mind at all? If not, what is the meaning of this false antithesis between the state of the human faculties and the object on which they are employed? and of the strange exaction that the Scriptures, once put on parchment, should be able, whether men could procure and read them or not, to overrule all the causes of internal corruption and external ruin, beneath which the Roman civilization succumbed? A "self-sustaining power" like this, a power to remain independent of perturbation from foreign influences, and to evolve like phenomena from the most unlike conditions of the human mind, is intrinsically inconceivable. Be a religion ever so divine, from the moment that it is consigned to human media and delivered to the keeping of mankind, it inevitably shares the fate of all the intellectual and spiritual possessions of our race, and rises and sinks with the tides of history. If our author's favourites,—the Latin moralists,—accomplished at the revival of learning what the Scriptures could not do, they availed as little as the Scriptures to pre-

vent its previous decline; and when Europe "sank into the gulf of Popery," she had Cicero and Boethius, no less than "the Bible in her hands." But "without free intellect," as Mr. Newman truly observes of the ancient Attic literature in the hands of the Greeks of Constantinople, "the works of their fathers did their souls no good": and is not the plea equally valid, that, without free intellect, the works of evangelists and apostles could do the souls of disciples no good? No Protestant ever disputed the need of Free Learning as an essential condition of the Reformation: and the only question is, whether the modern changes in the religion of Christendom arose from the free study of the Scriptures, or from the free study of the Pagan writers? It is difficult to discuss such a question with gravity. If our author really thinks that the Huguenots derived their inspiration from Seneca and the Puritans from Cicero; if he imagines Marcus Antoninus in the pocket of the Brownists, and Epictetus beneath the pillow of John Knox, he entertains a conception of modern history more peculiar than that of the Anglican theologians themselves. We had always imagined, that, from the time of Petrarch, the ancient literature was nowhere more assiduously studied than in Italy; which, nevertheless, witnessed no "improvement of spiritual doctrine," and was not assuming, under the patronage of the Medicis and the Papacy of Leo, a course of development very promising for religious truth and moral earnestness. The assertion that the Reformation would have been more beneficent, had the Reformers never lived, belongs to a kind of speculation which appears to us fruitful in delusion. That concurrently with the rise of those great leaders there existed a general ferment of mind in Europe favourable to their influence, is undeniable; that, if they had not appeared, this condition would have manifested itself in some direction, drawing into it many of the energies which they bespoke, we have no doubt; but that this substituted phenomenon would have been "the Reformation," analogous in its characteristics and equivalent

in its merits, is a proposition beyond the reach of human evidence, belonging to the computation of contingents, the *scientia media* of Molina's God. It is as little possible to conceive of the Reformation without Luther, as to imagine an Evangelicism without Paul, or even a Christianity without Christ.

A few topics in this volume we must leave untouched; an omission which will be more readily excused, we fear, than the handling of so many. In parting from it, we restate our conviction that Mr. Newman exaggerates the resources of the purely subjective side of Religion, and undervalues its objective conditions. A spirit like his own may doubtless draw, from the mere depth of its inner experience, a faith and trust adequate to the noble governance of life. But just as the Intellect of mere metaphysicians, spinning assiduously from its own centre without fixed points of attachment for its threads, produces as many tissues of thought as there are original thinkers; so the Soul of mere spiritualists, in attempting to evolve every thing from within without any datum of historical reverence, must create as many religions as there are worshippers. As we have faith in a Common Reason, so have we in a Common Conscience, of mankind; the eye, in the one case of natural, in the other of divine truth: but liable, in both instances, to the same law,—that *objects* not ideal but real be given for perception and appreciation; objects, not different for each observer, but large and conspicuous enough to fix simultaneously the universal vision. The grand objects of the physical universe, discernible from every latitude, look in at the understanding of all nations, and secure the unity of Science. And the glorious persons of human history, imperishable from the traditions of every civilized people, keeping their sublime glance upon the Conscience of ages, create the unity of Faith. And if it hath pleased God the Creator to fit up one system with one Sun, to make the daylight of several worlds; so may it fitly have pleased God the Revealer to kindle amid the ecliptic of history One

Divine Soul, to glorify whatever lies within the great year of his moral Providence, and represent the Father of Lights. The exhibition of Christ as his Moral Image has maintained in the souls of men a common spiritual type to correct the aberrations of their individuality, to unite the humblest and the highest, to merge all minds into one family,—and *that*, the family of God.

II.

NEW 'PHASES.

THIS Second Edition of the Phases of Faith contains, besides minor additions, two new chapters, designed to settle the author's accounts with his critics. In one of these, he replies to the "Eclipse of Faith"; in the other, he discusses, with especial reference to the notice of his book in the *Prospective Review*, the doctrine of the Moral Perfection of Jesus. Perhaps it is proof of self-deceiving partiality, that we confess ourselves greatly delighted with the one, and wholly unconvinced by the other; and it may be unbecoming in us, seeing that we also are in the same case, to express satisfaction at Mr. Newman's indignant self-vindication against the flippant insults of the "Eclipse of Faith." But that book, with all its cleverness of caricature, has always appeared to us so full of reprehensible misstatement, and so exclusively an inspiration of utter moral scepticism and irreverence, that we cannot but rejoice in the terrible justice of Mr. Newman's exposure and rebuke. The method of the work,—its plan of appealing from what seems shocking in the Bible to something more shocking in the world,—simply doubles every difficulty, without relieving any; and tends to enthrone a Devil every-

* "Phases of Faith: or, Passages from the History of my Creed." By Francis William Newman, formerly Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. Second Edition. London: Chapman, 1853.—*Prospective Review*, 1853.

where, and leave a God nowhere: and, though the writer does but follow here in the argumentative steps of Butler, he manifests a very different spirit, never caring to relieve the real oppression of a doubt, but exulting in the discovery of another to balance it; attempting absolutely nothing to clear the disturbed waters of Revealed faith, but hastening with the utmost glee to poison the fountains of Natural piety; relishing the sorrow of the believers whose dreams he seeks to dissipate; and content to persuade them that, as the Universe is ugly, and their Life an injustice, and their own Nature a lie, it would be squeamish to find anything in Scripture that is not good enough for them. The whole force of the writer's thought,—his power of exposition, of argument, of sarcasm,—is thrown, in spite of himself, into the irreligious scale; and to no class of readers, we believe, has his book been more acceptable, than to the literary and political men, who look on all theological reasoning as a mere play of gladiatorial skill, and, assuming religious truth to be unattainable on any terms, are pleased to see each fresh attempt to find it put down in favour of an hereditary creed. If the work be really written in good faith, and be not rather a covert attack upon all religion, it curiously shows how the temple of the author's worship stands on the same foundation with the *officina* of atheism, and in such close vicinity that the passer-by cannot tell from which of the two the voices stray into the street. Betrayed by his mocking spirit, the author has grossly misrepresented Mr. Newman's opinions and arguments; and now meets a fitting retribution from a logic more masterly, and a conscience more commanding than his own.

How it is that these same powerful instruments, when wielded in a different cause and directed against ourselves, appear to us to beat the air, we really cannot tell. If it be any pride of personal consistency, or any blindness of prejudice and fear, that hides from us the truth as it presents itself to the perceptions of our author and friend, we

are unworthy to discuss with him questions which only trustful men, loving reality better than their own dreams, are fitted to approach. His own considerate and affectionate treatment, leaves us too without excuse for any sentiment inconsistent with perfect openness and veracity of mind. We are conscious of a profound deference for Mr. Newman's moral and historical judgments; yet so little can we feel the force of his new arguments, that we rest our Christianity on that Moral Perfection of Jesus which he arraigns, and in the holiest elements of our conception of God, trace the lineaments of that Historic Person whom he charges with arrogance, affectation, and vanity. We must justify in a few words our tenacity on this point.

Mr. Newman argues against the Moral Perfection of Christ on two grounds: that it is, intrinsically and *à priori* incredible, if his nature were simply human; and that it is directly contradicted by many traits of imperfection presented in the Gospels. The first argument is presented thus:—

"To me, I confess, it is almost a first principle of thought, that as all sorts of perfection co-exist in God, so is no sort of perfection possible to man. I do not know how for a moment to imagine an Omniscient Being who is not Almighty, or an Almighty who is not All-Righteous. So neither do I know how to conceive of perfect holiness anywhere but in the Blessed and only Potentate.

"Man is finite and crippled on all sides; and frailty in one kind causes frailty in another. Deficient power causes deficient knowledge, deficient knowledge betrays him into false opinion, and entangles him into false positions. It may be a defect of my imagination, but I do not feel that it implies any bitterness, that even in the case of one who abides in primitive lowliness, to attain even negatively an absolutely pure goodness seem to me impossible; and much more, to exhaust all goodness, and become a single Model-Man, unparalleled, incomparable, a standard for all other moral excellence. Especially I cannot conceive of any human person rising out of

obscurity, and influencing the history of the world, unless there be in him forces of great intensity, the harmonizing of which is a vast and painful problem. Every man has to subdue himself first, before he preaches to his fellows; and he encounters many a fall and many a wound in winning his own victory. And as talents are various, so do moral natures vary, each having its own weak and strong side; and that one man should grasp into his simple self the highest perfection of every moral kind, is to me at least as incredible as that one should pre-occupy and exhaust all intellectual greatness. I feel the prodigy to be so peculiar, that I must necessarily wait until it is overwhelmingly proved before I admit it. No one can without unreason urge me to believe, on any but the most irrefutable arguments, that a man, finite in every other respect, is infinite in moral perfection."—P. 141.

This argument, however, would be overruled, Mr. Newman conceives, if a superhuman origin could be claimed for Jesus. Those who raise him, physically, into an exceptional being may, with some consistency, make him a moral unique; by taking him out of the category of humanity, they may exempt him from its predicates of infirmity.

"It could not be for nothing that this exceptional personage was sent into the world. That he was intended as the head of the human race, in one or more senses, would be a plausible opinion; nor should I feel any incredulous repugnance against believing his morality to be, if not divinely perfect, yet separated from that of common men so far, that he might be a God to us, just as every parent is to a young child."—P. 142.

The parent, however, stands in this relation to the young child, without being an "exceptional personage" at all, or deriving any aid from a miraculous entrance into this world. Nay, his whole moral power over the child, the interchange between the two of tenderness and reverence, depend upon their being *the same* in kind, related as the higher and the lower stage of homogeneous existence. And so it is throughout all the wider circles to which moral

ties communicate their form and symmetry. The whole world is held together by like forces of natural reverence, grouping men in ten thousand clusters around centres diviner and more luminous than themselves. And if every family, every tribe, every sect, may have its head and representative, transcendent in the essential attributes that constitute the group, what hinders this law from spreading to a larger compass, and giving to *mankind* their highest realization, superlative in whatever is imitable and binding?

The doctrine, common to Mr. Newman with most Christians, that a hyperphysical nature or endowment is an indispensable condition of a sinless life, appears to us to mistake and compromise the very essence of Moral Perfection. Such perfection consists, as we understand it, in entire fidelity to a trust, and the persistent obedience to a higher impulse in the presence of a lower. To say that this is *impossible*, is to deny the power of man to do the will of God: to claim, as its prerequisite condition, an extra supply of forces is to pronounce the human problem an over-match for human resources, and to impugn the proportion and measures of our task. Were Christ's immaculate excellence attained on these exceptional conditions, not only would it fail to impose, but it would actually disprove, any obligation in us to be like him; for it would be a public proclamation, that, had not Heaven come to his special rescue, even *his* administration of life must have broken down. Nor would it, in fact, have amounted to moral perfection at all: for as the scale of faculty rises, so does the range of duty enlarge; and to be sinless in all *human* functions with *superhuman* powers is, if that be all, to fall short of the demands upon the conscience, and be *imperfect*. Nothing can well be more suicidal than that moral theology, which first extols the stainless purity of Christ, and then proceeds to account for it by miraculous contrivances, which at once degrade the wonder from moral to physical and transfer it from his per-

sonality to his lot. Paul and the early church regarded his "obedience" and immaculate holiness as the proper object of *recompense*, and the real ground of his exaltation. But what a mockery would it be for God first to take care, by special protection, that he should not sin, and then affect to reward him for the exemption! What a contradiction to say that he was supernaturally secured against a fall, and yet to pretend that he was "in all points tempted as we are"! Taking the character of Christ as a fixed historical datum, you may contemplate it either with spiritual veneration as a monument of holy faithfulness; or with dynamic amazement, as a prodigy of foreign power; but whichever sentiment you admit excludes so far the dominion of the other.

May it not be, that Mr. Newman's predilection, in this regard, for a physical origin other than human, is an unconscious remnant of the doctrine of *birth sin?* Were ours a spoiled and convict nature, inheriting disqualifications for goodness in its very blood, there might be a necessity for changing its lineage ere you could exhibit its moral possibilities. But if it be in its normal condition, and the souls invested with it to-day, are fresh as the unworn types of primeval humanity, we see no tendency to any moral gain by going out into other grades of being. We deceive ourselves by talking of *human* imperfection, as if it were an attribute which would be escaped by nativity into some different race. Wherever there is capacity for holy attainment, *there* must be openness to temptation and liability to sin: nor do we know of any reason for supposing that the conditions of existence among other orders of being are morally securer than our own. A bad angel is, *à priori*, just as conceivable as a wicked man. His larger nature and higher theatre of being make him greater, but not better; and will be used or abused according to the direction taken by that free moral power which he possesses in common with mankind. The device, therefore, of abating and diluting the simple humanity of Christ by importing

celestial admixtures, however consistent in those who see in our nature only an anomalous ruin, is unmeaning and ineffectual on any other theory: and a model of excellence is as likely to arise on our platform of probation as in any other rank of the great family of responsible minds. All that could result from special creative pains or sanctifying guardianship bestowed exceptionally on Christ, would be equivalent to a *happy constitution*, a beautiful and balanced nature, admirable as a work of spiritual Art, but not imitable by the nerve of conscience. As an object on which the imagination may dwell and the affections repose, we do not deny an elevating power to such a product of the plastic skill of the Most High. But this kind of perfection, just like a lovely face or a graceful form, is natural, not moral: and though it might help the conception of God in whom these two *momenta* coalesce, could not touch the conscience of man, where they wrestle for ascendency.

The only way to adjust without mutual interference the moral perfection and the supernatural element of Christ's life, is to invert their order of sequence as usually stated; and regard his sinlessness not as the fruit, but as the condition of his special endowments. His inward inspiration would lose for us all its interest and most of its credibility, were it specifically different from that which is open to every holy mind, were it not a sample of the Spirit's ways, instead of a deviation from them. No man is denied contact with the supernatural realm: no man is shut out from what is above both outward nature and himself. A Divine and loving presence dips down, so to speak, into every soul, and puts a little grace there, of tender thought, of holy wonder, of secret tears, of unspeakable aspiring. It is her first trust of sympathy from God himself; and if she stands in awe and takes her sandals off, it will not be her last. Let her but yield a pious response, and a clearer whisper will come next. Whoever is true to an incipient call will soon find himself less far from the heavenly voice:

using faithfully a small grace, he will be entrusted with a greater. And so ever nearer and brighter grows the light of God's communion, and deeper the holy insight which it gives. The close and never-wandering walk with Him, brings more and more of his Spirit into the mind, to clear the love and empower the will. And if Christ had the most of all, it was because he was the best of all: and his inspiration carries to the culminating point a lustre which lags for us in lower altitudes. In him, as in us, it is plainly not the office or effect of the Spirit, to give infallibility to the intellectual apprehensions, but pure colouring to the affections and transparent discernment to the conscience. The endowment of physical miracle can be brought into no causal connection with this moral inspiration, but must remain outside, as a foreign gift and additional trust, enlarging the responsibility of the possessor; and, in its effect, operating as an external signal to render conspicuous a light of guidance, which might else have escaped detection amid the shady places of history.

It is possible that, by the use of too strong expressions, we have led Mr. Newman somewhat to overstrain our doctrine of Christ's Perfection. He ascribes to us the belief, that Jesus was not only *higher than we*, but *absolute* in goodness. We are far, however, from insisting on the latter of these expressions in distinction from the former: nor do we wish to claim more for the founder of our religion than an excellence such as may be reached by a finite nature,—an excellence thus far unique in history, and to our present apprehensions concurring with the moral ideal of humanity. That no higher being can ever appear on earth we would by no means venture to affirm: that Mr. Newman's conceptions may already transcend the Galilean fact, and render it useless to him, it would be presumption in us to deny. When Jesus himself said, "Why callest thou me good? none is good save One, that is God," he must have had a thought in his mind beyond his own reality, and he thus points to possibilities which

he did not exhaust. Of *Absolute* excellence, as of absolute power and wisdom, though they be objects of necessary belief as predicates of the Most High, we can form no positive conception: but the Moral Perfection which we attribute to Christ *is* most distinctly conceivable: we read it off at once from the portraiture of the gospels; it is simply the beauty of holiness which we see in the image there; and we only say—"This, of all historical realizations, is morally the highest; and having gazed on him, we shall henceforth know better what Divine goodness is, and see in the Supreme Heaven and Infinite Archetype of all, a tender depth and a speaking look we had not discerned before." We are further willing to confess, that if we were wholly strangers to the transactions of this world, and, knowing nothing of its past and present, were merely introduced to the biography of Jesus among a mass of other personal records and memorials of life and thought, it is doubtful whether we should single it out with anything approaching to the feeling we now attach to it. We admit and maintain that to the Person of Christ Christendom supplies an indispensable commentary; and that to judge of him as of a private neighbour by puzzling out his lineaments beforehand, instead of observing the action of his individuality upon mankind and the mingling of his influence with the currents of time, is not unlikely to lead to an estimate of him other than that which we defend. But the measure of the grandest beings cannot be taken by any private standards or contemporary memoirs: and history is their biography writ large. The power of their personality is but incipient in their own generation; and its quality, not less than its intensity, grows clearer as the dimensions of its agency enlarge. As Plato thought it needful, in his investigation of Morals, to study their embodiment in the magnified scale and conspicuous orders of the State, so is it impossible to apprehend aright the person of Jesus without watching the spread of his shadow over the ages, and throwing back upon him the characteristics of the Chris-

tian faith. The necessity of thus qualifying, or rather expanding, the simply ethical by an historical judgment, is readily admitted in all cases at all analogous to this. What competent scholar, for instance, would limit himself, in his estimate of Socrates, to the delineations of Xenophon's Memorabilia even when filled in by touches from the rich dramatic colouring of Plato? It is not till we find the place of this great figure in Athenian history and culture, not till we see that he marks and makes a crisis in the Hellenic thought, not till we count the diverging schools, sceptical and religious, logical and ethical, of metaphysics and of polity, that sprang from his originating power, that we at all appreciate the compass of his genius or the weight and intensity of his character. In the personal memoirs most readers will be disappointed: in the historical effects, all expectation, and almost admiration, will be outstripped: and when we ask ourselves, *which* impression is to be trusted, we remember that the written record is the tentative witness of human incapacity, while the unwritten is the unerring testimony of reality and God. Judging with the aid of this posthumous attestation, we are far from concluding, with Mr. Newman, that the Evangelists have overcoloured the picture of their Master. We rather believe that they saw as little into his real greatness as Xenophon into the significance of Socrates and his life; that what they emphatically insist upon when they most wish to honour him is (while of course the least reliable) precisely that which we are best pleased to spare: and what they let out unconsciously, without a glimmering of its meaning, is the broken reflection of a soul far beyond their measurement. Their narrative presents to us much rather the fragments of a spoiled reality, than the rounded completeness of an hypostatized dream. Hence our right to interpret it, on the moral side, *in meliorem partem.*

The *consensus* of Christendom in favour of the moral perfection of its head Mr. Newman withdraws from us as

a support, by saying that it has always rested on grounds admitted to be false. It has been a dogmatic opinion, not a personal estimate. To all who believe in the doctrine of atonement, it is an indispensable assumption. The apostles held it, because some of the Messianic offices required it. And the later Church has inferred it from the miracles and outward authority ascribed to Christ.

That Christendom has been in the habit of giving very indifferent reasons for its beliefs, we are well aware: and, for the most part, the more certain the belief, the worse, we should say, has been the reason. From one father of the church we learn that God was obliged to make the human body cruciform because the soul was to be redeemed upon the cross: from another, that since there are but four quarters of the world from which the wind can set, there cannot be more than four gospels, to blow immortality on men. Mediæval logicians explain the triplicity of the syllogism by the three persons in the Trinity: and there is no end to the things accounted for by the name and number of the Apocalyptic beast. Bad reasoning, however, is not only ineffectual to destroy good facts, but fails to invalidate the particular evidence in their favour derived from general consent. It is of truths the best secured already in the feeling of mankind, that nonsensical proofs the most abound: consciously defended on one ground, they unconsciously rest upon another; and occupy in a professed doctrinal system a different place from that which they hold in reality. And as natural facts are not resolved into fanciful antecedents till they are *there* as data of perception, neither, we are convinced, was the holiness of Christ discovered to be a necessity of creed till it was already present to the moral apprehension. It is as little possible to account for the characteristic elements of the Christian faith by the dogmatic nexus between its parts, as to explain the nature of man by the association of his ideas. Moral perfection, it is said, was one of the established marks of the Messiah, and got attributed to Jesus

in this capacity. But if this attribute were an admitted necessity to the Messianic character, Jesus must have been felt to fulfil the condition ere that dignity could settle upon him. It is conceivable that with the *later church*, the moral estimate might be a blind inference from his miracles. But if, as Mr. Newman contends, the miracles were as unreal as the moral greatness, then to the *early* disciples who originated the belief, there were no such premisses to yield it as an inference; and if there had been, the inference would have been contradicted by the fact. The miracles themselves, when it comes to their turn to be explained away, can only be regarded as fictitious products of reverential invention, as expressions of the feeling directed towards the person of Christ: and whence that feeling, that powerful and creative sentiment,—if not from the resistless appeal of his individuality to the conscience and affections of the disciples? We cannot both get rid of the miraculous as a spurious growth from moral reverence; and then show the door to the moral reverence as bearing stolen credentials from the faith in miracle. Indeed it does appear to us a dreary doctrine of spiritual causation, which evolves such a phenomenon as Christendom, without admitting either the physically or morally divine; which treats it as originating in arrogance and vanity, propagated by credulity, and established by violence. We cannot believe that the confluence of stupid errors, and unveracious morals, and false history, and blundering predictions, can ever form a religion true to the best intellect, dear and sacred to the best affections of the world's best centuries. We can understand the theory of those who from lofty, and it may be exaggerated, notions of the natural power of greater souls over the lesser, discard the agency of physical miracle in favour of a purely spiritual grandeur of endowment and character in Christ. We can appreciate also the opposite doctrine which, from mistrust of the sufficient force of inward inspiration, and disparagement of the invisible dynamics of

the mind, stakes everything on outward signs and wonders. But no words can express our amazement at the two-edged scepticism that cuts away *both*, and finds no wondrous pulse, either of power, or of goodness, at the heart of a faith which has circulated the life-blood of civilization through so vast an organism of nations. What, in this view, are the data out of whose combination Christianity sprung? A despairing Judaism, given up to Messianic fanaticisms; an effete and leprous paganism, too sick to resist and able only to infect, a new claimant at the gate of its Pantheon; a Galilean mechanic, seduced by vanity into pretensions which he covered by evasion, and escaped by a self-murder so contrived that the *onus* of the guilt should fall on others; a few posthumous missionaries, to spread this hopeful cause among the Jews by falsifying the prophets and inviting a community of goods; and one convert of sufficient depth and genius to live at issue with all the rest, and sufficient catholicity to become suspected of Israel, without ceasing to be ridiculous in the eyes of Gentiles. These, if we understand aright, are to be taken, not as conditions *in spite of whose presence* the religion arose; but as the operative causes which wholly created it. Had Jesus *not* been arrogant and full of himself, he would never have pushed his pretensions on the simple: had he *not* been proficient in clap-trap and evasion, he would not have maintained himself against questioners and Pharisees: had he *not*, by a storm of malign provocation, succeeded in procuring his own condemnation, he would have had to retreat into veracity instead of carrying through his triumphant consistency in falsehood. This is the feature of Mr. Newman's theory,—this resolution of great issues into mean causes,—which affects us not with incredulity simply, but with distress. The doctrine that rottenness can produce health, and pretension create a faith of humility, and unscrupulous effrontery light the lamp of the world's conscience, and affectation bring us to the feet of God, appears

to us the counterpart, in relation to the moral world, to the atheism which, in explaining the natural world, fetches the higher out of the lower, thought out of organization, organization out of chemical, and chemical out of mechanical data, and makes brute insentient force the fount of all. What is true of the *Divine* process of creation is, on the same grounds, true of the *Human*: and if, in cosmical affairs, it is inconceivable that dead power should come first and living mind be last, so, in historical causation, we must believe that the prior is not the lower, and that Reason cannot grow from a root of Unreason, or Love and Goodness appear as the blossom of Egotism and Deceit. Mr. Newman's powerful and conclusive protest against the one doctrine makes us wonder at his apparent leaning towards the other; for, however scanty his admiration of the Christian religion, he evidently thinks the fruit better than the seed. It is easy, we are aware, to disguise the character and tendency of such a principle of derivation under the fascinating name of a doctrine of *Progress*: and we should be the last to deny that a new religion may part with errors and absorb truth as it proceeds; may work itself clear of detaining prejudices and faults; and may not even exhibit its characteristic resources till its age is reckoned by centuries. But to this development it is indispensable that the living grain, the seed of a future age, be really there: if the time-field have been strewed with only cast-off chaff and straw, no spring will break the winter barrenness. In Christianity that germ of life we believe to have been,—the Individuality of Christ; the distinctive features of which have transfused themselves into the whole faith and sentiment of churches, and coloured anew the admirations and reverence of the world's foremost tribes. 'But,' suggests our friend, 'this is a mere fancy: from first to last the Moral Personality of Jesus has been quite a subordinate affair, and has scarcely been dwelt upon at all. Whether he was the Messiah,—whether he was the Logos,—how his two natures managed to lodge together,—what he paid in

redemption for mankind, and whether he paid it to the Father or to the Devil,—these are the questions with which his disciples have been engaged: and in arguing about his superhuman position and work, they have taken little notice of the moral outline of his humanity.' For this very reason,—because it has been a *latent* presence, tinging the love without shaping the thought, hid in the silent centre instead of tossed upon the clamorous surface of the mind,—do we fix on it as the divine element and power of Christendom. The future of society ever lies wrapped in the *unconscious* worship and faith of the present; whose *conscious* beliefs, turned into objects of the intellect, are not so much religion as theology, and belong to what is on the wane with God, though still seeming to be on the meridian with man. The garrulity of faith comes with its wrinkles and dwells upon its past: but when it cannot speak as yet, and only turns its full eyes to the light, its cheek is as fresh and its pulse as busy as a young child's. In the Messiah doctrine, amicable leave was taken of Judaism; in the Logos doctrine, of Heathen theosophy; in both cases, with respectful acknowledgment and reconciling look: but they were decidedly bowed away into the past; and the departure was caused by a new reverence awakened by Jesus of Nazareth, which, unseen itself, altered the aspect of the old abodes. The principle might be vindicated by copious examples: but enough has been said to make its application evident. Progress and development for good are possible in the history of Christianity; but only on condition that the original heart of it be a living sanctity with Love to kindle love, Goodness to subdue conscience, Humility to cast down pride, and Beauty of holiness to sustain aspiration. By a noiseless vital energy these elements, once given, may clear themselves of the dead or dying matter amid which they first appeared, and turn it into nutriment. But without these there could be no succession of Christendom to Heathendom: there would be but Death to bury the dead.

We pass on to the particular counts of Mr. Newman's indictment against the character of Christ. There is some difficulty in ascertaining with precision his real estimate of this character. He complains of us for vindicating,—as if against him,—"the majesty and sanctity of Christ's mind"; and says that this is not "what he is fundamentally denying." He denies it "*only so far as would transcend the known limits of human nature.*" Yet the Person to whom this large measure of moral greatness is *not denied* is charged with "arrogance," "evasion," "blundering self-sufficiency," with the airs of "a vain and vacillating pretender," and with an aggravated form of self-destruction in the maintenance of conscious falsehood. Against such imputations, partially implied before and fully expressed now, we cannot think that the allegation of "majesty and sanctity" was an irrelevant plea.

There is not only plausibility, but justice in our friend's complaint that, when he has convicted Jesus of some error or weakness out of the gospels, we are apt to slip through his fingers by denying the record. The complaint, we say, is reasonable; it lies, however, not against us, but against the very nature of the earliest memorials of Christianity transmitted to our times. Our gospels are mixed and imperfect memoirs, neither to be all taken, nor all left: and it is vain to insist that we must retain every lineament of their representation, or else abstain from forming any image of Jesus at all. We could certainly wish that the sources of our knowledge were more complete and reliable in detail. But after every allowance and deduction, there remains, we think, light enough to reveal the grand and graceful outline of the figure we chiefly desire to see. The "expurgated gospel," which our friend demands at our hands, is the very result at which historical criticism of the first centuries is ever aiming and to which we cannot but think it is visibly approaching. It will not come in answer to any impatience that it shall immediately appear. It is a work that must grow under the labour of successive genera-

tions: which Mr. Newman has, in rich measure, the faculty to help; we, only the competency to watch and not to hinder. Meanwhile in adopting our provisional conclusions, we are prepared to defend them from the charge of arbitrariness and caprice.

The first objection brought against the moral character of Christ is, that he assumed the tone of an oracular teacher, continually preached HIMSELF, declared the acceptance of him to be a condition of the Divine favour, and under the title of the *Son of Man* claimed the throne of judgment over all mankind.

The reply of Christendom at large would be,—'He actually *had* all these prerogatives; and it was only truth and necessity to claim them.' In part our answer is the same, though it cannot be so absolute and unqualified. He was conscious, we suppose, of being in the hand of God for some deep purpose which forbade him the repose of private life: he surmised the approach of a crisis in the Providence of the world: he felt an irresistible urgency from a spirit higher than his own, to speak as the herald of its coming, and to startle the consciences of men with the word of preparation. Well: did he in this over-estimate his destiny? Did not the tide of the world's history turn with him? and has not his word been with greater truth an oracle, and an oracle of greater truth, than any that God has ever brought to utterance? Would he have kept closer to fact and Providence if he had assumed the style of the 'humble individual,' and supposed that Heaven meant nothing in particular by his existence? The attestation of ages has not simply justified, but far outstripped, the *scale* of his pretensions to authority: and if in *form*, the realization has not concurred with the preconception, this at most is evidence of intellectual misapprehension, not of moral self-exaggeration. Is all inner sense of a Divine authoritative mission unconditionally condemned by Mr. Newman as a personal arrogance? Not so; for he intensely admires the Hebrew prophets, who ever break into speech with a

"Thus saith the Lord"; who freely wield the thunders of Jehovah; and denounce and promise at first hand in a tone which Jesus, in any case, did but reflect. And when the solemn consciousness of a great trust struggled for the means of utterance, is it to be imputed as a moral fault that it could not find the language and conceptions of future ages in which to clothe itself, and was obliged to speak and think in the Messianic representations familiar to the present? These were the nearest types of thought,—indeed the only ones,—for conveying to the mind of his contemporaries the faith and feeling kindling in his own: and had he shrunk from mentioning any "Kingdom of Heaven" on the verge of which he stood, had his inspiration been made too intellectually fastidious to pour itself through the sole medium that had a thrilling tone for the popular heart, the circuit would have been broken by which his mind was to make itself felt through history.

At the same time, we are firmly convinced that our present gospels exhibit this oracular and Messianic character of Christ's teaching in great excess of the reality. When the disciples, after his departure, had made up their minds that he was to be Messiah (on his return), they could not but feel how little notice of this destiny had been given by the aspect of his preliminary visit; how many of the recognized marks of it were wanting; how often he spoke of the promised kingdom without identifying it with himself; how open they were to the remark that, if indeed he were the "Great King" elect, it was under a deep disguise. To justify their conviction they would naturally hunt through the past for every recoverable trace of his designation to so great a lot; would persuade themselves that there were times when the veil of humiliation was lifted and a ray or two from the treasured glories of his person strayed out and struck the eye; and they would make the most of every dignified consciousness and dim surmise that, in open moments, overflowed upon them from his sorrowful elevation. In that pure life of his, which had

been the free pilgrimage of love and conscience lifting the latch of opportunity, and entering the duty of the hour, they began to make out a scheme aforethought: they found a place for even its most embarrassing failures and its tragic close; and saw in them so suitable a meaning as to mistake the posthumous interpretation for an intention and foresight out of which they sprung. The whole tendency of this state of mind was to coerce the personal history and delineation of Christ into the ready-made framework of a Messianic theory; to import into his biography the colouring and complexion of a succeeding age; to wipe out the traces of unconsciousness and planless inspiration in him; and to give a false sharpness of outline and definiteness of expression to every hint and incident that could at all make his existence congruous with their interpretation. To trace the operation of this cause in detail would be to write a critical treatise on the four evangelists: we can only say now, that, under a just application of the process, the alleged claims of Jesus himself for the Messiahship rapidly disappear; and with them, a large proportion of the language which is objected to. The Messianic conception in the fourth Gospel is so totally different from that which pervades the others, that *both* types of official character cannot have been united in the same pretensions. Mr. Newman himself remarks that, up to a certain date (not far from the end of his career), the synoptic gospels attribute to Jesus great reserve as to his Messiahship, and describe him as letting out the secret only to his disciples, who were to "keep it close." With a simplicity which we confess to have lost, our friend accepts this as the historic fact, instead of seeing in the account an attempt, on the part of the narrator, to explain why this claim to be the Messiah was never made by Jesus, never even crept out from his attendants, during his Galilean ministry. And why is that, in so large a proportion of the discourses and predictions respecting the "Son of Man," this viceregent of God is spoken of as a *third person*, without any identification of

the speaker with him? We believe it went hard with the compilers of the gospels to get together any instances at all which could fasten upon Jesus himself the pretension to the Messiahship. When once, however, he had been preached as the Messiah, all that he had said, or been reported to say, about the "Christ," "the Son," the "King," the "Son of Man," was understood as if said of himself, and the "*I*," and the "*Me*" were regarded as interchangeable with these titles. The discourses on which Mr. Newman's objection chiefly rests, are, at all events, the most exposed to reasonable doubt of any attributed to Christ. We are surprised at his ready acceptance of the discourse in Matt. xxv. as "actually delivered (in substance)." Does he then accept also, as actually delivered, *the earlier portion of the same discourse, in Matt.* xxiv. containing the specific prediction of the destruction of Jerusalem? If so, he must admit the prophetic endowments of the speaker. If not, he must allow for the action of later imagination and the interests of Messianic doctrine in the report of this very discourse: and must either explain his title to reject what would glorify while retaining what (he thinks) dishonours Jesus, or else concede our equal right to reverse, in our exclusions, his principle of selection.

Mr. Newman's objection then will be inoperative on Christians, for this reason: that those who affirm of Jesus the Messianic attributes, can take no offence at the Messianic claim; while those who think the attributes for the most part imaginary, regard the claim also as in great measure fictitious.

All the other objections by which Christ's Moral Perfection is impugned appear to us to rest upon readings of the evangelical history so eccentric, that (with one exception) we must excuse ourselves from any other answer than may be contained in a mere re-statement of the common interpretation.

The *dictum* with which Jesus dismissed the question about the tribute-money is condemned as "unsound and

absurd," and betraying "a vain conceit of cleverness";—a "conceit" which undoubtedly would have been peculiarly "vain," if the reply had broken off where our friend interrupts and ends it,—"Render therefore to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." The knotty question, however, was not thus attacked with half a pair of scissors; whose sharpness, whatever it might it may be, would assuredly have been ineffectual without the complementary limb of the reply,—"and unto God the things that are God's." Mr. Newman, discrediting or disregarding the motive attributed to the questioners ("They desired to lay hands on him,—and they watched him, and sent out spies that should feign themselves to be righteous men, that they might lay hold of his discourse, and so deliver him up to the power and authority of the governor," Luke xx. 19–21), treats the problem as if proposed in good faith, and demanding from any good man a grave and unambiguous solution. And such solution, strange to say, he conceives, in its intention Christ's answer to have been; and charges it with absurdity in assuming that coins, instead of being the property of the holder, belong to the potentate whose head they bear. The ordinary interpretation, that the answer was designed to *evade* the question,—our author has heard from high "Trinitarians"; which indicates to him, "how dead is their moral sense in everything which concerns the conduct of Jesus." Alas! there are also some low Unitarians who are equally lost to shame: grievous as it is to fall under our friend's stern censure, we cannot shrink from avowing and defending this condemned opinion. It appears to us a ridiculous prudery to say, that a moral teacher is bound to discuss casuistry with a set of political spies; and that, if the question be only well-chosen and real, he is to be unaffected by the malicious purpose of the questioners. Change the scene: let the person be Kossuth at some critical moment when a word is a risk: the dissemblers, Austrian spies: the question, whether a Hungarian is lawfully subject to the House of Hapsburg: and we venture

to think that any veracious answer which would slip the noose would better please our friend than the stupid honesty which would hang the hero. When people ask what they do not want to know, it is not merely a silly softness, but an irreverence to truth itself, to produce it to be spit upon or abused to crime. As to the particular mode in which Jesus parried the question of his enemies, nothing, we think, could be more admirable. The coin, domesticated as it was in Palestine, was the symbol and evidence of *some* political relation with the Roman government: it arose out of a state of the world and a distribution of power which, practically, it was impossible to ignore. What precise form and degree of Jewish dependence upon Rome was thus represented, Jesus declines to say; that is a matter for them to determine who mind "the things of men," not for him whose "kingdom is not of this world." But whatever be the tribute they have to pay to this necessity, they are to render to God the appropriate service that, under all outward destinies, never ceases to be his,—the inner devotion of the moral and spiritual nature. This retreat of Jesus from the casuistry of faction to the permanent relations of the soul, his hint that, amid the changing pressures and coercions of this world, an imperishable realm remains open for human fidelity and Divine communion, we cannot but regard as not only an acute escape from artifice, and a wise check to zealotry, but in the highest degree dignified, beautiful, and profound.

The precept to "sell all and follow" Christ gives particular offence to Mr. Newman, the more so because, in his view, it is announced as having universal and perpetual obligation. "*Perpetual*" obligation is not very distinguishable from *temporary* in a scheme which, as reported to us, contemplated an early close of mundane affairs. And whatever account be rendered of that erroneous expectation, will carry with it, for better or worse, all injunctions manifestly contingent on that view of the world. The *moral*

aberration is not to be measured by the standard of those whose rules are adjusted to the conditions of a theocratic future; designed therefore to awaken the unready world, and form, as the centre of retreat, the nucleus of a society of saints. Relatively to the false Messianic picture, the ethical feeling involved in this class of precepts is true, and casts not the faintest shade upon the character of their propounders. The objection therefore relapses into the general difficulty occasioned by the mistaken visions which have left their traces on the gospels. If these misapprehensions are later conceptions incorrectly thrown back by the evangelical compilers into the biography of Jesus, the same critical excision which removes them from his life, removes also the precepts organically combined with them. And even those who may think this process too violent, and are unable to relieve Jesus of all share in the errors of his followers, have no reason, in conceding his fallibility, to qualify in the least their claim of perfection for his moral sentiments. For the manifestation of character, imaginary external conditions may be as good as the actual: were it otherwise, admiration and respect would lose all inward rule and measure, and must merge in the vulgar worship of success.

The precept however to "sell all" was originally given upon an occasion which does not necessarily connect it with any delusive expectations, and supplies it with an independent ground of defence. It was addressed to the young man who, in merely "keeping the commandments," could not feel that he rose upon the wing towards "eternal life"; and was disappointed to be again referred, by one so holy as Christ, to the old law whose paths only crossed the flat of common habit. "Then Jesus, beholding him, loved him, and said unto him, 'One thing thou lackest; go thy way, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, take up the cross, and follow me.' And he was sad at that saying, and went away grieved; for he had great possessions."

(Mark x. 21, 22.) Surely the fact that Jesus, in first defining for this youth the conditions of "eternal life," said nothing about "selling all," but confined himself to reciting the admitted moral law, is a direct disproof of Mr. Newman's assertion, that this special precept is announced as a part of "universal morality." It is given, on the contrary, avowedly in supplement to the general sphere of human obligation, and to meet the spiritual exigencies of an individual case. Is it possible to mistake the nature of those exigencies,—the deep grace of soul in that young man, on noticing which Jesus, "beholding him, loved him?" Had he not manifestly caught the vision of a higher life than that of measured obedience? and was he not one of those, who, when love and aspiration have once been touched, can live in law no more; who, when a diviner image hovers above their eye, are so haunted by it, that the beauty flies from lower objects, and conscience cannot rest on them again; for whom, in short, ethical conditions provide no peace, and there is need of some free sacrifice for God? With finest adaptation to the requirements of such a nature, which can obtain its emancipation only through heroic self-surrender, Jesus bids him follow out the very impulse which has drawn him thus far, —which cannot turn back without always seeing its own shape in a shadow of sorrow, but, if it advances, forgets all in the light it pursues. Let him break away from the placid miseries of a lot that cannot fill his soul, and trust himself to work of higher enterprise that will burst the ligaments of conscience and exhaust the resources of affection. The suggestion to "sell all" simply pointed to the readiest mode of that utter self-abnegation in which alone such a spirit could find rest. It was a "counsel of perfection," not given till God had sent his call, visibly written on the sad and tender features. It failed of outward result, but answered its spiritual end. It instantly revealed the young man to himself; made him feel the disharmony of his being; and sent him sorrowing away, that light had

come in through the bars of the commandments, while the master-key of love was missing to set him free.

On this precept, stripped of its moral significance by being torn from its occasion, the Ebionitism of the early church seized, in justification of a doctrine of asceticism and voluntary poverty. Hence the appearance, in the synoptic gospels, of unreasonable stress laid on the relinquishment of property: hence the self-glorification of the apostles for their sacrifices; and the reported promise of the twelve thrones and twelve judgeships in return. When offices, judicial or other, are bespoken by rumours of royal or influential promise, the interest in which those rumours are circulated is not difficult to conjecture. And the whole tone of the passages to which we refer, betrays an age prone to magnify apostles rather than to apprehend Christ, and engaged on behalf of the Jewish "*twelve*" to the exclusion of the Gentile *thirteenth*. Mr. Newman takes it all alike as history, and apparently feels no moral incongruity in bringing the dictum about the "twelve thrones" out of the same lips that had just revealed the one thing needful to the soul in quest of eternal life. The asserted co-existence in the same mind of such mutually repellent tendencies of thought affects us as a self-evident absurdity. And if we wanted an authority for free dealing with the twelve judges, we should ask ourselves, before *which* of them,—from Peter to Judas,—*Paul* would have to stand his trial? We fancy he would deny the jurisdiction and dispute the title of the court; and we do but join his protest.

The mode in which the *death of Christ* was brought about is peculiarly conceived by our friend. After playing fast and loose as long as he could with the Messianic office, Jesus felt at last that he must either go forward and publicly assert the claim; or retract his pretensions and retire into privacy and contempt. Unable to bring himself to the honester course, he determined to advance. But as he thus assumed a character which he was conscious of in-

ability to sustain, his only resource was to escape from the responsibilities of the claim as soon as he had made it. With this view he rushed upon death; going to Jerusalem, where danger awaited him; entering the city amid tumultuary greetings as its king; committing a breach of the peace in the temple; and pouring out such bitter invectives against the public authorities, as to goad their resentment to the murder-point. His excessive vehemence of speech turned even the popular feeling against him, so that Barabbas was more in favour than he. At his trial he refused to rebut accusation, being determined to die: with the same object, he burst into an avowal of his Messiahship; and this at last secured his destruction.

The treatment of historical materials in this hypothesis is something unusual: but the conception of motives and character involved in it appears to us still more extraordinary. A fanatic, we know, will rather die than relinquish a pretension he cannot vindicate; supported by the illusory consciousness of really *being* before God other than he seems in the eye of men. An impostor, again, will play a hazardous game and, for a great stake of dignity or power, take his chance of meeting the last failure of death. But that a man unsustained by any inward conviction, or any outward means of making good his word, should deliberately put forth a false pretension, in order to get immediately put to death, is a supposition more curious than plausible. Other pretenders to the Messiahship played for a crown; but Jesus put on the royal mask for the sake of the cross. He had the popular feeling of a province at his back: he had the ear of the temple crowds: he was the terror of the authorities, who dared not touch him openly: yet he had no desire to profit by these advantages and make a dash at the prize which he announced to be his right. He valued them, on the contrary, only as conveniences for suicide: with their help, he could shock the pious and sober by raising a riot in the courts of worship; could disgust and alienate the populace by too strong a dose of abuse against

the priests; could turn the rulers' terror into a rage that would be sure to work; and when once brought up, he might "behave as one pleading guilty," so as to clench his doom. Was there ever a more dismal kingdom imagined as an object of ambition? It is "neither of this world," nor of any other world.

The path moreover, taken to the cross was surely needlessly circuitous. Jesus had nothing to do but to publish that assertion of his Messiahship, to which Mr. Newman says his mind was now made up, and his condemnation was secured. It was just the want of any such assertion that made the case against him incomplete, and embarrassed his judges so long; and the instant it was extorted from him, his fate was sealed and his sentence passed. And he knew its effect well enough, our friend affirms; and uttered it with an express view to its result. We naturally ask, why then did he withhold it to the very last? and Mr. Newman replies, *that* also he did for the same purpose, viz., to ensure his sentence of death; it was his way of "pleading guilty!" And so, whether he holds his peace or whether he declares himself aloud, it comes to the same thing with the tribunal at whose bar he stands,—be the judge High-Priest on the bench of the Sanhedrim, or Professor on the seat of Criticism.

It is not our intention to vindicate again the language of terrible exposure in which Jesus spoke of the scribes and Pharisees. We abide by our conviction that it was a necessary alarum to the people's conscience; and maintain that there is a point in public degeneracy at which the forbearing calculation of consequences must cease, and the trustful spirit of indignant veracity must have way. It is no sign of weakness, but of health and strength, that a soul, stationed at that point, should feel its position, and refrain no more; should break off negotiations with iniquity, send passports to its ambassadors, and proclaim a war. But however we may settle the general rules of speech or silence in relation to evil counsellors in high places, we deny that

Christ's anti-pharisaic discourse, (Matt. xxiii. Mark xii. Luke xi.) can be shown to have any causal connection with the apprehension of Jesus, or to have been intended by him to provoke such result. According to Luke, it was uttered, not during the last visit to Jerusalem at all, but at a far earlier time and at a private house in Galilee. And Mark, so far from conceiving that it alienated the people, as Mr. Newman affirms, mentions it in immediate illustration of the statement, "And the multitude of the people heard him gladly." The fact that the priests and rulers were still obliged to proceed with secrecy and circumspection, to make the seizure a deed of darkness and the trial an affair of early morning, and to strain their influence to "stir up the people," proves how large were the elements of power which Jesus abstained from evoking.

We are asked whether in our view, the death of Jesus was wilfully incurred? Certainly *not*, as we interpret it; not more at least than any death incurred, with previous surmise of its possibility, in the faithful discharge of duty. We believe that he simply said the truest, and did the rightest from hour to hour, whether it were to live or to die. And if we are to look closely at the immediate causes of the enmity whose victim he became, we find them in the *spiritual doctrine* which brought him into antagonism with the temple-worship. Of all the witnesses sworn against him, the only ones, it seems, that could produce any impression, were those who reported his saying, "Destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build another made without hands." 'Only take away the temple of the priest, and in a trice he would raise a religion of the soul. Let him but have dealings direct with the human spirit, audience face to face with its penitence and inspiration; let sacerdotal spies and guards no longer bar the entrance, and interpose before the veil; and he could find an inner shrine not made with hands susceptible of worship deeper, and of graces fairer than had been known before.' Such being, as we take it,

the meaning of this sublime sentence, it is plain that he and the ritual hierarchy could not co-exist. It was their human business to kill animals, and burn incense: it was his divine mission to sweep all that away from the approaches to God. His piety was their sacrilege: and as *they* could call the police of the hour, *he*, only appeal to the heart of ages,—they gained their tragedy, and the world its redemption.

We believe he was carried forward to this catastrophe by no deliberate plan, no theatrical foresight of history, no theological commiseration for condemned souls; but by the simple necessitation of God's Holy Spirit, the moral necessity to be true and faithful, the affectionate necessity to love and trust. In adherence to these conditions, and from inability to disown the inspiration that claimed him, he fell in the way of enmity and death. He forgave the one; he bowed to the other; and simply commended his spirit to him that judgeth righteously. Later and retrospective interpretation invented an economy and project for all this, and thought to dignify him by making it the artifice of foresight instead of the evolution of nature. But that which God and holy spirits, freely creating forwards, mean only for beauty, love, and goodness,—perverse men, reading backwards, turn into mere mechanism, conjuring, and deformity. For ourselves, taking the Divine fact, and rejecting the human version, we turn to the bended head on Calvary, and see in it a holy self-sacrifice, but neither an atonement nor a suicide.

Some misapprehensions of our meaning in the former critique we must leave without correction. We could wish to set ourselves right, especially in respect to the bearing which we have attributed to Christianity towards slavery. But the topic is quite distinct from that which it has been our present purpose to discuss: and to correct the refraction which our sentiments have undergone in passing through Mr. Newman's medium of vision involves so much, that we must content ourselves with simply disclaiming the

principles of servility and injustice attributed to us, and professing our hearty concurrence in the indignation poured upon them. As to the character of Christ, our dissent from our acute friend is substantive, and cannot be explained away. After well reflecting on his strictures we see no reason to renounce our conviction, that, notwithstanding the imperfect medium through which we contemplate the author of our religion, the image is clearly discernible of a most powerful and holy individuality, harmonizing opposite tendencies, balancing the affinities between earth and heaven, rich in compassion for suffering and indignation at wrong, denying to self and in close communion with God, and inspired at once to teach the deepest truths of faith and personate the purest elements of goodness.

III.

THE UNITY OF MIND IN NATURE.

AN accomplished and thoughtful observer of nature,—Hugh Miller, the geologist,—has somewhere remarked, that Religion has lost its dependence on metaphysical theories, and must henceforth maintain itself upon the domain of physical science. He accordingly exhorts the guardians of sacred truth to prepare themselves for the approaching crisis in its history, by exchanging the study of thoughts for the apprehension of things, and carefully cultivating the habit of inductive research. The advice is excellent, and proceeds from one whose own example has amply proved its worth; and unless the clergy qualify themselves to take part in the discussions which open themselves with the advance of natural knowledge, they will assuredly be neither secure in their personal convictions nor faithful to their public trust. The only fault to be found with this counsel is, that in recommending one kind of knowledge it disparages another, and betrays that limited intellectual sympathy which is the bane of all noble culture. Geology, astronomy, chemistry, so far from succeeding to the inheritance of metaphysics, do but enrich its problems with new conceptions and give a larger outline to its range; and should they, in the wantonness of their young ascendency,

* "Ein Geist in der Natur," &c. (mistranslated through not observing that *Ein* is numeral) "The Soul in Nature; with Supplementary Contributions." By Hans Christian Oersted. Translated from the German by Leonora and Joanna B. Horner. London. 1852.

persuade men to its neglect, they will pay the penalties of their contempt by the appearance of confusion in their own doctrine. The advance of any one line of human thought demands,—especially for the security of faith,—the parallel movement of all the rest; and the attempt to substitute one intellectual reliance for another mistakes for progress of knowledge what may be only an exchange of ignorance. In particular, the study of external nature must proceed *pari passu* with the study of the human mind; and the errors of an age too exclusively reflective will not be remedied, but only reversed, by mere reaction into sciences of outward fact and observation. These physical pursuits, followed into their further haunts, rapidly run up into a series of notions common to them all,—expressed by such words as *Law*, *Cause*, *Force*,—which at once transfer the jurisdiction from the provincial courts of the special sciences to the high chancery of universal philosophy. To conduct the pleadings,—still more to pronounce the judgment,—there, other habits of mind are needed than are required in the museum and the observatory; and the history of knowledge, past and present, abounds with instances of men who with the highest merit in particular walks of science have combined a curious incompetency for survey over the whole. Hence, very few natural philosophers, however eminent for great discoveries and dreaded by the priesthood of their day, have made any deep and durable impression on the religious conception of the universe, as the product and expression of an Infinite Mind; and in tracing the eras of human faith, the deep thinker comes more prominently into view than the skilful interrogator of nature. In the history of religion, Plato is a greater figure than Archimedes; Spinoza than Newton; Hume and Kant than Volta and La Place; even Thomas Carlyle than Justus Liebig. Our picture indeed of the system of things is immensely enlarged, in both space and duration, by the progress of descriptive science; and the grouping of its objects and events is materially changed. But the altered

scene carries with it the same expression to the soul; speaks the same language as to its origin; renews its ancient glance with an auguster beauty; and, in spite of all dynamic theories, reproduces the very modes of faith and doubt which belonged to the age both of the old Organon and of the new. How complete may be the transfusion into the most modern Baconian science, of the ancient Aristotelian theology, the present volume of essays, by a distinguished Danish savant, curiously shows.

Professor Oersted's European fame rests, it is needless to say, on his discovery, in the year 1820, of the connection, which he had long suspected, between the voltaic and the magnetic phenomena. By ascertaining at once the fact and the law of the needle's deviations in the vicinity of a galvanic current, he called into existence the science of electro-magnetism. In his own country he had already won, previously to this brilliant achievement, a position and repute amply sufficient for the moderate ambition of a balanced and philosophic mind. From the inheritance of a poor provincial apothecary, he had raised himself, by his personal merits, to the rank of Professor of Physics in the University of Copenhagen, and to intimacy with the most distinguished men of letters and science in the northern capitals. An early study of Kant and Fichte, the friendship of the poet Oehlenschläger, the influence of the Schlegels and the excitement of romanticism in Germany, awakened in Oersted sympathies and sentiments not often found in the apparatus-room, and widened his intellectual horizon far beyond the range of his professional studies. He was fond of quitting, on public occasions, his own particular pursuits, and discussing, in essays or lectures, the principles of Art, the doctrine of Beauty, the essence of Religion. The volume before us is a miscellaneous collection of such papers, prepared at different times between 1814 and 1849; and having no further unity than they derive from the application to several subjects of the same manner of thought, and especially of the same theory of human nature

in relation to the objects of knowledge, admiration, and belief. Notwithstanding an admirable variety of attainment and breadth of view, he is too deeply committed to the logical formulas of physical science ever to trust himself beyond them: he lives and moves in them; he regards them as coextensive with the universe of actual and possible thought; and is intent on finding room within them for poetry, morals, and religion. To apprehend the laws and forces of nature constitutes with him the entire perfection of man. Imagination, intellect, conscience, and faith, are only different modes of reaching this apprehension, which completes itself only in the reason of the philosopher, holding conscious communion with the ideas embodied in the universe. Around this doctrine all Oersted's opinions revolve; and its constant reappearance in his treatment of the most opposite subjects imparts a certain degree of sameness to his disquisitions. It matters little whether you read an essay on matter and spirit, or on the sources of delight in natural beauty, or on superstition and unbelief, or on the Protestant reformation, or on the unity of reason in all worlds; you will find the outline of his philosophy traced in each; and with expression so similar, that, notwithstanding much ingenuity of illustration and charm of style, the book affects you like an air played with variations. However pleasant and profitable at first to find how much may be made of some neat little inspiration of the muse, in the end you begin to regret the limited nature of the *afflatus*, and to long for some of the divine surprises of free thought. Like most writers of kindred pursuits, Oersted moreover treats the topics most interesting to human affections with a cold serenity, that makes indeed benign allowance for natural faith and love and finds a hidden sense in them, but is still above sympathy with them and remains ashamed of them till they have been *rationalized.* Living in the contemplation of inexorable laws, and of eternal forces that use up individual existences as the mere fuel of their self-subsistence; regarding them too as identical with

the Divine Reason ; he seems to aspire to a passionless perfection, and to have brought the living pulses of his soul to beat time with the relentless chronometry of the universe. We speak here, it will be clearly understood, only of his system of abstract thought. The concrete man himself, in the relations of practical life, appears to have been eminently friendly, simple, faithful ; richer every way in the humanities than the ideal philosopher whom he nominated to the royal observatory of creation, or the God whom he fancied developing himself into planetary geologies and polarized light.

By far the most striking and original of Oersted's speculations will be found in the Essay entitled, "The whole Universe a single intellectual Realm." His aim in it is to establish, that throughout all worlds are beings fundamentally similar, in their rational faculties, both to each other and to the eternal living reason of God. This conception is not indeed new ; the sayings, that "all minds are of one family" ; that "the Principia of Newton would be true upon the planet Saturn" ; nay, the maxim of Plato that "God geometrizes,"—express the same doctrine. But in Oersted's hands it has received, for the first time we suppose, a careful and systematic treatment on scientific grounds, and been distinctly claimed as a legitimate theorem of natural philosophy. The argument consists of two parts ; one of which seeks to identify our human reason in its laws and methods, with the Supreme Creative thought ; while the other proves the collateral affinity of all created intelligences scattered throughout the provinces of space. The former, though presenting incomparably the greater difficulty, is treated very slightly, and is inadequately protected against the objections of a consistent experience-philosophy ; but would probably be accepted as conclusive by most continental metaphysicians. To the great body of our deductive science, mixed as well as pure, Oersted attributes an *à priori* character : its propositions are true, not contingently, like assertions of fact, but necessarily, by the

inherent decree of thought; they express laws which reason, so far from picking up from the theatre of its exercise, would have to impose upon all objects given for it to deal with. The physical rules, of quantity, of proportion, of motion, equilibrium, and force, which we think out and register in our books of demonstrative science, are found, however, to be everywhere in action in the external world, and to have prevailed there countless ages, before we were present to detect their consonance with the requirements of pure intelligence. What we know *à priori* from ourselves reappears *à posteriori* in the actual system of things: how then can it be denied, that the universe is but the realized legislation of thought? If nature fulfils the logical promise of demonstrative science, her methods of operation concur with ours of reasoning: the problems proposed to us but yesterday she has solved from the old eternity; and we could not be thus anticipated, did not one common type of mind pervade the universe and ourselves. Our author carries this argument into some detail. A straight line, generated in thought by the unvarying flowing of a point, is self-evidently the simplest product of motion, and the appropriate result of a single impulse. Without will a body cannot change the velocity or direction of its movement; and the occurrence of such change is a manifest sign of external force, composite or continuous or both. A continued force in one direction adds, during each successive instant, as much velocity as was acquired during the first; so that the final velocities must be as the time. In like manner it may be mathematically shown that all energies issuing from a point distribute themselves, if intercepted, over planes whose dimensions are as the square of the distance; so that the energy, after each interval of emanation, is inversely as the square of the distance. Oersted appears even to think, like Kant, that the universal existence of Attraction, diminishing by the foregoing rule of emanating forces, is susceptible of *à priori* demonstration; and that consequently there is no dependence on

inductive support in our belief, that, if bodies be impelled within the sphere of a central attraction, their path must be some one of the conic sections. Furnished, actually or potentially, with these vaticinations of reason, we open the eye of observation; and *there* are bodies falling with the proper amount of accelerated motion; the earth bulging and weights diminishing at the equator with the true centrifugal fraction; terrestrial projectiles flying in parabolas; and planetary bodies conforming to the ellipse. The system of things therefore is nothing but science turned into reality; and is the eternal embodiment of a thinking faculty like our own. It is evident, throughout his writings, that our author not only assumes the *à priori* basis of the deductive sciences, but regards those sciences as the ultimate type of all our knowledge; so that our defective power of intellectual combination is alone to blame, if we are now as little able to forecast the entire programme of nature, as the ancients were to deduce the ground-plan of the solar system. The vision floats before him of a time when the outlying domains of the universe, at present abandoned to the gropings of empirical method, shall be embraced within the luminous circle of demonstrative truth. As soon as you conceive correctly, and state in definition, the essence of light, all the laws of reflection, refraction, polarization, inevitably follow, and conduct you to phenomena never guessed before yet always present. And if man could rightly seize the primary idea, not of this or that particular existence, but of nature in general, he would obtain a genetic definition, whence the phenomena of all worlds and ages would be consequentially evolved. That thought, in proportion to its perfection, thus puts us on the traces of fact, is proof, conversely, that fact is generated by ever-living thought; that the universe is but the thinking aloud of an eternal reason, consciously reflected in our own. The mind in us and the mind in nature are thus of congenial faculty.

The divine thought, however, thus established in unison

with the human, is no terrestrial affair, but is impartially immanent in the remotest spaces to which science can track the vestiges of law. It is manifestly the intellectual key-note of the universe, in relation to which all intelligences must be constituted. The inhabitants of Jupiter are implicated, no less than we, in the local effects of the laws of motion. They have periodic times analogous to ours: a day with its alternation of light and darkness; a year with its successive seasons. Their neighbouring skies are fitted up with moons, in whose phenomena we recognize the same laws of weight that here prevail. The velocities of falling bodies there are different from ours, but, in an unresisting medium, the same among themselves; and the mathematical series which represents for us the differences, moment after moment, of accelerated motion, might stand in *their* manuals of elementary physics. Do they set their ordnance officers to ball-practice?—it is still the parabola with which they have to do under every variety of range. Or to measure an arc of a meridian?—the ratio of the polar and equatorial diameters is still what the theoretic conditions of equilibrium require. Unless, therefore, the inhabitants of Jupiter are incapable of reading off the scene in which they live, they must have an intellect fundamentally akin to ours; for their settlement lies within the compass of the same physical jurisdiction; and the natural laws stand as a middle term of objective knowledge common to them and us. Were it otherwise, either their faculties must be unveracious, or ours, — suppositions intrinsically inadmissible, and, so far as we are concerned, practically confuted by the countless successful predictions which establish the authority of our science. Nor is their unity of nature with ourselves limited to the pure intellect. Every apprehension, even of a simple geometrical law, such as the relation of the abscissa and ordinate in a curve, involves, with the act of reason, an actual perception or an inward representation of sense; and beings competent to

understand such an object of thought must resemble each other in both these powers. They may differ indefinitely in susceptibility and intensity of faculty. Our planetary kindred may be able to discern, for instance, all the properties of the conic sections with the easy glance which shows us the equality of a circle's radii. But still, if they are cognizant of the path they travel, their geometry, be it quick or slow, must, like their orbit, be the same as ours.

Our philosopher, however, once set out on the business of "visiting his relations," puts up at Jupiter, only as a first easy stage. He commits himself to a new element to carry him to more foreign parts. *Light* is ever traversing immeasurable spaces, and bringing in reports thence, to which science has the certain key. Oersted wisely makes no reference, in his argument, to his own peculiar theory, that light is but a succession of electric sparks. He merely insists on the identity of character found in all luminous rays, celestial and terrestrial. Proceeding from the remotest fixed star, they are refracted, reflected, polarized, coloured, like ours; and the correction required for aberration shows their velocity to be the same. Within the limits of the solar system, the planetary moons give evidence that the projection of shadows is universal and uniform. The prismatic series of colours is everywhere constant; inclosed, as a whole, between the system of chemical rays above the violet in swiftness, and that of calorific, below the red; and determined, in its several hues, by the breadth of the luminiferous wave, which is never less than the three hundred millionth (in the violet), or more than the hundred and seventy-five millionth (in the red), part of a line. It is indeed quite conceivable that, in beings of another race, the visual scale may be much larger than ours, exceeding it not less than the whole gamut exceeds an octave. It needs but a slightly altered sensibility to introduce within the range of sight the rays at present known by their chemical or their calorific effects. Under the varied conditions attaching to different stations

there must be a free play for such modifications of faculty. We cannot but suppose, for instance, that the inhabitant of Jupiter, living as he does amid only a twenty-fifth part of our terrestrial illumination, is endowed with a greater sensitiveness to light than we :—

"This higher susceptibility he brings with him to the contemplation of the heavens. His atmosphere being little less transparent than ours, the spectacle of the starry sky will be to him more copious and brilliant. Observation of it, too, will teach him more, and with much less trouble place within his reach a comprehensive cognizance of the universe. The rotation of his native sphere with more than twice the speed of ours, gives a proportionate velocity to the apparent revolution of his heavens, and so contributes a new element to the impression of this phenomenon. Indeed, we may go so far as to conjecture that the quick alternation of day and night must be connected with a corresponding quick alternation of action and repose; and this again with a quicker and more lively reception of impressions, and a quicker vanishing of them away. And finally, the inhabitant of Jupiter will be able, on account of the vast plane of its orbit, to see also far more of the system of the world, and much more easily to effect the measurements which are necessary for determining the distances of the fixed stars."—(P. 147.)

From the mechanism and optics of the universe, Oersted advances to its chemistry; and shows that there is the same unity in its materials and in the laws of their combination, which has already been traced in its astronomical dynamics. Since the time when Franklin furnished the clue to the interpretation of electrical phenomena by his happy suggestion of the two electricities, there has been a rapid convergence of many doctrines,—of elective affinity, galvanism, crystallography, magnetism,—towards a point of higher unity in which they will separately merge. No sooner had galvanism been recognized as a mere mode of electricity, than the decomposition of water by the voltaic wires drew chemical phenomena into the same sphere; the magnetic were

afterwards added by our author's own researches ; and the discoveries of Dalton and Mitscherlich supplied the first elements for mathematical laws of composition, and of forms as dependent on composition. Whenever this large group of laws shall fall under one category, as they assuredly will, the problem of the constitution of matter will be brought much nearer to its solution ; atoms will probably be resolved into points of space endowed with force ; and the ultimate law of that force will appear not only constant for all worlds, but alone persistent through all time, the one abiding thought out of which the materials and the form of everything are evolved. Meanwhile, it is already evident, not only that the general properties of matter,—size, form, weight, inertia, mobility, etc.—are everywhere the same, but that the more special phenomena of *heat*,—differing from light only in velocity of vibration, and announcing itself by the presence of solids, liquids, and airs,—of *electricity*, evolved as it is by differences of heat,—of *chemical action*, the consequence of electricity,—must be no less universal ; all the conditions and many of the traces of their development being noticeable on the planets. In the meteoric stone we have a strange witness to the prevalence, in regions beyond our world, of the materials, the combinations, the crystalline forms, with which we are familiar. And while the spheroidal figure of the planets refers us back to a period when they were fluid, their analogy in this respect to our earth, whose history since that era the geologist can trace, irresistibly suggests the probability of a similar course of development. If so, we must imagine there, what is in clear evidence here,—namely, the successive appearance of organisms in an ascending scale, till they culminate in a self-conscious race, capable of knowing as well as embodying the producing laws of nature. Thus rational beings are everywhere the product of nature in the same sense in which we are ; they are crowning organisms,—the efflorescence of animalization,—whose knowledge is bound up with a corporeal

constitution, and cannot be fundamentally different from ours :—

"In this statement," says Oersted, "I only announce respecting man an unquestionable fact, without committing myself to the deeps of inquiry as to the mode of connection between body and spirit. Just to obviate, however, every appearance of materialism, I would refer to the following double antithesis as containing the principle of a solution,—that Nature, having Man on the one hand as its undeniable product, must itself, on the other, be admitted as a product of the ever-creating spirit; so that the divine origin of our spirit is in no way compromised by recognition of the rights of Nature. In other words: our notion of the universe is imperfect, unless we conceive of it as the invariably continued work of the ever-creating spirit. The creative principle in it is the spiritual; of this the material is the product; and it would cease to exist, could the producing function cease. Regarded as a work of nature in this sense, the spiritual element in man must contain within it the natural laws;—only potentially, however, so that the influence of nature is indispensable to their being called forth into consciousness. And without any agency of his, nature around him cannot but exercise an influence in accordance with his intellectual faculty; though it is not perhaps till after thousands of years that his intellect can at length attain perception of this harmony. It is easy to see that the grounds on which we rest this conviction hold good for the entire universe. Throughout the universe beings are distributed, with intellectual faculty to catch the sparks of the divine light. To these beings God reveals himself through the world around, awakening the reason dormant in themselves by the reason dominant in everything which affects them with an impression; and, *vice versâ*, the more their own mind is awakened, the deeper is the glance he gives them into material existence: so that they are involved in a ceaseless living development, which, on reaching a certain stage, carries them ever further from the fancy that palpable matter is the basis of existence, and impels them on the discovery that they are to view themselves,—body and mind,—as members of an infinite organism of indwelling Reason (Vernunftorganismus). Thus then do the truths of Natural Science ever more and more fall in with those of

Religion, so that they must lapse at length into the most intimate combination."—(P. 155.)

With this remarkable passage, we believe, the essay originally closed. At least, the author's first design went no farther than to prove the position which he here quits as sufficiently established,—that the *intellectual* faculty has a common type throughout the universe. "But if the intellectual," said Frederika Bremer, to whose friendly admiration Oersted was opening his train of thought, "then also the *moral*, and the *sense of beauty*, in short all the great characteristics of a spiritual nature." Upon this hint the author enlarged his thesis, and added the chapters in which he claims for all worlds imagination and conscience, as well as understanding. It is difficult, however, to work out the suggestions of another; and though the painter of life could tell her thought to the philosopher of nature, she could not transfuse into his soul the peculiar colouring of affection and feminine piety with which it glorified itself in her own. Hence, perhaps, the manifest inferiority of the succeeding chapters, especially of that which treats of the *moral* constitution of the universe. The argument is essentially the same as before: the inner faculties are dependent for their awakening on the action of the outward universe; this action consists in a touch of sympathy, by which like responds to like; whatever, therefore, breaks out of sleep in us and rises into permanent consciousness has its counterpart in nature, and exists there as a realized idea of the eternal reason; this realized idea, having in nature a permanent and universal objective embodiment, cannot but be read off by all minds placed before it, seeing that those minds are nothing but its subjective reflection. Thus our faculties attest the presence of corresponding living prototypes in the laws of the universe, which may be called the thoughts of God; and those laws, being co-extensive with space, supply the conditions and therefore attest the presence everywhere, of other faculties

constituted like our own. The application of this doctrine to the imaginative feeling of man is more plausible than to the moral. Our inner sense, secretly constituted according to the same laws of reason as the outward scene and objects on which it gazes, feels satisfied, it knows not why, when presented with things that have the stamp of reason and do not fall short of their own idea. By a kind of filial instinct and yearning of a nature born of thought, it embraces whatever has the features of a purely realized conception, and disowns all spoiled, confused, and spurious things. It is inconceivable that any being involved, like the inhabitant of Jupiter, in the same geometry with ourselves, should not share in our annoyance at seeing a distorted circle instead of a true one; and sympathize with our pleasure in symmetry, as the balance and unity of opposites: and among objects of this feeling, esteem that the *most* beautiful which, like the human form on earth, expresses the highest idea. As from the omnipresence of geometry Oersted thus concludes to a universal beauty of form; so from the boundless diffusion of light and its interior chemistry in relation to warmth and life, does he infer the universal beauty of colour; and from the acoustic laws again, which would assuredly repeat the vibrating phenomena of stretched strings wherever the experiment was tried, he is convinced that we have no monopoly of sweet sounds, and makes us curious about the Mozarts and Mendelssohns of Jupiter and the operas on Saturn's ring.

If Oersted is less successful in fastening upon foreign spheres the thread of ethical than of æsthetic and intellectual affinity with our own, it is not because the analogy between our position and theirs breaks in his hand; but because, in his theory, *this human world* is not really the seat of *moral* phenomena at all, and therefore he has nothing of this kind to carry to any other. He uses indeed the *language* current among men for marking the facts and distinctions of character; but with explanations that with-

draw the essence of its meaning, and set us in the midst of mere *quasi*-moral phenomena. His psychology,—not founded on reflective self-knowledge, but a mere application of physical doctrine to the mind,—leaves no room for any but a verbal difference between the intellect and the conscience,—between constitutional gifts and achieved virtues,—between unhindered development and free personality. The consequence is that his whole chapter on this subject is engaged with raising ethical questions and apparently assuming ethical notions, and then resolving them into the *un*ethical. The only character really left, to save the moral powers and laws from falling into perfect coalescence with the intellectual, is simply this,—that the latter are wakened into consciousness and progress chiefly by the spectacle of nature, the former by the presence of men. This, however, is a distinction which, at best, detaches into view not the moral, but the social elements of the mind. Our author indeed, at the very outset, pushes aside, by a false definition, all idea of proper obligation. "All natural effects being effects of God, *natural endowments*," he says, "may not improperly be described as a *divine trust*";—as a divine *effect*, assuredly; but not on that account as a divine *trust*; for this is more than the reasoning will cover, and requires, not only derivation from God, but in ourselves a discretionary power of use or abuse. If such a power *bonâ fide* exist, then, and then only, are the conditions of a trust complete and without illusion. If otherwise, if the power be but a semblance, determined at a few removes by the necessary march of natural law, then is the putative "trust" construed back into a bespoken "effect," and mere causation by God will no longer morally distinguish it from the height of the human stature or the greenness of nature's grass. How then does it stand with Oersted in respect to this second condition of human responsibility? Does he allow to us this determining power? In words, he does; in reality, he does not. He constantly speaks of men as "free

beings"; but his conception of freedom betrays itself in his brief phrase, "Men are *free* beings, in so far as they are *thinking* beings." Is it so? If a creature be only self-conscious, and become the theatre across which trains of thought pass, not without his inspection, though quite beyond his control, is he on that account "*free*"? Whether the thoughts succeed each other like the disjointed images of a dream, or with the unity of a poetical creation, or with the coherence of philosophical discovery, makes no difference to the point at issue; so long as they follow each other by laws of necessary sequence and suggestion, they are similarly related to the thinker, who gains no *liberty* from being the subject of any of them. All the phenomena of our mental life,—the conceptions and emotions and inclinations that rise within us,—are but the *data*, the assigned conditions, of the problems which our freedom is invoked to solve; and if they all moved in a linear stream through us,—as they often do when we simply *think*,—without our ever stepping in from behind our phenomena to settle an alternative and arbitrate between competing possibilities, we should indeed be intellectual organisms, but by no means moral agents; and it would be not less a superstition that man could have a duty, than that there is malignancy in planets or a spirit of frolic in the dancing leaves. The modern German philosophy, like the ancient Greek, is pervaded by this inadequate idea of freedom, as a mere locked-up force, condensed into an individualized existence, and left for awhile, with the key turned upon it, to build its nest and spin its history. Such a power might as well be called imprisoned as free. Regarded from within, it has indeed scope enough for its action and the evolution of its appropriate effects, until it presses against the limits which inclose its individual field. But so have all forces; which, in their very idea and definition, are dynamical through a certain range, till, by encounter with adequate resistance, they become statical. If the stage in their action prior to the attainment of equilibrium is to be called

free, then must freedom exist wherever there is *motion*, and necessity be found only in the state of *rest*. The absurdity of this result is not escaped by merely shutting up the force within the outline of some object insulated in space,—as a plant or an animal; or by introducing *sensation* in correspondence with every physical change; or by adding even *self-consciousness* of what is going on. All that is thus effected is to substitute the notion of vital development of a more or less complex kind for that of mechanical operation; and man is still definable as a mere *intellectual endogen*,—without the least approach to the exercise of that *preferential* power,—of giving determination to the indeterminate,—which is the essence of his freedom and the condition of his duty.

On the peculiar path of thought taken by Oersted, no such power as this presents itself to his notice. By missing it, he evades the only check to his enterprise, of erasing the boundary between the free and the subject provinces of the world, and enthroning Necessity as the autocrat of all. Nothing is easier than to reconcile individual freedom with the sway of universal law, if that freedom be nothing but universal law itself converged into an individual, and kindling the phenomena that radiate from his particular being. There remains indeed nothing to *be* reconciled; the contradiction ceases to exist: flung by the force of a definition into the realm of predetermined nature, man offers no further opposition to the powers which are there omnipotent; and we are only surprised that our author can address himself at all to a difficulty which the premisses of his philosophy hinder from ever appearing. The only sense in which his individual "free beings" could take any liberties with universal law, is that in which a tree, whose proper attitude is vertical, takes the liberty of growing crooked; or a musical box, rebellious against the rules of melody, goes out of tune; or an intellect, in spite of the spontaneous affinity of thought for truth, is deflected by the attractions of some error. These are merely cases of

deviation from an average type of action, in consequence of the presence of special conditions. Such conditions not belonging to the group of causes by which the type is permanently moulded, but being imported from the momentary combinations of time and place, are little liable to recur; and in the long run their traces are obliterated and their influence overruled by the persevering agencies that never absent themselves. It is precisely and only in this manner that Oersted conceives of the moral aberrations of mankind; which are not therefore *violations* of any dominant law, but *varieties* on it, cancelling each other by their opposite tendencies, and leaving the mean direction of reason and right secure of its ultimate vindication.

Had our author admitted the conscience as a source of ethical knowledge, on equal terms with perception as a source of physical, and the understanding of logical, he might have transported our laws of rectitude and holiness to other planets in the same vehicle of proof by which he has carried thither our optics and our geometry. With no other assumption than that which is indispensable in all reasoning,—that the primary testimony of our faculties is veracious,—he might have passed out from the moral constitution of man to the moral perfection of God, and thence have dropped on star after star to see the divine image multiplied; with precisely the certainty attending his belief that the elliptic path of Jupiter is a thought original with God and common to its inhabitants with ourselves. The free element in the human soul is not less surely a valid type of the free sentiments of God and the free powers of all spirits, than are its law-bound elements of the legislation regulating the conditions of all thought. As in the latter we have a clue to the whole realm,—to whatever, that is, lies subject to impassable rules;—so in the former are we introduced to the realm beyond nature,—the supernatural,—the spiritual beings, that is, which are detained out of the range of necessity and left with a portion of divine determining power. Oersted, however,

recognizing no such antithesis, has no separate and direct source of moral knowledge. With the unitary and exclusive logic of the physical philosopher, he draws everything into the all-absorbing vortex of homogeneous law. Regarding man, even in his highest relations, simply as an object of natural history, he is at a loss for evidence to show that the physiology of human society must be repeated among the races peopling foreign worlds. He is obliged to resort to an indirect and circuitous method: first, resolving the conscience into a mere phase of the intellect, which has already been proved to be universal: and then, insisting that the development which at one of its stages turns up the moral phenomena, depends with us upon external conditions present also in other worlds. In his view of the progress of man from the savage to the social and moral stage, there is much which reminds us of Hobbes. He does not indeed so completely insulate individual men, in his picture of the "state of nature": he assumes, on the contrary, an instinctive sympathy of like with like, which makes all creatures of rational perception fundamentally social, and even disposes them to recognize in the physical world around them the stirrings of a life and will like their own. But this instinct is at first driven back and repressed by dread of each other's passions and experience of mutual injuries. By the reciprocal advance and retreat of this sympathy and fear, is occasioned the first idea of good and evil, of just and unjust; till some tribe advances far enough to unite for common help, and conceive of an order and law needful for the general good. This is the birth-point of the notion and feeling of duty among them; which from that moment becomes ever clearer, especially through the influence of highly-gifted individuals endowed with an insight which, not being their own work, is regarded as an inspiration of the gods. Nor is this to be treated as a mere superstition. The affluent power and depth of such souls, enabling them to bring the moral ideas into clear consciousness, is really the divine energy in nature, and chiefly in

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human nature,—an energy, however, acting according to the necessary laws which rule the development of human thought and insight. The conceptions of God which accompany this progress present us with three stages of theology. For a vast period nothing appears but a mere nature-worship, a homage to beings supposed to haunt the scenes and command the changes of the visible world. Next, man is taken as the type of Deity, to whom therefore something of a moral charter is ascribed among other anthropomorphic elements. Myths, the produce of this stage, are often framed in ages of passion and ignorance: handed down without change through a changing civilization, they offend the knowledge and conscience of later times, and are rejected, first by the learned, then by the people. Hence room is made for the third and final faith,—the faith of natural philosophy. Science may at first, from its necessarily destructive action on previous beliefs, seem inimical to religion. It takes out of the rank of free beings, and subjugates to laws of nature, objects,—like the sun and stars,—which had been regarded as gods: and periods of great scientific advance, snatching away with relentless rapidity one centre of reverence after another, may be attended with wanton rejection of spiritual truths. But thought always compensates its own evils, and recovers the disturbance of its balance. It is found in the end that the free beings cancelled by science from the fields of existence are replaced, not by the blind forces of a groping fate, but by the laws and order of eternal reason. With the enactments of that reason every one will find himself in harmony, the more he conforms with the precepts of ethical doctrine. Indeed, so completely do all moral laws resolve themselves into an injunction to live according to reason, and so intimate is their secret connection with each other through this common tie, that whoever will fairly follow out the favourite rule of *any* ethical system,—even the rule of self-interest,—will find himself carried through the entire circuit of duty, not excluding the point of

remotest antithesis to his first thought. Thus the moral element in man is only, under another guise, the same rational power which governs the universe; and unfolds itself in us by our action on each other, and in response to the appeal of an everlasting reason interfused through nature.

Hence, our author concludes, moral and intellectual laws are coextensive. In respect to both, our earth is but a province of a wider realm, in every part of which a similar ascending growth towards more perfect forms of life may be presumed. The inhabitants of other planets are formed according to the same laws of omnipresent reason, and under many momentous conditions visibly analogous to ours. They *begin* to exist at a certain time and place, from the influence of which they cannot be exempt. They are also perishable, and must have their period of rise and of decline. They feel the presence and action of the world around them, and are therefore creatures of sense, susceptible of pleasure and pain. As free and thinking beings, yet finite, they must fall into conflict with each other, and with nature; yet must be conquered and reclaimed by the irresistible perseverance of nature's laws; and therefore they must advance and more and more reflect the real course of things. In these and other respects, though amidst vast differences, they must be our counterparts. Nowhere in the universe should we find ourselves wholly strangers; or reach the limits of the One Intellectual Realm.

We have selected this interesting and suggestive essay for particular analysis, because it presents within a small compass a view of Oersted's mode of thought on the several subjects of art, morals, and religion, which felt the interpenetration of his philosophy. What now is the value of his argument, as a whole? We must confess that it leaves on us the same unsatisfying impression as all physical reasonings in demonstration of religious truth; giving some grandeur and richness to the conception of

truth, but not really contributing to it any new evidence. Reserving for separate consideration his doctrine of God, we may pause for a moment on his proof of the affinity of all created minds. It depends mainly on one consideration,—the omnipresence of natural agencies and laws, considered as objects of science. The space, without which there were no geometry, the light which furnishes us with optics, the satellites so instructive as to the laws of motion, are not left behind by removal to Jupiter; and *where the things to be known are the same, the knowers cannot be different.* But how much is postulated! (1.) That knowers are *there;* (2.) that, if there, they must have their knowledge directed to the same objects that are apprehended by us, instead of being turned upon some phase of nature wholly dark to us; and (3.) that our human knowledge is valid for the reality of things, and is not a mere subjective affair, whose truth cannot be depended upon away from home. A geologist, referring to the time when no man was upon the earth, might question the first; a psychologist, who derives all knowledge from sense, and, by the easy conception of *other* senses, supposes the possibility of other knowledge, might doubt the second; and a follower of Kant (as Oersted himself once was), who is convinced of the ideality of space, would deny the third. Whether even the discoveries of modern science, whose threads our author so skilfully weaves into a network of universal law, have really much to do with our belief in that *unity of all nature*, whence he infers the likeness of all minds, appears questionable. Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle belonged to an age and a people ignorant of the law of gravitation and the theory of light; yet they spoke in a language and taught philosophies, betraying the profoundest impression of this very unity of nature; so that we cannot even translate the phrases, *τὸ ἕν*, —*τὸ πᾶν*,—*τὸ ὄν*,—into which the feeling was condensed. The grand picture, with which Plato mythically closes his "Republic"—of the universe revolving round the spindle

of necessity, to the blended hymn of past, present, and future; of the eternal circulation of spirits between heaven and earth; of the throne of Lachesis beneath the span of the milky way; of the Prophet scattering the lots of mortal life, and warning the "souls of a day" not to choose amiss, since the free thread of choice once taken would be fastened to the wheel of destiny; of the journey across Lethe's leafless plain, and the encampment by the river "Careless," and the midnight spring, as with the shoot of stars, up to the human birth,—is penetrated throughout with a feeling of the physical and moral oneness of existence everywhere, to which neither Newton nor Fresnel could add any fresh intensity. Intellectual and moral culture so affects the attitude of the human faculties towards nature, as to render the faith inevitable that all her parts constitute a perfect whole; and whatever may be the direction which that culture predominantly takes,—whether metaphysical as in Greece, or physical as in modern Europe,—the mind's instinctive demand for unity will make itself felt, and compel the universe to respond. What once was but an incipient point of clearness rising from the sea of the unknown, reflects ever more light from a surface gaining breadth and grandeur: no sooner does it open a habitable abode to settled thought, than subsidiary spots emerge around and group themselves invitingly first to the explorer, and ere long to the colonist; and as the island of knowledge is multiplied into the archipelago, so is the archipelago blended into the continent; till reason can every way pass to and fro over its world, and find it a thing of spheriform perfection. Without this synoptic progress, the occupation of the intellect would be gone; and the faith which attends it,—faith in the unity of nature,—while finding support from the contents of all sciences, is contingent on the special discoveries of none; and cannot be properly treated as the exclusive or characteristic revelation of natural philosophy.

The identity of nature as between other created beings

and ourselves is thus made by our author to rest upon too narrow a basis; and his reasonings, like those of natural theology, do but contribute a series of illustrative applications of a faith not really dependent upon them. His proof of our identity of mental nature with God, and his whole conception of the Divine presence in the universe, appears to us liable to much more serious objection. His argument amounts, in brief, to this: we find that nature has for ages been following the very laws which we now fetch out of our own mind by necessary procedure of reason; since, without our aid, nature *acts* in the order in which we *think*. Thought, like our own, is the eternal agent in nature; and that thought is what we mean by "God." Again and again, with repetition which precludes mistake, does Oersted announce, as the ground of all religion, this concurrence between the physical laws without us and the logical laws within. We object to the argument on scientific grounds. It assumes, to an extent entirely unwarrantable, the *à priori* character of all natural knowledge; and represents the encyclopædia of the sciences as an excogitated system arising by the evolution of pure thought, and then brought into comparison with the realm of fact, and turning out to be an accurate prediction of its course. The whole body of science is conceived of according to the type and method of geometry, in which, after the definition of a few elementary notions, and the statement of a few axioms, one property of figures after another is reasoned out by necessary laws of thought. And as a counterpart to this process, the universe is described as standing opposite, and doing the very same: reasoning itself out into open being, as if it were mimicking our intellectual ways,—overhearing our deductions and echoing them. The whole value of this concurrence, between external physical law and internal logical law, as evidence of the presence in both of a divine reason higher than either, is plainly contingent on the two series being independent of each other. If either be a

mere copy of the other, their agreement is not wonderful, and can report nothing to us respecting the cause whence they proceed. Should the doctrine of the sensational philosophy be true, and all our modes of thought be the mere delivery of the outer world upon our receptive capacity,—it will no doubt still hold that the world will accord with our intellectual rules, but only because those rules are humble followers of the world's course, and would compliantly reflect it, whatever it might be. It is no glory to the universe to be "agreeable to reason" in this sense, no distinction even from any other supposable condition; for it could not possibly be anything else: so long as it flings an impression upon a conscious being set before it, that impression, irrespective of its quality, is just what the philosophy in question *means by* "reason." Again, should the opposite doctrine of idealism be true, and all "laws of nature" be but the projected figure of our laws of thought, the seeming intellectual structure of the universe can neither surprise nor instruct us; for we see but the shadow of ourselves traversing the spaces of our objective thought. It is only on the hypothesis that nature and man are as perfectly distinct as two strangers who have never met before, that you can appeal to correspondence in their ideas as evidence of their joint relation to an eternal reason as a *tertium quid*. Yet Oersted by no means preserves the balance of this dualism against the two extremes which are ever soliciting it in opposite directions. The idealist indeed he does attempt to put down by the remark, that the successful *predictions* of science prove her to be no dreamer but to have a good understanding with reality. The fallacy of the remark is transparent. Were nature nothing but appearance, transacting itself wholly within the mind, there would still be *laws* of appearance, according to which the phenomena would recur; and the correct observation of these laws would be announced and rewarded by the punctual fulfilment of expectation. Ineffectually resisting the error of exclusive idealism,

our author repeatedly falls into that of exclusive realism; instead of detaining the human mind outside the realm of nature, he flings it in among her products, represents it as wholly generated by natural laws, and accounts in this way for its seeing in nature the likeness of itself. This likeness, however, we should see in any case, so long as we were growths of nature; for it is, in our author's view, the mere sympathy of origin, the tingling of the sap of ancestry in our veins. To us, who are her fabric, nature would be sure to look like ourselves, and to wear the semblance of such mind as ours, whether she were the work of reason or not; this aspect is given, not by her laws being the result of intellect, but by our intellect being the result of her laws. Were it therefore ever so true that the correspondence between our mind and the universe is the sign of a common power pervading both, it would still remain undetermined whether nature, to begin with, was the fruit of mind, or our mind, in the last resort, were the blossoming of mere nature. That the heavens and the earth are *intelligible* to us cannot surely be accepted as, in itself, a revelation of their *intelligent* origin, though this is our author's frequent assertion. Are we to lay it down as an axiom that, in order to be *objects of reason*, a set of facts or truths must be *products of reason*;—so that whatever is apprehended by a living mind must be regarded as having its genesis from a living mind? What then are we to say to the truths of geometry, than which no more perfect example of logical sequence can be found? In what sense can these objects of rational cognizance be considered as births or creations of the divine intellect? It is their function to define the relations of space under the limitations of figure; and these relations, so far from requiring a living mind as their cause, are wholly unaffected by the supposed presence or absence of such a mind, remaining in any case equally and independently true. Who indeed can persuade himself that, if there had been no sphere of truth except the mathematical, accessible to our thought,—if, without any concrete

knowledge, any personal love, any sense of beauty or rectitude, we had been a mere incarnation of porisms,—we should ever have found ourselves on the traces of a Divine mind? Yet not only would all the conditions of Oersted's faith be still present, but they would be present in the most intense degree and the most perfect form; for it is just when the universe becomes to us one vast deducible, with all its epochs and constructions hung together by a texture of necessity, like the *data* and *quæsita* of a theorem, that, in his view, it must unconditionally appear to be the pure genesis of eternal thought. It is highly instructive to observe that this *à priori* sequence of phenomena, on which our author rests his theism, is the favourite stronghold of the older atheism. I ask no more, says La Place, than the laws of motion, heat, and gravitation, and I will write you the nativity and biography of the solar system. Allow me further, says the physiologist, electricity and cells, and I will evolve the organic universe in an appendix. And only grant us a little time, says a third, and we will reduce the number of primitive data we require, and probably merge them all into one; and then you will see that nothing could have been other than it is: from the alpha to the omega of the series of phenomena, every succession is determined by a force which science has ascertained and defined, and which, instead of rising out of mind culminates into it. We want therefore no God; there is nowhere any scope left for the action of his will. It is precisely in confutation of this reasoning that Paley and others have endeavoured to rescue certain provinces of nature from this voracious claim of necessity,—to show that light, while needful for the eye, did not create it; that the blood, so curiously related to the atmosphere, did not compound it; that life abounds with provisions necessitated by no known force, but flung in as the gratuity of a free beneficence. The class of phenomena which are thus the pride of Paley's argument are the opprobrium of Oersted's; who, on the other hand, discovers a divine thought only in a realm

which, were it universal, would put Paley into despair. We are clearly of opinion that Paley's *feeling*,—his sense of what we want to have proved,—is infinitely the more correct; and if his mode of proof is precarious and unsatisfactory, the fault lies in his conceding too much to the natural philosophers, and secretly adopting in his own mind their false postulate, that their favourite "forces" are separate realities in nature, instead of mere hypotheses of thought. No theist ought to be alarmed by the encroachment of science upon the region of indeterminate phenomena, her interpretation of free into necessary facts, or even by her ultimate threat of exhibiting the entire universe as a deducible. He ought by no means to resist or disown her progress in this direction, and to entrench himself as in a forlorn hope on the heights not yet within her reach. Let him rather anticipate her final conquest of a universal empire and suppose it gained. His answer to any atheistic boast may then stand thus: "I grant that you can now deduce all things, and have won, in reference to nature, a clue of universal prediction. But the necessity of your sequences does not terrify me; for it is a necessity reigning only in your thought, and not dominant in the reality of things,—the necessity with which consequences flow from an hypothesis, not that with which effects arise from their cause. *If* your stock of original forces, as conceived and defined by you, were producible as operative facts, having a concrete history each for itself, they would doubtless be the producing source of all phenomena. But I see no evidence of their reality, and find them to be, not concrete existences, but mere abstractions of the mind, fictions of analysis, formulas of computation, no more resembling the living agencies of things than the rules by which the astronomer catches a star's place would resemble the instinct of an angel's flight returning thither home. All that you have done is, to say how, if you had to deal with a dead universe, you would make it do in your absence just the work it does now; and you have devised a set of conditions which, if they

could but find themselves prefixed at the outset of events might serve in place of mind, if mind could not be there. But if mind *can be* there and *is* there, its competency to the voluntary production of the same effects cannot be denied; and we may then dispense with your set of conditions as real causes, and use them simply as a stock of substituted ratios, varying as the phenomena and so serving to predict them. A lecturer on animal mechanics will explain to you the rationale of a Taglioni's movements; will analyse the complexities of an attitude, and the requisites of the most graceful curve; will tell you how many score of muscles, and in what nice antagonisms, compose a gesture of equilibrium. And doubtless, if he could make a solitary automaton, with all the separate springs of which he speaks, he might set it on the stage with like effect. But in the performer herself, it is a simple power that does it all; the living will, inspired with rhythmic and poetic feeling, and leaping without once touching the steps of the scientific dynamics, straight from conception of beautiful form to the execution. As surely as this lecturer gives us but a *quasi*-dancer, so surely do physical systems the most perfect give us, instead of the divine reality, only nature's hypothetical equivalent."

This answer appears at once to reconcile the just rights of science and of faith; withdrawing every jealous lingering fear that would obstruct the one, and leaving the other its fresh simplicity; referring to God as the living Cause in the universe, yet looking to science as the indirect calculus of its phenomena. In cutting down the pretensions of physical theory to the rank of hypothesis, we do no more than take it at its word. For what do its first laws of motion affirm, but a hypothetical proposition, namely, that *if* a body be unoccupied by a will, it cannot, when set in motion, change the direction or velocity of its course, without the application of another foreign force? What, as Oersted himself observes, is the so-called "*Inertia*" of matter but "the absence of will from body destitute of soul?" The primary maxims therefore and definitions on which the august

structure of the celestial mechanics is raised, do not pretend to be more than conditionally true: should will be absent, then they hold; should will be present, the case does not arise for their application. When the doctrine of central forces is said to account for the motion of a planet, all that is meant is accordingly this: "*If* no will be there, such is the way in which the phenomena come about,"—which we readily grant, but which is not to debar us from thinking that a will *is* there, or to slip from representative modesty to positive usurpation.

Oersted's mode of presenting nature and her operations to the mind is however far more objectionable on religious than on scientific grounds. We are far from saying that to himself and others formed in the same intellectual mould, the conception of God, as the unity of all natural forces, with just as many thoughts as there are laws, as the common element in which gravitation and electricity and the ether-base of light and heat and chemical action, all coexist, may not be adequate to the demands of the conscience and affections. Possibly men, all whose admirations have been drawn into the one direction of natural research, may rise to a sufficing worship in contemplating a Being whose eternal life consists in the steps of a demonstration, who genetically *proves* the universe into realization, and descends into phenomena by Newton's synthetic method. But sure we are that a conception like this,—avowedly excluding purpose, affection, moral preference,—from the Divine nature, and resolving it all into an *à priori* development of reason, cannot give inspiration and repose to balanced minds and sorrowing hearts. The essential defects of this religion will most easily appear,—or at least their root will be most effectually touched,—if we conclude with a few words, exhibiting its fundamental difference from contrasted modes of thought.

The ultimate problem of all philosophy and all religion is this: "How are we to conceive aright the origin and first principle of things?" The answers, it has been contended

by a living author of distinguished merit, are necessarily reducible to two, between which all systems are divided, and on the decision of whose controversy, all antagonist speculations would lay down their arms. "In the beginning was FORCE," says one class of thinkers; "force, singular or plural, splitting into opposites, standing off into polarities, ramifying into attractions and repulsions, heat and magnetism, and climbing through the stages of physical, vital, animal, to the mental life itself." "On the contrary," says the other class, "in the beginning was THOUGHT; and only in the necessary evolution of its eternal ideas into expression does force arise; self-realizing thought declaring itself in the types of being and the laws of phenomena." We need hardly say, that the former of these two notions coalesces with the creed of atheism, and is most frequently met with upon the path of the physical sciences, while the latter is favoured by the mathematical and metaphysical, and gives the essence of pantheism. Each of them has insurmountable difficulties, with which it is successfully taunted by the other. Start from blind force; and how, by any spinning from that solitary centre, are we ever to arrive at the seeing intellect? Can the lower create the higher, and the unconscious enable us to think? Start from pure thinking, and how then can you get any force for the production of objective effects? How metamorphose a passage of dialectic into the power of gravitation, and a silent corollary into a flash of lightning? In taking the Intellect as the type of God, this difficulty must always be felt. We are well aware that it is not in *this* endowment that our dynamic energy resides. The *activity* which we ascribe to our intellect is not a power going out into external efficiency, but a mere passage across the internal field of successive thoughts as spontaneous phenomena. Nor have we, as thinking beings only, any *option* with respect to the thoughts thus streaming over the theatre of rational consciousness; our constitution legislates for us in this particular, and the order of suggestion is determined by laws, having their seat in us.

Finally, we are not, by mere thinking capacity, constituted *persons*, any more than a sleeper, who should never wake, yet always be engaged with rational and scientific dreams, would be a person. Without some further endowment, we should only be a *logical life* and development. All these characters are imported into the conception of God, when he is represented as conforming to the type of reason. The activity of intellect being wholly internal, the phenomena of the universe could not be referred to him as a thinking Being, were they not gathered up into the interior of his nature, and conceived, not as objective effects of his power, but as purely subjective successions within the theatre of his infinitude. Intellect again having no option, the God of this theory is without freedom, and is represented as the eternal necessity of reason. And lastly, in fidelity to the same analogy, he is not a divine *Person*, but rather a *Thinking Thing* or the thinking function of the universe; we may say, *universal science in a state of self-consciousness*. The necessity under which pantheism lies, of fetching all that is to be referred to God into the *interior* of his being, and dealing with it as not less a necessary manifestation of his mental essence than are our ideas a manifestation of the mind that has them, explains the unwillingness of this system to allow any motives to God, any field of objective operation, any special relation to individuals, any revealing interposition, any *supernatural* agency.

Is it however true, that human belief can only choose between these two extremes, and must oscillate eternally between the atheistic homage to force, and the pantheistic to thought? Far from it; and it is curiously indicative of the state of the philosophic atmosphere in Germany, that one of her most discerning and wide-seeing authors* should find no third possibility within the sphere of vision. In any latitude except one in which moral science has alto-

* See the Essay, before alluded to, by Professor Trendelenburg; "Ueber den letzten Unterschied der philosophischen Systeme; in his Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, 2ter. Band, Berlin, 1855.

gether melted away in the universal solvent of metaphysics, it would occur as one of the most obvious suggestions, that the intellect is not the only element of human nature which may be taken as type of the Divine, and as furnishing a possible solution to the problem of origination. Quitting the two poles of extreme philosophy, confessedly incompetent in their separation, we submit that WILL presents the middle point which takes up into itself thought on the one hand and force on the other; and which yet, so far from appearing to us as a *compound* arising out of them as an effect, is more easily conceived than either as the originating prefix of all phenomena. It has none of the disqualifications which we have remarked as flowing from the others into their respective systems of doctrine. It carries with it, in its very idea, the co-presence of thought, as the necessary element within whose sphere it has to manifest itself: its phenomena cannot exist *alone*: it acts on preconceptions, which stand related to it however not as its source, but as its conditions, and are its co-ordinates in the effect rather than its generating antecedents. If, therefore, all things are issued by will, there is mind at the fountain-head, and the absurdity is avoided of deriving intelligence from unintelligence. While it thus escapes the difficulty of passing from mere force to thought, it is equally clear of the opposite difficulty of making mere thought supply any force. The activity of will is not, like that of intellect, a subjective transit of regimented ideas, but an *objective* power *going out* for the production of effects: nay, it is a *free* power; exercising *preference* among data furnished by internal or external conditions present in its field; and it thus constitutes proper *causality*, which always implies control over an alternative. We need hardly add, that all the requisites are thus complete for the true idea of a *person*: and an infinite Being, contemplated under this type, is neither a fateful nor a logical principle of necessity, but a living God; out of whose purposed legislation has sprung whatever necessity there is, except the self-existent beauty

of his holiness. Thus, between the force of the physical atheist, and the thought of the metaphysical pantheist, we fix upon the fulcrum of will, as the true balance-point of a moral theism.

The rapid and insidious encroachment of false and mischievous modes of thought upon this great subject,—a tendency not unlikely to be encouraged by the appearance of this volume of essays,—has tempted us to fix exclusive attention on one treatise and one aspect of the book. The elements in it which we have passed without notice are rich in interest: the reader, however, who would glean what is best in them would do well not to limit himself to the "supplementary contributions" annexed in the English translation, but to include in his study the whole contents of the Danish or German editions.

IV.

MANSEL'S LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

THE Canon of Salisbury must have entertained a strange idea of the exigencies of the orthodox Christian faith, when he provided it, by bequest of his estates, with a fresh defence every year till the day of judgment. To the Aberdeen merchant whose munificence evoked Archbishop Sumner's *Records of Creation* and Mr. Thompson's *Christian Theism*, it seemed sufficient if a new buttress were added, or a new approach were opened, to the edifice every forty years. Even at this rate the pure gospel must become coated over, like the focus of a labyrinth, with excessive protection, or be accessible, like an Egyptian sanctuary, through an endless propylæum. But if Oxford is to widen its zone of "evidences" just forty times as fast, and annually drive back the lines of "heretics and schismatics," it is alarming to think how the little oratory of true worship will lie in the midst of a Russian empire of demonstration; with certain proof of one text at least, that scarcely will "the world itself contain the books that have been written." To judge, however, from the seventy years or so that have elapsed since the foundation, the Bampton Lectures are not un-

* "The Limits of Religious Thought examined in Eight Lectures, preached before the University of Oxford, in the year 1858, on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M.A., Canon of Salisbury." By Henry Longueville Mansel, B.D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College; Tutor and late Fellow of St. John's College. London: Murray. 1858.—*National Review*, January, 1859.

likely to melt into oblivion at one end as fast as they come into existence at the other. In proportion to the number of eminent names that appear in the series, including Heber, Milman, Whately, Hampden, and Thomson, it is remarkable how few of the volumes can be regarded as permanent enrichments of our theological literature. The nomination to the lectureship seems to oppress the natural forces of even strong minds; to reduce genius and learning to commonplace, if it does not tempt them into heresy. In a few exceptional instances,—as Bishop Hampden's volume on the Scholastic Philosophy,—the series illustrates the painful cost at which reputations are won in theology; in many more it shows the facility with which they may be lost. Among the recent annual occupants of St. Mary's pulpit have been two accomplished logicians, Provost Thomson and Dr. Mansel; but the *Lectures on the Atonement* had no trace of intellectual identity with the lucid and comprehensive *Outline of the Laws of Thought;* and now the acute and well-read author of the *Prolegomena Logica* gives us, on the greatest of subjects, a book which, in spite of its careful elaboration and literary skill, will probably convince no one but himself, and be felt by many of his best readers to unsettle the very bases it was written to establish.

There are two ways in which you may conduct a process of religious persuasion. You may appeal directly to the sources of spiritual conviction in the human mind, and endeavour to awaken the mood and present the thoughts from which belief in Divine things becomes conscious and distinct. Or you may think it needless thus to begin at the beginning, and, taking the matter up at a later stage, may seek to ward off and remove objections by which the springs of faith have lost their action. The former method is creative and sympathetic; the latter is corrective and antagonistic. The one develops what is latent; the other suppresses what is obtrusive. The one rests in affirmation; the other negatives denial. By the rules of logic these two

methods ought to be equivalents in validity; and in the treatment of any subject purely intellectual they would actually be so. But religious faith once broken by logical doubt, no logical refutation, it is probable, ever restored; so long as its inner ground remains unenlarged, so long as no new field of moral consciousness is opened, the mere dialectic discussion of data grown ineffectual must remain, we believe, without result. This, indeed, is only a consequence of the essential difference between a philosophy and a religion. In the apprehension of our Divine relations the logical faculty has but a secondary function,—to justify, to reconcile, to organize, to unfold certain given convictions; and is misapplied in the attempt to evoke or re-instate what is not there. Hence it is that, in many a mind, a mass of sceptic clouds, charged with thunders of denial, will cling steadfast to its cold heights against your keenest blasts of argument; and then, by some unnoticed change in the climate of the soul, will silently disperse. And hence also it is that men who have got rid of their own scepticism are so seldom able to shake other people's. To their old companions in doubt, they seem to have deserted their camp by a mere spring of caprice; and they are themselves disappointed, when they would account for their altered position, that they cannot trace the approach to it by a more intelligible path. They find themselves using—to the disgust of their associates—the very same evidences which used to affect them with *ennui* or contempt; and from the refutations which once appeared demonstrative some secret cause seems to have drawn all the pith away. The removal into a higher region of belief is seldom effected by retracing the logical staircase which brought us to a lower; but rather by flinging away some detaining weights, and passing with spontaneous ascent into congenial altitudes.

From insensibility to this fact, theologians greatly overrate the power of mere critical refutation directed against heretical doubt. They fancy that it must undo in the

sceptic the process which it seems to render impossible to themselves; and when a book like Butler's *Analogy* appears, they regard the orthodox case as complete, and its triumph secure, except with the wilful or the stupid. The clerical pride in that ingenious work, the constancy with which its arguments are reproduced, the exultation with which its dilemma is presented to every opponent, curiously contrast with its utter inefficacy upon the minds it was intended to influence, and show how wide the chasm which separates the systematic divine from the troubled hearts he has to help out of their perplexities. Who ever heard of a Deist turned into Christian by reading the *Analogy*? or of a Christian brought by it into higher conceptions of his religion? Its whole force is expended in baffling simple Theism, or any Christianity that assumes it, and compelling you to take either more than this or less than this,—to go on to orthodoxy or fall back on atheism. Equally admired as a logical feat by sceptics who strain at a gnat and dogmatists who swallow a camel, it hurts and browbeats every intermediate feeling; and even where it carries the intellect, does so by perplexing the moral sense, and reducing reverence to lower terms. That this fatal tendency belongs to the very essence of the argument, will appear from the barest sketch of its structure.

It is altogether an *argumentum ad hominem*, addressed, on behalf of ecclesiastical Christianity, to the believer in simple Theism. He is taken up on his own ground; and nothing more is asked from him at the outset than he is accustomed to allow,—that the world and human life evidence the existence and exemplify the moral government of an Infinite and holy God. Go with me this one mile, says Butler, and I will compel you to go twain; resting with me at last in the assurance that the scheme of Redemption, as orthodox men understand it, has the same Author as the scheme of Creation. For, not a questionable feature can you name in my theology which has not its exact counterpart in yours. It is needless for me to deny

or explain the difficulties; it is enough that I retort them, and show that you also are in the same case. Do you object to the *miraculous* origin of Revelation?—I remind you of the miraculous origin of Nature. Are you repelled by the mystery of the Incarnation?—It is no darker than any other union of the Infinite with the Finite, of spiritual freedom with physical necessity. Are you shocked at the notion of hereditary corruption?—What say you, then, to the natural entail of disease and character? Is it incredible that the punishment of the guilty should be ransomed by anguish to the innocent?—I refer you to the whole history of human life, where all redemptions are vicarious, and the best men pay in sacrifice and sorrow for the deliverance of the worse. If, in the face of these difficulties, you can hold to your Natural Religion, why should they disturb your acceptance of a Revelation to which they still adhere? If the two schemes come from the same Author, what more likely than that they should exhibit the same features?

This argument, it is evident, far from relieving any perplexity, lets it lie in order to balance it by another. It duplicates the sense of painful embarrassment, by detecting the same repulsions in the sceptic's residuary belief which have already determined him to partial unbelief. So far as the reasoning succeeds, it is not by lightening objections in the ecclesiastical scale, but by weighing them more heavily in the theistical; and the only new feeling it can give to an opponent is this, that however ill he may think of other people's God, he has no reason to think better of his own. If he is driven to accept a scheme of doctrine on this ground he surrenders his higher sentiment to a lower necessity, and betrays the devoutness of his faith from shame at a logical reproach.

The cogency of this reasoning appears to us not less questionable than its piety. Granting even that every ugly feature found in the received "scheme of redemption" may be refound in the "scheme of creation," we submit that it occupies a totally different place in the two,—con-

stituting the very text and substance of the one, and only, as it were, a foot-note in an appendix of the other. In the constitution of the world, those parts and arrangements which perplex our sense of the Divine justice and goodness are insignificant exceptions in a grand and righteous whole; and the gloom they would occasion, did they stand alone, is lost in a "more exceeding glory." They do not speak the essence and spirit of the system; they are the silent enigmas that lie out of relation to it, and are superable by faith only from their relative unimportance. It is otherwise with the doctrines by which the creeds offend the moral sense and the natural pieties:—the hereditary curse of sin and ruin;—the eternal punishment of helpless incapacity;—the conveyance of an alien holiness by imputation, and the transfer of an infinite penalty from an offending race to a saving God;—these are no exceptional incidents in the orthodox scheme, but its organic members, its very plan and life, the only thing it has to offer in exemplification of the character of God. These are not the "difficulties" of its "revelation," but the whole of it; if these are not revealed,—its advocates will tell you,—nothing is revealed; and a theology that omits them wants "the essentials" of the Christian faith. Thus the darkness, the negations, the sorrows of Natural Religion are made, not simply to reappear in this Christianity, but to constitute it and be the only soul it has; while the illuminated side of theism suffers eclipse and falls into shadow as a "non-essential." This inversion in the proportion of light to gloom on passing from the one system to the other appears to us utterly to vitiate the conclusion from their Analogy; indeed, in strictness, to destroy the Analogy itself.

Nor is this the only fallacy involved in Butler's reasoning. His fundamental maxim, that "Revelation and nature, having the same Author, may be expected to *exhibit the same features*," may be admitted, until he adds, "and *therefore to contain the same difficulties*." There is, we suppose, *some* limit to the resemblance which may be reasonably

looked for between the two systems. No one's anticipations would be satisfied by their being perfectly alike,—each, in its disclosures, an exact *fac-simile* of the other. And if so,—if the presumption be irresistible in favour of some difference in the midst of the visible affinity,—where should we fitly seek for the lines of divergence? Surely the very antithesis, "*Natural*"—"*Revealed*," is an index to the true seat of contrast. Precisely what Nature hides, is Inspiration given to unveil: it is where the one is silent that the other has to speak; and only in so far as the first leaves us in the dimness of perplexity does the second vouchsafe its light. The "difficulties," therefore, of unaided Theism are exactly what we should *not* expect to find over again in a religion sent to our rescue; and just in proportion as we do so, does the gift forfeit its character as a "Revelation," and remain undifferenced from our prior darkness. To insist that the universe and the gospel come from the same Author, and to forget that they contemplate different ends, supplementary of each other, is to do violence to all laws of rational presumption.

We are far from saying that there is anything inconceivable in a partial revelation, which shall leave many obscurities not cleared up: nor dare we prescribe, by any *à priori* rule, how much must be given, and how much left. We only say that it is the essence of revelation to dissipate darkness; that whatever it does, be it little or be it much, must be of this kind; that, though it may let old perplexities lie unsolved, it contradicts its nature if it introduces new ones; and that as its very idea and aim is to give the key and method of the Divine administration to those who were in danger of missing its spirit amid conflicting details, the antecedent probability is extreme in favour of a luminous simplicity, and against its reproducing the identical riddles on which it takes compassion.

We well know that to question Butler's perfection is, in the eyes of churchmen, little short of the sin against the Holy Ghost. We can honestly say that it is not without

trying hard to believe in him, and not without admiring recognition of his merits as an ethical thinker, that we find his theology, as expressed in his great work, oppressive to the religious feeling and unsound in its logical elaboration. This being the case, it is not surprising that Dr. Mansel's book gives us just the same experience: for it is essentially an adaptation of the same argument to the altered conditions of modern philosophy. The chief difference is the following. Butler concerned himself with the outward constitution of things in both the spheres which he compared, —with the actual laws and arrangements of the world on the one hand, the organic facts and system of redemption on the other. For everything apparently objectionable in the latter he was ready with some corresponding ill look in the former; and having set the deformities in equilibrium, there he left them to cancel each other. How far they are real or not is indifferent to his reasoning, which dwells only on their parallelism, not on their intrinsic validity. He no further accounts for them than by referring to the small measure of our present faculty as applied to the immensity of the Divine scheme; and supposes that they would disappear, even from our view, were our horizon enlarged, and a wider survey obtained over the relations of things. Dr. Mansel, on the other hand, rests nothing on the objective analogy of natural and supernatural arrangements, and everything on the subjective incapacity of the intellect for dealing with either: his plea is, not that God has set similar puzzles in the world and in the gospel, but that man brings the same logical disqualification to both. It matters not, therefore, in his argument, what the particular adjustments of nature or doctrines of Scripture may be: change them ever so much, on this side or on that, they would suit us no better. Our difficulties are not in the things, but in ourselves;—not matters of degree, brooding heavily here and vanishing there, and variable with our opportunities; but, being carried about with us in the very structure of our faculties, are constant for every possible system, and

never short of irremediable contradiction. That the rationalistic critique of the orthodox faith is successful in finding insuperable inconsistencies, is not denied; but you have only, it is said, to apply the same logical experiment to any religious philosophy whatsoever, and it will equally disappear under the process. Thought lies under a fatal disability with regard to Divine things, and is doomed to frame its religion out of hopelessly incompatible beliefs.

There is something very tempting to a reasoner in principle of this kind,—the discovery of a subjective incompetence. It does great execution on very easy terms. It saves all trouble of external reconnoitring and comparison of evidence, and serves for every case alike. It despatches all enemies with one instrument: a sort of unicorn polemic that, like the beast in the book of Daniel, "pushes" impartially against all the cardinal points. Dr. Mansell, accordingly, by a single operation, clears the field of all opponents at once; he has only to wave his metaphysical wand, and pronounce his universal incantation, and they turn into phantoms, and disappear into his appendix;—a miscellaneous prisonhouse, where all evil spirits are reserved for judgment. There would seem to be some little difference between the springs of doubt in ethical minds like Theodore Parker's or Francis Newman's, and in mystical, like Bruno and Schelling, — between the akosmism of Spinoza and the atheism of Comte,—between the historical scepticism of Strauss or Baur and the speculative dialectic of Hegel,—between the business-like rationalism of the Socini and the impersonal theology of Schleiermacher: and he indeed must be a fortunate divine who has found an answer that will serve for all. The danger of such a comprehensive refutation always is, lest it should inadvertently include yourself. It is difficult to set so large an appetite to work, and stand yourself out of reach of its voracity. And we have serious fears that Dr. Mansel must sooner or later fall a victim to the hunger of his own logic.

The mighty spell which is to paralyze all heretical critics at a stroke is no other than Sir William Hamilton's principle, that the Infinite cannot be known, because to know is to discriminate, and what is discriminated is finite; or, again, to state the matter in another form, that the Absolute cannot be known, because to know is to apprehend relations, and what is related is not absolute. The rule may be expressed in the terms of various other antitheses: that thought, as such, can deal only with that which is *conditioned* and which is *plural;* and must therefore find unconditioned and unitary being inaccessible. This inability to think or apprehend, except by relation and difference, is assumed to be a human limitation of faculty, a provincial incompetency, a negation of mental light and power. And the realm from which it excludes us is precisely, we are told, the religious realm: for God is that infinite, absolute, unconditioned unity, the knowledge of whom contradicts the very nature of thought. Hence there can be no philosophy of religion. Every attempt to construct such a system has to substitute spurious counterfeits of the genuine Divine essentials: for positive "Infinitude," the simply *Indefinite;* for the "Absolute" *per se,* the mere ground term of a Relation; for the "Unconditioned," the conditioning antecedent. Not only are these ambitious impostures in contradiction with the legitimate originals (the "indefinite," for instance, being susceptible of increase, while the "Infinite" is not); but they are themselves only illusions,—negations of thought rather than thoughts,—the mental background on which our positive conceptions rise and display themselves. No ingenuity can avail to rescue us from this inherent disqualification: no spasmodic spring can carry us over the chasm that parts our intellect from all divine knowledge; no cautious steps and steady eye can find a bottom to the cleft between. A critique of religion is impossible to a mind which is condemned by its constitution to a faith composed of contradictions.

In order to show the different forms in which these

inevitable contradictions crop up, our author reviews, first, the metaphysical systems which form themselves, like Spinoza's and Hegel's, by evolution from the supreme terms of thought,—the Infinite, the Absolute, the Causal,—as their data, and endeavour from this ontological beginning to find a deductive path into and through the phenomenal world of nature and humanity: and then, the Psychological systems which, inversely, commence from the laws of human consciousness,—the sense of dependence, the belief of origination, the feeling of obligation,—and attempt thence to explore a passage into the hyperphysical and divine world. In the former, the finite can never attain to its rights or at all emerge from the pantheistic whole; nor can any predicates be attached to the Infinite: for, on the principle that *omnis determinatio est negatio*, it parts with its essence by gaining an attribute, and, unless it is to lose its affirmative reality, must for ever remain the blank of Being. In the latter order of systems, on the other hand, we can never escape from the finite: if we wait for logical stepping-stones to the other side, we shall wait for ever, and have no resource but to lodge in an atheistic world; and if, rather than this, we convey into a presumed Infinite our ideas of Personality, Intellect, and Character, we do but deny the essence we mean to enrich, and in the same breath affirm limitation and disclaim it. The self-destructive nature of the fundamental conceptions of rational theology is thus exhibited:

"These three conceptions,—the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite,—all equally indispensable, do they not imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same being? A Cause cannot, as such, be absolute; the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect; the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction, by introducing the idea of

succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the Infinite. How can the Infinite become that which it was not from the first? If causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite, that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits. Creation at any particular moment of time being thus inconceivable, the philosopher is reduced to the alternative of pantheism, which pronounces the effect to be mere appearance, and merges all real existence in the cause. The validity of this alternative will be examined presently.

"Meanwhile, to return for a moment to the supposition of a true causation. Supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But consciousness, again is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the object is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by itself as the Absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded, by distinguishing between the Absolute as related to another and the Absolute as related to itself. The Absolute, it may be said, may possibly be conscious, provided it is only conscious of itself. But this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive than the other. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of the subject's existence or not, is either created in and by the act of consciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In the former case, the object depends upon the subject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends upon the object, and the object alone is the true absolute. Or, if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each exists independently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only a pair of relatives; for co-existence, whether in consciousness or not, is itself a relation."—(P. 47.)

The general conclusion which Dr. Mansel draws from this *Streit der Facultäten* is hardly what the premisses would lead us to expect. Our idea of the "Infinite," being merely negative, would seem to be the index to no positive reality. Our idea of "Personality," being a mere reflection of our limited consciousness, is declared to be incapable of application to a nature not finite. Yet we are assured (p. 89) that it is "our duty to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite," though the two conceptions contradict each other. The notion of "Infinitude" is at once "inadmissible" in theology, and yet "indispensable." Nor is this humiliating necessity of compounding a faith out of contradictories at all peculiar to our *Religion*. All the fundamental postulates of thought,—Time, Space, Substance, Power,—are in the same plight; introducing us to entities which we cannot harmonize with our experience of phenomena. In all these cases nothing is left to us but to accept the ontological ideas as *true relatively to us*,—given forms of *our* thought,—but to beware of regarding them as valid for things in themselves, or for any point of view beyond our own. Whether they do or do not represent realities as they are, we cannot tell: but as we are imprisoned within them, they are *regulative* truth for our minds, though having no claim to the character of *speculative* truth, imaging what lies in the outer daylight of the universe beyond our dreams.

Our readers will at once recognize in this sketch a revival of the principles of Kant; who, by resolving into subjective conditions all our ontological and perceptive assumptions, left the intellect in idealistic insulation, and blew up every bridge by which thought could pass to the mainland of real Being. Dr. Mansel, however, is more thorough-going still. Kant, it is well known, recovered in his treatise on the Practical Reason the ground he had abandoned in his analysis of the Speculative: and authorized the resumption, as presuppositions of conscience, of

the very faiths, in moral freedom, responsibility, and absolute divine law, which no dialectic was able to guarantee. Our author complains of this as an inconsequence; and carrying his own scepticism steadily through, involves Morals with Theology in the same sentence of mere subjectivity, rendering their ideas inapplicable, except in condescension to our incapacities, to any sphere beyond the human.* We may indeed,—perhaps must,—*speak* of an Absolute Morality: but the phrase involves a contradiction in terms; for the moment we try any ethical conception upon an Infinite nature, it is swallowed up and disappears. Emotion and change, such as are inseparable from disapproval or compassion, from either free forgiveness or conditional reconciliation, and from openness to prayer, are incompatible with immutable self-identity: yet, on the other hand, the alternative suppositions, of an ethical neutrality or an optionless and necessitated justice, no less impose limits on the perfection of Being. On this side also, our author contends, all religious belief is necessarily a tissue of contradictions, protected only by the existence of equal contradictions in any scheme of unbelief. The conclusion from the whole is, that, in our natural Theism, we must hold to *both* of the incompatible terms, the existence of the Infinite that can have no predicates, and the truth of the Finite predicates he cannot have; and that, bringing this state of mind to the scheme

* It is with great diffidence that, speaking from memory alone, we call in question a statement respecting Kant, repeatedly made or implied by so studious and careful a writer as Dr. Mansel. But we know of no authority for the following representation, and cannot persuade ourselves that Kant has anywhere exposed himself to so reasonable a criticism: "Kant unquestionably went too far, in asserting that things in themselves *are not* as they appear to our faculties; the utmost that his premisses could warrant him in asserting is, that we cannot tell whether they are so or not" (p. 348). Dr. Mansel produces no citation, and affords no means of verification. Certainly, if Kant ever said such a thing, he not only "went too far," but fell into variance with the whole spirit of his philosophy.

of Redemption, we are in no condition to cast the first stone at its seeming inconsistencies, but are bound to content ourselves with estimating its evidences, without attempting a critique of its doctrines. Taken at their worst, they are as good as ours.

This line of thought, we must confess, appears to us even painfully precarious. Suppose, for argument's sake, that we grant the premisses, and say, with Sir W. Hamilton, that only the Finite can be given us in thought; that the Infinite is for us only a negation,—a subjective inability to think; and that relative conceptions, on such a subject, are equivalent to ignorance. How far do these assumptions bear out Dr. Mansel's conclusion, that we must throw ourselves on Revelation? They establish conditions which make all revelation impossible.

Let us allow for the moment that, by the constitution of our faculties, we have (as our author says) a legitimate belief in the *existence* of the Infinite, but a total inability to attach any predicates to this subject. How can such a Being, so cut off from all possible access to our minds, *reveal* himself to us? As well might you say that Silence can make a speech. An existence without predicates is a non-existence: as Dr. Mansel himself admits, "pure being is" *to us* "pure nothing" (p. 328). That negation should send a message to nescience appears not readily conceivable; nor can we imagine in what the "evidences" of such a communication could consist.

But do the premisses really guarantee to us even the bare *existence* of the Infinite? We cannot see how. The only ground for this faith which Dr. Mansel ever presents is, "that our whole consciousness is compassed about with restrictions, which we are ever striving to pass, and ever failing in the effort" (p. 121). But the bird in the cage and the captive in his cell learn nothing, by their vain efforts, of the world beyond. It is a marvellous thing to affirm that every incompetency implies an Infinitude. Our mental limits are evidence of no more than that the intellect

is less than the intelligible. If, moreover, we are capable of discovering, with Hamilton and Mansel, that this "Infinite," which we are to endow with "existence," is but a subjective negation, the mocking shadow of our own impotence, we lose every ground for holding to its objective reality. The very discovery itself consists in nothing else than the detection of untrustworthiness in the belief. What does it amount to but this,—that our cognitive faculties are constructed without provision for any thing beyond phenomenal knowledge,—that we are made exclusively for the finite, not for the infinite? And this is only to say that, whether there be an Infinite or not, is a question beyond our affirmation or denial.

Turn the matter which way you will, this much is certain: to a mind disqualified in its structure for a "Philosophy of the Infinite," there can be made no Revelation of the Infinite; in older form of phrase, if natural religion be impossible, *through incapacity in the subject*, so is supernatural. Religious ignorance arising from defect in the attainable evidence, or from an undeveloped state of the faculties, may be remedied by supplementary information or an awakening discipline. But if the very instrument of intelligence carries its own darkness with it, and is fated ever to turn its blind side to God, then it stands similarly related to all possible media of expression, and there are no terms on which Divine light can be had. Where the receptive power is at fault, it is vain to multiply and intensify communication: as well might you hang a blind asylum with chandeliers, and expect that, though the daylight was useless, the brilliancy at night would tell. If there are no predicates of God assured to us by Reason, or only such as contradict each other and open the way to opposing possibilities; if we have only such knowledge (?) of Him as either may or may not represent him as he is (p. 146); if we can affirm nothing of him that might not with equal reason be denied;—there are no discriminative marks by which he and his agency may be recognized: for the

unknown has no characteristics. Our incompetency extends therefore further than Dr. Mansel contemplates,—to the signs and evidences of Revelation, as well as its contents; and the paralysis of Natural Religion is the suppression of Revealed.

Our author's logic, then, in mowing down its thistle-field, inconsiderately mows off its own legs. He cuts away the only supports on which religious thought can rest or move; and nothing short of an unqualified ontological scepticism is in agreement with his premisses. We cannot in the least discover *why*, on his principles, we are to believe *either* of the two contradictories which he requires us to hold in combination,—that God is infinite, that God is personal. He disparages the sources of cognition from which we receive these propositions, yet keeps their allegations on his books. If the witnesses are untrustworthy, why let their testimony fix the main points of the case? The "infinite" being unmeaning for us, and the "personal" unmeaning in God, what title can they show to joint hold on our belief? No intellectual intuition, no consciousness, no legitimate inference, can assure us of either; where, then, are their credentials? To these questions we find no reply except that disbelief, if we choose to try it, will bring no logical gain. This is a good argument for a Pyrrhonist, who would maintain us in indeterminate equipoise, but is inconvertible to the purposes of the Christian philosopher and divine. The habit of dealing with derivative steps of thought is not favourable to a firm grasp of the primary data; and we cannot help thinking that Dr. Mansel's own mind is not clear with regard to the ultimate roots of religious belief. He cleverly pursues and breaks the track of many a system of erratic metaphysics; but, fascinated with the hunt of delusion and incompetency, he pushes the rout too far, and, as it seems to us, rides over the brink of the solid world, and falls into the abysses.

And now, having argued the matter from our author's premisses, we must confess and justify our discontent with

them. We cannot admit the doctrine of the religious incompetency of the human faculties; and the wide concurrence in it of schools apparently opposite,—of Mill and Comte, of Hamilton and Mansel,—will hereafter, we conceive, be looked upon as no less curious a phenomenon than the ovation with which, in the last century, the Critical Philosophy was carried off along the most divergent paths of thought. Undeterred by the fashion of the day and the influence of authoritative names, we do not hesitate to believe with Cousin, that there is a legitimate "passage from psychology to ontology," and to protest against the paradox that human intelligence, in its highest exercise, can only mock us with impossibilities and contradictions.

To put the matter into the shortest formula, let us say, we admit the *relative character* of human thought as a psychological fact; we deny it as an ontological disqualification. All acts of the mind, whether creative or apprehensive, are undoubtedly discriminative, a procedure from a less to a more determinate state. As self-conscious, they carry with them the distinction between subject and object; and as directed upon this, and not on that, they cut out a definite from an indefinite. To conceive, to know, to reflect, is in every case to deal exclusively with difference and relation: mental action is dualistic, not monistic. So far we are agreed.

Is, then, this *relativity* an incompetency or a qualification for thinking? a cognitive limitation, or a cognitive power? Our author, following Sir W. Hamilton, treats it as a provincial restriction imposed upon our nature, barring us from escape into the realm of real rather than seeming knowledge, and under the show of science dooming us to nescience. Is there any plea for such disparagement and distrust beyond the argument which, in parallel case, Hegel wittily attributed to Kant: "It cannot be true, because *we* think it"? What reason is there to suppose that in natures higher than ours there is another sort of knowledge in which nothing is differenced, and even the knower is not separated from

the known? And if such a condition of being existed, would it legitimately rank as *more* intelligent or *less* intelligent than ours? And again, where is the field of otherwise possible knowledge from which this relativity excludes us? Drop the limit, and what new reaches of being do you bring within the intellectual horizon? Nothing surely can be more arbitrary than to treat the very essence of a faculty as the negation of faculty, and complain of the eye as enabling us to do nothing but see, and condemning us to see only what is visible. That we cannot think except by differencing, means only that we cannot know where there is nothing to be known, or that we cannot use a function without having it. If intelligence consists in distinguishing, how can distinguishing be an incompetency to understand? And does the "competency" of the most perfect intellect consist in this,—that it dispenses with differences, and sees all things to be equally true, and truth itself identical with falsehood?

But, it will be said, this relative character of knowledge at all events limits you to the finite, and precludes access to God as Infinite. On the contrary, we submit that relative apprehension is always and necessarily of two terms together: if of sound, then also of silence; if of succession, then also of duration; if of the finite, then also of the infinite. It is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of Spinoza, of Schelling, of Hegel, of all monistic speculative systems, that they set up in isolated supremacy one of two inseparable data of thought, and then endeavour to educe the other out of it; and Dr. Mansel falls, we think, into the same snare. He strains after an Infinite that shall exclude the Finite; an Absolute that shall emerge from all Relation; a Causality that shall be pure of all conditions. If Theism were staked on his finding such things, his despair of it would be natural enough. For these conceptions, which he denies to be on speaking terms, are in each case Siamese twins, between which any affectation of estrangement cannot fail to be highly inconvenient. They come into existence before

our thought together, and have their living meaning only *in pairs;* one of the two giving us the constant and ontological ground, the other the phenomenal manifestation. The attempt to think away the finite from the presence of the infinite, or *vice versâ*, must inevitably fail; and of the two schemes to which the attempt gives rise, viz., that which says "entities only can be known," and that which says "phenomena only can be known," both are to be unhesitatingly rejected. Two other possibilities remain, viz., the Idealism which, treating all "relation" as a subjective economy of ours, pronounces that we know *neither;* and the Realism which, taking relations in the mind as exponents of relations out, decides that we know *both*. It is on this last alone that, in our view, a sound philosophy can take its stand.

The position taken up against this doctrine rests on the distinction between positive and negative ideas. Of the finite, it is said we have a positive idea; of the infinite, except as the negative of this, we have none at all: the one, therefore, is the exponent of an objective reality, the other is only a subjective incapacity. The term which is given to us by experience is reliable: its concomitant, which is supplied in thought, is an empty form. In every case of relation between presumed entity and perceived phenomenon,—Space and position,—Time and succession,—Substance and quality,—Infinite and finite,—the more ambitious term is unaccredited,—a mere metaphysical impostor; putting on the airs of demonstration and universal validity, and pretending to hold good for all possible worlds; but, by this very mark, betraying its close confinement to our own mind as the mere shape and shadow of our faculty. So far does Dr. Mansel carry this Kantian Idealism, that he pronounces all judgments insecure and personal in proportion as they are self-evident, and, like the exact sciences, exhibit the characteristics of Universality and Necessity (p. 203). Now we will not enter here on the question whether those pairs of ideas are or are not valid

beyond the enclosure of our nature; *that* falls into the general controversy with the Idealist. But this we venture to affirm, that, valid or invalid, the two terms of each pair must stand or fall *together;* and that, except by an arbitrary *coup-de-tête*, one cannot be taken and the other left. Both are given to us,—*e.g.*, a limited figure and the boundless Space from which it is cut out,—in one and the same mental act, and are equally secured by the veracity, or vitiated by the unveracity, of our intellectual constitution. There can be no objection to call the one "positive" and the other "negative," provided it be understood that *each* is so with regard to the other, and that the relation is convertible; the finite, for instance, being the negative for the infinite, not less than the infinite of the finite. If more than this be meant, if the word "negative" is immovably fixed on the ontological term, as a disparagement of its trustworthiness and an assertion that it is obtained by mere thinking-away of sterling elements, then we dispute the doctrine as false alike to psychology and to logic; and with Dr. M'Cosh, whom our author unsatisfactorily criticizes (p. 333), contend for a "positive" idea of the infinite. The attempt to resolve this idea into that of the "indefinite," does but mock the feeling of every precise thinker. That is "indefinite," to which we know no end; that is "infinite" which we know to have no end. The belief in the one is attainable by simply thinking limits away; the belief in the other rests on the positive deposition of our own faculties, which must be either taken at their word or dismissed as cheats.

It is perfectly true that of the Infinite, whether of Space, Time, or other mode of Being, we can form no mental *representation;* and that, when we try to do so, we can only resort to a vain stretching of the finite till we are tired and give it up. We suspect that this is what is meant when the idea is identified with a mere inability to think; for certainly many of the "contradictions" charged upon it are simply cases of baffled imagination. But it is no objection

to either the reality or legitimacy of a thought, that it is not of a kind to be brought before "the mind's *eye*." We *believe*, though we cannot *conceive*, the infinitude of space and time: and these beliefs take their place and perform their proper intellectual function in processes of rigorous scientific reasoning; not only without vitiating the result, but with indispensable aid to its true evolution. If this is not a "*thinking*" the infinite,—this letting it into a procedure of thought with operative power on the final product,—we know not what thinking is.

We confess a total insensibility to most of the alarming perplexities which our author endeavours to fix on the Idea of the Infinite. They all arise out of the spurious Spinozistic demand, that this idea shall be kept out of relation to any thing, and the false assumption that, unless this is done, the idea is sacrificed. Except in personal argument with opponents making this demand, there is no reason for giving way to it. No religious truth or moral interest requires us to identify God with any infinitude but that which stands in ontological relation to the finite. When we are asked whether, in creating the world, God increased the quantity of being, and are reminded that, if He did, infinitude received addition, and if He did not, the finite world is nothing at all,—the consequences do not in either case distress us as might be expected: an Infinitude that supplies its own completion was potentially without defect; and a world that manifests an Infinitude other than its own atones for its nonentity. As well might you ask whether the sun, on first appearing, added any thing to the extension of the universe; because, if he did, it was not infinite before; if he did not, he could have no size. These puzzles (which, be it remembered, remain after Revelation precisely what they were before) arise in great measure from the application of quantitative ideas to qualitative existence, and the attempt to solve all problems of genesis and change by the formulas of addition and subtraction. In order to be added together or to limit one another, objects must be

homogeneous and must be magnitudes; and to speak of "quantity of *being*" in the abstract, or to discuss such a combination as God + World, appears to us not less unmeaning than to ask about the temperature of duration, or to debate whether sleep + dream is larger than sleep alone. In forgetfulness of this principle, our author pronounces the co-existence of the Divine attributes inconceivable without contradiction, because involving a plurality of infinitudes, side by side. If the attributes were not each *sui generis*, and if they wanted room, the remark would be true. But if, according to Spinoza's rule, "thinking is not bounded by body, or body by thinking," there is no need for heterogeneous attributes to become finite in order to co-exist.

These things being borne in mind, it is truly astonishing to find Dr. Mansel treating as perfectly parallel mysteries the co-existence of Attributes in the Divine substance, and the co-existence of Persons in the Divine Unity. For the cases differ precisely in that which turns the scale from possibility to impossibility. No two *attributes* of the same substance are alike; there is no tangential relation between them; therefore no mutual interference. But with *personalities* it is otherwise: as so many distinct *subjects* they are generically the same, with differences only attributive; and are therefore mutually exclusive and limit each other. It is only by attenuating the conception of personality till it melts away into that of attribute or function, that this doctrine becomes at all presentable in thought; and so, to the very relation which our author adduces as the counterpart of its contradiction, we habitually resort to relieve it of its mystery. In like manner, Dr. Mansel's remark that the doctrine of the God-Man is neither more nor less perplexing than any other co-existence of a finite object with the infinite overlooks the real seat of the difficulty, which lies not in the relation of magnitude between the two natures predicated, but in the fact that both of them are *Personal*

essences,—the second Person in the Godhead and the "perfect man" Jesus,—and therefore, by the rule of mutual exclusion in such cases, incapable of union in the same subject. It is a bold paradox to assert that the tormenting and intricate subtleties of the Eutychian and Monophysite controversies concerned a matter no harder to understand than the co-existence of the finite Moon with the infinite Space.

On the whole, then, we cannot follow Dr. Mansel in his scepticism respecting the natural springs of religion in the human mind; and if we could, we should feel that the possibility of revelation was gone too. We have entire faith in the veracity, and in the consistency, of the reports given in by our highest faculties; and think it possible, even within our segment of a life, to trace their convergence towards one Divine and Holy Reality. The causal instinct of the intellect, the solemn suspicions of the conscience, the ideal passion of the imagination, the dependent self-renunciation of the affections, are all, we believe, so many lines of attraction to the same Infinite Object. And however numerous the aspects under which that transcendent Being may present Himself to the different sides of our nature, we see no reason to doubt their consonance, or to despair of the noble and pious attempt to exhibit them in harmony. Nor do we think it should be a congenial task, for a divine versed in philosophy, to enlist his skill in the defeat of this attempt,—in widening the discrepancies, reducing the approximations, and making the most of the failures of the religious reason. We have no tenderness towards the metaphysical pantheism,—from Spinoza to Hegel,—which Dr. Mansel criticizes in his earlier lectures. But we should give it up to him with more satisfaction, did he not, in his doctine of the Infinite, appropriate its chief feature, and so, in the very act of putting it to death, transfer to himself its most fatal weapon. The effect of his essential sympathy with these systems in their conception of the problem to be

proposed, shows itself especially when he ceases to contend with them, and address himself to the *moral* difficulties of faith, the doctrine of forgiveness, the grounds of prayer, the possibility of character in God. His treatment of these great subjects makes us forget the philosopher and recognize the divine: inventing imaginary difficulties, and removing them by fictitious solutions; implying slighter acquaintance than in the previous discussions with the literature of the subject; and missing, as it seems to us, the essential bases of ethical theory.

The general spirit of this book is scholarly and liberal; and probably the deviations from this tone are involuntary and intellectual merely. But there are examples of controversial unfairness, which, though sanctioned by usage, we deeply lament to see. In notes giving some account of the works of Strauss and of Baur, Dr. Mansel thinks it allowable to bring together, as an anthology of absurdities, all the extreme results and most amazing hints which the Hegelian dialectic of these writers supplies, without noticing the fact that their philosophy is an insignificant accident, which, if entirely removed or replaced by a different scheme, would leave the mass of their historical criticism unaffected. The consequence is, that these notes present a gross caricature, and leave an impression utterly false of two writers, both of whom, in spite of great aberrations of ingenuity, have produced an ineffaceable impression on Christian theology; and one has furnished contributions of extraordinary value to the solution of the grandest of historical problems. How decidedly we are opposed to their main theories, our habitual readers well know; and from their philosophy we stand at a greater distance probably than Dr. Mansel. But no orthodoxy can consecrate the spirit of polemic detraction, or excuse a scholar from recognizing scholarship, or a Christian from observing justice. A writer, however, who thinks (p. 247) that Christianity is all lost, if once you admit the slightest human element in the teaching of Christ, belongs to a stage

of theological opinion at which genial admiration and judicial estimates of modern critical learning are hardly possible. Few things indeed are more striking in this volume than the contrast between the acuteness and refinement of its metaphysics, and the purely popular and elementary character of its Biblical ideas.

NATURE AND GOD.*

THE two brothers Humboldt, it is well known, applying each a fine genius to different pursuits, diverged in their convictions with regard to the supreme objects of thought and faith. William, in sympathy with the life of humanity, studious of its expression in language, in literature, in law, and in all the vicissitudes of civilization, never lost the traces of a Divine Government over the world, and even in the superstitions of mankind saw only a barbarous jargon

* "The present Relations of Science to Religion: a Sermon preached on Act Sunday, July 1, 1860, before the University of Oxford, during the Meeting of the British Association." By Rev. Frederick Temple, D.D., Head-Master of Rugby School. Oxford and London. 1860.

"The Correlation of Physical Forces." By W. R. Grove, M.A., F.R.S. Second Edition. London. 1850.

"The Mutual Relations of the Vital and Physical Forces." By Dr. Carpenter (Philosophical Transactions. 1850).

"Principles of Human Physiology." By Dr. Carpenter. Fifth Edition. 1855.

"The Order of Nature, considered in reference to the Claims of Revelation." By Rev. Baden Powell, M.A., F.R.S., &c. London. 1859.

"The Intellectual Development of Europe, considered with reference to the Views of Mr. Darwin and others, that the Progression of Organisms is determined by Law." By Prof. Draper, M.D., of New York. Communicated to the Zoölogical Section of the British Association (*Athenæum*, July 14, 1860).

"Glimpses of the Heaven that lies about us." By T. E. Poynting. London. 1860.—*National Review*, October, 1860.

attempting an eternal truth. Alexander, at home in the great Cosmos, familiar with the ways of Nature from her rude Titanic workshops to her finest harmonies of life, significantly declared himself to be of "the religion of all men of science." That his implication of "all men of science" in his own negative doctrine is far too sweeping, —not less so, indeed, than the Bishop of Oxford's counterpart assertion that "no men great in science favour Mr. Darwin's hypothesis,"—is evident not only from the older examples of Newton, Boyle, Cuvier, and Davy, but from many of the newest representative names, Oersted, Herschel, Owen, Faraday. Still, there is ample evidence of a certain general tendency in Natural Science to foster habits of thought embarrassing to religious conviction. On a first view it certainly appears strange that the men most conversant with the order of the visible universe should soonest suspect it empty of directing Mind; that they should lose their first faith on the very field where natural theology gleans its choicest instances of design: and on the other hand, that humanistic, moral, and historical studies,—which first open the terrible problems of suffering and guilt and contain all the reputed provocatives of denial and despair, —should confirm and enlarge, rather than disturb, the prepossessions of natural piety. The result, however, ceases to be paradoxical, on closer inspection of the relation between physical and moral knowledge.

The jealousy between natural science and religion is of very long standing. From the time of Anaxagoras onward, every attempt to explain by secondary causes phenomena previously unreduced has been regarded as an audacious wresting of some province from the gods. And, on the other hand, as early at least as Epicurus, the investigators of nature began to tolerate the reference to Divine agency merely as a provisional necessity, to be superseded in each field as it was explored, and serving only as a decent disguise for our residuary ignorance. The dialogue of the *De Naturâ Deorum* exhibits, in the persons of Balbus and

Velleius, the same rivalry between Theology and Physics which often animates the Section-rooms of the British Association. The antiquity of the controversy attests its deep-seated origin, in causes beyond the range of the Biblical records and the peculiarities of the Christian doctrine. The Scriptures, in the presence of the Baconian logic, have merely encountered the inevitable fate of any inflexible *litera scripta* existing side by side with ever-widening inductions. A consecrated theory of the phenomenal universe, embodying the perishable imaginations of one age or people, necessarily blends with every religion, however charged with essential and inspired truth; and, as necessarily, comes to be discredited as discovery extends, till it has to be discharged from its spiritual receptacle. The series of questions on which the conflict has been renewed in modern times between the closed "Word" and the opening Works of God is as long as the chain of inductive sciences themselves; and the result has been invariable,—the patience of nature overcoming the authoritative plea of miracle. Copernicus, in spite of the hierarchy, has cried with more effect than Joshua, "Sun, stand thou still!" Ships are daily chartered to those Antipodes which Lactantius declared to be impossible, and Augustine unscriptural, and Boniface of Metz, beyond the latitude of salvation. Witchcraft so long preserved by the Mosaic Law among our list of crimes, has disappeared from every European code; and demoniacal possession in mania and epilepsy, though in the Gospels giving form to the miracles and evidence to the Messiahship of Christ, has been unable to hold its ground against the exorcism of the College of Physicians. The common parentage of the human race, already rendered distasteful by Prichard's suggested probability of a black Adam and Eve, has become an open question with the advance of ethnology, notwithstanding the absolute dependence upon it of the whole scheme of ecclesiastic theology. The tower of Babel faded into a myth, as the affinity of languages was better under-

stood. Egypt, so long measured by the patriarchal chronology, and cowed by the song of Moses and Miriam, has at last taken a strange revenge upon her fugitives, by discrediting their traditions, and exposing the proofs of her dynasties and arts beyond the verge of their Flood, nay prior to their Eden. The terrestrial cosmogony of Genesis, in spite of all the clamps and holdfasts of a perverted exegesis, has long been knocked to pieces by the geologic hammer. And now it would seem doubtful whether, even with regard to the specific types of organized beings, the idea of sudden creation may not have to be altogether relinquished in favour of a principle of gradual modification.

One by one, these questions may be determined and pass away. And if this were all, a mere glance at the past results, without appealing to the supreme security of truth, ought to tranquillize all religious alarms: for who that has in him any intelligent image of our modern Cosmos would think it "for the glory of God" to have back again the little three-storied, or seven-storied structure, in which the Hebrew and early Christian imagination found room and time for everything, earthly, devilish, and Divine? Every thing has turned out grander in the reality than in the preconception: the heavens that open to the eye of a Herschel, the geologic time whose measures direct the calculations of a Lyell, the chain of living existence whose links are in the mind of a Hooker, Agassiz, or Darwin, infinitely transcend the universe of Psalmist's song and Apocalyptic vision. However obstinate the battle may seem to be on each of these particular points, as it arises, the combatants again and again fight out a peace at last: —why, indeed, should the theologian object to find the scene of Divine Agency larger, older, more teeming with life, than he had thought? But all these collisions have a significance far deeper than the special topic of each occasion. They are signs of a more fundamental conflict, whose essence remains when they are set at rest;—of a

real, ultimate, irreducible *difference*, easily mistaken for *contradiction*, between the whole scientific and the whole religious mode of approaching and viewing the external world.

Christianity, engaged in establishing immediate relations between Man and God, takes little notice of Nature; which might in fact be absent altogether without material injury to a scheme pervadingly *super*natural; and which was actually to vanish in order to the final realization of the Divine purpose for Humanity. The defining lines of the religion run, so to speak, overhead of Nature, and pass direct from spirit to Spirit: Given, the human consciousness of sinful need and the sigh for holy life; given also, the Divine response of forgiveness, rescue, and communion; and the essential idea is constituted. The circle of thought and feeling which it collects around it has only a negative relation to the outward Cosmos, and finds Nature rather in its way. Still, when compelled to look the visible world in the face and recognize it as the depository of some permanent meaning, Christianity, like all pure and spiritual Theism, can only regard the universe as the manifestation and abode of a Free Mind, like our own; embodying his personal thought in its adjustments, realizing his own ideal in its phenomena, just as we express our inner faculty and character through the natural language of an external life. In this view, we interpret Nature by Humanity; we find the key to her aspects in such purposes and affections as our own consciousness enables us to conceive; we look everywhere for physical signals of an ever-living Will; and decipher the universe as the autobiography of an Infinite Spirit, repeating itself in miniature within our Finite Spirit. The grandest natural agencies are thus but servitors of a grander than themselves: "the winds are his messengers; and flaming fire, his minister." Using Nature as his organ, he transcends it: the act in which he does so is the exercise of his own Free Volition, rendering determinate what was indeter-

minate before: it is thus the characteristic of such act to be *supernatural:* and Man, so far as he shares a like prerogative, occupies a like position; standing to that extent outside and above the realm of necessary law, and endowing with existence either side of an alternative possibility. At both ends therefore of the scheme of Cosmical order, are beings that go beyond it: all that is natural lies enclosed within the supernatural, and is the medium through which the Divine mind descends into expression and the Human ascends into interpreting recognition. The effect of this faith upon the study of objects and phenomena is obvious enough. They will be interesting, not on their own account, but as signs of the Thought which issues them: in quest of this, conjecture will turn inwards; and, taking counsel from the higher moral consciousness, will come back to them and see meanings and motives they do not contain. The observer will be in danger of converting the universe into the mere reflection of his own conscience and emotions; of overlooking its calm neutralities; of reading some special smile in its sunshine and judgment in its storms; or, when experience and culture have rendered these simple interpretations no longer possible, of following some more elaborate, but still premature, clue of design, and losing himself in a labyrinth of misconstrued relations. The disposition of the human soul to seek for its own prototype and start at its own shadow in the outward universe, is a solemn and significant fact. But it can no more do the work of natural knowledge, than the inspection of a foreign people's expressive looks and gestures can supersede the patient study of their language,—a language formed by the working of the same feelings and ideas, yet not intelligible through mere sympathy with these. At a moment when our thirteen inches of summer rain are episcopally explained, in diocese after diocese, as a punishment of some unspecified sin, and are about to be stopped by deprecation, we can scarcely wonder at the well-known contempt

with which both Bacon and Spinoza have visited the applied doctrine of Final causes.

Science, on the other hand, brings to the scrutiny of Nature quite a different order of faculty and feeling. It lays aside, as intrusive, the inner moral consciousness with its postulates and beliefs; and enters the field under pure guidance of the Perceptive and Comparing powers. It might accomplish the whole of its avowed aim, with less embarrassed speed, if the mind could actually be reduced to an unmoral, impersonal mechanism of intellectual elaboration; transfusing nothing of itself into the universe, but logically working up, in crystalline arrangements of resemblance, co-existence, and succession, the phenomena given from without. This *à priori* limitation of its instruments involves a corresponding limitation of its field; precluding it from the whole area of free causality, and enclosing it within the range of phenomena now determinate. For the same reason, the order of its advance through this field must be ever one and the same,—from sensible particulars to related groups, from minor to major laws, from classifications with a single base to others that take account of many. Beginning with the rudest raw materials of observation,—the *πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς*,—it carries up the rules they yield into the next rank of things, taking on some refined addition to make the expression adequate to the case; and so on, till the formula which shaped itself at the bottom of nature finds its way upward to the top, and humanity itself, as a scientific object, seems to come out as a mere culminating development of the earliest and lowest term. The hierarchy of laws which Science constructs accomplishes the grand end, of enabling her to predict the course of nature. In part, they are direct rules of empirical and concrete succession, simply describing the order of bodies and their appearances, as in Plane Astronomy. In part, as in Physical Astronomy, they are rules combined out of the decomposed conditions of analyzed phenomena. In either case, the power of

prediction is attained; and equally so, whether the rules present the *ipsissima vestigia* of nature, as we believe to be the case with Kepler's laws, or whether, by some device of reduction and substitution, they furnish mere equivalent elements, tantamount, in all their combinations, to the natural facts. The Ptolemaic foreknowledge of eclipses was manifestly due to artifices of this latter kind: and we incline, with Adam Smith, to refer even the Celestial Dynamics of Newton to the same head. Be this as it may, the mere ability to reason out future individual phenomena by strict deduction from some equation of abstract conditions impresses us with a sense of Fate: the logical cogency of the inferential steps is mistaken for a material nexus among the objective facts: and, when taken in conjunction with the uniformity revealed by inductive observation, fixes upon the scientific fancy that nightmare of Universal Necessity, beneath which every higher faith either is suppressed or cries out in agony. In a universe thus regarded there is no room for any thing but determinate phenomena: and the semblance of somewhat else in man is readily explained away, by simply throwing him in among natural objects, studying him exclusively from the outside, and disparaging the possibility or the validity of self-knowledge. Had he ever so free a causal power, *its* phenomena also, once summoned to exist, must be determinate, must vary with the scope and weight of his limiting conditions, must be no less open than any other facts to the statist's method of averages: so that you have only to shut the door on the inner consciousness, and restrict us to the gate where the facts come out, in order to lose witness of the supernatural in man, and draw him also within the meshes of inevitable Law.

The radical antithesis, then, between Religion and Science consists in this:—that the former, proceeding on the data of our Voluntary and Moral faculties, carries a supernatural interpretation through the universe, and sees in nature the expression of affections and will like our

own; while the latter, proceeding on the data of our Perceptive and Generalizing faculties, discovers uniformities of phenomena, and accepts the conception of necessary law not only as the key to Nature, but as exhaustive and ultimate. Let the maxims which are self-evident to either of these sets of faculties be applied to the sphere of the other, and the effect can only be to discredit and dissipate the objects in that sphere. If every phenomenon is the momentary expression of free volition,—if the supernatural reigns everywhere and alone, then is nature an illusion, and the demarcation is erased between Primary causality and Secondary law. If, on the other hand, "we know nothing but phenomena,"—if our cognitive endowments are exhausted upon "resemblances, co-existences, and successions,"—then is the Order of nature our only reality,—its Causality, our dream; and of God,—who is not "a phenomenon,"—we cannot rationally speak.

The most obvious way of escape from this dilemma is, to restrain the pretensions of each class of faculties within its own province, and protest against its ambition of universal empire. Let the moral and spiritual intimations, it is said, have their own authority and sustain their own beliefs; they need not be meddled with so long as they stop at home and do not overrun the Cosmos with their theology. Let the observing and inductive tendency push on,—the mensurative and deductive calculus work out its results;—they can but give us new truth, so long as they deal only with finite things, and do not trespass upon the sphere of Personality and Infinitude. This is the tone prevailingly assumed both by liberal divines and by reverential or cautious men of science; and it suffices to establish an armistice between them which is at least an agreeable change upon open war. To this compromise Bacon habitually resorted: and quite in the sense of his philosophy it is found pervading the writings of the late lamented Baden Powell. To us, we confess, it is profoundly unsatisfactory:

especially when the two separated provinces are treated, not as two independent and incommensurate kinds of knowledge or kinds of faith, but the one as knowledge, and the other as faith. Mr. Baden Powell intended, we are sure, to be not less loyal to his Christian Theism than he was to his Inductive philosophy. When, however, after volumes of proof that the universe discloses nothing but immutable law and material development, so orderly indeed as to bespeak Thought, but so inexorable as to be silent of Character, after treating the supernatural as intrinsically incognizable, and the moral and spiritual as entirely out of relation to the rational faculty, he briefly relegates us to "faith" for our grounds of religious conviction, we certainly feel that the door is rather rudely slammed in the face of our inquiry, and that we are turned out of the select society of the philosophers who know, to take our place with the plebs who believe. It is utterly destructive of the equipoise of authority between the two spheres, to characterize the one as "knowledge," which involves objective certainty, the other as "faith," which goes no further than subjective assurance. This it was which exposed Bacon to the false, but not unnatural, suspicion of Atheism; and the painful negative impression of unsolved problems, so generally left on Mr. Baden Powell's readers, is mainly due to the same crudeness of distinction. The truth is, he had effectually thought out the one side of the question which was congenial with his intellectual habits and pursuits, without gaining any corresponding command of the other; and his imagination, left alone with the astounding revelations of modern science, was not simply possessed but overpowered by the conception of all-comprehending and necessary laws. A more balanced reflection would at once have shown the futility of the distinction he wished to establish. If by "*faith*" he meant reliance on a principle as self-evident, *i.e.*, recommended only by its psychological necessity;—if by "*knowledge*," distinguished from faith, he meant an acquired apprehension of truth on evidence other than its

own ;* then there is just as much "faith" concerned in Science as in Religion ; and just as much "knowledge" in Religion as in Science. Not a step could Geometry, Arithmetic, Physics, advance without assumptions respecting Space, Time, external Substance, which are no less pure and absolute gifts of our psychological constitution than the moral assurance of our responsibility. And in Ethics, the propositions, that it is wrong to punish an unconscious act, that extreme temptation mitigates guilt ; —in Religion, that the hypocrite's prayer is unavailing, that to the pure in heart God is best revealed,—are *known* not less certainly than in Science the place of the North from the pointing of the needle, or the recent birth of an animal from the mother's milk.

Even apart from the inexact and unequal balance maintained by Mr. Baden Powell between the rival claims, a mere compromise founded on a division of territory is intrinsically impracticable. The *savant* cannot help advancing his lines of thought into human and moral relations and esteeming them amenable to him. The theologian cannot help applying his faith to the universe, for the supernatural is conceivable only in relation to the natural, and the transcendency of God involves the subordination of the world. And if a man be at once *savant* and theologian, how is he to manage the partition of his creed? One side of him denying all knowledge but of necessity and nature, the other believing only freedom and God, is he to take turn and turn about with the "Yes" and "No," and care nothing about their discord or their harmony? Whether as a logical invention or as a work of art, we cannot admire this composite figure, half *philosophe*, half *saint* ; on the left of the mid-line, a Diderot, on the right, a Fénélon. No earnest mind can endure a life of double

* We do not propose these as satisfactory definitions of "faith" and "knowledge": but the terms, if treated as mutually-exclusive opposites, appear to admit of no others. And this is the case with which we have to deal.

consciousness, or excuse it on the pedantic plea of different faculties. Many or few, their testimony must all converge on the unity of truth, and is falsely construed till it does so. If the report of "the moral and spiritual powers" be trustworthy,—if there lives an Eternal Will immanent in the universe and communing with ourselves, it is impossible to avoid the inquiry, in what relation this Primary and Voluntary Cause subsists to those Secondary Laws of phenomena which it is the business of Science to define. How are the seemingly contrary beliefs forced on us by our outward and by our inward apprehension to adjust themselves in reconciled co-existence?

Is there any middle term which can aid the mutual understanding between the Religious and the Scientific view of nature?—any fundamental thought common to both, or passing as an essential from the one to the other? We think there is, viz., the idea of *Force*. That this really is an intermediate conception, more than physical, less than theological, will probably be conceded on both sides. It is less than theological: for, in league with the epithet "material," it can quit the Theist, and take service with the Atheist. It is more than physical: for the term certainly goes beyond the meaning of the word "Law"; it expresses neither any observable phenomenon, nor any mere order of co-existence or succession among phenomena. To our objective Perception and Comparison nothing is given but movements or changes; to our Inductive Generalization, nothing but the sifting and grouping of these in space and time. Such mental aggregates or series of phenomena complete what we mean by a Law; but are only suggestive *signs* of a Force in itself imperceptible. As defined by Mr. Grove, the word denotes "that active principle inseparable from matter which induces its various changes" (p. 14). So well aware, indeed, are the more rigorous Inductive logicians (as Comte and Mill) of the hyperphysical character of this notion, that they would expel it as a trespasser on the Baconian domain; or, if it stays,

strip it of its native significance, in order to reduce it to their service. Let any one, however, only imagine the sort of jargon into which, agreeably to this advice, our language of Dynamics would have to be translated; let him try to express the several intensities in terms of Time-succession, and he will need no other proof of the utter helplessness of physics without this hyperphysical idea. Mr. Grove most justly remarks: "The word 'Force,' and the idea it aims at expressing, might indeed be objected to by the purely physical philosopher as representing a subtle mental conception, and not a sensuous perception or phenomenon. To avoid its use, however, if open to no other objection, would be so far a departure from recognized views as to render language scarcely intelligible" (p. 12).

It is admitted, then, that we have here a physical postulate indispensable to the interpretation of nature, yet not physically known. Its objective reality is guaranteed, the suspicion of its being a "mental figment" is excluded, by the same security on which we hold the infinitude of Space and the impossible co-existence of different Times, viz., its subjective necessity as a condition for conceiving objects and phenomena at all:—a necessity, we must add, evident in the habitual language, not only of those who consciously acknowledge it, but equally of those who, like the Positivists, affect to believe in a γένεσις of things without a δύναμις. Being thus, at the same time, real in its existence, and ideal in its cognition, Force admits of being investigated both physically and metaphysically: and take it up in which aspect you will, the results are remarkable and concurrent.

The tendency of natural science in its earlier stages is to establish a plurality of "Forces." Each separate family of phenomena throws back its distinctive characteristics on the dynamic source to which they are referred; and Nature is conceived to have on stock as many powers as she has kinds of product to display. Thus it is that we fill out our list of mechanical, chemical, vital, mental forces. The only differences actually observed lie among the phenomena:

but these are taken as exponents of corresponding differences in the causes behind. The very distinction and organization of the Sciences themselves proceed upon this principle: each science taking up from among the properties of matter some one type, and chasing it, as it were, through the universe, and writing out the history of its achievements. Latterly, however, especially since the application of a more refined research to the so-called "imponderable agents," the old lines of classification have been losing their mechanical straightness and sharpness, and the colouring of the several provinces has faded into softer contrast, tending to something more than harmony. The first effect of the prism, in the hands of Newton, was to destroy the simplicity of light, and to disengage it in idea from heat: the last effect, in the hands of Bunsen, has been, in the very act of giving extension and precision to the analysis, to twine together, in a web of wonderful relations, the luminiferous, the calorific, and the chemical rays. By the undulatory theory, the same calculus embraces the measurement of sound and of light. Galvanism, manipulated by Davy, became the most powerful of chemical agencies. And, by both direct and converse proofs, Oersted and Faraday have compelled electricity and magnetism to exchange effects. The several modifications of motion produced by all these agents carry in them mechanical momentum, and avail to overcome cohesion and gravitation. By combining such facts as these, Mr. Grove has shown, in his ingenious and striking Essay cited at the head of this Article, that all the forces comprised under the term "Physical" are so "correlated" as to be no sooner expended in one form than they re-appear in another,—in fact, to be convertible *inter se;* and therefore to be not many, but one,—a dynamic self-identity masked by transmigration. Not content with a dead pause at Mr. Grove's resting-place, Dr. Carpenter, in his communication to the Royal Society, has carried the argument to a higher point, and shown that the law extends to the Vital forces:

and, in his *Human Physiology*, he conducts it to its climax in the Mental forces. The energy of volition communicates itself to the motory nerves; these again hand over the stimulus to the muscular fibre; by whose contraction, finally, some mechanical movement is produced: each step of the process being marked by a waste or consumption of the transmitting medium, but an undiminished propagation of the transmitted force. It is not within the scope of our present design critically to estimate this subtle speculation; but simply to record it as the last result of dynamic generalization. The conclusion is, that the plurality of forces is an illusion: that in reality, and behind the variegated veil of heterogeneous phenomena, there is but one force, the solitary fountain of the whole infinitude of change.

This position, however, immediately opens a further question. If we are to reduce our numerical variety of forces to one, *which* member of the series is to remain with us as the type of all? Where is the initial point of these migrations? How are we to know the *propria persona* of the power from its disguises? Shall we more rightly presume that the lowest term,—the mechanical,—passes upwards and re-appears in the form of mind?—or that the highest rather descends, divesting itself of prerogative qualities at each step, and appearing at last with quantitative identity alone? For answer to these questions we must turn from the physical to the metaphysical scrutiny of the main conception. We have seen that it is a hyperphysical idea, a postulate of Reason, applied to nature; and to find its essence and true type, we must disengage ourselves from its applications and detect its pure form in our intellectual constitution. Cast your eye, then, along the series enumerated by Grove and Carpenter, and ask yourself in which of these forms the dynamic idea originally necessitates itself. Is it that you have to supply it on seeing an external body change its place? or, on witnessing some chemical phenomenon, as an acid stain of red on

a blue cloth? or, on noticing the needle quiver to the North? It will be admitted that, if we ourselves were purely passive, all these changes might cross our visual field with only the effect of a time-succession,—first one movement or condition, then another: while, conversely, if, without any of these phenomena exhibiting themselves before us, we ourselves were in the active exercise of Volition more or less difficult, the idea of Force would be provided for. It follows that *Will* is the true type of the conception, identical with it as a primitive intuition; and that its lower forms are but an attenuated transcript of this, stripped, by artificial abstraction, of all that is superfluous for the exigencies of scientific classification. The habitual resort of philosophers to this, when they want an illustration of the dynamic idea, might convince them that it is *more than* an illustration,—that it is the sole and exhaustive case, of which the rest are but mutilated conceptual repetitions, and without which there would be no others. Dr. Carpenter, with his usual clearness in penetrating to the essential point, seizes at once on the "sense of effort" as the ground of all our causal thought,—as the "form of Force *which may be taken as the type of all the rest;*" declares that "our consciousness of force is really as direct as is that of our own mental states"; and admits that, "in this particular case, Force must be regarded as the direct expression or manifestation of that Mental state which we call Will." But he stops short, as it seems to us, of the true breadth and simplicity of his reduction, when he adds,—"In the phenomenon of voluntary movement, we can scarcely avoid seeing that Mind is *one* of the dynamical agencies which is capable of acting on Matter; and that, like other such agencies, the mode of its manifestation is affected by the nature of the material *substratum* through which its influence is exerted." * If Force is known to us from within, if it is the name we give to self-conscious exercise of power, then that is just the whole

* Human Physiology, § 585.

of it known to us all;—not "*one* particular case," leaving "other such agencies" to be learned in some different way; but the absolute dynamical conception itself, co-extensive with every actual and possible instance. Take away the "consciousness of force" in ourselves, and with the keenest vision we should see it nowhere in nature. Endow us with it; and we have still no more ability than before to *perceive* it as an object in the external world, observation giving us access only to phenomena as distributed in space and time. Nor, from knowing it within, do we acquire any logical right to *infer* it without, except in virtue of an axiom of Reason inseparably present in it,—that "all phenomena are the expression of Power,"—the counterpart of that power which issues our own. This it is which constrains us to think causation behind nature, and under causation to think of Volition. "Other force" we have no sort of ground for believing,—or, except by artifices of abstraction, even power of conceiving. The dynamic idea is either this, or nothing; and the logical alternative assuredly is, that Nature is either a mere Time-march of phenomena, or an expression of Mind.

The physical and the metaphysical scrutiny of this indispensable scientific conception converge, then, upon one conclusion;—that all Force is of one type; and that type is Mind.

This resolution of all external causation into Divine Will at once deprives the several theories of cosmical creation or development of all irreligious significance. Not one of them has any resources to work with that are other than Divine: you may try what you can do with this kind of force or with that: but you cannot escape beyond the closed cycle where each is convertible with Volition. To you it may not appear under its full aspect: for "Force" is precisely Will from which *we omit* all reference to the living thought: but its objective character is unaffected by this subjective default. We lament to see the question between a sudden and a gradual genesis of organic types

discussed on both sides,—not indeed by the principals in the dispute but by secondary advocates,—too much as if it were a question between God and no-God. In not a few of the progressionists the weak illusion is unmistakable, that, with time enough, you may get every thing out of next-to-nothing. Grant us,—they seem to say,—any tiniest granule of power, so close upon zero that it is not worth begrudging; allow it some trifling tendency to infinitesimal increment; and we will show you how this little stock became the Cosmos, without ever taking a step worth thinking of, much less constituting a case for design. The argument is a mere appeal to an incompetency in the human imagination; in virtue of which magnitudes evading conception are treated as out of existence; and an aggregate of inappreciable increments is simultaneously equated,—in its cause to *nothing*, in its effect to *the whole of things*. You manifestly want the same Causality, whether concentrated on a moment, or distributed through incalculable ages: only, in drawing upon it, a logical theft is more easily committed piecemeal than wholesale. Surely it is a mean device for a philosopher, thus to crib causation by hairs-breadths, to put it out at compound interest through all time, and then disown the debt. And it is vain after all:—for dilute the intensity, and change the form, as you will, of the Power that has issued the Universe, it remains, except to your subjective illusion, nothing less than Infinite and nothing lower than Divine. And hence it is an equal error in the Theist to implicate his faith in resistance to the doctrine of progressive development,—be it in the formation of the solar system, in the consolidation of the earth's crust, or the origination of organic species. That doctrine would be atheistic only if the first germ on the one hand, and the evolution on the other, were root and branch undivine,—some blind material force that could set itself up in rivalry to God's. Inasmuch, however, as all forces are convertible, and that, too, not by culmination into Volition but by

reduction from Volition, they are but his mask and can never be his competitors: and if ever they seem less than Will, it is only by a self-abnegation which is itself one of the highest acts of Will. Why, but for the fallacious suspicion to which we refer, should you object to recognize a law of progression in nature any more than in human history? You think it Providential that *Man* should be conducted from low beginnings, through the struggles of a various experience, to a civilized existence beyond the dreams of an early world. You follow, not without a solemn piety, the steps of a Lessing or a Bunsen tracing the Education of our race. From the painful impression left upon you by the long and wide spectacle of savage life, by the meanness of a thousand superstitions, by the cruelties and flagitiousness which darken even the most brilliant and sacred eras, you fly for relief to the thought, that these are but transitory stages on the way to better things;—that they do not in themselves give the true idea of the world;—that they must be viewed in connection with the ulterior destination on which all the lines of the past converge. You even argue that, were there nothing of this movement in advance,—were every thing human stationary as Chinese society or periodic as the Stoic's universe,—all would look too much like Fate: it is not in a perpetual noon, but only in a brightening dawn, that Divine hope rises in the heart. Why, then, if it be reverential to think thus of man, should it be atheistic to think the same of nature? What is cosmical development but the counterpart of human progression? Without an ever-living movement of idea, how can we conceive of an Eternal Mind at all? And if there be a Divine plan through all, how is its law to be read off and its drift deciphered, but, as every infinite series is found, by legibly exposing some adequate segment of its terms, and spreading its steps along the ages? We pronounce at present no opinion on the scientific question to which Mr. Darwin's book has recently imparted a fresh interest. Looking at

the speculation with rather a logician's than a naturalist's eye, we confess that our prevailing impression, at a little distance from the fascinations of the author's skill, is of the extreme exility of the evidence compared with the immensity of the conclusion. Should, however, the doctrine of Natural Selection become as well established as that of successive geologic deposition, we venture to predict that works on Natural Theology will not only survive this new shock to the idea of creative paroxysms, but will turn it to account as a fertile source of theistic evidence and illustration. It is matter for regret and surprise that Mr. Darwin himself should have set forth his hypothesis as excluding the action of a higher intelligence:

"Nothing" (he says) "at first can appear more difficult to believe than that the more complex organs and instincts should have been perfected, *not* by means superior to, though analogous with, human reason, *but* by the accumulation of innumerable slight variations, each good for the individual possessor" (p. 459).

Surely the antithesis could not be more false, were we to speak of some patterned damask as made, *not* by the weaver, *but* by the loom; or of any methodized product as arising *not* from its primary *but* from its secondary source. All the determining conditions of species,—viz. (1) the possible range of variation, (2) its hereditary preservation, (3) the extrusion of inferior rivals,—must be conceived as already contained in the constituted laws of organic life; in and through which, just as well as by unmediated starts, "Reason superior to the human" may evolve the ultimate results. In a perfectly analogous case the products of human industry distribute themselves over the earth according to the laws of Political Economy, all springing from the spontaneous pressure of human desires: yet who would think it a just antithesis to say, that the ebb and flow of wealth and arts are due, *not* to any Providence of God, *but* to the hunger of mankind?

At the same time, though Primary and Secondary causation do not exclude each other, we own the difficulty of clearly adjusting their relation in our thought: nor can we pretend that it is abated by resolving all power into Will. In the supernatural sphere, indeed,—the communion of Spirit with Spirit,—the Divine with the Human,—this Personal conception of power meets every exigency; because here the relation all depends on the free play of affection and character. But the governance of *Nature* by Personal Volition is less easy to conceive, the more we are impressed by the inflexibility, the neutrality, the universal sweep of her great laws. For mere manageable clearness, if that were all, some credit might be given to the old Deistical representation, of God as once contriving the universe and then stocking it with properties and powers which dispense with his further agency. Unfortunately, these properties and powers once installed in the cosmical executive, are too apt, like mayors of the palace, to set up for themselves: and the more all definite idea of a creative epoch, marked by sudden birth of the heavens and the earth, breaks up and distributes itself, the less has this theory to hold it together, and the more urgent becomes the cry for an immanent and living God. The religion of the present age, in all its newer and more vigorous manifestations, represents this cry. Reacting against the usurpations of secondary causation, wearied of its distance from the Fountainhead, it flings itself back with pathetic repentance into the arms of the Primary Infinitude, and tries to feel even the iron clasp of nature as the immediate embrace of God. It is a pure and high impulse: yet, when tranquil enough to go in search of its philosophical ground, it must become conscious of dangers and self-variance on this side too. It is impossible to resolve all natural causation into direct Will without raising questions (we say it plainly, but with reverence) of the Divine psychology. You say, He personally issues all the changes in the universe. Is there, then, a volition for

each phenomenon? and if so, what constitutes a single phenomenon?—each drop of rain, for instance, or, the whole shower? or, the wider atmospheric tide which includes the other term of the broken equilibrium? or, the system of aërial currents that enwrap the earth, and of which this is as much an element as the rain-drop of the shower? or, the tissue of conditions, without which such currents would not be what they are,—including, at a stroke, the constitution of water and of air, the laws of caloric, the distribution of land and sea, the terrestrial rotation, the inclined equator, the solar light and heat? Where, in this mighty web of relations, are we to fix, and how to insulate, the *unit of volition?* Driven by the infinite multiplicity of phenomena, to recognize in some form the occurrence of *generic* volition, you encounter the ulterior question, what, then, constitutes the *principle* of grouping for each genus, whereby what is manifold towards us is *one* from Him? Are the objects of his determining Thought concrete things and integral beings, individuals or kinds, such as Natural History deals with in its classifications? Or, are they rather those functions or properties into which we analyse bodies,—which run together to constitute an individual, and separate to traverse a host;—so that he thinks in the order of Science, with a volition for each Law,—now gravitation and all that it carries,—then, Electricity throughout its sweep? Lay out the conception which way you will, the two divisions cross each other. In the contemplative religion of many a cultivated man, they doubtless come, the one or the other, as may turn uppermost, with no sense of inconsistency. But down in subtler depths the perplexing mystery has been felt, ever since Plato's εἴδη, after vainly grappling with it, left it to the consciousness of the world.

Mr. Poynting, in his *Glimpses of the Heaven that lies around us*, assumes the *Scientific* order of Divine volition; supposes the Cosmos to be thought out, Law by Law, in the track of Newton's, Dalton's, Oken's, Faraday's generaliza-

tions; and feels every shadow gone in the simple recognition of God as personally executing the whole scheme. His book is not less picturesque in exposition and ingenious in combination than it is bright and joyous in tone; and to young readers, able to adapt themselves to its somewhat fantastic form, it gives a valuable *coup-d'œil* of the newer methods of scientific thought, though perhaps with too little discrimination of positive results from speculative interpretation. For our fastidious gravity, we must confess, the visionary and supernatural dress of the first part of the work,—in which the author, escaped from the body, has the world explained to him by a celestial lecturer,—is more a burden than a help. But doubtless we are heavy of wing; and in compassion to such infirmity, the author, in a second part of the volume, re-appears in the flesh, and takes his stand upon the level earth again, and gives a prose version of the "Divina Commedia" that precedes. From this part we gather the theory that God's supreme end is the revelation and spiritual reproduction of Himself in humanity; that history, Scripture, nature, are constituted throughout to serve as the school and discipline of our race; that the lower ranks of organized beings are sent forth as prefigurements, in advancing series, of man; that the several orders of force,—mechanical, chemical, vital, mental,—by which nature is built up, are developed modes of atomic attraction and repulsion; which again are resolvable, atoms and all, into a direct exercise of Divine power in lines converging on given points of space. An atom is a geometrical centre on which God directs force in all radii, thus constituting an attraction thither. Did the radii mutually impinge with perfect precision, they would give a statical resultant: but arriving with slight inaccuracy, they form an eddy round the centre, and so surround it with a zone of repulsion. Two atoms unite, when, through rotation in opposite directions, their osculating surfaces are moving in the same; while under reverse conditions they retreat. An atom quivering makes its lines of gravitating

force quiver too; and hence the phenomena of light and sound, and whatever else is reducible to undulation. By changes, often ingeniously rung, upon these elementary assumptions, the atoms are made to climb into their place and build the world and its organisms; and the lines to vibrate in such mode and degree as to furnish law after law in every science from physics to physiology. The hypothesis, in its resolution of matter into force, bears an essential resemblance to Boscovich's; and, as might be expected breaks down at the same point, — the attempt to step, with only quantitative help, to the qualitative phenomena of nature. All the optical history, for instance, of a sunbeam is elaborately deduced: and the physiological changes along the visual nerve are also set forth: and both series of propagated movements are regarded as a wonderful provision for enabling us to see. But when the question is asked, how is it that one vibration of atoms gives the sensation of heat, another that of light, a third that of sound, the only answer is, such is the will of God, who, "as soon as the quivering beats on eye or spirit," "raises in the mind the idea of light," or of heat, &c., as it may be. Were it not, then, for this interposed special volition the visual idea would not arise, and trains of vibratory processes would be as inoperative on the eye as they are upon the ear. There is thus no more fitness in one of the mechanisms than in another, or in any than in none at all, to produce its appended perception: for this flows from a Divine act which might just as well interchange the antecedents or dispense with them entirely. And when we further remember that all the prior movements are also described as God's own volitional force, we seem to lose ourselves in a gratuitous circuit, in which he devises and works his own complex machinery for providing his own occasions for interposing his own volitions. We are reminded irresistibly of Malebranche: who, in the chain of material causes and effects, saw a scheme of nature offered to the apprehension of Minds; and, in the constituted

faculties of minds, beheld a provision for the cognition of Nature; yet sunk an impassable chasm between them, and made intercommunication impossible, except by miracles *mero arbitrio*, that superseded both. With Malebranche, however, the direct Divine act was limited to the intermediation between Mind and Matter, each of which could operate in its own sphere though not cross over to the other. But Mr. Poynting's spinning machinery of atoms is the immediate activity of God: the whole mental life of man, and the ordinary exercise of his faculties, are so too; not less than the intercourse between the one and the other. When the objectivity of Nature, and the subjectivity of Man, and the whole scheme of relations uniting them, are all thrown into the Infinite together, all distinctions of being disappear, all problems vanish, and complex tissues of adaptation seem to lose all serious meaning and take the aspect of an empty play of thought, evoking conditions in order to meet them. For our own part, we confess to a very sceptical appreciation of the whole atomic doctrine, so unfortunately mixed up by Dalton with the law of definite proportions; and cannot help regarding the idea expressed by the word "atom" as a purely fictitious contrivance for escaping the contradictions of infinitude, an arbitrary stop in face of the perils of that wilderness, a logical thrust of the ostrich-head into the sand. And it may be due perhaps to this disrespectful estimate, that we find it painful to picture the Divine agency expending itself in rectilinear descents upon these centres, and in eddies round them, and quiverings from them, and a continuous evolution of nature from nothing else than such questionable rudiments. If such things really go on, we are not anxious to wrest them from the men of science and their "secondary laws," in order to claim them for the Primary.

But besides the questionable character of this atomic starting-point, and the incongruous mixture of necessary deduction and interpolated miracle, the exposition is open to the objection which attaches to every scheme of mere

Divine self-evolution: it is, or in the mind of consequential thinkers it must become, Pantheistic. We use this word, not as a loose term of current reproach,—reproach often directed against precisely what is most pure and true in the religion of thoughtful men,—but rigorously, to mark the absence in a scheme of the universe of any thing or being properly objective to God: and this feature we cannot but regard as a fatal loss of philosophical equilibrium. Mr. Poynting anticipates this objection, and meets it thus:

"I have been told that some people will suspect the views of the universe here set forth of being Pantheistic. If there should be any such persons, let me beg them not to be frightened by their own spectral fancies. The views here given, instead of being Pantheistic, are the antidote for Pantheism.

Pantheism is the conception of the Universe as God. According to it, nature and human minds are all only parts of one Mysterious All, called God, but not thought of as a personal Being, as having thoughts and affections like the Christian God.

Now, instead of saying that the Universe is God, I distinctly say that the Universe is only the *sign and effect* of God,—his word, just as our words are signs and effects of our being. Instead of saying the mind of man is only a part of God, I distinctly say that the very explanation of our existence is, that God desires not to multiply *Himself*, but that he craves otherness,—beings not Himself; but only like Himself, sympathizing with Him,—sons and heirs, not members of his own being.

The conception of God here presented is intensely unpantheistic, because it is intensely personal. God is thought of here as a being of love, goodness, thought; as, in fact, a Father. The whole doctrine of the book depends upon the soundness of our attributing to Him sympathies like those which we ourselves possess." (*Introduction*, p. xxi.)

This emphatic disclaimer is perfectly satisfactory, so far as the author's own faith, and the conscious aim of his teaching, are concerned. It is also true that, throughout his volume, the Personality of God, and his Transcendency

beyond Nature, are never compromised; and that the ascription to him of emotions and conceptions akin to ours is carried even to the verge on which reverence begins to tremble. But it is not enough that you save the Divine personality, if you sacrifice the Human; without relation to which lesser, as substantive moral object, the greater, left to shed affections only on its own phenomenal effects, cannot sustain itself alive. Our author's theory appears to us to make no adequate provision for the personality of Man,—to treat him merely as the highest natural product, the last organism prefigured by the imperfect approaches of other animals, and crowning the long line of homogeneous development. Mr. Poynting, indeed, himself believes, and *intends* to work out the belief, that God craves *otherness*, beings not Himself": and if this intention be successfully carried out, our scruple is groundless. How far the discrimination of man from God is adequately made,—how far it establishes them in real relations of Person to Person,—may be estimated by the following statements:

"How often had a poor doubting mind confessed to me, 'You say that God is in contact with us, and gives his Holy Spirit to those who ask Him. Yet I look back through all my life, and I am not aware of any inspiration, any revelation, any suggestion, that has not come, like all my thoughts and feelings, by my ordinary faculties and instincts. It seems to me that I have been left alone with my own mind, and God has not at all interfered in its workings.' *I now saw that what we call the ordinary working of the mind itself, the law of its faculties, the movement of its impulses, was the very flowing of the Holy Spirit*" (p. 75).

The same doubt is met with the same answer in the Second Part: where it is said:

"We have watched our minds, we have prayed and striven, but we have been able to detect no trace of any stirring in our spirits beyond the natural action of our faculties and instincts.

Let us, then, consider these ordinary impulses and faculties.

When we feel the impulse of Benevolence, the love of the Beautiful, the love of Knowledge, when we feel the Sentiment of Conscience approving or disapproving, when we feel the Reason leading us on from step to step of truth we know not how,—whence do these impulses and movings come? what is their fountain? Do *we* invent these movements? Do *we* originate or direct them ourselves? No, the movements seem to come in upon us like streams of life from a source outside our Will. Now what is the *source* from which these streams or movements come? Is there an inexhaustible supply of such streams, powers, impulses, shut up in secret wells within us, and is there some mechanical contrivance for unlocking these wells at our need, and letting these streams flow in upon our consciousness? I reply, we know of no such wells; we cannot, indeed, imagine them. We have never had experience of any such contrivance. On the other hand, there is a Cause, a real known cause at hand all around us,—God himself, the Eternal fountain of Life and Power,—quite sufficient to account for the phenomena" (p. 365).

If every feeling which streams in upon me, and every facultative activity that goes out from me, is thus foreign to me and is the Personal agency of another Mind, what remains to be my own? Where am I? My subjective experience, my objective energies, all given away, the whole essence is gone, and I have no longer any pretension to rank as a Person. The only conceivable residue of humanity left, after the Holy Spirit has thus claimed its own, is an empty capacity for the reception and transmission of alien influences and emanations. Mr. Poynting accordingly speaks of the soul as an organ,—God's great organ,"—the music of which is from the breathing and inflowing of God's Holy Spirit (p. 310):—the very image employed, if we remember right, by Tertullian, in order to express the entire superseding of the human personality by Divine inspiration in the sacred writers. To say that we stand related to God, as the artfully-constructed instrument to the skilled hand that makes it speak, is to exclude the conditions of moral life, and make us his fabric rather

than his Sons. Perhaps our author would refer us to other passages, in which he seems to reserve *the Will* as man's peculium: as in this sentence:

"Every sensation, every thought, every feeling, every motion of every muscle, destroyed a fibril in the *voluntary, or man's part* of the frame; every motion of the heart, every motion of the lungs, and each other organ connected with the preparation and circulation, destroyed a fibril in the *involuntary or God's part* of the frame" (p. 158).

Will, however, cannot stand alone, to make *a person*, when every thing else has been alienated. It fails of the very conditions of its exercise, unless surrounded, within the same individuality, by the data, and aided by the light, of other faculties, forming with it the proper nature or constitution of the living *self*. To will, without affection to desire, and reason to compare, is impossible: the *style*, so to speak, of affection, and the style of reason, are just as personally characteristic, as the style of willing: and to banish the two former into the Divine Personality, while retaining only the third for the human, is at once to "confound the persons" and "divide the substance." In proof of the impersonal and alien nature of our Reason, Conscience, Benevolence, &c., our author appeals to their *involuntary* character, and asks whether "*we* originate and direct them." He may test the value of the argument by putting the same question respecting *God's* Reason, Benevolence, Holiness, &c. Are these products of his Will? Did he "originate" or "invent" them? And if not, are they foreign to him? On the contrary, they are of his innermost essence; forming the spiritual background of pre-requisites to Volition; more than all else defining his real and ultimate Self, precisely because *not* effects of his Will, but beyond him to create or to destroy. In short, if it is Will that goes to make personality, it must carry with it, not its products alone, but its indispensable conditions. And these are just the circle of impulses and faculties which our author forbids us to appropriate.

We think, then, that Mr. Poynting has not adequately guarded his doctrine on this side; and has left, in strictness, but one Person in the Universe. Let us add that, in this, he stands associated with a great and holy company, and with them yields only to the excess of a noble affection. It has ever been the tendency of intense and paramount devotion to take nothing to itself, and give every thing to God. Minds engaged in habitual contemplation of the Infinite seem to become conscious, not of littleness only, but of nothingness in the Finite: and the vain attempt to hold the two in co-existence ends in passionate casting of the Finite away. They pass by meditation into a certain speculative form of Christian self-abnegation; and feel, with Augustine, that, ethically, Humanity has no standing before God; with Malebranche, that, intellectually, it has no light but his; with Tauler, that, spiritually, its only strength is to pass, exposed and weak, into his Hand; with Spinoza, that, substantively, it vanishes into a mode of his reality. Transiently, every religious man, it is probable, touches one or other of these dizzy verges of thought, where the spirit trembles between the supreme height and nothingness. And there are seasons in the history of every church and nation when, in re-action from a temper of false security and pragmatical self-assertion, it is well for the consciousness of a people to be snatched away, and planted for a while where it may look into the solemn space and feel the awful breath. But the permanent equilibrium of human thought is not there. The sense of Duty returns; the strife of Reason starts afresh; the toil of the Will resumes its tools;—and the latent assurance of personal faculty and of real freedom to use it, feeling its natural root, grows up into the light again; and pushes its green terrestrial margin ever further upon the overpowering expanse of Divine Necessity. Augustine converts the world: but Pelagius is its counsellor day by day. And we hold it indispensable to any tenable theory of Religion, that finite natures, and especially the human personality,

should be secured in their real rights, and so interpreted as to remain, in some intelligible sense, objective to God.

This condition, it is evident, no theory can fulfil which represents God as evolving the universe "*out of Himself.*" He is then both its substance and its phenomena; and it is in no way differenced from him, except by his transcending it. A blunt way of avoiding the consequence was resorted to by the more Judaically-minded Fathers of the Church in their doctrine of "creation out of *Nothing*";—a doctrine which, holding its ground so far as material or fabricated nature is concerned, yielded, at the higher stage of human and spiritual existence, to the Alexandrine notion of the extension of the Divine Logos: and thus made way for the distinction between a mere *creature* and a *son* of God. This blank "Nothing,"—whatever philosophers may say against it,—was at least effectual for cutting off all obligations to antecedent material, whether within or without the Eternal substantive Being, and compelling the recognition of the world as something *other* than God. To this grand Hebrew distinction, a true instinct led the Church to cling through all the seductions of Gnosticism: and though the formula embodying it may give way, philosophical Theism cannot afford to surrender the distinction itself in any re-action towards Greek and German modes of thought. Our age professes itself weary of the old mechanical Deism, and cries out for the Immanent and Living God. It is well: but, even for Immanency itself, there must be something wherein to dwell; and for Life, something whereon to act. Mind, to think out its problems,—unless those problems are a dream, — cannot be monistic, — a mere subjective infinitude,—its tides and eddies all within. What resource, then, have we, when we seek for something objective to God? The first and simplest, in which accordingly philosophy has never failed to take refuge is *Space.* Inconceivable by us except as co-extensive and co-eternal with him, yet independent of him, it lies ready, with all

its contents of geometrical property, for the intuition of his Reason. And to Thought, which thus comes out of its eternity, and engages itself upon determinate relation, we cannot help ascribing the cognition of *Time*, with its attendant *Number*. Thus, the circle of quantitative data is complete, and the ground of all mensurative and deductive intellect is there. Will this, then, suffice? Can we follow out the Cosmical problem to its end upon this track? The experiment has been too tempting for philosophers to resist; and again and again they have worked in this vein, and tried to exhibit the universe as a *deduction*, thought-out "*more geometrico*" from axioms of Eternal Reason; to dispense altogether with creative *volition*, as the source of order; and to connect even physical qualities and phenomena by a conceivable chain of logical necessity with the self-evidence at fountain head. But though in these attempts the most has been made of quantitative methods and conceptions, though, for instance, *Extension* has been set up as the essence of Body, in the same way as Thought is the essence of Mind,—it has proved impossible to avoid resort to other conceptions,—as Substance, Attribute, Cause. Still, with these purely metaphysical and *a-priori* ideas added to the mathematical, it was supposed possible for Reason to evolve the world by following out the steps of a demonstration. The Necessity of things was coincident with the Necessity of thought: the *nexus* of Nature's development was the nexus of logical sequence: cause and effect were identical with premiss and conclusion: creation of being was discovery of truth: and final causation was the attainment of a Q.E.D. To complete the organism of such a system has been the vain ambition of many a keen and spacious intellect; and in the Ethics of Spinoza and the Dialectic of Hegel the pretension has, in modern times, twice culminated and twice fallen. The principle of their failure is this: they did not,—for, in truth, they could not,—keep their promise of borrowing nothing from experience and observation, and working

everything from ontological self-evidence. Physical postulates lurk in their metaphysical axioms: and however ready we may be to admit the *a-priori* necessity of such ideas as "Substance" and "Cause," and so far to let them stand on the same list of primary entities with "Space,"—as Real yet not empirically Known, Ideal yet not mental fictions,—still there is this difference;—that they are intrinsically *relative* notions, each of them member of a pair, and that the other correlative term—"Attribute" antithetic to Substance, "Effect" or "Phenomenon" to Cause,—is simply physical and an indispensable condition of its companion. Under the cloak therefore of stately metaphysical axioms, as they march in plenipotentiary array, concealed entrance is given to material assumptions; and in the subsequent logical progress, it is just these inductive principles which cunningly slip out and lay the plank across many a chasm that were else impassable. Thus, the unsatisfactory results of these bold attempts, their inevitable slip out of their pure Monism, may well confirm our reasonable presumption, that nature cannot be treated as a geometrical or logical necessity; that, were God alone with the inner Laws of Thought and the outer data of Quantity, no universe need ever have been, and that to evolve the result intelligibly, we must go beyond the assumptions of the mathematics and metaphysics. In other words, there must be something else than Space objective to God.

Whether it is rationally conceivable that God should,—so to speak,—*supply Himself* with objectivity, by a "creation out of nothing,"—or whether, as Sir W. Hamilton contends, the conception is absurd and self-destructive, we need not pause to inquire. The idea is in any case discredited by modern science. It arose from an interpretation of the Mosaic cosmogony: it belongs to the doctrine of the six days and the sudden "beginning" of their work; and loses all support, even from the imagination, as soon as the creative process is deprived of starts and catastrophes, and

construed into a slow perpetuity of change. An instantaneous summons of a Cosmos out of nothing seems to require as its product a world perfected at once, in simple answer to the call: as the idea is enounced, so must it be realized; and nothing could be more incongruous with the ecclesiastical notion of absolute origination than that, in response to the Creator's *fiat* there should appear, for instance, a red-hot earth, requiring millions of years before its human and historic purpose could even open. The measure of its ulterior progress inevitably becomes the measure of its earlier emergence. But if we must pronounce this conception superseded, there is only one resource left for completing the needful objectivity to God; viz., to admit, in some form, the coeval existence of matter as the condition and medium of the Divine agency and manifestation. We freely allow that this is an assumption, resting on quite other grounds than those which support our belief respecting Space. But it is an hypothesis which neither religion nor philosophy, beyond the pantheistic circle, has been able to avoid; which at one extreme, Hebraism admits in its Chaos; and, at the other, Hellenism in the ἄπειρον, ἀνάγκη, τὸ μὴ ὄν, of Plato, and the ὕλη of Aristotle. Our mental constitution itself, indeed, seems to contain a provision for the belief: just as every phenomenon, necessitating the idea of Causation, carries us to God; so every attribute, necessitating the idea of Substance, refers us to Matter. And all the physical indications point unambiguously the same way. Stupendous as the chronometry is which the Geologist places at our command, its utmost stretch into the Past brings us apparently no nearer to a lonely God: nature is still there, with no signs of recency, but still in the midst of changes that have an immeasurable retrospect. May we not, then, fairly say that the burden of proof remains with those who affirm the absolute origination of matter at a certain or uncertain date? Failing the proof, we are left with the Divine Cause and the material Condition of all

nature in eternal copresence and relation, as Supreme subject and rudimentary object.

This position, however, needs some obvious limitations. We do not mean, of course, to claim perpetual existence in the past for the particular material objects we see around us: or, for any of the kinds of beings now extant: or, even for all the *properties* which matter now exhibits: for, prior to the appearance of organization, for instance, the physiological qualities and actions were not assumed. Stripping off, as we retire backward, the more refined, as being the more recent modes, and endeavouring to reach the simplest skeleton of the constitution of matter, we meet with a familiar distinction which may prevent us, in taking what logical necessity requires, from taking more than it requires. We refer to the distinction which the attacks of a purely sensational philosophy and the neglect of a purely deductive only tend to confirm between the Primary and the Secondary qualities of Body. The former are those which are inseparable from the very idea of Body, and may be evolved *a priori* from the consideration of it as solid Extension or Extended solidity. The latter are those which we could not thus evolve by reflection, but which, having no necessary implication with the definition of body, must be learned, like all contingent things, from experience. To the former class, for instance, belong Triple Dimension, Divisibility, Incompressibility; to the latter, Gravity, Softness or Hardness, Smell, Colour, &c. As the former cannot absent themselves from Body, they have a reality coeval with it, and belong eternally to the material datum objective to God: and his mode of activity with regard to them must be similar to that which alone we can think of his directing upon the relations of Space, viz., not Volitional, to cause them, but Intellectual, to think them out. The Secondary qualities, on the other hand, having no logical tie to the Primary, but being appended to them as contingent facts, cannot be referred to any deductive thought, but remain

over as products of pure Inventive-Reason and Determining Will. This sphere of cognition, *a posteriori* to us,—where we cannot move a step alone but have submissively to wait upon experience, is precisely the realm of Divine originality: and we are most sequacious where God is most free. While on this Secondary field his Mind and ours are thus contrasted, they meet in resemblance again upon the Primary: for the evolutions of deductive Reason there is but one track possible to all intelligences; no *merum arbitrium* can interchange the false and true, or make more than one geometry, one scheme of pure Physics, for all worlds: and the Omnipotent Architect Himself, in realizing the Cosmical conception, in shaping the orbits out of immensity and determining seasons out of eternity, could but follow the laws of curvature, measure and proportion. And so, in the region of the demonstrative sciences, to us the highest that mere intellect attains, where most we feel our thought triumphant and seem to look down on dominated nature, there is his Mind the least unconditioned, and there alone comes into experience of necessity.

There is, then, on the one side and the other of this boundary-line, a ground in Nature for the action of a purely Intellectual Divine power, evolving consequences by necessary laws of thought; and for the action of a purely Voluntary power, weaving-in what is absolutely original, and executing the free suggestions of design. And there is a justification for both forms of religious philosophy;—that which attempts the "*a-priori* road," which detects Divine vestiges in the mysterious significance of Space and Eternity and Substance, or in the diagrams which suit alike the terrestrial and celestial mechanics,—which feels it a solemn thing that One and the same Reason pervades the universal Cosmos,—and that which, on the track of experience, recognizes marvellous combinations, and delights in the surprises of beauty and design. The only fault of either method lies in its self-exaggeration and intolerance of the other. When, however, we come close to the question

in what way the Volition of God applies itself to the objective material on which it works, the difficulty still recurs: does it move in the lines of nature's general laws and forces, so that each one of these has as it were a volition to itself: or, does it alight upon the concrete and living results in individualized, especially in conscious, and supremely in moral, beings? If we take the first side of the alternative, we throw the aims of God into the order of the Inductive analysis of nature, and seem to withdraw all realized things and persons from his contemplation: we engage him in weaving worlds and creatures to which, except as compounds of a thousand lines of skill, he is indifferent. If we take the second side, we relieve indeed this moral anxiety, but, in rendering each integral being the object of a distinct and unitary purpose, we throw out of intelligible gear the several laws which science shows to be confluent in that one nature, and seem, in claiming them also for the Will of God, to send the volitions in cross directions.

We do not deny that these conflicting modes of thought are hard to reduce into complete harmony; or into harmony at all without selecting one of them as of superior authority and entitled to exercise a regulative influence over the other. Were we never to look beyond physico-theology, we believe the controversy between the two would be perpetual; the naturalist, and every sympathizing observer of individual objects and kinds, being so prevailingly impressed with adaptations of organism and life as to see the final causes there; the student of the physical sciences, on the other hand, being so possessed with the conception of grand imperial laws that override all single integers of being, as to deem all concrete design subordinate or doubtful, and engage the Divine interest chiefly upon the method and tissue of the universal order. The indications of purpose which Paley finds in the fitness of the eye for its special use, Baden Powell rather sees in the symmetry and uniformity of the great optical laws, which still speak of Mind,

though they sweep over tracts of time and space where vision cannot be. The scale must be turned and the verdict gained by appeal to the *Moral* sources of religion within us. Volition, in its very nature, is at the disposal of *Character:* and the character of God,—the order of affections in him,—the ends that are highest in regard,—we learn, not from the tides, the strata, or the stars, but from the intimations of Conscience, and the distribution of authority in the hierarchy of our impulses. The perfection which is our ideal is but his real; the image of him thrown upon the sensitive retina of the soul by his own essential light. The moment we refer to this interpreter, we know that if intellectual tastes are good, personal affections are better, and reverence for goodness the best of all: we can no longer dream that the sense of symmetry, the delight in beauty of thought or things, can have paramount disposal of the Divine Volition: we must recognize as supreme with him the Love towards personal beings capable of sympathy with his nature, of trust in his direction and free aspiring to his likeness. If the moral order of the universe be the τελειότατον τέλος, the physical must stand to it in the relation of an instrument: general laws are for the sake of particular beings; and the order of nature, whatever other ends it may embrace, has primary reference to the personal agents on its scene, who, in the endowment of freedom, occupy a position above nature. Does this reduction of the scientific laws to a secondary place withdraw them from God and convert them into his deputies? Not in the least: they are secondary, not in nearness to his Person, but in rank within his Thought: and there is in this nothing to interfere with his execution of his own design, and letting his Will be the only Force. The volitional character of the several modes of natural power does not require that they be willed upon their own account, so that they carry in their aspect the features and movements of the Divine character. As the methods of his activity they variously traverse, in their classification, the grouping of his pur-

poses. He is immanent in Nature: but his real life is known only beyond Nature. To believe the first alone of these clauses is Pagan, to believe the second alone is evangelical; Christian philosophy must blend them both.

There is, however, a limit beyond which we find it difficult to carry out, with satisfactory clearness of conception, the doctrine of God's *immediate* agency in nature. The secondary qualities of matter, the "physical forces" of the world, may readily be regarded as mere disguises or mere signs of Himself. But *living* beings can hardly be conceived as simply the *nidus* of power not their own,—the organism theirs, the function, not. We cannot follow Descartes in treating them as mere automata. Their whole distinctive significance lies in their being separate centres of at least incipient individuality; and to represent them as only media of a Divine incarnation is offensive alike to science and to religion. Here, then, it seems impossible to dispense with the idea of *delegated* power, detached by one remove from the universal source, and lent out for a term of life to work the conditions of a distinct existence. The instincts and spontaneities of animals constitute a true Divine guidance, adjusted as they are in accurate relation to their external position, and restrained within definite limits of possibility: but this very method and preconception imply an abstinence for the time being of direct and momentary volition, and a consignment of the whole phenomena, in group or system, to a determinate "nature" or "constitution." The difference is perhaps, after all, incident only to our point of view, and would disappear could we contemplate the world "under the form of eternity." We live down from moment to moment; we deliver forth our volitions one by one in linear detail; we have no experience enabling us to interpret generic acts of Will inclusive of complexity of relations and a persistence in time: and cannot present to ourselves the Divine power running into fixed types, or trace the deep-rooted unity of these seeming islands in the sea of things with the continuous continent

of the Infinite Will. Be it remembered too, that there are two kinds of union with God,—dynamic and moral; and that moral union requires dynamic separation; which accordingly widens as we ascend in the scale of being, till a true Self,—a free Personality,—appears, sufficiently beyond the verge of Nature to give an answering look to the very face of the Most High. At this culminating extreme we have a real trust of independence,—subjectivity perfected,—causality realized. At the other and initial extreme where the material datum lies, we have passive potentiality,—mere objectivity, causality not yet begun. Between this infranatural commencement and supernatural end, the Creative agency moves, to build and animate the mighty whole which we call Nature; at each advance receding from the bare receptivity of matter, and approaching, through the spontaneous vital energies, the actual individuality of personal existence. In this great cycle, Matter is the negative condition of Divine power; Force, its positive exercise; Life, its delegation under limits of necessity; Will, under concession of freedom. And if we may venture to speak of a yet higher stage which evades the reach of words,—that saintly posture of the soul which Scripture designates by the term Spirit, may we not say, it is the conscious return, by free identification, of every delegated power into harmony with its Source? And so, the dynamic removal finds its end in moral unity.

But these questions deepen and widen under our hand; and we must close them. We have endeavoured to throw a line or two across the gulf which unhappily divides the *savans* from the theologians of our day. Whether any communication will pass along them we do not presume to say. But of this we are sure;—that the alienation they seek to remedy can be but transitory, having no foundation in the nature of things, arising only in the crossing lights and illusory darkness of human fancy. Inasmuch as Deductive Science represents the Order of God's intellect, Inductive Science the methods of his agency, Moral Science

the purpose of his Will, the blending of their voices in one glorious hymn is as certain as the Oneness of his nature and the symmetry of his Universe: and it must be a very poor Science and a very poor Religion that delay by discord the approach of that great harmony.

VI.

SCIENCE, NESCIENCE, AND FAITH.*

IF we intended to review either of these books, we should not name them both. Each of them has a scope too vast for the span of our critical measurement. The Reviewer's steps are short and few, and would soon be lost in Mr. Maurice's five centuries of Metaphysics; still more in following Mr. Spencer's genesis of the universe from chaos to the Crimean war. In the historical work, suffice it to say, the student will find a faithful guide to the deeper literature and life of modern Europe; copious in knowledge, catholic in judgment, genial in spirit; betrayed, perhaps, here and there into some waywardness and disproportion by an impatience of psychology, and a distrust of all "human notions" that have become systematic and exact; but essentially true to the genius of great representative writers even in the most opposite times. In the speculative book of *First Principles*, we have a kind of prose Lucretius; an attempt to show, both by inductive generalization from admitted laws, and by *a-priori* inference from the ideas of Matter and Force, how the

* "First Principles." By Herbert Spencer, "Author of "Social Statics," "The Principles of Psychology," &c. London: Williams & Norgate. 1862.

"Modern Philosophy; or, a Treatise on Moral and Metaphysical philosophy from the Fourteenth Century to the French Revolution; with a Glimpse into the Nineteenth Century." By the Rev. Frederick Denison Maurice, M.A. London: Griffin, Bohn & Co. 1862.—*National Review*, Oct., 1862.

Cosmos, natural and human, has evolved itself, and, on the assumption of a homogeneous nebular stuff to begin with, must have become what we find it to be. To those who are versed in scientific literature, the mere statement of the thesis will characterize the work. Enterprises of so bold a sweep recommend themselves only to minds that have unbounded confidence in logical architecture, and can venture, with a few well-shaped abstractions at the base, to build and arch to any height. They are uncongenial with the cautious temper of the practised observer: and differ in their vastness and vagueness from those special vaticinations in which, more by glance than by experiment, a Newton, an Oken, or a Goethe may decipher the style of nature. They are neither the perceptive readings of a genius intimate with the world, nor a *bonâ fide* generalization taking up into itself without fear or favour all the threads of ascertained order; but a framework of hypothesis, constructed from the metaphysical terms in which science is obliged to speak, and filled in *ad libitum* with such picked phenomena from every field as may symmetrically fit. In such a scheme, the masses of fact presented, though occupying the main area, are of subordinate moment to the lines of thought: and Mr. Spencer himself, we are convinced, would have attained no trust in his Cosmogony, had he not, in the true spirit of a logical enthusiast, felt his footing sure on his *a-priori* ground. But for this, the enormous disproportion (oppressive enough even on Mr. Darwin's limited field,—the mere "Origin of Species") between the weight of the conclusion and the tenuity of the induction must have overpowered him; and he must have doubted the use of dressing-up a few score of plausible appearances with a whole universe of phenomena out of the reckoning altogether. For our own part, we must confess that this new book of Genesis appears to us no more credible than the old. While its doctrine is too big for physical proof, it is of the wrong kind for metaphysical. We should as soon think of giving

an *a-priori* receipt for a pudding, as for a solar system or a jelly-fish. If mere intellectual force could conquer an intrinsically unmanageable task, it would yield to the prowess of our author. With the resources of a scientific culture he unites a severe logical habit, an originality of combination, and a precision of expository method, to which no reader can be insensible; and which want nothing but a securer set of first principles to justify the somewhat positive tone of self-reliance characteristic of him, as of most system-building intellects.

Passing by, however, the substantive matter of both Mr. Maurice's history and Mr. Spencer's Cosmogony, we fix attention on a single fundamental problem, which has a pervading influence on both works, and receives from them contradictory answers. What is the highest legitimate object of Reason in man? Is he precluded from passing beyond the finite order of "co-existences and successions," which Science scrutinizes and defines? or, is he capable of apprehending the Infinite Cause behind, of which Religion speaks? Mr. Maurice not only believes that knowledge of Divine Reality is possible, and is given, but looks upon the whole course of human history and thought as its witness and illustration. Mr. Spencer not only rejects as failures all attempts hitherto to cross the confines of phenomena, but undertakes to prove that the human mind has no organ for cognizance of the Supreme Cause: so that Religion resolves itself into the acknowledgment of an inscrutable background, in front of which all the luminous shapes of knowledge have their play. While the one writer sees in the working of devout wonder and the sense of an eternal living thought the mainspring of all intellectual search, the other deplores the darkening influence of sacred ideas upon the human understanding, and opposes Science to Religion as the known to the unknown, —the perceptions of daylight to the dreams of night.

We have no doubt that Mr. Spencer represents, in this doctrine, the prevailing sentiment of living scientific men,

and the tendency which for some time to come will gain force against all resistance. It is a necessary price which we must pay in re-establishing the distinction and just relation between the sphere of phenomena and that out of which phenomena come; between also the faculties in us which apprehend the one, and those which are organs for the other. We have not yet escaped a period, co-extensive with the history of Christianity, during which, from blindness to this distinction, religion has identified itself with interpretations of nature now known to be false; and it must suffer the re-action against a discredited prophet unable to make good his word. Compare the picture of the universe in the imagination of a Herschel, a Lyell, a Darwin, with the same scene as disposed in the thought of Isaiah, of Paul, of Chrysostom: look at the celestial architecture of the Apocalypse, and then at what the telescope reveals: think what is implied in the mere conception of a "Solar system," and the changed classification from "Heaven and Earth" to "Suns and Planets": remember that with the disappearance of the supernal halls from the sky, and of the abyss with its infernal chains from the subterraneous strata, a host of inhabitants are dislodged, and fallen angels and imprisoned spirits and tormenting fiends lose themselves in the cold void: and can you wonder that, on the one hand, Augustine would hear nothing of antipodes, or Rome of the Copernican idea, or the Dean of York of the geological; or, on the other, that those who had dissolved the fictitious palace of the Most High should suppose they had discovered a mere darkness or a blank within? The modern redistribution of the cosmical bodies in space undeniably involves a total break-up of conceptions previously guaranteed by sacred authority. So too, with regard to the origin of the universe in time. What has become of the date which many of us learned at school: "B.C. 4004, Creation of the world"? Limit the term "world" as you will, suppose it to say nothing but of this planet; still, with what amaze-

ment must we now look back on the practice of entering its birth in the annual register, like the battles and budgets and debates that make up a *Times* New-Year's Day retrospect! Into what magnitude has that "chief event of a year" opened before us! Walking through a geological museum, and estimating its intervals by what unit of time we please, we not only discover the "Creation of the world,"—like a Chancery suit,—to be "rather a process than an event," but are constrained to give it an asymptote for its measure, arriving at our own position from out of an indeterminate immensity. Instead of being the flash of a moment, or a week, from which the great periods of national vicissitude on the world may be sharply reckoned, it breaks into indefinite duration, and they shrink into a point. Yet they, too, have rebelled against the limits we had allowed them; and human history, while dwarfed by physical, asks, with every new discovery, for larger room and more numerous centuries in our imagination. After every allowance for uncertainty in the earliest vestiges of humanity, the concurrent evidence of Egyptian archæology, of the laws and affinities of language, of comparative religion, and of the stone implements, if not more positive remains of man, found in not the most recent deposits, must be held to imply an indefinitely more remote beginning and more gradual development of our race upon the earth than we had been taught to believe.

The alteration thus introduced into our modes of conception is the same throughout. Larger space, longer time, slower movement, finer gradation, than we had dreamed of, have everywhere to be admitted. Among objects, nothing isolated; in events, nothing sudden; a web of infinitely extended relations, in which *this* is part of the same mesh with *that;* a history of infinitely divisible changes, in which to-day is born of yesterday, and the shifting shadows glide and never leap;—these are the new aspects under which modern knowledge presents the system of the world. And though it still leaves vast

lacunæ where, if you insist on it, you may find room for things unique and lonely, and starts of existence *per saltum;* yet, as these gaps are being steadily filled in, and look just like older chasms where similar fancies lie in ruin and now visibly grassed over, there arises an increasing presumption against exceptional crises of surprise. Hence, on the whole, we are passing over to the idea of evolution, rather than creation; of a creeping upwards, little by little, in place of a leap out of nothing; of the lower type of phenomenon preceding the higher, and the better coming out of the worse. Nor can any well-informed man seriously doubt that in this idea the order of genesis is more truly represented, than in that which it replaces.

What is the meaning, what especially the religious bearing, of this change? It is essentially an assertion of neglected rights on the part of *Nature;*—that sphere of unconscious *growth,* which has always been recognized as copresent with Man and God, the beings of conscious thought and power; but has not always received the attention due to an immeasurable empire and an everlasting law. Christianity in particular was, from its very essence, so absorbed with the immediate relation between Man and God, as to look upon the universe as the mere theatre of their alienation and re-union,—the visible *stage* of a moral drama,—the scene built up, above, below, for the solemn tragedy of human probation and Divine Justice, and reflecting in its lights and glooms the changing phases of the plot. It was but the tabernacle raised for the abode of spiritual beings,—the heavens "a tent" for the Eternal "to dwell in,"—the earth a hospice for the Mortal to lodge in; sprung from the fiat of yesterday, dissolved by that of to-morrow, and meanwhile pliant alike to the steady purpose or the sudden occasions of the Almighty Will. However true and needful was this claim of transcendent reality for Moral relations and living Minds, it doubtless made too little of the cosmical system, usurped its rights and misconceived its ways; and scarcely left any adequate interest

attaching to the patient scrutiny of its facts and laws. For such tranquil pursuits we need an absence of passionate problems and the presence of a durable world; and we cannot imagine in a Tertullian the researches of an Aristotle, or transfer to a Carlstadt the reasonings of a Galileo. At last, however, in re-action from the exclusive ascendency of the Christian idea, Nature resumes her place, —it may be, more than her place; shows her uniformities spreading everywhere through space and time; pushes her claims far up into the being of man himself; and requires us to think again what it is that irremovably belongs to God.

The answer to this question appears to us simple: Science discloses the method of the world, but not its cause; Religion, its cause, but not its method: and there is no conflict between them, except when either forgets its ignorance of what the other alone can know.

When, for instance, the old book of Genesis announces God as the Cause of all, it speaks the language of pure Religion, which cannot be traversed or met, except behind the field of mere phenomena. When it relates that it took six days to make the universe, and recounts what was done on each; how, first, Day and Night, then Heaven and Earth, then Land and Sea, were parted from each other; how, between the creation of vegetable and animal life, the greater and lesser lights were set aloft; how the water and the air were peopled before the solid ground, and man came last of all to rule the other tribes and live upon the fruits of the field;—in all this, it essays the language of Science, and is open to correction from every fresh reading of the order and method of the world. And so, when the modern book of Genesis wants years by the million for every day of that Creation-week; when it deals with spaces in which ten thousand of those "firmaments" would be lost; when it alters all the elements and transposes all the order, and distributes to be done for ever what had been gathered up to be despatched at once; when it substitutes

a perpetuity of birth and death in things for an outburst of creative labour succeeded by eternal rest;—in all this, it also speaks what Science has a right to say, though it compels all the prophets to retract and apostles to sit still and learn. But if, on the strength of this right, it goes on to say, "these ways of nature are all in all, and behind them there is nought for man to apprehend," it usurps a function not its own, and affirms that which lies not less beyond its competency than was the Newtonian astronomy beyond that of the Hebrew cosmogonist. No discoveries of method touch the question of causation. Whether the way of procedure be *this* or be *that*, be such as we now think, or such as once was fancied, or such other as may hereafter be conceived, is indifferent to the background of Reality, which throws the procedure forth. As religion has no voice about the order of phenomena, conversely, the order of phenomena has nothing to say about religion: they sit perfectly clear of each other: nor is any delusion more absolute than the notion that the one can ever contradict the other. Causality, with which alone religion in this relation has to do, is not amenable to the same faculties that take cognizance of method,—those by which we perceive, compare, arrange: it cannot be heard, smelt, or seen: no lens can fetch it into view; no generalization reach further than its effects; no classification grasp more than its outward expressions. It is no object of sense; or of inference from any combination of the data of sense: and a merely observing, sifting, discriminating mind, however keen its perceptions, however delicate its feeling of resemblance and difference, could never come across it. It may,—nay must,—be thought: it may be named: but it is added on by the intellect to the experiences of perception; not drawn by the intellect out of them. It is by an inner necessity of Reason that we refer all phenomena, single or grouped, disposed into this picture or into that, scattered in negligence or reduced by induction, to an originating Power: and precisely at this point it is, where

Science has already come to an end, that Religion begins, and undertakes to speak of that which remains when the account of phenomena is closed.

Seeing, then, that the two spheres have no contact, or contact only at a point, it is not less futile to imagine atheistical encroachment from physical knowledge than to be afraid lest the tangent should cut a slice out of the circle. The more we discover, the more phenomena will there be crying out for their Cause. Is their field widened every way? so much the more august must his universal presence be. Is their succession immeasurably older? so much the sublimer what we conceive of his duration. Is their symmetry more exact and their cycle more determinable? so much the surer the order of his thought. Is the method of their issue, not by paroxysms of omnipotence, but by perpetual flow of power stealing to the roots of things? then does the Genesis cease to be historical, and we are at it ourselves; and may read it no longer in the preterite, but in the progressive tense; saying not that once he *did create*, but that now and always he *is creating* the heavens and the earth. If the Theist was ever right, according to the measure of his day, assuredly nothing has been found out to put him in the wrong. If the poor little universe that over-arched the tents of Abram, and had been there only for a few generations, made its claim felt to be of origin Divine, it certainly has not forfeited that claim by prefixing to its age the reaches of geologic time, deepening around it the heaven of Newton, and suspending itself in the balances of Clairaut.

"But was the Theist ever right?" it may be asked. Granting that science makes his case no worse, and can never acquire a title to contradict him, still we may inquire what, intrinsically, *is* his case? What can we say, and on what warrant, respecting that invisible sphere of Power behind phenomena?

That *something* may be truly said about the Cause of things has been rarely questioned, since the New Academy

ceased to parade its doctrine of universal nescience. Men have spoken in terms different enough: but, far from saying "we cannot tell," have variously affirmed, (1) Nature has a Divine Author; (2) Nature has no Divine Author; (3) Nature is Divine, and its own Author: and these several doctrines have been discussed upon common principles and on objective grounds, in perfect assurance that somehow or other the controversy was rationally terminable, and truth attainable. If there was any thing on which, in this matter, Theist, Atheist, Pantheist demonstrably agreed, it was surely this,—that the problem on which they all engaged was amenable to thought, and might be solved. Else, why plunge into it, and pronounce upon it? Without the assumption that knowledge is possible, the very attitude of quest is impossible. Yet Mr. Spencer, analysing the doctrines of these three men, and discharging all their mutual discordances, finds them all concur in this,—that the object of their search is hopelessly out of reach, in a darkness beyond the limits of thought itself. It is a bold feat of eclecticism to sift out any common "soul of truth" at all from the two contradictory propositions of Theist and Atheist: but to make it consist in precisely what each, by its very existence, excludes,—to draw a declaration of nescience from two positive professions of knowledge implies an almost Hegelian dexterity of logical cross-examination. We must say it seems to us a burlesque application of the questionable maxim,—every human belief has a "soul of truth,"—to take up not only inconsistent opinions, but positions of which one must be true and the other false, and by pretending to dissolve their variances, precipitate the residuary "soul." The process cannot be soundly carried through. Between "Yes" and "No" there is nothing common. If you discharge their differences, one of them disappears. If you save any thing from both, the falsehood and contrariety are uneliminated still. You may choose, but cannot compromise, between them: and if there be a delusive show of some joint element, it

can only be gained through sophistical manipulation of the propositions, inserting by implication what is required to be got out again by explication. We could allow something to our author's argument, if he turned it round and rested it on the real dissidence, instead of the pretended concord, of ontological beliefs; if, with Bossuet in his *Variations of Protestants*, he said, "the truth is in none of you; for truth is one; and you are all at sixes and sevens, and have not a shred of unity to show." But to bring into court three differing men, each sure that he knows, and tell them, "the truth is in all of you; for you all mean to say, that you are quite in the dark," is a strange combination of paradox and reproach.

The position which is thus curiously gathered from the critique of opposite opinions,—viz., that the Supreme Cause is incognizable,—is not left, however, without support from more direct and positive reasoning. On this we must say a few words. The hardy old-fashioned Atheist used to say outright, "There is no God," and forthwith to set his faculties and yours at work upon the problem, to get to the bottom of it. Of late,—thanks to Sir W. Hamilton,—we have fallen upon a more refined and idealized form of the same doctrine, a purely subjective atheism, which leaves with the Divine Reality permission *to be*, but withdraws from us the power *to know*; and says,—"Apprehensible by us there is no God." The trial of the case is thus removed from the outer court of existence, where we seek the limits of real being, to the inner tribunal of psychology and logic, where we investigate the limits of human reason. There is certainly a modest look in thus apparently contracting the problem within a narrower circle and bringing it home to the familiar seat of our self-knowledge: and it has a sound of meekness to say, "We pretend not to make our line the measure of things as they are; beyond its end there is the unfathomable still: only we find that it stops short of God; and if he be, it is in the abyss we cannot reach." Yet we greatly doubt whether the seeming simplification is not

sophistical, and the humility a self-deception. The limits of thought are not in effect easier to determine than the limits of being: and the battles once fought on the field of Metaphysics are renewed, one by one, and fought over again on the field of Logic: nor have Locke and Kant, with their critique of faculty, closed a single question previously opened by the contemplation of existence. The haunting old realities, Space, Substance, Essence, Cause, are not got rid of by stopping in our own chamber and refusing to go forth among them: they re-appear in their shadows on the floor and their reflections on the wall; and in the dress of *a-priori* thoughts awaken the same faith or scepticism which they had provoked on the field of necessary being. Suppose it, however, to be otherwise: suppose the cognitive limits accurately defined: suppose the line separating the possible light from the irremovable darkness incontrovertibly drawn. What then? In order to fall on the right side of the line, an object must comply with certain conditions: and conversely, before you exclude it, you must be able to deny those conditions. But how can you do this of an object quite unknown? by what right do you prejudge a hidden reality, and so give or refuse it predicates as to assign its place? Is it not plain that, in declaring it absolutely inscrutable, you assume it to be partially known? and that like children in some blindfold game, you have taken a peep at it before letting it go into the dark and professing that you cannot see it at all? It is but the semblance of intellectual humility, which must thus presume a knowledge in order to disclaim it.

The doctrine of religious nescience has been rendered so familiar by Mr. Mansel, as to belong to the common stock of contemporary thought, and to make any full exposition of its grounds unnecessary. It assumes that God, if acknowledged at all, must be entitled to the epithets "Absolute" and "Infinite" on the one hand, and "Cause" on the other. Supposing this to be admitted, several contradictions arise between the parts of the

admission; and some positions to which thought is incompetent altogether. To be "Absolute," for instance, means, to be out of all relations: to be "Cause" means, to stand related to an effect: and the same object cannot be both. Again, "Infinite" Being is unexclusive being, to which nothing can be added and no new predicate attached: "Causal" Being is transitive and productive, passing to conditions not occupied before, and adding to the stock of existence, or functions of existence, chargeable upon it. The epithets are therefore incompatible. Moreover, the very nature of Thought itself imprisons us within the circle of relative things: for it carries in it a necessary duality, and consists in marking off and distinguishing,—object from subject, body from space, attribute from substance, prior from posterior, and individuals, classes, and qualities *inter se*. Apart from a field or term of comparison, *any*-thing proposed for thought becomes *no*-thing, and only a vacancy remains: nor is the vacancy itself appreciable but by standing over against the self that looks into it. If then to think is, on the one hand, to note the confines of things, it can never pass beyond the finite: and if it is, on the other, to discriminate their contents and properties, it can never pass beyond the relative. The Absolute and Infinite cannot therefore present itself to the intellect at all.

So the warrant for the doctrine of religious nescience is simply this: that God is "absolute"; and we can know nothing but the relative.

Of one point, however, Mr. Spencer declares, we may be sure; and *that* upon the highest guarantee;—the same *a-priori* necessity of thought which enforces the nescience itself,—viz., *that the Absolute exists* in reality, though denied to apprehension. For, were it otherwise, there could be no relative; relativity itself being in its turn cognizable only by contrast with the non-relative, and forming a duality with it. Take away its antithetic term, and the relative, thrown into isolation, is set up as absolute, and disappears from

thought. It is indispensable therefore to uphold the Absolute in existence, as condition of the relative sphere which constitutes our whole intellectual domain. Be it so: but when saved on this plea,—to preserve the balance and interdependence of two *co*-relatives,—the "Absolute" is absolute no more; it is reduced to a term of relation: it loses therefore its exile from thought: its disqualification is cancelled; and the alleged nescience is discharged.

So, the same law of thought which warrants the existence, dissolves the inscrutableness, of the Absolute.

What after all, then, is the amount of this terrible nescience, victoriously established by such a flourish of double-edged abstractions? Let not the dazzled observer be alarmed: with all their swift dexterities, these metaphysical whifflers draw no blood: if they do more than beat the air, they cleave only ghostly foes that need no healing and are immortal. It all comes to this; that we cannot know God out of all relation, apart from his character, apart from his universe, apart from ourselves,—vacuum within, vacuum without, and no difference between them, but everywhere a sublime equivalence of being and of blank. Privation of this knowledge we suffer, not in our capacity of *ignorant* creatures, but in our capacity of *intellectual* beings; intelligence itself consisting in *not having* cognition of such sort: so that, if we had it, we should cease to understand, and pass out of the category of thinking natures altogether. If any one chooses to imagine that this would be a promotion, and to feel himself aggrieved by his exclusion from it, far be it from us to disturb so transcendent a grief: but from the common human level his dream of privilege is indistinguishable from the reality of loss, and his ambition of apotheosis seems tantamount to a longing for death. God other than "Absolute," God as *related* to nature, to humanity, —as embracing and quickening the infinite world, as the Source of all order, beauty, good,—in every aspect which

distinguishes the "Living" from the "Existing" God,—we are not by the hypothesis debarred from knowing. This is enough; and every step beyond this would be a step out of knowledge into ignorance, a lapse over the brink of reason into unreason. We protest against these relative apprehensions being left to us with an apology, and disparaged as "regulative knowledge,"—a kind of pious frauds put upon our nature,—falsehoods which it is wholesome for us to believe. Their relativity is a ground of trust, and not of distrust; presenting precisely that union of the Real and Phenomenal, Being and Genesis, the one and the Many, the divorce of which, in the interest of either, has falsified almost every philosophy. True, God so regarded will not, in the rigorous metaphysical sense, be absolutely infinite. But we know no reason why he should be; and must leave it to the schoolmen who worship such abstractions to go into mourning at the discovery.

The doctrine of nescience is further defended by appeal to Spinoza's principle, that to predicate is to limit,—"Omnis determinatio est negatio." Whatever you affirm of any subject introduces a boundary into its nature, and shuts the door on a possibility previously open. How then, it is asked, can the Infinite be the object of thought? To think is mentally to predicate: to predicate is to limit: so that, under the process, the Infinite becomes finite: and to know it is to destroy it. If so, however, the Infinite can have no predicates,—none of the marks, that is, or characters of existence, and will be indistinguishable from non-being. To deny it to Thought, yet save it to existence,—as Mr. Spencer proposes,—is thus impossible. If it is an incognizable, it is also a nonentity. What is intrinsically out of thought is necessarily out of being.

Or will you look at the Infinite from the affirmative rather than the negative side; and instead of guarding it from what it must *not* be, consider what it must comprise and be? Then we shall give just the opposite account of it: ceasing to say that it can have *no* predicates, because

no limits, we shall demand for it *all* predicates, because all phases and possibilities of being. To the Infinite, as unexclusive, every thing affirmative belongs; not only to be, therefore, but to be known;—to subsist within the sphere of intellect as well as in every other sphere. To claim it for Being, yet withdraw it from Thought, is thus again impossible. If it is an entity, it is not an incognizable. The Infinite which is real in existence is possible in cognition.

We cannot see, therefore, the slightest logical advantage in the new subjective atheism over its broader objective counterpart. The denial, for all minds, of any possible knowledge of God, is tantamount to the denial, for him, of real being. Not only do the two negations appear to us morally equivalent, with only a tinge perhaps of more reluctant dreariness in that which is at present in vogue; but they are inseparable without metaphysical contradiction. Mr. Spencer must, it strikes us, concede either more to ontology or less; either fall back on the maxim, "All we know is phenomena"; or go forward from his assurance, *that* the Infinite Cause is, to admit some possible apprehension of *what* it is. The law of thought which is his warrant for the simple *existence* does not stop there, but has something to say of the *nature* too: it is either good for nothing, or good for more than he accepts. Reserving this point for the present, we may exhibit the doctrine in still another light, before taking leave of its metaphysical aspects.

Every relative disability may be read two ways. A disqualification in the nature of thought for knowing x is, from the other side, a disqualification in the nature of x for being known. To say then that the First cause is wholly removed from our apprehension is not simply a disclaimer of faculty on our part: it is a charge of inability against the First Cause too. The dictum about it is this: "It is a Being that may exist out of knowledge, but that is precluded from entering within the sphere of knowledge."

We are told in one breath that this Being must be in every sense "perfect, complete, total, including in itself all power, and transcending all law" (p. 38); and in another that this perfect and omnipotent One is totally incapable of revealing any one of an infinite store of attributes. Need we point out the contradictions which this position involves? If you abide by it, you deny the Absolute and Infinite in the very act of affirming it; for, in debarring the First Cause from self-revelation, you impose a limit on its nature. And in the very act of declaring the First Cause incognizable, you do not permit it to remain unknown. For that only is unknown of which you can neither affirm nor deny any predicate: here you deny the power of self-disclosure to the "Absolute": of which therefore something is known;—viz., that nothing can be known!

It is matter indeed of natural wonder that men who, in standing before the First Cause, professedly feel themselves in face of the impenetrable abyss of *all* possibilities, should take on themselves to expel that *one* possibility, that the Supreme Reality should be capable of self-revelation. Among the indeterminate cases comprised in their inscrutable abyss they cannot help including this,—that the Mysterious Being *may* be Conscious Mind. Let them deny this, and their profession of impartial darkness becomes an empty affectation: they so far exchange their attitude of suspense for one of dogmatism. Let them admit it: and how, with the possibility of God, can they combine an impossibility of revelation? May it be that perchance all minds live in presence of the Supreme Mind, source of their own nature and of the nature that surrounds them, yet that he cannot communicate with them, and let them know the affinities between the human and the Divine? Is there a possibility of kindred, yet a necessity of nescience? Who is this Uncreated that can come forth into a field of existence and fill it all, yet by no crevice can find entrance into the field of thought? that can fling the universal order and beauty into light and space, yet not tell

his idea to a single soul?—that can bid the universe into being, yet not say, "Lo! it is I"? So little credible do we find this combination, that, when we hear men insisting on the dumbness of the Everlasting Cause, we cannot imagine but that the religious interpretation of the world has already ceased to be open to them; and that, however they may assume, with Mr. Spencer, a neutral attitude towards the spiritual and the material conceptions of the Ultimate Reality, the controversy has in effect, though perhaps unconsciously, died out for them by prejudgment.

To assure me that some familiar conception is totally impossible, and goes dead against the "first law of thought," is the polite metaphysical way of saying "you are a fool"; and the frequency and *gusto* with which your men of formulas resort to this euphemism are highly amusing; and with the timid and self-distrustful, win doubtless a temporary success. Nobody knew, till Hamilton and Mansel told him, that whenever he talked of things beginning or ending, of time, of space, of power, all his terms were "inconceivable," and all his propositions "contradictions." This was discouraging: and now Mr. Spencer steps in with a new opprobrium. He has discovered a set of *pseudo-ideas*, a species of mental impostors, that do somehow turn up in the mind, but have no proper business there, and must be cast out into limbo, or wherever else their settlement may be. They, include, as might be anticipated, all the elements of ontological belief, usually referred to an *a-priori* source. They are charged with falsehood, for no other reason that we can discover than that, being symbolical transcripts of sensation, according to the exigencies of our author's psychology, they refuse to acknowledge their parentage, and put on quite independent airs. And they are distinguished from true ideas,—as generally the "inconceivable" from the "conceivable,"—in this, that they do not, like the latter, come before the *imaginative or representative faculty*. After assuming

this test of "true and false," of "clear and obscure," of "thinkable and unthinkable,"—and it is the test which Hobbes has bequeathed to his followers,—it is all plain-sailing out of the *a-priori* seas. If, among our mental stores, phenomenal perception, and what grows out of it, may alone be held valid as knowledge, the ideas of reason, with regard to real and ulterior being, are condemned without a hearing as ignorance. Repudiating these one-sided assumptions, we maintain the equal validity of our phenomenal and our ontological apprehensions.

That all consciousness and thought are relative, is not only true, but a truism. That this law visits us with disability to transcend phenomena is so little true, that it operates as a revelation of what exists beyond. The finite body cut out before our visual perception, or embraced by the hands, lies as an island in the emptiness around, and without comparative reference to this cannot be represented: the same experience which gives us the definite object, gives us also the infinite space; and both terms,—the limited appearance and the unlimited ground,—are apprehended with equal certitude and clearness, and furnished with names equally susceptible of distinct use in predication and reasoning. The transient successions,—for instance, the strokes of a clock,—which we count, present themselves to us as dotted out upon the line of permanent duration; of which, without them, we should have had no apprehension; but which, as their condition, is unreservedly known. Time with its one dimension, Space with its three, we are compelled to regard as infinite; not in the mere subjective sense, that our thought of them suffers no arrest; but in the objective sense, that they in themselves can have no beginning or end. In these two instances of relation, between a phenomenon given in perception, and an entity as its logical condition, the correlates are on a perfect parity of intellectual validity. You may disparage the underlying ground as "negative": and negative it is so long as your attention only uses it to

pitch on the phenomenon it carries: but this order is reversible at will; and the moment you change the focus of your thought and bring the containing field into your view, your representation of space is not less positive than that of body. Plus and minus are themselves relatives, and change places according to the starting-point and direction of your measurement. "The darkness," says Malebranche somewhere, "strikes upon our perceptions as well as the light: it effaces, no doubt, the glare of colours; but produces in its turn effects of its own." You may decry the ideas of the "infinite" and the "eternal" as not "clear": and clear they are not, if nothing but the mental picture of an outline can deserve that word. But if a thought is clear, when it sits apart without danger of being confounded with another, when it can exactly keep its own in speech and reasoning, without forfeiture and without encroachment,—if, in short, logical clearness consists, not in the idea of a limit, but in the limit of the idea,—then no sharpest image of any finite quantity,—say, of a circle or an hour,—is clearer than the thought of the infinite and the eternal. Or, finally, will you perhaps admit these to their proper honours as mere *thoughts*, — positive thoughts, clear thoughts,—but deny to them the character of *knowledge?* This course is open to you on one condition; that you restrict the word "knowledge" to the discrimination of phenomena from one another, and refuse it to the discrimination of them from their ground; and say, for instance, "I know the moon to be different from the sun; but I do not know it to be different from the space in which it floats": or, "I know Cæsar's life and date to be other than Seneca's; but I do not know either from the eternity in which it appears." Can any thing, however, be more arbitrary than such a definition? more repugnant to common sense and common language? nay, more self-destructive? for only as differenced from their common ground can things ever be known as differenced from one another: erase the primary differentiation, and all others

are for ever kept out of existence. We have no guarantee for any except in the assumed veracity of our perceptive and logical faculties: and that guarantee we have alike for all. We conclude then, on reviewing these examples of Space and Time, that ontological ideas, introducing us to certain fixed entities, belong no less to our knowledge than scientific ideas of phenomenal disposition and succession. The two types of cognition are different in this: that the one gives to our apprehension the unchangeable constancies of the universe,—what ever is, not what will appear, —and so supplies no aftersight, no foresight, but simply insight: while the other gives us the order and the lines of change; and so enables us to reproduce the past in thought and anticipate the future. Both kinds of discernment have the same warrant: both are alike indispensable to the harmony of Reason with itself and with the world: neither can affect independence of the other; and the attempt to glorify exclusively the characteristics of either is a mere professional limitation of mind, whether in the priest of Nature or the priest of God. The charge of nescience, advanced on the plea of the relativity of knowledge, is double-edged, and cuts both ways. True it is that the Infinite, discharged of all relation to the Finite, could never come into apprehension; as, without body, we should not know the truth of space: and that, in the attempt to deal with it absolutely, thought, overleaping its own conditions, is baffled and perplexed. But it is no less true that the Finite, discharged of all relation to the Infinite, is incognizable too; as, without the comprehending space, bodies could not mark out for us their determinate figures and positions: and that, in spite of every vow to ignore all except phenomena, Science is obliged to resume into itself certain metaphysical elements, were it only as the vehicle of description for its own work. On either hand, these are unfruitful propositions. What is the use of telling me that an "Absolute" which came into no relation would be inapprehensible? It is only saying that an unmanifested

Infinite could never be found out; that an everlasting silence would be totally inaudible. Vapid words, in a universe full of visions and of voices.

What we have said with regard to Space and Time applies equally to the case of Causation. Here, too, the Finite offered to perception introduces to an Infinite supplied by thought. As a definite body reveals also the Space around, and an interrupted succession exhibits the uniform time beneath, so does the passing phenomenon demand for itself a power behind: the Space and Time and Power not being part of the thing perceived, but its condition; guaranteed to us, therefore, on the warrant, not of Sense, but of Intellect. They are all on the same footing: we think them all by the same necessity: we know them all with the same certainty. Mr. Spencer freely allows that we are obliged to regard every phenomenon as the manifestation of some Power; that "we are obliged to regard that power as Omnipresent" (p. 99); that "we are no more able to form a circumscribed idea of Cause than of Space or Time, and we are consequently obliged to think of the Cause which transcends our thought as positive though indefinite" (p. 93); that we have a right to trust this demand for originating power; and that on this reposes our indestructible belief in an ultimate Omnipotent Reality. Here already are several predicates assigned which hardly consist with the proclamation that the Primary Existence is wholly unknown: that Being, it seems we may say, is One, Eternal, Ubiquitious, Omnipotent, manifested as Cause in all phenomena. Is there not more explicitness here than could be expected from an entity absolutely latent? But this is not all. Our author further identifies the First Cause with what appears in Science under the name of "Force," and is tracked through the metamorphoses of physical, chemical, vital, and other phenomena. The dynamic principles that we carry into our interpretation of nature, that Force is persistent through all expenditures and one under every disguise,—are in

truth but the transformed expression of the axiom of ultimate Causation. The primary and secondary agencies being thus merged into one, and conjointly made objects of *a-priori* apprehension, the next question naturally is,—what in the last resort means this word "Cause"? Pursued backward to its native seat, as a form of the intellect itself, what type does the thought present? Mr. Spencer truly says, "the force by which we ourselves produce changes, and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general, is the final disclosure of analysis" (p. 235); he admits that we cannot match our own voluntary effort against an external force, and regard them as susceptible of a common measure, without assuming them to be like in kind (pp. 58, 254): and as "no force save that of which we are conscious during our own muscular efforts is immediately known to us," while "all other force is mediately known," it is clearly the inner volition that serves as prototype of all exterior power, and defines what the intellect intends by the word Cause. Now combine these several propositions. One power we immediately know. That power is Will. Others, if assumed by us, must be assimilated to this. But behind every phenomenon we must assume a power. And all such powers are modes of one and the same. And that one is identical with the First Cause and Ultimate Reality of Being. The inference is irresistible, that by a fundamental necessity of thought we are constrained to own an ever-living Will, a Personal Agent, as Author and Administrator of the universe. This is precisely what the Theist maintains; and includes all that he can gather from the bare contemplation of physical nature, apart from the moral experiences and the spiritual history of humanity. Collected from so limited a ground, the ground too least rich in phenomena of the highest expression, it is but a meagre and imperfect form of faith. But still it dissipates the theory of nescience. It vindicates some distinct apprehensions of the "Supreme Reality." And drawn as it is directly from the statements of an

author who controverts it, it makes us curious to see how he evades the apparent cogency of his own premisses.

He forsakes the line of proof by a very simple device. The likeness between our own force and that which operates around us, though a necessity, is also, he conceives, an illusion of thought: and so we must give up our first natural belief that the universe is at the disposal of a Mind, the Divine counterpart of ours. There is no other conception open to us in our apprehension of outward causality: and yet this conception fails, and betrays us into absurdity. How so? Because it implies that the weight which I lift with my muscles must, in order to pull against me, be furnished with muscles too: and whatever teaches me that the objects about me are not alive destroys the assumed resemblance between the inner and the outer world. The case is thus stated:

"On lifting a chair, the force exerted we regard as equal to that antagonistic force called the weight of the chair; and we cannot think of these as equal without thinking of them as like in kind; since equality is conceivable only between things that are connatural. The axiom that action and re-action are equal and in opposite directions, commonly exemplified by this very instance of muscular effort *versus* weight, cannot be mentally realized on any other condition. Yet, contrariwise, it is incredible that the force as existing in the chair really resembles the force as present to our minds. It scarcely needs to point out that the weight of the chair produces in us various feelings according as we support it by a single finger, or the whole hand, or the leg; and hence to argue that as it cannot be like all these sensations, there is no reason to believe it like any. It suffices to remark that since the force as known to us is an affection of consciousness, we cannot conceive the force existing in the chair under the same form without endowing the chair with consciousness. So that it is absurd to think of Force as in itself like our sensation of it, and yet necessary so think of it if we realize it in consciousness at all" (p. 58).

There would be something in this reasoning, if the muscles were the Personal Agent disposing of the chair, and their sensations the power he put forth. The causality, however, does not lie in them, but behind them; they are themselves obedient to a mandate from within; and their sensations, which occur only in the execution of the act, do not even begin till that mandate has given the signal. Were the muscles altogether insensible, the power at head-quarters would not on that account be disqualified for action, or be unconscious of itself. We may entirely discharge out of the account the whole of this merely ministerial apparatus, with all its supposable varieties. It is not this which even the simplest individual,—be it that small "child" so much dandled by the psychologists, or the everlasting "peasant" preferred by bachelor philosophers, or the "fetish-worshipper" in favour with Mr. Mill,—attributes to the external objects acting upon him: and his discovery that they do not possess it disabuses him of no previous idea. What he plants in idea behind the phenomena that strike him is similar, not to his muscles which obey, but to his Will which bids: and of *this* idea, though it has a history to go through in correspondence with his culture, no progress of reason, we feel assured, will ever disabuse him. At last, as at first,—because by a necessity of thought which runs through all experience,—he has to think of Causality as meaning Will, and to borrow all his dynamic language,—"attraction," "repulsion," "tension," "percussion" "active," "passive," "weak," "strong," "overcome," "resist,"—from familiar instances and conditions of Will. If not, there must be some point and some process for unlearning his original postulate, and substituting some other idea of power. Yet this can never be. For, confessedly, it is beyond the competency of experience, however refined, to disclose anything but *laws:* the mystery of *force* evades the penetration of the observer, and therefore has no presence among the materials of inductive generalization: Science did not give it, and Science cannot

take it away: it lies on another field, where the correction or corroboration of phenomenal knowledge can never meet it. Born as a pure intellectual datum, it remains among our intellectual reserves, withdrawn not only from every actual, but from every possible contradiction:—an indestructible and unalterable postulate, inherent in the very organism of Reason itself. Does this require us then, as our author insists, to "endow the chair with consciousness," and, with Kepler, to set a separate spirit on each planet for its guidance? By no means. The theory of Living Causality involves no such puerilities; is no more negligent than Materialism itself of the lessons of scientific generalization: only it puts upon them a somewhat different interpretation. On the fundamental fact to be construed there is sufficient agreement. Undisciplined Man looks on all moving and impressive things as animate; starts at the spirits in the wind, the rushing water, and the forest gloom; and feels upon him a host of awful eyes in the watching lights of heaven. Civilized Man goes among these things, and tabulates them all; takes meteorological notes; draws up nautical almanacs: calculates when the timber will become available as coal; and in a few weeks reduces even a new comet to rules, and publishes its road in the *Times* newspaper. Wherein consists the essence of this change? Will you say, "Nature, which we supposed alive at the beginning, we have found at last to be dead"? We should rather reply, "Nature, which in our childhood seemed charged with the caprices of a thousand spirits, has become, for our maturity, organ of the faithful thought of One." The widening circuit of law, the merging of anomalies, the ever-growing tissue of analogies, do not touch the inner nature of causality: they are but the spread of unity where plurality was before. So long as the provinces of the visible world, and the corresponding sets of phenomena, struck our perception one by one, they needed for their explanation a god a piece: when two were fused together, the separation of their causes lapsed as

well: and when, by the apprehension of some universal law, the great cosmical conception, embracing heaven and earth in a common order assumed consistency, the miscellaneous crowd of spirits necessarily disappeared, in favour of the One Mind that manifestly thought out the whole. By this change, the provincial departments of nature, formerly invested with independent life, fell into subordination;—became simply instrumental;—and, when taken apart for separate contemplation, could reveal *method* only, not *causality*, which had now retired into the unitary background. The notion of distinct *laws*, mechanical, chemical, vital,—mere *modes* of causal procedure,—succeeded to that of distinct personal agents, and furnished lines of demarcation, often entirely new, between field and field of nature: but as this notion does absolutely nothing either to supersede or to satisfy the axiom of causation, the personal agents expelled by it leave a function unfulfilled. That function, vacated by their many wills, is taken up and absorbed into one; the singleness of the world expressing the singleness of its Cause. The early identification then of Causality and Will can never be disproved, and is never lost: the spiritual element is not discharged by any discovery of Laws: dislodged from this or that detached seat, it simply ceases to be scattered and becomes concentrated: and as Science weaves phenomena into unity, Religion blends the Divine Powers into One. We are told it is "Fetichism" to look on the world as instinct with Living Mind. If so, it is at least that imperishable element which Fetichism has in common with the highest Theism. We are told, it is the effect of Philosophy to exorcise every spirit from the universe, and reduce it to an aggregate of unconscious laws. If so, it is at least that effect of Philosophy which it shares with mere stupifying Custom;—an infirmity of technical habit,—not any vision of what is special to its field, but an acquired blindness to what remains beyond. There is doubtless a different reading of the world present to the mind of the man of Science,

and to the soul of the Poet and the Prophet; the one spelling out the order of its phenomena; the other, the meaning of its beauty, the mystery of its sorrow, the sanctity of its cause. But seeing that it is the same world which faces both, and that the eyes are human into which it looks, we can never doubt that the two readings have their intrinsic harmonies, and that the articulate thought of the one will fall at last into rhythm with the solemn music of the other.

On full survey of the logical conditions of this great problem, it seems to us that Mr. Spencer has alighted on the least tenable of all the possible positions. We can understand the Positivist with whom laws are ultimate, and who turns causation out of doors into metaphysic night. We can understand the Theist, who says that, on whatever ground you know the First Cause to exist, on the same ground you know that Cause to be a free Mind. But we cannot understand the intermediate position, which allows a field to Ontology, but condemns it to perpetual barrenness; which admits and demonstrates the ὅτι ἔστι, but meets the τί ἐστι with only negations and despair. To prepare the way for this paradox, both the Theistic and the Atheistic doctrines are charged with contradictions which they do not contain. The *self-existence*, for instance, which the latter ascribes to the universe, and the former to God, is declared to be "rigorously inconceivable," because "to conceive existence through infinite past-time, implies the conception of infinite past-time, which is an impossibility" (p. 31). We cannot answer for the consciousness of others; and in the face of this frequent assertion we hardly like to speak for ourselves. Yet after repeated reflection we cannot at all detect this alleged "impossibility." To form an *image* of any infinitude,—be it of time or space or number,—to go mentally through it by successive steps of representation,—is indeed impossible; not less so than to traverse it in our finite perception and experience. But to have the *thought* of it, as an idea of the Reason, not of the

phantasy, and assign that thought a constituent place in valid beliefs and consistent reasoning, appears to us not only possible, but inevitable: and the large part it plays in mathematical science alone suffices to vindicate its worth for the intellect. So far as *this* difficulty goes, "self-existence" appears to us perfectly susceptible, and equally susceptible, of intelligible predication regarding the universe and regarding God. Not that the two assertions,—the Atheist's and the Theist's,—remain at all upon the same footing beyond the circle of this particular criticism, and are equally free from other difficulties attaching to the claim of self-existence. Mr. Spencer treats the two cases as parallel throughout, and charges it on Theists as a gross inconsistency that they demand for their Ultimate Reality the very attribute which they forbid the Atheist to affirm of his. "Those who cannot conceive a self-existent universe; and who therefore assume a creator as the source of the universe; take for granted that they can conceive a self-existent creator" (p. 35). "If we admit that there can be something uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for any thing" (p. 37). Far from admitting this indiscriminating doctrine, that self-existence may go either everywhere or nowhere, we submit the distinction that while, by the laws of thought, phenomena demand causation, entities dispense with it: and it is, we presume, in obedience to this law, that our author himself plants his "Absolute Reality" behind the scenery and changes of the world. It is not existence, but entrance upon existence and exit thence, that must be referred to an originating power. And inasmuch as the universe resolves itself into a perpetual genesis, a vast aggregate and history of phenomena, the Theist is perfectly justified in treating it as disqualified for self-existence; and in passing behind it for the Supreme Entity that needs no Cause. This distinction is no invention of mere theology: it is recognized in other fields. No one asks a cause for the *Space* of the universe: and it depends on the theory we may form of its

Matter, whether that too is excepted from the category of originated things. But everywhere the line is drawn upon the same principle; that entities may have self-existence; phenomena must have their Cause.

It is an old reproach against gross forms of religion, that they teach worshippers to suppose God "*altogether* such a One as themselves." This reproach is now a favourite weapon, used by the nescient philosophy, against those who worship a Divine nature *in any respect* such a one as their own;—against all therefore who see above them any Divine object at all; for plainly, in the total absence of common attributes, no apprehension, no reverence, no sympathy, no suspicion of existence even, would be possible. Unless man is the monopolist of mind in the universe, and it culminates in him, higher intelligences, however they transcend him, must resemble him up to the extreme limits of his thought; and to take the rudimentary experiences of spiritual faculty in himself as his base of conception for the Universal Mind is no more presumptuous than from his paper diagrams and calculations to construe the geometry of the heavens, and lay down the orbits of the stars. It is singular that an author who both insists on the necessary belief of a First Cause, and declares that the only causation we know is our own, should also write as follows in derision of the theologians:

"If for a moment we made the grotesque supposition that the tickings and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of consciousness; and that a watch possessed of such a consciousness insisted on regarding the watchmaker's actions as determined, like its own, by springs and escapements; we should simply complete a parallel of which religious teachers think much. And were we to suppose that a watch not only formulated the cause of its existence in these mechanical terms, but held that watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate this cause, and even vituperated, as atheistic watches, any that did not venture so to formulate it; we should merely illustrate the presumption of theologians by carrying their own argument a step further" (p. 111).

Standing as it does for a "theologian," this is of course meant to be a great fool of a watch. Yet, till it gets excited and begins to "vituperate," its "first experiments in thinking" do not seem so much amiss. For do they not contrive to hit somehow upon the exact truth? Give the "springs and escapements" their "grotesque" change of meaning and function; let them cease to be "mechanical," and become vital and mental; let the watch, in virtue of them, be able to think and will, and raise questions of causality: and then, when it guesses its own origin from a being similarly gifted with rational and voluntary powers, does it not pitch upon the fact? Had it not a watchmaker? and was he not furnished with just the conscious faculties which had been newly awakened within itself? The endowments by which he made it, are they not like those by which it found him out? To us, we must confess, the "springs and escapements" of our author's satire seem a little out of order; and the logical "ticking" of the watch less at fault than the reasoning which makes fun of them.*

If of such type be the presumption of theologians, it is at least a happy presumption, in that it solves its problem truly. To carry out the illustration a little further, suppose, as the first fruit of their much thinking, a dispute and jumble of cross-tickings among the watches; and that one, —attached to the "know-nothing" party,—faced full upon our first reasoner and said: "Do not tell me about a watchmaker: such person is impossible, except in the dreams of your miserable egotism. *Some* Cause certainly

* The watch is so evidently in the right, that it is not easy to explain where the point of the illustration is supposed to lie. If the absurdity be meant to consist in this, that the watch attributes to its maker, not simply *faculties*, but in addition *organs* like its own, the "simile" breaks down in its application: for no theologian ascribes to God any thing analogous to the human organization,—of muscles, brain, nerves, &c.: or fails to guard expressly against any intrusion of "parts and passions" into the idea of him.

you and I must have had: but if every creature is to set up a Maker like itself, where shall we be? You and I can do a little thinking, no doubt; but that is because we have wheels; it is a kind of ticking they have. We can also choose this way or that; but only because there is an elastic thread in us that goes tight and loose by turns. We fancy ourselves living, and seem to go of ourselves: but if you attend to the winding-up that happens to us, you will see it is only a mechanical force turning itself into vital. So, for us to be alive and knowing, there is no need for the Cause of us to be so. No, no: your watchmaker-theory is too mechanical for me: watch-evolution is better, as far as it goes. 'I suppose we grew.' But of the Real Cause the only thing I know is, that it cannot be a watchmaker: it cannot be in any respect like us: it cannot think: it cannot will: it cannot live: and to believe any thing of the sort is 'transcendent audacity.'" Is this nescient watch entitled, merely by its humour for negations, to the praise of eminent modesty, and also to the prerogative of high rebuke? To drop the illustration, does a profession of ignorance, does an immunity from theological belief, confer a right to stigmatize the faiths of others as "impieties"?

Such censure, however, does the sensitive zeal of Mr. Spencer administer to us for irreverent speech in our pages* regarding the Supreme Cause;—speech so irreverent as to cast into the shade the presumptuous fellow who lamented that he had not been consulted at the making of the world. What is the sacrilegious violence,—the Titanic scaling of the heavens,—that calls down this lightning of reproof? Simply the utterance of these three thoughts: that, though Sense may vary, Reason must be uniform in all beings: that the uncreated nature conceded universally to space it was difficult to deny to matter in its Primary Qualities: and that, as Mind must be one, so must Righteousness be one, whether in Heaven or upon

* See the Essay on Nature and God, p. 143.

earth. As our author himself maintains that Matter can have no genesis and suffer no destruction, it cannot be the second of these positions that offends him. The first declares precisely what the most calm and cautious of modern savans, Oersted, wrote a treatise to establish,—the Unity of Reason throughout the universe; the ubiquity of space and time securing the relations of measure and number everywhere; and all other knowledge being entangled with this constant element. The third declares the corresponding Moral principle,—the Unity of Goodness,—the persistency of Right,—the identity of Real Excellence, from sphere to sphere of character. Is it "audacity," is it "irreverent," to apply these principles to the Highest of Spiritual Natures? Then it is "audacious" and "irreverent" to own him as Mind, or speak of any Divine Righteousness at all: for to do so is to assume a constant essence embodied in these words. Mr. Spencer's conditions of pious worship are hard to satisfy: there must be between the Divine and human no communion of thought, no relations of conscience, no approach of affection, no presence of Living God with living soul: to the jealous prophet of an empty "Absolute" these things are all "impieties." And the "true religion" which condemns them consists in "the consciousness that it is alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through which all things exist as The Unknowable" (p. 113). When we ask against *whom*, what dear object of sacred loyalty, our grievous irreverence has been committed, the name of this blank abstraction is given in. Far be it from us to deal lightly with the sense of Mystery. It mingles largely with all devout apprehension, and is the great redeeming power that purifies the intellect of its egotism and the heart of its pride. But you cannot constitute a Religion out of mystery alone, any more than out of knowledge alone: nor can you measure the relation of doctrines to humility and piety by the mere amount of conscious darkness which they leave. All worship, being

directed on what is *above* us and transcends our comprehension, stands in presence of a mystery. But not all that stands before a mystery is worship. The abyss must not be one of total gloom,—of neutral possibilities,—of hidden glories or hidden horrors, we know not which,—of perhaps the secure order of perfect Thought, or, equally perhaps, the seething forces of a universe fatefully and blindly born. Such a pit of indeterminate contingencies will bend no head, and melt no eye, that may turn to it. Some rays of clear light must escape from it, some visions of solemn beauty gleam within it, ere the darkness itself can be "visible" enough to deliver its awfulness upon the soul. Without positive apprehensions of a better than our best,—of a Real that dwarfs our Ideal,—of a Life, a Thought, a Righteousness, a Love,—that are the Infinite to our Finite,—there is nothing to revere, nothing to decide between despair and trust. To fling us into bottomless negation is to drown us in mystery and leave us dead. True reverence can breathe and see only on condition of some mingling and alternation of light and darkness, of inner silence and a stir of upper air. Nor do we believe that any of the appropriate effects of "true Religion" can outlive the simple trust in a Personal Ruler of the universe and human life.

VII.

EARLY HISTORY OF MESSIANIC IDEAS.*

I.

THE distance at which Christianity stands from Judaism at the present hour might well surprise us, if we measured their affinity by what they hold in common. With two-thirds of their sacred history accepted by both, with the whole of the canonical literature of the one maintained in authority by the other, with the same consecrated list of patriarchs, poets, and prophets, and the very glow and pathos of their piety resorting to the same words, they yet exhibit an apparently ineffaceable contrast of inward genius. This fact becomes the more striking the nearer we place ourselves to the incunabula of Christendom, and the more closely we scrutinize its external filiation. These two religions furnish the strongest antitheses of human thought and feeling,—law and love,—letter and spirit,—the claims of an old birth and need of a new birth,—the promise of this world to a nation and that of another to every human

* "Des Doctrines religieuses des Juifs pendant les deux siècles antérieurs à l'ère chrétienne." Par Michel Nicolas. Paris. 1860.

"Essais de Philosophie et d'Histoire religieuse." Par Michel Nicolas. Paris. 1863.

"Die jüdische Apokalyptik in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung." Von Dr. A. Hilgenfeld. Jena. 1857.

"Handbuch der Einleitung der Apokryphen." Von Dr. Gustav Volkmar. Tübingen. 1860.

"Abhandlung über Entstehung und Werth der Sibyllinischen Bücher." Von Heinrich Ewald. Göttingen. 1858.—*National Review*, 1863.

soul; and the precision with which every thing is formulated in the casuistry of the synagogue reverses the free life of faith and conscience which forms the saintly ideal of the Church. The vitality of Judaism displays itself in an unchangeable persistency, gazing out of the same eyes on an ever-varying world: that of Christianity in an inexhaustible susceptibility to fresh lights of truth and goodness, enabling it to appropriate what is best in the civilization of every age. And yet these two faiths no Roman of the first century could distinguish from each other: the same law protected, or the same edict proscribed, both: the tumult that expelled the Rabbi did not spare the Apostle: and had some philosophic civilian listened to their polemic in the proseucha of Philippi or Thessalonica, he would have heard them start from the same assumptions, appeal to the same traditions, quote the same Scriptures, and vie with each other in reverence for the same names. The whole difference arose from two causes scarcely appreciable in their earliest action: the personal characteristics of Christ's divine humanity, and the Pauline doctrine of a heavenly and universal Redeemer. In these is contained the living essence of the new religion: and their intense power cannot be adequately estimated till we fully picture to ourselves the original identity, which they have so absolutely destroyed, between the Hebrew and the Christian ideas.

It is no wonder that the religion of Christ, now that its genius has distinctly opened itself out, should appear to us to make quite a new beginning in the world; should stand detached, as a sudden apparition, from the common history even of the nation in which it arose, and seem scarcely to touch the earth except as the theatre of its manifestation. This illusion, due to our distance, could not be shared by the first witnesses who lived across the dividing time of the old world and the new, and occupied the very scene of the transition. They, accordingly, linked their fresh allegiance closely with their national birthright: if they accepted the

gospel, it was in obedience to the law: they followed Jesus of Nazareth, because the prophecies must be fulfilled; nor were they surprised at his call, for they were looking for some such "consolation to Israel." In its earliest aspect Christianity was no new or universal religion; Judaism had found the person of its Messiah, but else remained the same. Had the first two gospels and the book of Revelation been the only monuments of the primitive age, no other view than this, which makes the New Testament simply the last chapter of the Old, would have been represented in our Scriptures: and it is by no means clear that, within the first generation, "the Twelve" and their disciples ever withdrew from the synagogue, or regarded the church as more than its supplement and ally. It was impossible, however, permanently to shut up and paralyze the spiritual power of Christ's personality within the narrow formulas of Jewish tradition and expectation. His words contained the germs, his life the image, his entrance into a higher world the consummation of the purest and widest human faith; and could not fail to speak home to many a spirit already sighing for such deliverance and repose. Hence arose a reaction against the Hebrew Christianity; beginning with Stephen, systematized by Paul, and urged to its extreme in Marcion's final breach with the Old Testament. In his attempt to unfold the independent religious elements of the gospel, and to vindicate their sufficiency, he committed the error of speculative minds, and disowned the Past: he was not content with cutting the thread which united new and old, but set up in absolute opposition the spiritual stages which were really continuous. The Church had enough of historical feeling to condemn this Gnostic extreme, and of catholicity to rise above the other Jewish one; and settled into the compromise which has continued ever since, and may be stated thus: Christ fulfils the Law and the Prophets, inasmuch as they look towards him, and he bounds their view. Christ destroys the Law and the Prophets, inasmuch as he super-

sedes by transcending them; and they, having no significance but as preludes to him, retire on his appearing. It is not true, as the Marcionites say, that they came from a bad god, he from the Good: there is one divineness in them all. Neither is it true, as the Ebionites say, that he was sent only to usher in the triumph of the Law, and publish the Old Testament religion among mankind: on the contrary, he is the end, they the instrument; and when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part is done away.

The good sense of this verdict, regarded as a practical solution, cannot be denied. It saves the main truth of both the extremes; reserving supreme authority for the specialties of the new dispensation, without displacing the sanctity of the old. The connection between the two, however, is represented as exclusively supernatural: it is sought for, not on earth, but in heaven;—in the scheme and economy of God, not as ruling, but as overruling, the course of human affairs. The sequence of the new upon the old is in no degree that of natural growth, but purely that of artificially-created correspondency,—antitype to type,—realization to prediction. Through the national drama of Hebrew history, the Divine purpose always had regard to the final scene: but that scene was not wrought out by the inner movement of the piece: it was subjoined by detached volition; and its time, its mode, its character, were any thing rather than results of the antecedent conditions, and were determined in unexpected ways by special creative power turning the tides of tendency. So long as God was quite set apart from the world, and supposed to act *upon* it rather than *in and through* the courses of its life, the divine connection of the two religions could be represented in no other way. The theory was also favoured by the chasm that lay between Malachi and Matthew,—the blank leaves that rendered it impossible to read on from the Old Testament to the New, and compelled them to stand aloof as the memorials of two economies. The

more, however, we see of the Divine method in the physical and moral universe, the less disposed are we to rest in the idea of sudden leaps of change, with no transition except in the mind of God; and the stronger do we find the presumption that the seeming breaks in the line of facts are but lacunæ in our knowledge. There could not in reality be that abyss of religious pause which makes a darkness to our eye between the last of the prophets and the Baptist's "voice in the wilderness": the period which was illustrated by the Maccabean heroism, which gave rise to the Jewish sects, which planted the Jewish colonies and taught them Greek, which made the free synagogues of Alexandria as powerful as the priests and temple at Jerusalem, could not be unfruitful of spiritual change: and were it possible to find the intermediate links, the method as well as the fact of a divine connection might become apparent between the Old and New. How rich a mine of elucidation for the Christian Scriptures is contained in the Rabbinical literature, the labours of Lightfoot and Schoettgen already proved. But the illustrative value of the Hebrew annotators depends greatly upon the time when they lived; and, in the uncertainty prevailing on this point, the relation between analogous Jewish and Christian ideas could not disclose its full significance. Of late years research has been directed upon other memorials, more ample and distinct, of religious belief in Palestine during the two pre-Christian centuries. The genius of the nation did not slumber during that period; and among the writings it produced, a sufficient number have been preserved to mark certain lines of continuous change of thought from the prophetic to the apostolic age. Some of these writings, though by no means the most important, are found in the Apocrypha; others are accessible only to the learned, and are still the subject among them of many a keen discussion; but, without pre-judgment of questions fairly open, enough is determinately known to throw great light on the early forms of Christian conception.

Whoever can read the New Testament with a fresh eye must be struck with the prominence everywhere of the Messianic idea. It seems to be the ideal framework of the whole,—of history, parable, dialogue; of Pauline reasoning; of Apocalyptic visions. "Art thou he that should come?" this question gives the ideal standard by which, on all hands,—on the part of disciples, relations, enemies, of Saul the persecutor and Paul the apostle,—the person and pretensions of Christ are tried. His birth, his acts, his sufferings, are so disposed as to "fulfil what was spoken" by the prophets: so that the whole program of his life would seem to have preëxisted in the national imagination. Yet when we turn back to the Old Testament for the sources of this preconception, no image with any clear outline is anywhere to be found: at most, only broken lights and the uncertain semblance of a feature here and there present themselves, like a landscape or a battle-scene construed out of evening clouds: nor is the disappointment ever more complete than when we look up in their context the very passages said to be "fulfilled," and feel the difference between their natural and their "non-natural" sense. This first impression, which even the attentive English reader can hardly fail to receive, is deepened with increasing insight into the true genius of the Hebrew poets and prophets: so that, except under constraint of fancied theological obligation, no eminent biblical scholar can find in the Old Testament the personal Agent who appears in the New. The contrast between the ancient text in its original breadth and ease, and the strained evangelical interpretation, implies a long intermediate history; it attests the gradual formation of the Messianic idea by stages which brought it into more and more determinate shape, till at last scarce a trace remained of its original germ. This process of growth is no longer matter of conjecture; we have fortunately the means of tracing it through the last century and a half before our era.

It is vain to look for any defined Messianic expectation

till after the return from the Captivity. The earlier prophets uttered such warnings and promises as an intense faith in the moral government of God dictated and justified; foreboding national calamities from national sins; announcing copious blessings on due faithfulness; and interpreting the vicissitudes of their world by the light of the Divine Righteousness. In the prophets of the exile, speaking to a people captive and broken, this faith, subdued to plaintiveness and penitence for the present, could only throw itself for relief into the future: the momentary humiliation, treated as a purifying discipline, gave a brighter glow to the dream of restoration; and as the sufferings of the commonwealth went back to the fatal division of the kingdom, to reverse them would be to reinstate the glories of an earlier time,—to send David or his like again. When the state had been reconstituted, first under Zerubbabel, then under Nehemiah and Ezra, and still presented but the shadow of its ancient greatness, the vision reluctantly moved a little forward; and though Zachariah looked for its realization in his own contemporary chief, we find the latest prophet, Malachi, still looking for a better future. In all this, there is simply the forecast of faith in a living Providence, operating under the limitations of national experience. The isolated monotheism of the Jews, planted in the midst of hostile religions, led them to feel themselves under exceptional "covenant" with God, and narrowed their conception of a Divine rule over men to that of a family theocracy. But here, nevertheless, had begun that belief in a "kingdom of God," which, infinitely deep and true in itself, can expand as the horizon of thought enlarges, and consecrate, not a people only, but a world.

It is not till two centuries and a half later that we next meet with this Messianic doctrine; and in the book of Daniel find it developed into a form distinct and new. Its substance, its scenery, its language, though working up some of the materials from the elder prophets, are essentially unlike anything we have encountered before. For the dithy-

rambic fervour of the old "men of God," we have the cold artifices of the interpreting scribe: for the conditional denunciations and encouragements of a moral faith, the absolute predictions of a clairvoyant: for patriotic passion, bounded by the view of home relations, a critical reckoning of the series of great empires in the world: parallel with the terrestrial scene we have a counterpart play of nameable angels in the sphere above: and we are introduced to symbolic monsters, and chronological riddles, and questionable visions, which imply a conception of revelation materially changed. The change is the more important, because in all these particulars the book has become the archetype of several later productions; and its characteristic phraseology,—especially the term "Son of Man,"—has passed into the New Testament with a permanent doctrinal significance.

The evidence that this book was produced as late as about the years 167–164 B.C. is of the simplest kind. Five separate visions, which pass under review, wholly or in part, the succession of heathen empires in the world, all converge upon the same terminus, viz., the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, and then immediately introduce the Messianic reign. Everything within the historical series is of definite outline; every personage can be identified with tolerable certainty; every leading event recognized under its mystic disguise; every calculation approximately made out. Thus far, the author, it is plain, saw what he describes laid out clearly beneath his eye. But after this, he passes instantly into an indeterminate cloud, and can tell us nothing, except that an everlasting kingdom shall be given to the saints of the Most High. Where this phenomenon appears, of perfect historical precision up to a certain date, with absolute indistinctness beyond, we must infer, till some positive counter-evidence is produced, that the author lived at the point of junction between his knowledge and his ignorance, and delivers to us his *vaticinia post eventum*. Is there, then, any counter-evidence to check this con-

clusion, in the present case? Of a critical kind, absolutely none. Daniel himself is a mythical personage, unknown to history. The name is absent from the list of worthies and prophets of Israel given (B.C. 200–180) by Jesus, son of Sirach (c. xlix.); and though it occurs in two passages in Ezekiel (xiv. 14–20, xxviii. 3), it there belongs, as Hitzig remarks,* to some other hero of earlier tradition. That we should have been left thus to learn from himself the existence of a prophet who uttered predictions for seventy years, and won honours from the Babylonian and Persian monarchs, is intrinsically incredible; and at all events deprives us of answer to the internal indications of date and authorship. The only possible reply is theological,—that the New Testament appeals to the book as Daniel's, and as prophetic. True: but in the same breath the New Testament identifies the siege of Jerusalem and the Messianic end of the world, and so limits its own authority as interpreter, whether of the future or of the past.

The method and meaning of the writer are relieved of all serious ambiguity by his repetition of the same matter in different forms. Twice (in chapters ii. and vii.) he brings before us the four dominions which fill up his picture of foreign history,—the Babylonian, the Median, the Persian, the Macedonian; under the symbol, first, of the composite image with (1) golden head, (2) silver breast and arms, (3) body of brass, (4) feet of iron and clay; and then, of four creatures that come up out of the sea, (1) the winged lion, (2) the bear, (3) the leopard, with four wings and heads (the four Persian kings, mentioned in Ezra iv. 5–7, and supposed by the writer to be the only ones), and (4) a nameless monster, with iron teeth and trampling strength, and ten horns (declared, vii. 24, to be ten kings, *i.e.*, the line of the Seleucidæ, down to Antiochus Epiphanes). It is this last mad persecutor of the Jewish people who is the real object of the visions: he is the "lesser horn" that appeared at the expense of three of the rest (Heliodorus,

* Das Buch Daniel, erklärt von Dr. F. Hitzig: Vorbemerkungen, 2, 3.

Seleucus IV., and Demetrius): his boastful impieties, his cruelty to the "holy people," his profaning of their sanctuary and extinction of the daily sacrifice, are to be the consummation of heathen wickedness, and to bring in the reaction into a triumphant theocracy. His figure it is that, placed thus in immediate antecedence and antithesis to Messiah's, furnished the conception of an Antichrist, and, as the predicted crisis moved forward, was carried with it and spread its portentous shadow over the expected close of historic time. In two other visions (chapters viii. and xi.) the writer detached for special notice the lower half of the same sweep of history. The first describes how the Macedonian "goat" destroyed the Persian "ram," and, having lost its single horn (Alexander), gave origin to four (Macedonia, Asia, Syria, Egypt); from one of which (Syria) arises again the "lesser horn" already known to us, which waxes great and insolent and provokes the end. The other, reciting also the fourfold division of Alexander's dominions, enters more fully into Syrian affairs,—the humiliation inflicted by the Roman general (L. Scipio Asiaticus),—the usurpation of the tax-collector, Heliodorus, destroyed "neither in anger nor in battle,"—and especially the final iniquities of Antiochus Epiphanes. Nowhere are his characteristics more unmistakably given than in this vision,—his wars against Egypt, his compulsory return on the appearance of a Roman fleet under C. Popilius Lænas, —the murder by his viceroy of Onias III. (the "chief of the covenant," xi. 22, and the "Messiah that should be cut off," ix. 26),—the dedication of the temple to heathen worship, in December 168 B.C.,—the tyrant's disregard for the gods of his fathers and new zeal for the worship of Jupiter Capitolinus and Mars Gradivus,—his favour to apostates and barbarities against the faithful Hebrews. But through all disasters an heroic band (under Mattathias) will hold together; and in heaven Michael, the guardian angel of the race, will interpose and deliver all whose names are written in the book of life; and to crown

the triumph appointed for the righteous people, prior generations shall return and share the everlasting life or everlasting contempt.

Four times over therefore is the Messianic golden age definitely fixed for the years following the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, in B.C. 164. But, as if to preclude all excuse for doubt, the date itself, apart from the thing dated, is made the subject of a special prophecy; in which (ix.) the angel Gabriel is introduced in the character of commentator on Jeremiah, and gives an explanation, much in the exegetical style of Dr. Cumming, of that prophet's seventy years (xxv. 12–14*). This period in the original plainly denotes the duration of Jewish humiliation between the year B.C. 606, when Nebuchadnezzar assumed the command of the Babylonish forces, and the year B.C. 536, the date assigned to the decree of Cyrus for the exiles' return. The pseudo-Daniel sees all this three or four centuries behind him: and to fit the oracle to his own time and purpose, its terms must be stretched and a new construction found for it. The angel accordingly invents a fresh numerical notation, which gives to each unit of the 70 the value of *seven*, and calls it a *week* of years. Besides this, he breaks up the resulting 490 into two parcels of 49 (7 weeks) and 441 (63 weeks); and instead of taking these consecutively, measures them both from the same *terminus a quo*, viz., the date of Jeremiah's prophecy, B.C. 606. From this point the shorter term brings us, for our first pause, to B.C. 558, when Cyrus, the "anointed prince," triumphed over Astyages of Media; whilst the longer one places us, if we pause one "week" before its close, at the date (B.C. 172)

* The fact that, nearly ten years later, Jeremiah still promises the return after seventy years, without apparently pushing back his *terminus a quo* from his present moment to that of any earlier oracle, warns us against laying too much stress upon this number, which is encumbered with various difficulties. The three verses are very probably a later interpolation. See Hitzig *in loc.* Their meaning, however, is perfectly plain.

when Onias the high-priest (an *Anointed* or *Messiah*) was cut off; and, if we proceed to its expiration, precisely in the year B.C. 165, when the deliverance was effected, and Judas purified and re-dedicated the temple. And then immediately enters the "everlasting righteousness, when vision and seer are sealed, and a Holiest of all is anointed."

Every where then we find ourselves moving in the same circle of ideas, and brought to a stand at the same point. The courses of the world were disappointing to the Hebrew faith in a Holy Providence. The old prophets must have meant something more and better than had yet been realized. It could not be that history was to be made up of successive brute forms of power, incapable of owning the true God, and empowered to keep his servants under the heel of scorn. There must be in reserve some type of rule more in the semblance of Humanity,—like, not the lion or the bear, the ram or the goat, but a Son of Man,—to assert at last God's thought in creating his own image. Such an ideal future might be ushered in by a last wild effort of the passions doomed to perish: but when it came, it would compensate the long delay. It would make Jerusalem the metropolis, and the chosen people the favoured subjects of a glorious theocracy; the preparation and approach of which is an object of interest to celestial beings, and engages the Jewish archangel Michael in contest with the guardian-spirit of Persia. The pious dead would be sent from Hades to join the living generation, and people the City of God. And the time was close at hand: the sanctuary purified, and the tyrant gone, the last act of the human drama was come.

It is singular that, of all the features in this picture, the least distinct is the most important,—the Personal Agent of the great revolution, the Messiah himself. The subsequent appropriation to him of the descriptive language of this book, and especially of its characteristic phrase "Son of Man," renders it difficult for us not to see his figure too plainly as

we read. But, in fact, it is very doubtful whether it ever appears at all. The visions bring before us, it must be remembered, not only the individual agents of history or prediction, but (1) certain symbolical forms, to represent the characteristic powers governing the world; and (2) angelic personages,—Gabriel, Michael, and their opponents, —who, in the upper world, conduct some counterpart of the struggles below. When among these scenic figures we search for the real Head of the announced theocracy, it is astonishing how again and again he evades us. Here, we think, he is,—in this mysterious being, like the Son of Man (vii. 13), who is brought upon the clouds of heaven before the Ancient of Days, to receive dominion and glory and a kingdom that shall not pass. But, as Hitzig points out, what the connexion here demands is not an individual personality, but a typical embodiment of the Hebrew people and their righteous sway. As the antecedent empires had been presented in the guise of four brute animals, each representing its particular nation, so the final figure to which their power is transferred stands, in the higher image of Humanity, to denote the nobler rule reserved for the collective "Saints of the Most High" (vii. 18, 22, 27). Again, on the banks of the river Ulai (viii) we seem to stand in Messiah's presence. There rises before Daniel "as the appearance of a man": at the same time he hears between the banks a man's voice saying, "Gabriel, make this man understand the vision." Who can this be that commands an archangel? The question is resolved by simply forming an accurate picture of the scene: the "appearance," standing on the bank, belongs to one person,—the angel Gabriel; the voice, being on the water, proceeds from another; and like that which Elijah heard at the mouth of his cave, expresses, out of viewless space and silence, the mandate of God himself. No third supernatural being enters the field. Still more remarkable is the mysterious figure in priestly dress and with princely insignia, "his body like the beryl, his face as

lightning, his eyes as lamps of fire," who appears in the vision by the Tigris (x. xi.). Sent as a messenger, he is some secondary being: he comes from the contests of the upper world, and he returns to them again: he describes himself as chief combatant, seconded by Michael, against the angels of the Heathen realms: and to whom can these characters attach but to Messiah? Yet, if it be he, it is strange that he should announce the Messianic crisis without the faintest mixture of his own personality with it; should describe his own function as confined to the contests of the angels, and as inseparable from Michael's, and claim no part or lot in the events which he predicts; and refer to no person in whom they should be fulfilled. This unearthly distance from the human world is less suitable to the Agent himself whose province it is to be, than to the same Gabriel, chief of the archangels, who had before been the chosen instrument of Daniel's revelations.

The part of personal Messiah then remains still empty. The conception of the theocratic reign is vastly more distinct than that of its representative head. *Some* sacred chief was doubtless imagined for that ideal time: but whether he was to be human or superhuman, whether an historic hero come back in his identity, or some one new to this world, the pseudo-Daniel leaves undetermined. The one great idea possessing him is, that the world's history is on the eve of being consummated by the overthrow of Heathen powers, and the inauguration of a kingdom of everlasting righteousness under dominance of the Hebrew religion and race. Every conception of more definite portraiture than this has been coercively drawn from the text by subsequent commentators, who have dealt with it precisely as the book itself deals with the oracles of Jeremiah.

In tracing the development of the Messianic idea, we find that while the book of Daniel is nowhere without influence, it is only in Palestine that its influence is paramount, and that in Egypt the doctrine presents itself under a somewhat different phase. In the curious collection of

Greek hexameters so often cited by the Fathers, especially Lactantius, under the name of the Sibylline Oracles, we have the thoughts of an Alexandrine Jew belonging to the same generation as the pseudo-Daniel. The older critics, it is true, Fabricius, Cave, and Lardner, condemn this production as a Christian forgery of the second century: and so long as it was mainly ascribed to a single hand or even a single century, no other verdict was possible: for the patristic quotations consist chiefly of pretended prophecies of incidents in the evangelical history; and the verses plainly speak of Hadrian and refer to the Antonines.* The fact, however, that a passage still in the text, respecting the tower of Babel, was cited not only by Josephus,† but by Alexander Polyhistor,‡ proves that some portion of the collection existed in the age of Sulla, and was in the hands of Pagan as well as Jewish readers. Prophecies, moreover, appear of the end of the world, after the reign of Ptolemy Physcon; and of the offering of hecatombs to the Jewish Jehovah at the temple of Jerusalem: neither of which can proceed from a Christian hand. Moved by these and similar phenomena, the late Professor Bleek§ submitted the work afresh to critical analysis, and established the general results,—that the book is an aggregation of separate pieces by many hands at work through three or four centuries; that the Christian elements have been woven into a previous texture, which it is not impossible to disengage; that in the third book we have the groundwork of the whole; and that its marks of time, place, and character, distinctly refer it to an Alexandrine Jew, about B.C. 160. These positions have been little disturbed by subsequent criticism; even German ingenuity contenting itself with shifting the date some twenty years or so. The latest editor, Professor Friedlieb, besides giving additional solidity to the

* Lardner's Credibility, part II. xxix. 2. † Antiq. Jud. I. iv. 3.

‡ This is attested by Eusebius; Chron. I. iv.; Præpar. Ev. ix. 15.

§ De Wette's "Schleiermacher's and Lücke's Theologische Zeitschrift, 1819, 1820."

conclusions of Bleek, has done not a little for the emendation of the text;* though even the dozen manuscripts which exhaust the critic's materials may probably, on closer scrutiny, remove many vestiges of confusion that still remain.

We cannot wonder that theological scholars were slow to discover the real origin of this production. That a *Christian* believer,—disciple of a universal religion,—should seek for a common medium of thought between himself and his Greek or Roman neighbour, and for that purpose should admit and use the prophetic spirit which Paganism also claimed, is nothing strange. Around the church of the second century, largely composed of Gentile elements, the heathen civilization closely flowed, and penetrated it with forms of thought and language other than its own: so that it was not against probability, however questionable in taste, that some ecclesiastical writer should think it a pious work to turn passages of the New Testament into Homeric verse. But it was hardly to be expected that a *Jew* should so far sink his nationality as to borrow an inspiration from Apollo; or so compromise his monotheistic feeling as to take the feminine dress of a poetic Pantheism, and set the strains of Isaiah to the hexameters of a Sibyl. The writer to whom such a disguise recommended itself must have receded far from the old Hebrew rigour, and intended to approach as near as possible to the ideas of Heathendom; and purposely devised a patois in which two religions might converse across the border. Accordingly, in the introductory lines preserved to us by Theophilus of Antioch,† his universalism at once appears; he recognizes all men as by nature standing on the same religious level, and characterizes God, not in his un-

* Die Sibyllinischen Weissagungen vollständig gesammelt: herausgegeben von Dr. J. H. Friedlieb. Leipzig. 1852. The Greek text is accompanied by a German metrical version, printed on the opposite page, and skilfully executed.

† Ad Autolycum, ii. 36.

approachable sovereignty, but as the Indwelling Guide of humanity, and rule of light (*πᾶσι βροτοῖσιν ἐνὼν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν φαὶ κοινῷ*): "He assigned the earth to all, and in the breast of all implanted the best thoughts." With this catholic conception the whole theory of the world is in harmony. The iniquities and idolatries of mankind are a wilful falling away from manifest truth and right; their sufferings are a discipline to recall, to end with a crisis of restoration in which the Divine idea of human nature shall be realized at last. To that golden age timely repentance will admit even aliens from God: but at the head of it will stand those who have never deserted him or lost his true worship. Thus the distinction between Israelite and Pagan is simply this, that the pure natural religion which the latter has abandoned, the former has kept, and when the aberration is discovered and confessed, the distinction will cease.

In conformity with this general idea, the pretended Sibyl sketches the process of human declension, and announces the crisis of restoration. Strangely incorporating the theogony of Hesiod with the legends of Genesis, she follows up the story of Babel and the flood,—the first revolt and punishment of men,—by an account of the partition of the earth, at the tenth generation from the Deluge, among the three sons of Ouranos and Gæa,—Saturn, Titan, and Iapetos; of the birth of Jupiter, Poseidon and Pluto from the first, and their conflict with their Titanic cousins, bringing the first war upon the world. Whether the Sibyl had visited Panchæa or not, she treats these personages very much as Euêmerus did; turning them from mythical into historical; accommodating them with suitable geographical settlements; putting them pretty low down in quite the prosaic parts of human chronology; and speaking of them rather with the dry voice of the rationalist than with the afflatus of the prophetess. As if to prevent their escape into an ideal space, they are carefully shut in between the commonplace post-diluvian people

and the kingdom of the Pharaohs; and their divine honours are due only to the folly and servility of mortals, deifying the men and women they admire. Again and again, the poetess, possessed with this idea of polytheism, dwells on the absurdity of investing with the eternal attributes of godhead beings that have been born and died. The argument, however little it penetrated to the real sources of false religion, was quite congenial with the intellectual temper of the age: it might have proceeded from a Cyrenaic as well as from a Jew; and is in no way at variance with the conciliatory desire to find a common ground of faith between monotheism and the Gentile world.

Descending into the times of authentic history, the Sibyl announces the succession of empires, not always in the same or in the right order; with a kind of prominence given to Egypt, which betrays the local point of view; and with a sympathetic leaning towards the Hellenic race strongly contrasting with the tone of the pseudo-Daniel. It is essential to the Messianic theory that the final term of human affairs should deserve that bad preëminence by its own inherent evil: in the eye of a Palestinian Jew, it was the Greek tyranny of Antioch that occupied this place: in that of an Alexandrine, it was the Roman sway. This further step, accordingly, the Sibyl makes, and then takes her stand as on the outermost verge of historic time. After investing with exaggerated glories the Jewish kingdom under Solomon, and devoting a few lines to the composite Macedonian empire, she passes to Rome; describing it, in terms of allusion to its Senate (*Patres Conscripti*), as the "white and many-headed power from the western sea," assigning to its period of pride and oppression the full measure of human corruption; so that when the seventh Greek king (Ptolemy Physcon, B.C. 170, with interruptions, to B.C. 117) shall reign in Egypt,* the hour of doom will strike, and the people of God will rise in their strength and become the

* iii. 194.

guides of life to all mortals. The time will be known by the march of a king from Asia (Antiochus Epiphanes) to afflict the land of the Nile.* More than once is this date repeated in different connexions: and how nearly it agrees with that of Daniel is evident from a description, marked by contemporary particularity, of the overthrow of Perseus at Pydna (B.C. 168) and conquest of Greek territory by the Romans (a πολυβάρβαρον ἔθνος):† calamities which are to bring the Greeks to better insight, turn them to the true God, and induce them to offer sacrifices at his temple of oxen and fruits of the earth.‡ This launches the Sibyl at once on the full Messianic times: the features of which it remains for us to mark.

The portents§ which announce the "end" have a strong family likeness to those which, in Josephus, and to some extent in the Gospels, are connected with the last days of Jerusalem. Towards evening and morning swords will flash in the sky. A dust will fall from above upon the earth. The sun will be darkened, so that the light of the moon will reappear. Blood will be found trickling from the rocks. In the clouds will be seen battles of phantom troops of horse and foot, as of hunters pursuing in the chase.‖

But the new feature which comes out most prominently, and which never afterwards quits the Messianic theory, is the grand league of Pagan kings and tribes against the "holy people," and the siege of Jerusalem by their united forces.¶ Closely investing the city, the unbelieving battalions will offer their wicked sacrifices within sight of the temple: and so vast will be their host, that, did not God fight for his people, resistance were vain. But the patience of the Most High is at an end. A tempest of supernatural destruction

* iii. 611; comp. 314 seqq.
† iii. 520 seqq.
‡ iii. 562–572.
§ iii. 795-805.
‖ Comp. Tacit. Hist. iv. 13. Visæ per cœlum concurrere acies, rutilantia arma, et subito nubium igne collucere templum.
¶ iii. 657 seqq.

bursts upon the invaders; flinging down amongst them fire and brimstone, hail and floods, torches and fiery swords; filling the ravines with dead and the streams with blood; causing the hills to yawn and Erebus to appear. Lamentation and a cry will go forth over the earth; and for seven years the shields and weapons of the annihilated foe will supply fuel, so that no wood will be cut from the forest.*

In proportion to the horrors of the struggle will be the peace and glory which succeed. The spectacle of the faithful nation, fenced round with Divine protection, and served by the favouring elements themselves, will turn the hearts of the remaining Gentile peoples: and they will burn their idols and bend the knee to the universal Lord; who thenceforth will erect one empire amongst men to last for ever, and have one temple to which all shall bring their offerings and incense. Physical nature will sympathize with the restored moral harmony of the world: the flock, the beehive, the orchard, the vineyard, and the field will yield a thousand-fold, and blight and earthquake will be unknown. Every store shall be full; every gain shall be righteous; every realm accessible; and every fruit of peace secure.†

So far we seem to meet with no Personal Head to this Messianic age. And it is singular that the obscurity on this point which we have noticed in the book of Daniel repeats itself, and in much the same form, in the announcements of the Sibyl. When she says, "Then will God from Heaven send a King, who shall judge each man in blood and a flash of fire,"‡ it seems at first sight certain that here we are in presence of a superhuman Messiah. But when we scrutinize the context, and find ourselves in the heart of the Jewish history, at the turning-point between the Babylonish Captivity and the Restoration; when we read on, that "a certain royal race, whose descent shall not fail

* iii. 727 seqq. † Comp. iii. 620, 702–727, 743–758.
‡ iii. 286.

(David's continued in Zerubbabel), will begin to raise a new temple of God, favoured by contributions of gold and brass and iron from Persian kings,"—it is plain that the Heaven-sent King is not in the author's future, but in his past, and is no other,—as Friedlieb has pointed out, and Hilgenfeld has not disproved,—than Cyrus "the Shepherd," "the Anointed" of God,* who was the instrument for executing the Divine judgments, "saying to Jerusalem, Thou shalt be built, and to the temple, Thy foundation shall be laid."† Still more positive appears the prediction of a superhuman Messiah in the words, "Then will God send *from the Sun* a King, who shall put an end to frightful war upon the earth, destroying one set, and fulfilling covenants with another." But here again, though the personage described is undoubtedly the Head of the future age, the epithet "*from the Sun*" means simply, according to Friedlieb, "*from the East*," and only applied to the expected deliverer the terms used of Cyrus; of whom it is said that God "raised up the righteous man from the East, and called him to his foot, and gave the nations before him, and made him rule over kings."‡ Thus interpreted, the lines do but express the belief, attested by Tacitus as prevalent in Palestine, that the East was at last to turn the tide of conquest which had so long set in from Europe.§ It perhaps deserves remark that, according to Ktesias and Plutarch, and apparently the general opinion of the ancient world, the name Cyrus (in the old Persian Qur'us') meant "*The Sun*": and though Lassen has thrown doubt on this interpretation, its common acceptance might well lead to some play upon the word, and associate with the sun that Messianic Prince of whom Cyrus was regarded as the prototype. It is not unlikely that, in dealing with the language

* Is xliv. 28, xlv. 1. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. xli. 2

§ Pluribus persuasio inerat, antiquis sacerdotum literis contineri, eo ipso tempore fore, ut valesceret Oriens, profectique Judæa rerum potirentur. Hist. iv. 13. Comp. Sueton. Vesp. 4, and Orac. Sib. iii. 350.

of such vague ideal beliefs, our criticism attempts to define too much; and that it is the indeterminate state of the writer's own thought which has left his terms ambiguous. Certain it is that, whilst an indistinct cloud of glory invests the Person of Messiah, rendering its human or superhuman nature undiscoverable, the conception of his kingdom and age is far less indefinite. Its time, its place, its providential function, its preliminary signs, its method of introduction, and the conditions of entrance to it, are all laid down with the precision of a stereotyped expectation. But its Agent, its duration (not adequately settled by such large epithets as "everlasting"), and its relation to realms beyond the historic world, are left as open questions.

We have thus exhibited, side by side, the two pictures, —by the pseudo-Daniel, and by the Sibyl;—the one drawn in Palestine, the other in Egypt. Both of them take the same general view of the Providence of history: the divine end,—the constitution of a perfect Humanity,—is never lost sight of: and its postponement, by the long succession of Pagan empires and humiliation of the true worshippers, is a disciplinary proceeding to bring both the evil and the good to a final head, and render a crisis of clearance inevitable. Both writers,—at a date not far from B.C. 160, —regard the crisis as at hand, and feel themselves in presence of the last desperate struggle of evil for supremacy. Both, in spite of their different geographical position, see in Jerusalem the metropolis of the approaching theocracy, and look upon the age to come as the simple continuation of terrestrial history, true at last to its pure idea. And though both refer to some Vicegerent of God who is to establish the kingdom, they alike leave his personality in the dark.

This general agreement does not preclude great and striking differences between the two writers. The celestial beings who appear as *dramatis personæ* in Daniel, the Gabriel, Michael, and angels of Persia and Græcia, whose contests on a higher stage cast their shadows down and

make human history, never cross the Sibyl's vision. Equally beyond her view are the depths of Hades and the secrets of departed souls: nor is there any resurrection of pious Hebrews from earlier generations to share the glorious age. This is one of the marks distinguishing the third and really ancient book from the later accretions by which it is surrounded: in the second book, for instance, and in the eighth, the Messianic realm includes and reunites the living and the dead. It is due to the different positions of the writers that the Hellenic race, the object of ultimate antipathy, occupying the place of Antichrist in Daniel, is regarded with unmistakable sympathy by the Sibyl; while the Romans receive all the vials of her wrath. Their downfall, as of a mere barbaric power, is unconditionally and pitilessly announced: but the Greeks are encouraged to repent of their idolatries; are exhorted to aid in restoring the Hebrews to their rights in Palestine; and invited to join in the offerings at the temple and enter the blessings of the theocracy. Thus, while the sacerdotal cultus is regarded as perpetual, the limitations of nationality are overpassed: and the idea is reached, if not of a spiritual, at least of a universal worship.

But by far the most surprising novelty in the Sibyl's vision is found in that siege of Jerusalem by Pagan armies, on the eve of the Messianic advent. It is vain to speculate on the precise origin of so definite a feature in a picture purely ideal: perhaps it is enough to say that the heroic and pathetic passages of Jewish history had linked themselves so often with attacks on Zion, as to render any supreme crisis of the nation inconceivable without them. The interest, however, of this element in the oracle attaches not to its source, but to its effect. The gospels of Matthew and Luke (chapters xxiv. and xxi. respectively) present the same events,—a siege of Jerusalem and the Messianic parusia,—in the very same conjunction, which here we find established two hundred years before. They express, it is plain, a settled national expectation, with such modifica-

tions as the conditions of the time required. Had the Sibylline lines been written towards the close of the first century, when the times of Vespasian and Titus lay in the past, they, like the gospels, would have given the city a disastrous fate. That it emerges in triumph bears conclusive witness to the earlier date of the prediction; and nothing is more conceivable than that, in the very agony of the siege, these same verses or prophecies of similar import may have circulated among the people, and sustained the desperate hope of supernatural victory. Here was the siege itself already come true: Jerusalem was surrounded, as had been declared, by idolatrous armies: and did not the calamities of the hour, befalling as it was written, guarantee the conquering sequel? To the Christian evangelist this illusion was over. But to him also the siege of Jerusalem, though with reversed catastrophe, was still "the beginning of the end"; and it kept him on the watch for the Advent. What that "coming of the Son of Man" meant; how it was understood by the first Christians; why the gospels make Palestine the scene of it, and before its judgment-seat gather "all nations," but no dead,—are questions perplexing enough to those who apply these images to the human life beyond the grave; but receiving great light from the corresponding delineations of an earlier literature. Christendom has incurred severe penalties by its narrow scripturalism, incorporating in its creed many an element due not to the divine individuality of Christ, but to the conditions of his nation and the accidents of his time; and carrying up into the highest and most solemn themes conceptions borrowed from apocalyptic romances of Asmonæan Judaism. If the pure revelation is to be freed from these extraneous adhesions, and to stand clear in its own essence, it can only be by comparative study, along with its memorials, of the vestiges of antecedent and contemporary belief, with a view to relieve the gospel from responsibility for what is clearly referable to prior historic causes. It is in the interests of this analysis, in the desire

of disengaging the imperishable truth from the transitory form, that we have traced the first lines of the Messianic faith, and shall, in the next section, follow down its development to the verge of Christian times. Though the documents are scanty, and the evidence precarious, they require a fuller treatment than our present space permits, and will reward a further patience by the curious picture they present of an obsolete type of literature and faith.

VII.

EARLY HISTORY OF MESSIANIC IDEAS.*

II.

HOWEVER much sensible people and inductive philosophers may despise the literature of prophecy, the charm which it has for the religious imagination is not wholly chargeable on the weakness of human nature. No doubt it owes something to the mere impatience of men, in moments of suspense, at the darkness of the future; their longing to lift the veil which hides their rescue or their fall; their hope to extort from heaven some hint of foreknown but inaccessible events. Intense want disposes to easy belief: so that trust is readily attracted to an oracle that promises to fetch a voice from behind nature, or a writing that looks like a casket of Divine secrets. But, besides this source of interest, common to Delphi and to Zion, to Zadkiel and Isaiah, the Jewish apocalyptic productions have a fascination infinitely deeper and altogether special to themselves. They are no apparition of mere inquisitiveness under the mask of piety,—much less of imposture practising on credulity. They are a theory of the Past, not less than a guess at the Future: and, in truth, have no care about what may be in reserve for the

* "Abhandlung über des æthiopischen Buches Henoch Entstehung und Zusammensetzung." Von. H. Ewald. Göttingen. 1854.

"Das Buch Henoch." Uebersetzt und erklärt von Dr. A. Dillmann. Leipzig." 1853.

"Commentar zur Offenbarung Johannes." Von Dr. Gustav Volkmar. Zürich. 1862.—*National Review.* 1864.

world, except as the fifth Act of a sacred Drama, already developed into tragic depths. It is the peculiarity and the glory of the Hebrew faith that, in its view, all history fel into the form of a moral problem on the sublimest scale and appeared not simply as the play of human passions but as the stately march of a Divine thought: and to reac the law and order of that thought as it passed on and left its trace,—to complete it by divination where there was no guide but inward sympathy with its intent, was the hope that animated every retrospect and every prospect. Historian and seer were in one, "beset" by an almighty righteousness "behind and before." We are aware of nothing like this in Pagan literature. No hint of a Providential education of the human race, of a moral organism of nations, working out at last the universal supremacy of truth and right, do we remember in even the more religious of the ancient philosophers. To Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, the Divine element of the world appeared, not in the historical vicissitudes of humanity, but in the Cosmical constancy and order;—not in any moral life through Time, but in the eternal beauty distributed through Space. The Timæus,—the Greek book of Genesis,—exhibits the origin, the harmony, the movement of the universe,—not omitting to find a place in it for human souls: but such as it is at first, such is it for ever; changing only with an eternal periodicity, and with no life able to break the cycle of alternate birth and death. The Hebrew cosmogony, on the other hand, hurries rapidly down into ethnology: once having built the heavens and the earth, it leaves them to tell their story, and follows the Divine clue into the families and societies of men. The genius of their races, the migrations of their tribes, the passions of their leaders, even the aberrations of their faith, are searched for the vestiges of a comprehensive plan. And the problem, started at the very cradle of this literature, haunts and possesses it throughout. The sense of some great meaning shut up in the constitution of

humanity never deserts it. Often fainting under its long patience, sometimes presumptuous with sudden hope, it changes its voice as the winds of Providence breathe high or low: but the feeling recovers from every temporary silence: and just when great tyrannies and overshadowing Paganism threaten to crush it out, it is heard in tones at once of deepest pathos and of highest trust. It would be vain to look elsewhere for a religion which has consecrated universal history.

The expression of this Jewish feeling is not confined within the limits of the Bible: and in a former number of this Review we gave some account of the form which it assumes in the "Sibylline Oracles,"—a production referable, in its oldest part, to an Alexandrine Jew, about B.C. 160. We propose to take up our sketch from that point, and present such traces as we can find of the Jewish theory of history, and especially of its Messianic consummation, in writings somewhat less ancient. The whole interest of the investigation is relative to the New Testament. We wish to picture clearly to ourselves the state of mind which preoccupied the first teachers and hearers of Christianity, to travel back, under almost contemporary guidance, into the circle of ideas which environed them; that, in the complex texture of Scripture, woven of old thought and new, we may be the better able to trace the thread of light winding through the staple material of the age. For this purpose, it is obvious, none but præ-Christian writings are of any avail: and the nearer our witnesses stand to the evangelic time itself, the more illustrative is their evidence as to the religious conceptions brought into the Church by its first disciples. Can we lay our hands, then, on any remains of Jewish prophetic literature from the century immediately preceding our era? We believe so: and we proceed to justify and apply this judgment with regard to that singular production, the "Book of Enoch."

Many an English reader has been puzzled by a couple of verses in the Epistle of Jude (14, 15): "Now Enoch, the

seventh from Adam, prophesied concerning these also, saying,—'Behold, the Lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints, to execute judgment upon all, and to convict all the ungodly among them of all their ungodly deeds which they have impiously committed, and of all their hard speeches which ungodly sinners have spoken against him.'" Ante-diluvian words are hard to recover: whence did the author get these of Enoch's? The work from which he took them, and which he evidently quotes as both authentic history and true prophecy, lies on the table before us; and is the second in the list at the head of this article. From the 8th to the 18th century it was entirely lost from view, and was known only by citations from it scattered through the patristical writings: and even these, though numerous down to the time of Augustine, disappear from that date in the Western Church, and owe their further continuance to the different taste of the Byzantine Christians. With the Greek fragments preserved in Georgius Syncellus the chronographer (about A.D. 795) the book vanishes into its long sleep. It was not till the year 1773 that it returned to the light. Bruce, the African traveller, found it still extant in Abyssinia among the biblical books:—and from two Æthiopic manuscripts which he brought to Europe the work was translated into English, and given to the world in 1821, by Laurence, afterwards Archbishop of Cashel. For this *editio princeps* little can be said, except that it secured attention to a curious monument of ecclesiastical antiquity, and served as a basis for a more critical reproduction and version of the text. The latest result, facilitated by the labours of Hoffmann and the acquisition of additional manuscripts, is the excellent German translation, with introduction and notes, by Professor Dillmann of Tübingen. Perhaps even this edition, which in the main, we have no doubt, faithfully represents the original work, hardly makes sufficient allowance for its exclusive custody, through so many ages, by the Christian Church. It is hardly to be expected that a Jewish apoca-

lypse should be quite safe, for hundreds of years, in Christian keeping: and, had the book been also preserved among the Rabbinical memorials, the various readings would probably disclose, in our actual text, many unsuspected assimilations to the language of the New Testament.

The citation of this book in the Epistle of Jude will satisfy most persons of its præ-Christian origin, and be accepted as a first step in determining its date. For although that Epistle is one of the books of disputed authority, the doubts respecting it have not been suggested by any indications of post-apostolic origin; and indeed have no more serious foundation than the use which the writer makes of an apocryphal book. Apart from this fanciful objection, there is nothing to disturb the usual judgment, which refers the letter to a time earlier than the destruction of Jerusalem. How far we must still go back to reach the origin of the Book of Enoch is a question certainly of much difficulty; depending for its solution entirely on successful analysis of the contents of the work. Dillmann, who attributes the whole production,—except two later sections,—to a single hand, assigns it to the closing years of John Hyrcanus, about 110 B.C. Ewald detects in it five component elements, of which three arose between the years 144 and 128 B.C., and the whole were fused into their present form by the middle of the next century. An acute criticism of Köstlin's reduces the constituent documents to three, and changes their chronological order; but adopts Dillmann's date for the oldest portion, and brings the newest no further down than the age of Herod the Great. We seem therefore to stand secure within the limits of the three half-centuries before our era.

Recently, it is true, this conclusion has been disturbed from its repose by a critic equally ingenious and adventurous,—Volkmar of Zürich. Denying, with Bruno Bauer, that any formed Messianic doctrine existed among the præ-Christian Jews, and believing that this whole system of

ideas first constituted itself around the person of Jesus,—he contends that (the Sibyl excepted) the entire Jewish literature of this class arose out of rivalry with the Christian apocalypse, and was formed on the immediate suggestion, not of the book of Daniel, but of the Revelation of John. To its coincidences therefore with the language and conceptions of the New Testament he applies an inverse explanation: the synagogue copies from the church all its Messianic scenery and drama; and only changes, or represents by nameless symbols, the chief personage in the plot. The book of Enoch indeed was written in the interest of a particular pretender to the Messianic office,—Bar-cochab, the "false Christ" of Hadrian's reign,—and issued from the school of his principal follower, the Rabbi Akiba. As the insurrection under this pretender occurred A.D. 132, and the book which it produced was in the hands of a New Testament writer, a still later date must be assigned to some portion of our canonical writings: and, under the exigencies of his theory, Volkmar accordingly transposes into the second century not only the Epistle of Jude, but a large part of the Christian Scriptures; keeping back the Gospel of Matthew and the Acts of the Apostles till A.D. 105–115, the first Epistle of Peter till A.D. 140–147, and the fourth Gospel till after the middle of the century.

Bold hypotheses like this are not to be regretted. They compel the bench of criticism to reconsider its verdicts, and, in case of reasonable doubt, to grant a new trial. But, except as a provocative of severer scrutiny, Volkmar's speculation appears to us a barren exercise of skill. It is a violent inversion of the natural order of development of faith;—which always proceeds from the less to the more determinate, and would follow its own law in fitting a pre-existent Messianic image on to a particular individual; but would never prefix a newly-invented ideal to an historical life,—much less,—like Volkmar's anti-Christian Jews,—disown the life, yet borrow the ideal. And though, when two writings present the same ideas, it is often perplexing to

say which was first, and a little adroitness may work the explanation either way, yet, if the concurrences and differences are taken together, there will usually arise a balance of superior simplicity, practically decisive of the order of derivation. In the present instance, we find it impossible to compare certain passages,—to which we shall presently refer,—of the Book of Enoch with portions of the New Testament without assurance that we have here a middle term between the Hebrew and the Evangelic faith.

The object of the author is to reconcile the Hebrew ideal of the world with the disappointing phenomena which seemed to contradict it; to give an account of human ills and tedious oppressions without prejudice to the righteousness of the Divine Government. Partly by throwing the blame on secondary free agents, partly by treating all the Past as probationary, but chiefly by drawing on the Future for redress, he brings out the Eternal justice clear. Nay, so completely, in his view, does a Moral idea dominate the universe, that its physical structure, geographical and astronomical, has been determined by nothing else; its deserts are for penal exile of wicked spirits; its mountains are dungeon-doors; its stars are free and bright in their obedience, or chained together in guilt and sorrow; and not far from one of its cardinal points, hid behind the horizon, are already prepared the throne of judgment and the nursery garden of the trees of Paradise. The machinery by which effect is given to this general aim is supplied by two mysterious legends from the book of Genesis;—that of the union of "the sons of God" with "the daughters of men" (Gen. vi. 1–4); and that of the translation of Enoch (Gen. v. 24). By the former the writer explains the inroad of evil upon humanity, and the spoiling of the world: and in the latter he finds a link of communication whereby the remedial measures devised in heaven may be revealed on earth.

We are accustomed to father our sins and miseries upon Adam, and to date them from a certain dialogue between Eve and the Serpent. Our author transposes the origin of

evil to a later time, and brings his indictment against other agents. In the time of Jared, Enoch's father, two hundred angels, ranged in tens under separate leaders, descended from heaven; and forming connexions with "the daughters of men," became the parents of an intermediate and "giant" race. This rebellious migration brought with it all the maladies of the world. Feminine artifice wrested from the new-comers forbidden secrets from the higher sphere,—astrology and magic,—and taxed their invention for the production of vain ornaments: while men were put upon ruinous and destructive ways, and taught how to fabricate the weapons of war. The monstrous progeny, inheriting a double taint, oppress and devour mankind, and raise the confusion to such a pitch that, in pure compassion at the sight, four of the unfallen angels report the case to the Most High, and obtain commissions to arrest the ruin and punish the guilt. The instructions given to them extend far beyond the immediate exigency, and include provisions for the whole future course and for the final consummation of human history. To meet the necessities of the moment, the giants are set on one another for mutual destruction; their disembodied spirits being still able, however, as demons, to ride on the clouds and haunt the earth and afflict mankind till the day of judgment. The spoiled human race is swept away by the Flood,—Noah being warned and reserved to begin a better time. To crush the causes of ill, the good angels are to capture and incarcerate their fallen companions;—to chain one of the chiefs in the desert,—to bury another beneath the hills, for seventy generations, till the day of judgment. To provide for the moral training of humanity, and prepare the germ of a righteousness that shall triumph at last, the archangel Michael (always the special patron of the Jews) is to "plant the plants of holiness,"—that is, to mark out the race through which the Divine traditions are to be preserved, and the Divine idea pass to its realization. With this selection of a sacred clan in the re-peopling of the earth, and

its opening divergency from non-Semitic tribes, begins the historical and human drama of the world. The ante-diluvian period is mythological, mixing up the incidents of heaven and earth, of mortal and immortal races, of monsters and of men; and leaving behind, after all the measures of redress, a legacy of evil powers in the air to torment the bodies and deceive the souls of men. And as angelic natures appear in the prologue, so do they re-appear in the epilogue, of the story of mankind. The post-diluvian ages, through long vicissitudes of probation, lead up to the great terrestrial assizes with which Messiah's reign begins: and that is the consummation of history. But, when this is over, the celestial assizes yet remain; at which incorporeal natures shall be brought up for sentence, and the imprisoned angels meet their final doom. This fourfold division of time,—an earthly probation and judgment, embraced between the two corresponding terms of a heavenly,—forms the invariable Hebrew program of the Providential designs.

The ripe mythological form given to this ante-diluvian sketch, the familiarity of the writer with the statistics and names of the angels, and his ascription of demoniacal possession to the wandering souls of giants, have been urged in proof of the late origin of this book. It introduces us to a circle of ideas,—especially to an organized doctrine of angels and demons,—which, according to Volkmar, first formed itself in the second century of our era. But in truth we know little of the chronology and growth of these conceptions among the Jews; and that little affords us glimpses of them at a much earlier date. Daniel is already acquainted with the names of Michael and Gabriel, and with the functions of other members of the heavenly host: and it is not probable that the ideal population of the heavenly world, thus far introduced to the imagination, contained no other definite personalities than these. Indeed, we have a curious and conclusive evidence of a systematized doctrine on this subject in the last præ-Christian century, if not before. The Essenic com-

munities in the south of Palestine admitted no probationer, at the end of his novitiate, without administering to him a solemn oath: and among the obligations imposed upon him was this,—that he should not *disclose the names of the Angels*. Further, we find Philo giving to the legend in Genesis the same fanciful interpretation on which our author proceeds: "the sons of God" he also identifies with "Angels": and the "Giants" are their wicked offspring from human mothers.* Souls, demons, angels, are but different names, he says, applied to the hierarchy of incorporeal natures; of which some are good and some depraved, both among those that are born into human life, and among those that retain their purely spiritual essence.† The demonology of the synoptical gospels, though giving us no personal name but that of Beelzebub, has all the marks of an established and well understood doctrine;—of a doctrine indeed so familiar and determinate as to furnish the most conclusive tests of Messiahship, and play a principal part in the evangelical polemic. Nor could the apostle Paul, in his instructions about the dress of Christian women in the churches,‡ have insisted on veiling them from the gaze of evil angels,—hinting his reason in the brief phrase "because of the angels,"—had not the story in Genesis been universally understood in the sense of the Book of Enoch. From these indications we must infer that, at and before our era, the atmosphere of Jewish thought was charged with the beliefs to which the work before us gives definite expression.

The plan having been formed in heaven for redressing the evils of the earth, recourse is had to Enoch,—already translated,—to convey its messages and reveal it to mankind. Human in race, celestial in abode, with the affections of one world and the insight of another, he is the fittest link of communication between the two realms. He is sent accordingly by the chief angels to warn their fallen

* Quæstionum et solutionum in Genesin. Sermo i. § 92.

† De mundo, iii. ‡ 1 Cor. xi. 10.

comrades of their doom: and finding them near Lebanon, so shamed by sin and fear as to shrink from immediate prayer, he is moved to act as their scribe and write an intercession for them. Retiring with the scroll to the south-west of Hermon, and sitting down to read it by the river of Dan, he falls asleep; and, in a dream which takes him before the face on which none can gaze, is ordered back with the petition, and charged to say, "You ought rather to intercede for men, than men for you."

His errand to the fallen Angels over, Enoch has to be prepared to carry notices of Divine intent to men. For this purpose he is again sent out, now under guidance of archangels, round the whole circuit of the world, to have its mysteries explained, and especially the function of each part in the moral scheme of the Creator. Of all that his conductors tell him he takes notes, and preserves the record in some curious chapters on physics: whose romantic and childish astronomy show how much Uriel himself needed the guidance of an Hipparchus, a Cassini, or a Humboldt. The cosmical picture presented is that of a great terrestrial plain, sustaining on the rim of the horizon the vault of the firmament: which is pierced with a row of six doors in the East, and six in the West, for the Sun's ingress and egress at different times of the year. For a month at Midsummer it uses the Northernmost doors; for a like time in Midwinter, the Southernmost; and month by month between, it steps, forward or backward, to the next intermediate door. Whether the sun itself is ball or disc is not very clear: but it is conveyed through its diurnal course in a chariot driven by the wind; and nightly conducted back through the North, apparently by an angel, since no physical cause is provided to accomplish the feat. It is needless to follow the system into its details; but most important to fix in the imagination its general structure: for the Hebrew theology and physics hang closely together; and the unconscious attempt to transpose its ancient faith into our modern universe entails innumerable illusions, exegetical and reli-

gious. In a cosmos which makes the earth the base of heaven, and unites them as the lower and upper stories of the same house, geography and astronomy become one; the inhabitants of each level are drawn into the life of the other; the council chamber is above, but all the realizations are below;—the whole destiny of humanity is to be wrought out, not by any transcendental migration, but on a terrestrial spot, in simple continuation of history. To this all the architecture of the inaccessible parts is subservient: it has its prisons of detention, its chambers of preservation, for souls that are gone but will come again; its caverns of torture ready for incorrigible men in one place, for angels in another; and its furniture and apparatus in reserve for the scene of judgment and the reign of peace.

We are not therefore to be surprised if, accompanying Enoch in his survey, we find ourselves transferred, with little interval, from the "flammantia mœnia mundi" to the suburbs of Jerusalem; and learn that whatever we have seen near the verge of heaven is only to dress the stage of the Judæan drama. Led first to the West, he is shown the gathering-place of departed souls, here for the wicked, there for the good, till the hour of judgment; and a vast fire into which the lights of heaven dip to renew their flames. Passing to the South, he sees, with three lesser heights on either side, the mountain throne prepared for the Supreme Judge, when he shall come down to judge the world; and, among the trees around, one of sweet odour, explained to be the tree of life, intended, at the consummation of all things, to be given to the elect, to be transplanted into the neighbourhood of the Temple in the North, and to give each partaker of its fruit a life of patriarchal length and painless vigour. His curiosity having been awakened about the tree, he is taken at once to look at the place whither it is to be transplanted. As the description of it fixes definitively the locality of the Messianic reign, and contributes some important elements to the picture, we will quote it as it stands:

"And thence I went to the middle of the earth,* and saw a blessed and fruitful place, where there were branches sprouting and striking root from an ancient stock. And there I beheld a holy hill, and Eastward, at the foot of the hill, a stream flowing South. And to the East I saw another hill of equal height and between the two a valley deep but not wide: in it also was a stream running towards me on the hill side. And West of this was another hill lower than the former and of no great height; and below it, between the two, was a valley: and at the end of all the three were other valleys deep and dry. And all the valleys were deep, but not wide, of hard rock: but they were planted with trees. And I marvelled at the rocks, and marvelled at the valley, and was full of wonder" (26).

The topographical indications here are unmistakable; as well as the symbolical designation of the Israelitish people as shoots from an old stem. Zion is the "holy hill," with Siloam at its foot flowing South; the Mount of Olives the more Eastern hill of equal height; with the deep valley and stream of Kedron between. The lower hill to the West of this is the "*Hill of Evil Counsel*," facing Zion to the South; and the valley of Hinnom is the separating ravine. The limestone rocks, the olives planted on the upper slopes, and the dry gullies running off between the spurs of the three hills, are all accurately true to the neighbourhood of Jerusalem. The passage continues thus:

"Then I said: 'For what is this blessed land which is full of trees, and this accursed valley in the midst?' Then Uriel, one of the holy angels with me, answered and said: 'This accursed valley is for those who shall be accursed to eternity: here must assemble all those who speak with their lips unseemly things against God and against his glory: here are they to be gathered, and this is the place of their punishment. And in the last times will the spectacle be given to the righteous, of a just judgment on these for ever and ever; for which those who

* As the Greeks considered their Delphi to be the *ὀμφαλὸν ἐριβρόμου χθονὸς* (Pind. Pyth. vi. 3), and believed the white stone of its temple to be the mid-point of the earth's surface, so did the Jews assign the same central position to their mount Zion (Ezek. v. 5, xxxviii. 12).

have found mercy will praise the Lord of glory, the eternal King : and in the days of that judgment will they praise him for the mercy wherewith he has appointed their lot.' Then did I also praise the Lord of glory, and spake to him, and thought of his greatness, as was fit" (27).

This is the earliest expression of the Jewish belief respecting the scene and mode of the Messianic crisis ; a belief which reappears in the New Testament, and prevailed with intense force in the early Church of Palestine ; and which, freeing itself from its geography as it passed among Gentile Christians, and even quitting this world altogether, developed itself into the doctrine of Hell and its everlasting torments. The Judgment, it is plain, was to take place near Jerusalem : and while the temple hill was to be the citadel of reward to the pious, the punishment of the wicked, in order to be within sight, would take place in the valley of Hinnom below. This spot, it is quite evident, is not figuratively referred to, as furnishing merely a name and symbol for the invisible penalties of another world ; but literally designated as their real topographical seat ; precisely as the neighbouring heights are taken to be the proper metropolis of the elect. Both physical and historical causes inclined the Jewish imagination to select this particular valley for the fatal purpose. Stretching towards the volcanic district to the South, it is said to have emitted at times a smoke which betrayed subterranean fires, and which would receive from the Jew the same penal interpretation that his Scriptures had already put on the convulsions of the Asphaltite basin. And as the frequent scene of the rites of Moloch, it was associated with many horrors, and had received the curse of the prophets.*

The *place*, then, is fixed, and is now known to Enoch. The *time* is reserved for later revelations, soon to follow, and communicated through a new medium. At the close

* Comp. 2 Kings xxxiii. 10; Jer. vii. 31–33, xix. 5–7, xxxii. 35 ; Is. xxiv. 15, 24.

of his circuit through the universe, Enoch is shown certain tablets in heaven, on which are inscribed the Divine decrees respecting the course and the consummation of history; and also regular books, kept by appointed angels, in which the deeds of all mankind are recorded. Being permitted to study these, Enoch is qualified to become historical interpreter and prophet: and is then set down at the door of his house, to spend a year with his son Methuselah, and report to his descendants the scheme of the world's future. We are thus brought back from supramundane scenes to the level of human affairs; and have the field of time marked out before us in sections similar to those of Daniel and the Sibyl. Up to a certain point, we can identify these with known periods; and obtain thence a measure of the rest to the expected end: and we find the place of the author of the book at the point of junction between the two.

The whole reach of history is divided into ten periods, designated as "weeks"; each of which is apparently conceived, without much regard to any but the patriarchal duration of human life, as composed of seven generations. Though the limits of these are not precisely defined, each is marked by some distinctive event, which saves the chronology from being entirely indeterminate. At the end of the first, Enoch himself is born ("the *seventh* from Adam," Jude 14): in the second will be the judgment by Flood and the saving of Noah: the third is Abraham's week: the fourth, that of Moses: in the fifth comes the building of Solomon's temple: in the sixth is a time of blindness and division,—the schism into two kingdoms; during it, "a man will go upwards" (Elijah); and at its end the temple will be destroyed. During the seventh will arise an apostate race (the Samaritans?); but towards its close, the elect and faithful will be rewarded by receiving sevenfold instruction respecting the creation and the course of time, from one who has seen the things in heaven, and who has heard the voice of God and lived. As this

"sevenfold instruction" is evidently the Book of Enoch itself, the author fixes his own time at this point, and leaves us to understand, what indeed is plain from the unhistoric haze investing the sequel, that the three remaining weeks were still future.* Before we pass to this ideal period, it may be useful to present the following synopsis of the historical weeks:

				B.C.
1st week;	to the translation of Enoch . .	987 years	.	4004 to 3017
2nd ,,	to the covenant with Noah . .	669 ,,	.	3017 to 2348
3rd ,,	to the birth of Isaac	462 ,,	.	2348 to 1886
4th ,,	to the death of Joshua . . .	442 ,,	.	1886 to 1444
5th ,,	to the Dedication of the Temple	436 ,,	.	1444 to 1008
6th ,,	to the destruction of the Temple	421 ,,	.	1008 to 587
7th ,,	to the Author's time (say) . .	420 ,,	.	587 to 167

This would bring us to the time of Judas Maccabæus, which from other indications we judge to be somewhat too early. But, after every allowance for uncertainty in the terminal dates of the periods, it seems clearly to result from the general survey (1.) that the Week is unequal in duration, and cannot be intended to furnish a fixed unit of measurement: (2.) that after the Flood, it is much less than before, and is reduced to an average of about 450 years: (3.) that the composition of the Book of Enoch, referred to the end of the seventh week, must fall within the second præ-Christian century.

At this point we suddenly step off the terra-firma of history into the Messianic cloud-land. In the eighth week, a sword is put into the hands of the righteous for the sub-

* It is remarkable that, as the text now stands, the Apocalypse of weeks is broken into two fragments, and that these fragments occur in the wrong order: the seven weeks of the author's past being described in xciii. 1–14; and the three yet future in a previous chapter, viz., xci. 12–17. This may be a mere textual transposition, due to accidents of copying. But, taken in connection with the eschatology of the three weeks, which is hardly consistent with the rest of the book and much more definite, it awakens a suspicion of some touches from a later hand.

jugation of a sinful world ; and before the period closes, heathenism is prostrate at their feet, and they have raised a house for their God, and made all ready for the Divine age. In the ninth week that age is at length realized : it is ushered in by a solemn judgment over the whole of this world ; which is cleared of every ill, divested of its old form, and glorified for the universal life of holiness. It is reserved for the tenth week to apply a like transformation to the upper world, and pass a corresponding judgment,—a "judgment of eternity,"—on the fallen angels : the former heaven will vanish away, and a new heaven will shape itself forth with lights of sevenfold lustre; and through weeks without number sin in either world will be no more known.

If we are to carry into these ideal periods any thing like the measures of length supplied by their historical predecessors, the author must have stood, as he conceived, on the verge of a long and final struggle between "the faithful people" and the Pagan powers of the world : and, for such an act of faith to be possible, he must have caught the excitement of some kindling time, when Gentile weakness or Jewish heroism gave a temporary expansion of national hope. An allowance of four hundred years for the conquest of Heathendom is certainly more liberal and long-suffering than is usual with the impatient apocalyptic race : who rarely choose to distance themselves so far from the golden age they predict. But, on the other hand, the same approximate measure, applied to the ninth or Messianic week, brings it into curious accord with the "Revelation of Esra,"—another important authority on these beliefs,—in which the reign of Messiah is expressly said to last four hundred years, and then by his death, and that of all mortals, to make way for the last and heavenly scene. It is singular that, in its apocalypse of weeks, the Book of Enoch is silent of any personal Messiah.

It is known how, in its several visions, the Book of

Daniel surveys again and again the same historical ground. Similarly our author, as if helping us to check one calculation by another, throws into the form of a dream, with fresh imagery and different numberings, the matter collected from the heavenly books. In this dream the several races of beings are represented by distinctive types of living nature; the wicked angels by stars; the good, by white human forms; the legendary giants, by camels, elephants, and asses; men, at first by oxen, but after Jacob's time, as if to mark a dwindled humanity, by sheep: among which the *rams* are the kings, and their horns the signs of power. It is only, however, in the pure line of the Hebrews that these pastoral emblems are admitted. The Heathen nations appear under the guise of species wilder or of low repute: Egypt, as the wolf; Chaldæa, as the lion; Idumæa, as the swine. With these allegorical equivalents the whole history is gone through, clumsily but intelligibly enough. A single passage may be cited, describing the building of the temple, the sending of the prophets, and the mysterious fate of Elijah:

"Above that house (*i.e.*, Jerusalem) was built a high tower (*i.e.*, the Temple) for the Lord of the sheep. The house was low, but the tower lofty: and the Lord of the sheep stood upon that tower; and they set a full table before him. And again I saw how those sheep went astray and abandoned that house of theirs. And the Lord of the sheep called some from among them and sent them to the sheep; but the sheep began to kill them. And one of them saved himself from the slaughter, and arose and raised a cry about the sheep: and they were for killing him; but the Lord of the sheep saved him out of their hand, and fetched him up here to me; and let him dwell there" (lxxxix. 50–54).

Through the infatuation of the lost sheep the house and tower are abandoned of heaven, and given up to lions, tigers, and jackals. In his pity for the scattered flock, Enoch is on the point of interceding for them; when he is silenced by learning the Divine counsels re-

specting them from the exile to Messiah's time. These are as follows.

The sheep are to be surrendered, during this interval, to seventy shepherds in succession : who will not be restrained from a certain limited range of oppression over them ; but of whose proceedings a recording Angel will keep account, that they may be held responsible for every excess. The earlier critics not unnaturally supposed that those who tended the sheep must be their own native rulers ; and went accordingly, with this clue in hand, through the domestic history of Palestine in search of seventy suitable princes. But the shepherds, who are all at last committed to the flames of Hinnom, are evidently the Pagan powers to whose hands the sheep are left for temporary chastisement. The first twelve, moreover, complete their time during the exile, when there was only foreign sway, and cover precisely Jeremiah's seventy years. Just double that number* fill up the succeeding Persian period, from Cyrus to Alexander the Great : a period of which we know little, but which our author describes as enfeebling his people's nationality and fatally mingling them with the populations around. Then appears a new race of world-oppressors, the Macedonian Greeks, symbolized as birds of prey; the first conquerors, by the eagle; the Syrian Seleucidæ, by the raven; the Ptolemies, by the hawk. When twenty-three of these have accomplished their time, and make up the number in all to 58, the sheep, fairly torn to pieces, are reduced to few, and those few are but living

* Unless, indeed, we accept Dillman's conjecture of 23 instead of 24 : without which the original total of 70 will not come out correctly as the sum of the several items. In that case the series will be composed of two equal parts of 35 ; each made up, in similar but inverted portions, of 12 and 23 : viz., 12 for the Exile ; 23 from Cyrus to Alexander : thence 23 to Antiochus Epiphanes ; and 12 more, to complete the drama. The difficulty is, that the second term is not mentioned by itself ; but, massed with the first, is said to give 36, or, by a various reading, 37 (instead of 35). Volkmar, accepting 37, alters the total accordingly into 72.

skeletons. The description forcibly paints the sufferings of Palestine as the battle-ground of Egypt and Syria, oppressed by the forces of both, corrupted by the alliance of each; till shame and misery raised at length the standard of religious war. The double relation of the country to these two rival powers explains the number of "shepherds" given to so short a term (about 330 to 170 B.C.); the 23 including contemporaneous princes of both lands. The final period opens differently from the preceding ones; not with the appearance of some new order of "shepherds," but with the growth of a new spirit among the "sheep." A fresh generation sees with painful clearness, and brooks with little patience, the political and religious humiliation of their country. "Young lambs born to the sheep, begin to open their eyes and to call to the sheep"; at first, with vain appeal; but afterwards, through the discipline of a long struggle with the Syrian birds of prey, with increasing success: till at length a "horn" of power appears which resists assault from all sides, and maintains itself against every combination. At this point, the historical terminus is reached: and since, in leading up to it, the twelve residuary "shepherds" are all expended, it must lie at some distance from the incipient Maccabæan revolt with which the section opens. It is fixed, by Ewald and Dillmann, on grounds deserving of reliance, at the culmination of John Hyrcanus's career; before he turned aside to the Sadducees' party, and forfeited the homage of the Jewish Puritans. If the effectual establishment of national independence, and the maintenance of it for a quarter of a century, did not entitle him to be called "a great horn," no previous member of the Asmonæan family could show a superior claim. With all their personal heroism, his predecessors for two generations had been rather party leaders than national chiefs; and had conducted, with fluctuating success, the contest which he at last brought to consolidated results. A pious Jew who, about B.C. 110, looked round him from

Jerusalem, and beheld the yoke of Syria shaken off, Samaria humbled, Idumæa converted and incorporated; who saw how "the ancient men sat all in the streets, communing together of the wealth of the land, and the young men put on glorious and warlike apparel"; might well persuade himself that the dawn of promise was beginning to appear, and the Messianic age at hand.

Accordingly, the shepherds' time being up, supernatural imagery pours down into the dream. At the threat of a combined attack upon the sheep by deserters from their own number, and by wild heathen powers, first the archangel Michael, then the Lord of the sheep himself, comes down to defend the right. On being shown, from the recording angel's books, that the last twelve shepherds have exceeded their commission, the Lord, with a stroke of his staff on the ground, causes many of the wild races to sink into the earth; and gives a sword to the sheep to drive away the remaining beasts of the field and birds of heaven. Thereupon, a throne was erected in the favourite land; and the Lord of the sheep sat on it, and all the sealed books were opened before him. He desires the archangels to bring before him, first, the stars (*i.e.*, the fallen angels), then the seventy shepherds:

"And lo! I saw them all in bonds, as they stood before him. And judgment was passed first on the stars; and they were found guilty, and went to the place of condemnation, and were thrown into a fiery deep, full of spires of flame. And those seventy shepherds were judged and found guilty, and thrown in like manner into that fiery deep. And then I saw, how a similar deep, full of fire, was opened amid the earth; and the sheep that were blinded were brought up for trial, and all judged guilty, and thrown into that fiery deep: there they burned: and this deep was to the right (*i.e.*, south) of that house (Jerusalem). And I saw how those sheep burned, and their bone burned. And I stood up to see, till he wrapped up that old house, and did away with all the pillars; and all the beams and ornaments of that house were wrapped up with it; and it was cast out and put in a place at the South of the land. And I beheld the Lord of the sheep, till he brought a new

house (Jerusalem), greater and higher than that first, and set it up on the site of the first which had been wrapped up : all its pillars were new, and its ornaments were new and exceeded the former old ones which he had cast away : and all the sheep were in it. And I saw all the sheep that had remained, and all the beasts of the earth, and all the birds of heaven, how they fell down and did homage before those sheep, and entreated them, and obeyed them in every word. And after that, the three in white clothing who had previously led me up, took my hand ; and, the hand of that young man (Elijah) holding me, they set me down among those sheep, before the judgment took place. And those sheep were all white, and their fleece thick and pure. And all the ruined and scattered sheep, and beasts of the field and birds of the air were gathered in that house ; and the Lord of the sheep had great joy, because they were all good, and returned to his house. And I beheld till they laid down that sword which had been given to the sheep, and brought it back into his house, and sealed it up before the face of the Lord, and all the sheep were gathered into that house and it could not hold them. And the eyes of all were opened, so that they saw the good ; and there was not one among them that had not sight. And I saw that that house was great and wide, and very full. And I saw that a white bullock was born, with great horns ; and all the beasts of the field and birds of heaven feared him and entreated him continually. And I beheld, till all their kinds were changed, and they all became white bullocks : and the first among them was a great creature,* and had great black horns upon his

* As the text now stands, there is here an absurd gloss introduced, which has been ignorantly turned to Christian purposes, and defended in spite of its obvious character of interpolation. The passage, with the corruption, runs thus : "And the first among them [was the Word, and that Word] was a great creature and had great black horns upon his head." Dillman shows that the Ethiopic term here rendered "Word" means, not λόγος, but ῥῆμα, and cannot have been written, even as a gloss, with any intention to identify the bullock (*i.e.*, Messiah) with the Johannine "Word." He supposes that, on the margin, some one wrote, in Greek characters, a Hebrew equivalent for the term rendered "bullock" : this would be ῥῆμ ; which a copyist, turning into ῥῆμα, inserted in the text. The Logos doctrine is absolutely foreign to the Messianic idea : and the violence of its intrusion here is self-evident.

head ; and the Lord of the sheep took pleasure in them and in the bullocks" (xc. 23–38).

When compared with the Apocalypse of Weeks this Vision of the Seventy Shepherds presents some notable peculiarities :

(1.) Its historical chronology comes down to a more definite and a somewhat later time, to the end, instead of the beginning, of the religious war.

(2.) Its picture of the judgment is single; bringing angels and men to sentence at the same time ; and taking the Angels first ; instead of leaving their trial to a second assize at the end of the Messianic reign.

(3.) It introduces a personal Messiah : not indeed as Judge, but as Head of the theocracy after the Divine judgment had been pronounced ; representing him as simply a human being of the original ante-diluvian type (a "white bullock was born "),—a type into which, on his appearance, all other men are changed.

These differences arise, we have no doubt, from different authorship. Nor can we doubt, respecting the two doctrines of the last Judgment, which is the older : for the natural order of development is always from the less to the more determinate. The one general assize for all beings would suffice for the earlier and simpler retributive feeling ; and only afterwards, when the differences between immortal angels and historic men were dwelt upon, would their cases seem to require a separate provision ; and a judgment for time would be open to fit this world for Messiah ; while at the other end of the theocracy a "judgment for eternity" would be reserved for spiritual natures. The later hand, however, from which comes the more specific picture in the Apocalypse of Weeks, is still proved, by its terminal historical touches, to be of so early a date that, in tracing its lessons, we are probably studying the lineaments, if not of the original author's generation, at least of the next.

By these two numerical revelations, then, the *Time* of

the Messianic advent appears to be fixed to the post-Asmonæan age, not less definitely than its *Place* to Jerusalem. No other conclusion can be drawn, unless we gratuitously supply data which the text does not place at our disposal. Volkmar does this, when he assumes that for each of the shepherds (of whom he reckons 72) we must allow a decade, and so look for the writer's Messiah at the end of 720 years from the commencement of the Captivity (558 B.C.), *i.e.*, in 132 A.D., the date of Bar-chochab's revolt. Hilgenfeld does this, when he similarly assumes a constant unit, only making it *seven* years, instead of ten. The calculation which he thus gives us (558–449 = 109 B.C.) has not the misleading effect of Volkmar's: for it hits approximately the true date: and it has a plausible ground of defence as an interpretation, like Daniel's, of Jeremiah's seventy weeks. But it creates difficulties in the subordinate sections of the period: it forces on the writer a measure which he would hardly have omitted, if his meaning required its use: and it elicits no reliable result which does not arise from the unaugmented text.

It is remarkable that the writer of these revelations should be so preoccupied with the historical aspect of his theocratic faith, as almost to forget the dead, and feel his picture of the world complete with mention only of the living generation upon it. A perfectly analogous phenomenon, however, presents itself in the gospel of Matthew: where the solemn judgment before the Son of Man gathers together "all nations," but no dead, and is evidently passed, if we measure it by the Evangelist's conception as he wrote, only on the contemporary generation. In each instance, we should not know, but for other parts of the same book, whether the author admitted the faithful of earlier days to share in the "kingdom to come." The Book of Enoch, however, leaves no doubt on this point. In the exhortations which the "Prophet" addresses to his descendants, as the practical issue of his disclosures, no topic of warning and encouragement is more earnestly insisted on, than

the certainty of righteous recompense to departed souls, and their sure custody in Hades to the hour of judgment. The "righteous," it is said, "will arise from their sleep: and wisdom will arise and be given them." The holy Angels are set to watch them; and however long their sleep may be, they have nothing to fear: "grace and joy and honour are prepared for you, and recorded in the books for the spirits who have died in righteousness: so that you will be compensated abundantly for your troubles: and your lot is better than the lot of the living. And your spirits will live,—you that have died in righteousness,—and will have joy: and the remembrance of you will be before the face of the Mighty One for all generations of the world: fear not therefore in the hour of humiliation." "The angels will remember you for good before the face of the Mighty One." "You will shine as the lights of heaven and be seen: and the gates of heaven will be open to you: and you will have joy as the angels of heaven." On the other hand, the trangressors' souls, even in Hades, will fare ill and have great trouble: while at the judgment they will be consigned to darkness and perplexity and burning fire: they will be thrown into the fiery furnace and perish in Hinnom. Yet throughout, it is evident, the theatre of all this retribution is still terrestrial, and its concomitant circumstances military and historical. The transgressors are delivered into the hands of the righteous, who "will break the necks of them": the horses will wade through the sinners' blood: the angels will come down and help, and will assemble all the wicked into one place. The recall therefrom from Hades is still a recall to this earth: and the new life is a resumption of the old, under conditions which exclude its humiliations and realize its true idea.

It remains for us only to notice one topic:—the representation which the Book of Enoch gives of the person of Messiah. With no element of the work is it so difficult to deal. If we merely collect together all the pertinent

passages from the present text, and throw down their lineaments upon the canvas, no clear image results, but a mere assemblage of incoherent and even incompatible members. Yet if we proceed to discharge, as interpolation, what seems most disturbing to the unity of the figure, we have little to guide us but a critical feeling which involves a world of prior theological judgments, and is scarcely communicable from school to school. We can only present and combine the facts, and report the impressions which they appear to justify.

The solitary mention of Messiah which we have yet encountered is indisputably genuine, and may be taken, more securely than any other, as a standard for the oldest writer's point of view. What, then, is the doctrine of that passage? After the judgment is over, there is born, within the happy community, one who is to be their Head; who exhibits their nature in its primeval perfection; and under whom they all lay aside their degenerate forms, and recover the true proportions of humanity. It is impossible more decidedly to detach Messiah from the celestial region, and more clearly to mark his terrestrial affinities, than by applying to him the special Adamic symbols, and calling him a "great white bullock with black horns." No such imagery could have proceeded from a writer who imagined him pre-existent in heaven, and assimilated him to the host of spirits, or associated him immediately with the Most High. For that higher world our author, as we have seen, has also his appropriate symbolism from which he never deviates; and nothing less refined than white human forms can enter his allegory there. His actual language, then, is consistent only with a strictly humanitarian conception. Yet when he winds up the exhortations of this very section, with an enumeration of Messianic blessings, he introduces the Most High, as saying, by way of encouragement to the righteous, "*I and my Son* will unite ourselves with them for evermore." Except the brief mention of the "white bullock" in a far-off chapter, this is the only allusion to Messiah in

the whole section: and nothing can be more strange than his sudden appearance here, like a familiar image, unless it be the new name,—"Son of God,"—by which he is introduced,—a name nowhere else occurring in the whole volume. It seems to us an incredible incongruity that a writer who shrinks from exhibiting even the angels under animal symbols should in one place present Messiah as a "white bullock," and in another speak of him as Son and Assessor of the Most High. We reject therefore this ἅπαξ λεγόμενον as evidence of nothing except the tampering of some Christian hand.

While the notices of Messiah are, for the most part, scant and few, even where the scene and times to which he belongs are painted in ample detail, there is one section of the book (xxxvii.–lxxi.) in which this reticence disappears, and he forms the main subject of revelation. Chiefly, indeed, to see him and learn who he is and what his function, is Enoch conducted in these chapters to the interior heaven, where dwell the spiritual Agents of God's reserved purposes. The spectacle presented to the "Prophet" is already familiar to us: it is precisely Daniel's vision (vii.) of the Ancient of Days and of "One like the Son of Man": only that the symbolic vagueness of the original is all removed, and, in conformity with the later interpretation, the human figure is treated, not as standing for the "holy nation," but as an individual Person,—the real and pre-existent Messiah:

"And there I saw one who had a head of days (the Ancient of Days), and had his head white as wool. And beside him there was another, whose countenance was as the face of a man; and his countenance was full of grace, like one of the Angels. And I asked one of the Angels who went with me and showed me all the hidden things, about that Son of Man, who he was, and whence he was, and why he went with the Ancient of Days. And he answered me and said: 'This is the Son of Man, who has righteousness, with whom righteousness dwells, and who reveals all the treasures of that which is

hid; because the Lord of Spirits has made election of him, and his lot before the Lord of Spirits has exceeded all, through righteousness, for ever. And this Son of Man whom thou hast seen will remove kings and mighty men from their places and the violent from their thrones, and will loose the bands of the violent, and will break the teeth of sinners. And he will thrust kings from their thrones and out of their empires, because they exalt and praise him not, and do not thankfully acknowledge the source whence their empire is lent'" (46).

We cannot perhaps with certainty construe this language to mean more than the Divine *fore-ordination* of Messiah: his actual *pre-existence* is not necessarily affirmed by his presence to the prophet's vision: for it is characteristic of the *seer's* gift to assemble synchronously before him objects which are to enter successively the field of reality. And the same doubt,—as if it hung about the writer's own mind,—attaches to his phraseology elsewhere. More than once he speaks of the *appointment*,—never outright of the *living agency*,—of Messiah, "before the world was": for instance, in these striking words:

"And at that hour was that Son of Man named before the Lord of Spirits, and his name before the Ancient of Days. Ere yet the sun and the constellations were created, ere the stars of heaven were made, was his name named before the Lord of Spirits. He will be a staff to the righteous and holy, that they sustain themselves thereon and do not fall: and he will be the light of the peoples, and the hope of those who are troubled in heart. All who dwell upon the earth will fall down in entreaty before him, and will celebrate and exalt and praise the name of the Lord of Spirits. And therefore was he elected and hid before him, ere the world was created, and will be before him to eternity" (xlviii. 2–6).

From the parallelism between Past and Future in these concluding words Dillmann infers that more than fore-ordination must be meant: as the *post*-existence "to all eternity" is real, so must be the *pre*-existence "ere the world was created." But the inference overlooks an

important difference in the things asserted by the two clauses: Messiah is "*to be*" before God (*i.e.*, in actual existence) "to all eternity": he was only "elected and *hid*" before Him (*i.e.*, determined in idea, but *reserved*) "ere the world was created." We do not know why there should be this invariable shrinking from direct ascription to Messiah of some antecedent part in the drama of the world, unless belief itself was still lingering on the idea of simple fore-appointment, and had not yet taken the step into a doctrine of pre-existence.

So prominent is this conception of Divine appointment, that "*The Elect*" is, throughout this section, the standing title of Messiah; as the same word, in the plural, denotes his subjects. In this capacity he is much less identified with the human race than we have hitherto found; is invested with functions elsewhere not delegated by the Most High; and especially with the office of Judge at the final crisis:

> "Sinners who deny the name of the Lord of Spirits," it is said, "are reserved for the day of anguish and consternation. On that day will the Elect (singular) sit upon the throne of his glory, and hold a discriminative judgment of their deeds and countless positions. And their spirit will grow strong within them, when they see mine Elect, and those who have called upon my holy and glorious name. And in that day I will cause my Elect to dwell among them; and will change the heaven and make it an eternal light and blessing: and I will change the earth and make it blessing, and let mine elect (plural) dwell upon it. But those who commit sin and transgression shall not set foot upon it. For I have seen and satisfied my righteous with peace, and set them before me: but for sinners I have reserved a judgment, to make them perish from the surface of the earth" (xlv. 3-6).

Compared with the first rude sketch which we assumed as a standard, all these attributes,—of Judge, Elect, Son of Man,—constitute a marked advance, involving not merely a fuller, but a changed belief. They bring the conception,

as every reader must feel, much nearer to the representations in the gospels. Still, there is not one of them that has not its germ in the Old Testament, and might not be elicited thence by modes of interpretation which we know to have prevailed in the præ-Christian synagogue. The Messianic meanings which apostles and evangelists extorted from the Hebrew Scriptures were not personal inventions of their own; but were doubtless part of a common stock long in possession of the national mind: and if we meet with what is akin to them a hundred years higher up, there is nothing in the phenomenon that need surprise us. But there is one epithet applied to Messiah in this section too startling to be easily neutralized by such an explanation. He is called "*Woman's Son*": and this too, in connexion with the last Judgment, as if to point the contrast between past humiliation and present glory: "Kings," it is said, "and mighty men will be in consternation, and their countenance will fall, and anguish will seize them, when they see that *Son of the Woman* sit upon the throne of his glory" (lxii. 5). The expression, never repeated, is immediately changed: "The kings and all the earth will praise and exalt him who rules over all, and who was hid: for previously that *Son of Man* was hid, and the Most High reserved him in his might and revealed him to the elect: and the community of the holy and elect will be sown, and all the elect will stand before him in that day" (lxii. 6–8). If we could entirely forget the Christian legend, we might perhaps, with Dillmann, consider the phrases, "Son of Man," "Son of Woman," interchangeable, and accept them both as expressing simply that Messiah, with all his glory, was still of human kind. We might cite the pathetic words of Job, "Man that is *born of a woman* is of few days and full of trouble," to show how naturally the birth-hour comes into the mind when an image is wanted of frail and suffering humanity. But, to bear this explanation, the phrase ought to be in current and idiomatic use; else, it would not speak for itself in

this sudden and solitary instance: and of such currency there is no evidence. If, prior to the story of the Virgin Mary, Messiah had acquired the title of "Son of the Woman," it must have been in virtue of some theory about his birth, out of which that story itself has sprung. It is far from impossible that, could we recover the missing links of præ-Christian doctrine, such a chain of causation might be established. But so long as we stand in face only of this isolated text, and remember that the book which contains it has been for a millennium and a half in Christian custody, we incline to treat so exceptional a phrase as a corruption from the hand of an ecclesiastical copyist. The verse immediately preceding compares the consternation of "kings and mighty men" to the "travail of a woman ere her son is born." Whether this occurrence of the words "son" and "woman" in the antecedent lines can have led to the introduction of the questionable epithet, we must leave to Ethiopic scholars to decide.

The peculiarities of this section have led Hilgenfeld to maintain not only its later, but its Christian, origin as a whole. And often, no doubt, its imagery and even its phrases remind us of evangelical texts, and carry us more readily to the New Testament than to the Old. When we hear that for the unbeliever "it were better that he had never been born" (xxxviii. 2);—that "no idle word is spoken with impunity before God" (lxii. 3, lxvii. 9);—that the earth and death shall give up the dead entrusted to them at the judgment-call (li. 1);—that the Son of Man "sits on the throne of his glory," and that "all judgment is committed to him" (lxix. 27);—that, after the Judgment, the righteous will be "clothed with the garment of life" (lxii. 15), and "will be as the angels in heaven" (li. 4); we seem for the moment to be conversing with Jesus or with John. And when we read that at the advent, "the Lord of spirits will dwell over them, and they will *dwell and eat together with that Son of Man*" (lxii. 14), the words so familiar to us naturally recur, "As my Father hath

appointed unto me a kingdom, I appoint also unto you that ye shall eat and drink at my table in my kingdom" (Luke xxii. 29); and "Verily, I say unto you, I shall not again drink of the fruit of the vine, till I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom" (Matt. xxvi. 29);—words which, as we know from Justin Martyr, were taken by the early Church in their obvious sense, viz., that Christ, on his return to Jerusalem, would eat and drink with his disciples.* But these coincidences, it must always be remembered, may be pleaded in evidence both ways; to prove that the Christian Scriptures have *furnished* the ideas; or, inversely, to prove that they have *borrowed* the ideas: borrowed them, that is, not from this or that particular book, but from the common heritage of beliefs which had descended to that age, and were preserved in every synagogue. The originality of the Christian Scriptures does not consist in the Messianic doctrine of the synoptical gospels and the Apocalypse: on the contrary, it is precisely here that we meet with what is purely Judaic and perishable in them,—with their necessary, but transitory, colouring of time and place: and, beyond affixing their ideal to the person of Jesus, they leave the traditional picture as they found it. Its features had doubtless *set* into many forms of thought and even expression, which could not fail to repeat themselves in different minds and flow from different pens: and the occasional concordances between the gospels and the less ancient part of the Book of Enoch are not more than we should expect from the fact that the primitive Christian Church was but a fresher form of Jewish synagogue. It is only in the case of very *special* phrases, such as—"Son of God," "Son of the Woman,"—which lie out of the known circle of Jewish Messianic ideas, yet within the compass of the Christian, that we feel authorized to suspect an interpolating hand.

If, however, we cannot, with Hilgenfeld, dismiss the Messianic section of our book as a Christian addition,

* Tryph. Jud. 51.

neither can we, with Ewald, regard it as the original basis of the whole work. The highly-developed form of doctrine which it exhibits appears to us to require a relatively lower date: and, in its peculiarities of phraseology, it departs further than the prior and succeeding sections from the simplicity of the Old Testament model. Its characteristic name for Jehovah,—viz., "*The Lord of spirits*,"—is surely more modern than "the Most High," "the Lord," or simply, "God." The titles given to Messiah,—"the Elect,"—"the Elect before the world was,"—"the Righteous,"—"the Son of Man,"—as well as the function of *Judge* assigned to him,—are not likely when once in use through earlier chapters, to have been dropped and lost sight of by later contributors to the work, and exchanged for the image of the "white bullock." As claiming the most for Messiah, they must rather crown than commence the doctrine of his person. The citizens of the kingdom also are denoted by some new names, not, like the "sheep" of other chapters, pointing to distinction of *race*, but following the moral and religious type of the terms "Righteous" and "Elect"; *e.g.*, they are called "Children of God," Children of Heaven," "Righteous and Good,"—implying a more spiritual order of conceptions, into which the literature might rise, but from which it would be little likely to recede. On the whole, we are convinced that in this section we have a maturer form of doctrine than in those which fix the place and time of the expected golden age, and that we obtain a reflection of the Jewish attitude of faith during the life of the parents or grandparents of our apostles.

It is not surprising, then, that we meet in this work so many anticipations of the Christian Scriptures. Apostles and Evangelists were born into its circle of ideas; and they remained within it even when a wider circle embraced them and enlarged their view. Here we find, a century before the first line of the New Testament was written, all the chief features of its doctrine respecting the "end of the

world" and the "coming of the Son of Man": the same theatre, Jerusalem;—the same time, relatively to the writer, the immediate generation,—the hour at hand;—the same harbingers,—wars and rumours of wars, and the gathering of Gentile armies against the elect;—the same deliverance for the elect,—the Advent of Messiah with the holy angels;—the same decisive solemnity,—the Son of Man on the throne of his glory, with all nations gathered before him;—the same award,—unbelievers to a pit of fire in the valley of Hinnom, and the elect to the halls of the kingdom, to eat and drink at Messiah's table;—the same accession to the society,—by the first resurrection sending up from Hades the souls of the pious dead;—the same renovation of the earth,—the old Jerusalem thrown away, and replaced by a new and heavenly;—the same metamorphosis of mortal men,—to be as the angels;—the same end to Messiah's time,—the second resurrection, and the "second judgment of eternity," consigning the wicked Angels to their doom;—and the same new creation, transforming the heavenly world, that it may answer to Paradise below. Here, in a book to which the New Testament itself appeals, we have the very drama of "last things" which reappears in the Book of Revelation and in portions of the Gospels. Whence, then, has this scheme of doctrine come? and whither has it led us? Itself a misunderstanding of the Old Testament, it has entailed a corresponding misunderstanding of the New. Spreading before us the successive stages of its development in Daniel, in the Sibyl, in the progressive sections of the Book of Enoch, we see the process laid bare of its actual growth from misconstrued and overstrained phrases of Jeremiah and Isaiah, its absorption of fresh mythological and legendary matter, and its shifting form and boundaries to suit the relentless progress of history and the wearisome delay of the end. A faith thus matured, however full of interest and pathos as a human phenomenon, it is impossible to invest with the

character of objeetive revelation, or to regard as more authoritative than the allegories of Philo or the Chiliasm of Justin Martyr. Yet, following it down into Christendom, we find it released, by an ulterior misconception, from its geographical and historical conditions, and transformed into the extramundane doctrine of a General Resurrection and Judgment, with awards to an everlasting Hell or Heaven. The great immortal hope, the solemn fears of presaging conscience, have become clogged with material images repugnant alike to our cosmical knowledge and our spiritual apprehensions: while the prolonged expectation of a "Second Advent," to substitute another world for this has not only been prolific in apocalyptic fanaticism, but has sunk the present human scene into the shade as a mere provisional existence, divine in its promise, but not in its realities. The person of Christ, disguised in that Messianic costume, which, often with barbaric taste, scribes and rabbis had elaborated, and which his disciples were eager to fold round him, imperfectly reveals its simple lines of spiritual majesty, and rather commands the homage paid to external functions than wins the allegiance of inward reverence. The very terms habitually applied to Him,—"King," "Lord," "Judge,"—are all borrowed from the antecedent theory of a theocratic fifth act to the historic drama, and express no personal lineaments: their meaning is wholly political, not religious. Till we are prepared to discharge from the Christian Scriptures, as the mere temporary vehicle of their higher significance, their whole inherited system of Messianic doctrine, the demonology, the "preaching to the spirits in prison," the Parusia with its throne and judgment, the "Gehenna of fire," the "reign of saints," the "table of the kingdom," and to penetrate behind this veil to the individuality of Jesus, expressed in his deepest words and his characteristic life, the divine essence of Christianity will not be reached, and its eternal truth will remain hid.

VIII.

M. RENAN'S LIFE OF JESUS.*

EVERY attempt to re-write the "Life of Jesus" implies an opinion that the four Evangelists have not been finally successful in their task. Had there been only one gospel, the grand figure which it presents might for ages have left a satisfying image on the mind. But when the simplicity of the impression is broken, when the outline appears in parts double or treble, and the movements separate on different lines, when tones of incompatible colouring are laid on, the eye instinctively endeavours to clear the confusion; first, by suspecting itself, and correcting its own point of view; and, failing this, by criticizing the representations themselves, and discharging the touches least true to nature. As early therefore as the second century, Tatian's Diatessaron redisposed the four gospels into one, and began the long and not very harmonious procession of "Harmonies." Their method consists simply in a mechanical re-arrangement of parts, a cutting-up of four threads into convenient lengths, to re-tie them in an order which omits nothing but the duplicates. The task may be achieved with more or less skill: the pieces may be too long or too short: the joints may be neat or clumsy: the geographical windings may be excessive: the time-measure may be open to dispute. But you are to criticize nothing

* "Vie de Jésus." Par Ernest Renan, Membre de l'Institut. Paris: Michel Lévy Frères. 1863.—*National Review*, 1863.

except the manipulation: you are to assume that the material is all right, and, like a dissected map, admits of being put together as a whole, when the rule of combination has been found. The result is not encouraging. So primary a point as the duration of Christ's ministry,—the size of the framework within which the detail is to be distributed,—remains undetermined. Not to mention the startling assertion of Irenæus that it extended to the Saviour's fiftieth year at least,—we have bipaschal, tripaschal, quadripaschal systems, each giving to the sacred life different proportions, a different *mise-en-scène;* and all involving jerks of incident and contortions of character which would be deemed unbearable in any other biography. The very repute of infallibility which would seem to secure reverential treatment for the gospels really exposes them to unparalleled violence; for it benumbs in the reader all historical tact, excuses him from applying the delicate measures of humanity, and sets him in a sphere beyond nature, where, all things being possible, nothing is arbitrary. In any but sacred history, the outrages on probability sanctioned by every Harmonist would be deemed intolerable. Because, for instance, one Evangelist* puts the "cleansing of the Temple" at the commencement of the Saviour's ministry, the others† at its close, Dr. Carpenter assigns it to *both*:‡ and, for a similar reason, he makes Jesus *twice*§ utter his lament over Jerusalem, in the same words; as if it were a passage got up for delivery now in Galilee, then at the Temple! The last meal before the crucifixion has, in each type of narrative, its symbolic incident; in John, the washing of the feet; in the rest, the institution of the Supper: the Harmonist introduces first one, and then the other.‖ The risen Christ who, in one account, appoints to meet his

* John ii. 13. † Matt. xxi. 12; Mark xi. 15; Luke xix. 45.

‡ Apostolical Harmony, pp. 27, 206.

§ Ibid. pp. 189, 221; Luke xiii. 34; Matt. xxiii. 37.

‖ Ibid. pp. 237, 244; John xiii. 1; Matt. xxv. 26; Mark xiv. 22; Luke xxii. 19.

disciples exclusively in Galilee,* and, in another, restricts his interviews to the neighbourhood of Jerusalem,† does not object, on the pages of a Harmony, to appear in both localities. A mosaic work thus pieced together from several distinct memoirs mars the design and chafes away the peculiarities of each; it dissects living unities to death, that it may use the *disjecta membra* in framing an artificial one. It puts out of sight the significant phenomena, of language and idea, which mark the place, the school, the era, whence each record comes; and creates in the mind an interest against the main source of light with regard to the beginnings of our religion. For if ever a clear image is reproduced of those sacred days, it will be gained, not by assimilating, but by differencing the early Christian memorials. The "Horæ Paulinæ" of an age of "Evidences" may find the "coincidences," of an age of History will interpret the deviations,—of Acts and Epistles: and the critic who shall explain the contrasts between the fourth gospel and the rest will in no slight degree clear the mist which hangs around the person of Christ. The Monotessaron conception which represents the first rude attempt at a "Life of Jesus" has long been the chief obstacle to any approximate success.

The modern demand for a clear "Life of Jesus" has however a much deeper source than any discrepancies of the Evangelists: it would remain, were there no gospel but one. It is quite impossible for the present age to accept the simple Jewish record as an adequate account of the divinest agency in history, or to replace its central figure in just the light with which Galilean thought invested it. Christianity has turned out other than its first votaries expected;—an unspeakably greater, purer, more enduring power than their final little "kingdom of heaven"; not alarming the world with magical and revolutionary surprise, sudden as the pangs of travail, but born into it, like some child of rarer beauty and higher conscience in a home, and

* Matt. xxviii. 7, 10, 16. † Luke xxiv. 13, 36, 49.

growing silently into the affections of kindred natures. The look therefore which it had to a prospective eye cannot satisfy our wants in retrospect: we require causes for other effects than were then in sight: we can dispense with causes provided for effects that never came. Even those who do not absolutely recoil from the miraculous element in the narrative must feel that it often assumes its form from untenable and obsolete beliefs, and needs to be either dropped as legendary, or corrected into intelligible history. To us, the demons vociferate in vain their superhuman recognition of the Christ; the healing virtue that oozes from the hem of a garment is not persuasively divine; and the payment of a tax by catching a fish with a shekel in his mouth is hardly credible. Nor can the traces escape us, even within the limits of the same gospel, of incompatible ideas impressed upon the record by different hands at different times: as when Jesus, for instance, at one time forbids his missionaries to address themselves to Samaritans or Gentiles (*ἐθνῶν*),* assuring them that, ere they have gone the round of the cities of Israel, the last Advent would have come; and at another commands them to go and teach all nations (*πάντα τὰ ἔθνη*).† For these reasons we cannot but feel that, could we be transported to the evangelic time and place, we should see and tell the story differently; that in the extant narrative there is present much which is not due to the personality of Jesus; and that in the residue which *is*, some elements belong simply to his inheritance of national thought, and only within and beyond these are the sacred characteristics reached of his divine originality. To conduct us to this final essence of our religion, to show us how it acted and suffered amid historical conditions, and comported itself in its influence on the succeeding period of the world, is the aim of M. Renan's work. The brilliant and impressive volume now published is to be followed by a second on the Apostolic age; a third will exhibit the

* Matt. x. 5, 6. 23. † Matt. xxviii. 19.

state of Christianity under the Antonines; and a fourth terminate the history with the settlement by Constantine. The latter half of this great enterprise enters upon firm historical ground: but in the earlier half the sources are so scanty and their authority so obscure, that it needs a refined and exhaustive ingenuity of combination to frame a connected narrative, and a rare power of psychological divination to construe and complete the interrupted lines of thought and character. The genius of M. Renan, eminently subtle and apprehensive, works congenially in such a field, and often opens to us delicate lights which at once reveal and beautify. Notwithstanding his large erudition, we are more disposed to trust his constructive imagination than his critical judgments. This book, conceived in the spirit of a devout philosophy, and executed with poetic tenderness and reverence, is nearly perfect as a work of art: and so far as it fails to recover the historic figure of Christ and the true drama of his life, the defect is due, we think, to no weakness of sympathy or fancy, but to imperfect discrimination in estimating his authorities, and too vague a theory of the relation between the Divine and the Human.

A pupil, we believe, of Ewald, M. Renan has not always, in his History of the Semitic Languages, accepted the authority of the master: but in his present work, especially in the fundamental place it assigns to the fourth gospel, he is true to the school from which he springs. From that gospel he adopts, as authentic, the general program of the life of Christ; interweaving from Matthew chiefly the *discourses*, which he regards as the basis of the first gospel, and identifies with the Hebrew λόγια mentioned by Papias; and from Mark chiefly the recitals of *incident*, supposed by the same witness to contain the recollections of Peter.*

* This distinction between Matthew's gospel as containing *discourses*, and Mark's as containing *incidents*, is not borne out by the terms in which Papias speaks of them, ap. Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* iii. 39. The term λόγια cannot be restricted to *spoken words*, but is certainly used of

In its groundwork, therefore, notwithstanding its free dealing with details, our author's volume is essentially a *Harmony*, incorporating into one system the materials of the Johannine and the synoptical gospels; and assigning the primary place to the later composition, the secondary to the earlier. He allows that weighty doubts attach to the authorship of the fourth gospel,—doubts not yet resolved; but on the whole inclines to an hypothesis of this kind: The Apostle John, whose exclusively Judaic expectations were embodied, about A.D. 68, in the Book of Revelation, gave up this order of Messianic ideas after the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70; and, removing into Asia Minor insensibly imbibed the speculative and Gnostic modes of thought prevailing there, till they tinctured and transformed all his memories, and changed for him the Galilean Son of Man into an Incarnation of Divine truth. Thus converted from a theocratic zealot into a metaphysical mystic, he is not satisfied with the current evangelical memoirs: he finds inaccuracies in them: they do not assign to himself his due place among the personal disciples, and make relatively too much of Peter: and to correct these faults, he dictates to those about him a recital of things better known to him than to others. This recital, circulating in the immediate school of John, was the source of those traditions which Papias was fond of collecting from personal associates of the Apostles; which especially Presbyter John and Aristion orally brought him from the circle of the beloved disciple, without telling him that they had been committed to writing.* This view of the origin of the fourth gospel

narrative as well: and Mark's production is expressly said to have contained τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ λεχθέντα as well as πραχθέντα. On Schleiermacher's attempt (*Theol. Stud. und Krit.*, 1832, p. 735 seqq.) to limit the word λόγια to discourses, see Bleek's *Einleitung in das N. T.*, p. 93, and Baur's *Krit. Untersuchungen über die kanon. Evangelien*, p. 580.

* Introduction, pp. xxiv–xxxvi. The silence of Papias (declared by Irenæus to have been a hearer of John) as to any Gospel of John

places its *narrative* in the first rank of historic value: but its *discourses* are dismissed by our author as free compositions, deserving of no credit as reports, and in themselves little else than "pretentious heavy, ill-written tirades" (p. xxx.), which could never have proceeded from the same lips with the Sermon on the Mount. It is difficult to reconcile M. Renan's thorough-going repudiation of the Johannine discourses,—which constitute the very essence of the book,—with his dependence upon the Johannine narrative. At times,* he throws the responsibility of the discourses on the secondary compilers and editors of the gospel,—"the school of John." But again,† as if conscious of the indivisible unity of the book, he accounts for the peculiar colouring of the speeches by the psychological revolution in the Apostle himself; who, on looking back, saw every thing through his own medium; and to whom the recollections of the past came altered by the intellectual atmosphere around. But surely, the same refracting medium which so changed the *voices*, must no less change the *images*, of distant years: things and thoughts, action and speech, must suffer in common by any subjective process which melts away the sharp lines and degrades the pure tints of truth. Critically, it seems to us impossible to give the incidents to a first hand and the discourses to a second: and psychologically, no less impossible to save or sacrifice the one without the other.

We regret our author's half-and-half verdict on this *quæstio vexata*, because it impairs the firmness of his hand and clearness of his eye as he proceeds to fill his canvas. For one who would recover the real portraiture of Jesus,

drives M. Renan to this strange assumption, that his informants kept its existence a secret. It does not appear, from the citation in Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.* iii. 39) that Aristion and Presbyter John were personally known to Papias.

* Introd. p. xxxvi. "Les discours aux moins ne sont pas du fils de Zebédée."

† Ibid. p. xxxi. "En prêtant ces nouvelles idées à Jesus, il ne fit que suivre un penchant bien naturel."

the first condition is, to choose between the two types of Evangelist: the Johannine Christ is not the synoptical Christ: and to blend the two is to take away all outline from the personality, and all natural sequence from the drama in which it acts. The contrast between them is far from being confined to the discourses, and seems to us much deeper than M. Renan allows. A gospel in which Jesus never meets a demoniac, and never utters a parable, —is neither baptized nor tempted,—partakes of no last Passover, and institutes no Lord's supper,—announces no coming of the "kingdom of heaven," no fall of Jerusalem, no return of Messiah to judgment,—speaks of himself as the "Son of God," and as carrying a preëxistent glory in disguise,—and finally is crucified in coincidence with the slaying of the paschal lamb,—belongs to quite a different world from its predecessors, and could never proceed from the same little group of personal disciples whose memorials we meet in the other evangelists. Least of all can we assign it to the son of Zebedee, whom, in the Apocalypse, we know as the Chiliast and Judaist, and find excluding Paul from the number of Apostles,* denouncing his principles,† expecting the return of Nero to the world,‡ and then the Messianic judgment. To suppose this "son of thunder" subdued and attenuated into the theosophic evangelist is to do violence not only to nature, but to history: for, as it happens, we are able to follow him into Asia Minor, and to see that he was still steadfast to Judaic usage and tradition,—and *that* upon the very point on which emphatically the fourth gospel contradicts them. In the second century, it is well known, the Christians of the West and of the East observed a different rule for the celebration of Easter.§ The Latins, constant to the sacred day of the *week*, merely singled out a particular Sunday at

* Rev. xxi. 12–14. Comp. ii. 2.

† Rev. ii. 14. ‡ Rev. xvii. 9–11.

§ Irenæus and Polycrates; epp. ad Victor. ap. Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* v. 24.

the vernal equinox to celebrate, with exceptional intensity, the same resurrection of which every Sunday was a memorial: and, having determined this *πάσχα ἀναστάσιμον*, they appointed, as a prelude to it on the previous Friday, a remembrance of the crucifixion; a *πάσχα σταυρώσιμον*: and the fast of that season continued unbroken through the week. They thus took no notice except of distinctively Christian facts, marking the two grand incidents in the crisis of redemption,—the life laid down, the life resumed. The Asiatics, on the other hand, adhering to the Old-Testament rule for the Passover, consecrated a given day of the lunar *month* (the 14th Nisan), and celebrated their eucharistic supper simultaneously with the Jews' paschal meal, whatever might be the day of the week on which this breaking of their fast might fall: and it does not appear that they appended any special commemoration of the resurrection, the weekly remembrance of it being regarded as adequate. In defence of their practice, repeatedly objected to from Rome, the bishops of Asia Minor,—Polycarp of Smyrna A.D. 160 (*Ἰωάννου ἀκουστής*), Melito of Sardes A.D. 170, Polycrates of Ephesus, A.D. 190,—advanced two cogent pleas;—that they did but follow the authoritative example of their Lord, "who had himself kept the passover with his disciples on the 14th Nisan, and then suffered on the great day of unleavened bread;"* and that they had received their usage direct from the Apostle John, who, like other of the apostles, had always observed it among them, and established a custom respected by all their venerated men.† We have thus the Apostle's name used as a tower of strength in support of the very tradition,—of the last supper as a paschal meal,—which the fourth gospel excludes: and the Jewish Christian usage founded on that tradition has its citadel in his special school, its upholders in his associates and followers, its authority in his personal example; and, on the other hand, its conclusive refutation in the

* Apollinaris: Fragm. ap. Chronicon Paschale, p. 14. ed. Bonn.

† Iren. ap. Euseb. H. E. v. 24, 16 and 2-7.

history attributed to him. May we not reasonably prefer the historical evidence of his continued Jewish identity to the fictitious hypothesis of a pyschological metamorphosis turning the millennarian Boanerges into the mystic form of the "beloved disciple"?

The external theatre of the ministry of Jesus, and its whole order and duration, are no less affected than its internal character, by our historical estimate of the fourth gospel. Exceptional in this as in every thing else, it makes Judæa, not only his native country,* but the main scene of his labours, places him in Jerusalem for five festivals, including three passovers, and thus nearly trebles the chronology of the synoptics, and renders him familiar from the outset with that wonderful society of priests and canonists into which the other evangelists bring him only to die. All these peculiarities hang together and belong essentially to the idea and plan of the work. "The Jews" collectively (the writer placing himself outside of them) are to be exhibited as incorrigibly hostile and insensible to the impersonated Divine Word,—as the dark medium amid which that veiled glory, escaping nevertheless in words of insight and works of power,—shone in vain: and it is only in the centre of the nation, not in its rural outskirts, that this divine controversy can be tried in the person of

* M. Renan indeed (p. 20) appeals, in proof of the birth at Nazareth, to passages in this gospel, viz., i. 45, vii. 41, to which may be added xix. 19. But in these passages Jesus is assigned to Nazareth only by others, speaking from common repute: and in vii. 27, 41 the very gist of the Evangelist's purpose is to let "the Jews" exhibit their *ignorant* confidence in regard to the nativity of Christ, and by an act of judicial blindness reject him on the *false* ground of a Galilean birth. The rule that "a prophet hath no honour in his own country," Jesus himself gives (iv. 44) as his reason for going *away from Judæa* (iv. 3), and *resorting to Galilee*, where he was well received (iv. 45: comp. vii. 1). By the synoptics this same rule is applied (also through the lips of Jesus himself) to explain the unbelief of the people of *Nazareth*, and the consequent turning of Jesus to other Galilean places. This inverse citation of the rule proves that the πατρίς was held to be Judæa in the one case, Nazareth in the other

its proper representatives, and the necessity be shown of seeking "other sheep, not of this fold." But the more the evangelist's scheme is consistent within itself, the less is it susceptible of disruption into fragments for amalgamation with the far different plan,—not ideal but historical,—of the synoptics. To treat either narrative as consciously composed of unconnected parts, and needing to be supplemented by the other, sacrifices the true genius of both. M. Renan indeed (p. 205) reproduces the argument, so often urged in favour of the Johannine frame-work of place and time, that even in the other evangelists Jesus alludes to sojourns at Jerusalem which they do not describe; when he exclaims,—"*How often* would I have gathered thy children together,—as a hen doth gather her brood under her wings;—and ye would not!" (Matt. xxiii. 37.) But the more closely this passage is studied, the more evident does it become that these repeated appeals to Jerusalem refer, not to the personal visits of Jesus at the festivals, but to the old series of Divine opportunities given to the city throughout its history. They go back avowedly into anterior ages:—"Lo, I send unto you prophets and sages and scribes; and some of them ye will kill and crucify." They go forward to incidents in the siege under Titus (Joseph. Bell. Jud. iv. 5):—"That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel to the blood of Zacharias son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar" (Matt. xxiii. 34, 35). Be the cause what it may, Jesus is here made to speak, not in his historical individuality, but as impersonating the entire Providence of the Jewish nation through its vicissitudes: and no inference therefore can be drawn from these words with respect to his attendance at the festivals of the metropolis. That Jesus himself should slip insensibly from speaking in his own person to speaking in that of God is at variance with all analogy; and betrays, even more than the anachronism with regard to the son of Barachias, the hand of a later evangelist throwing back

upon the sacred year what was present to the eye and thought of a new generation.*

In estimating the relative value of the primitive Christian records, we are left mainly to internal indications: and no conclusions fairly deduced from the phenomena of the gospels themselves can be materially affected by the scanty and doubtful testimony of ecclesiastical witnesses. Even if we had direct citations of the fourth gospel by name in the very earliest of the Christian fathers, Papias, Polycarp, and Justin, they would carry us no further back than the middle of the second century; leaving us at a distance still of two generations from any probable apostolic authorship, and of nearly four from the events related. In an age prolific of supposititious writings, and a society quite uncritical, this interval is ample for the diffusion of a book amid a halo of unauthentic tradition; as may be seen from instances both within and without the canon of the New Testament,—the Epistle to the Hebrews, that of Barnabas, and some of the Clementine writings. But we have no such citations: and M. Renan is not justified in saying, "no one doubts that the fourth Gospel existed and *was attributed to John* about the year 150": or even in adding,

* In Luke (xi. 49) the words, "I will send unto you prophets," &c., are introduced as a *quotation* from the "Wisdom of God":—"Wherefore *the Wisdom of God said*," &c. This "Wisdom of God," it has been suggested, was probably a lost Christian production of the first age, in which the Divine Wisdom was represented as addressing warnings and appeals, in the tone of the old prophets, to the Jewish people. If the work was produced under the excitement of the Jewish war, it might well contain the allusion to the murder of Zacharias. Luke, by avowedly citing, clearly exhibits the change of person which in Matthew remains confused, and, but for the parallel passage, could only be conjectured. The quotation extends, according to Strauss, to the lament over Jerusalem, which, in Matthew, immediately follows, though Luke less naturally transposes it to another connexion (xiii. 34), and represents it as spoken already in Galilee, before the approach to Jerusalem. In this way it is not *Jesus*, but the *Wisdom of God*, that exclaims, "*How often*," &c. See an Essay by D. F. Strauss in Hilgenfeld's "Zeitschrift für wissensch. Theologie," 1863, p. 84.

of the first epistle, "it is recognized as John's by Polycarp, Papias, and Irenæus" (xxv. xxvi.). The "texts of Justin" to which he appeals in support of the first assertion certainly are closely related to words in the gospel, though not accurately representing them: but John is not mentioned as the authority for them; and the only time when his name occurs in Justin, he appears as author, not of the Gospel, but of the Apocalypse. So of the Epistle: in the same anonymous way Polycarp's letter to the Philadelphians includes one of its short sentences: and of Papias Eusebius simply says that he "used testimonies from it." Of Irenæus alone, and his contemporaries, in the latter part of the second century, does our author's remark hold good. The external evidence, in short, is so little definite as to be compatible with any conclusion suggested by comparative criticism of internal historical features.

How far the voice of M. Renan in favour of this justly venerated book will be acceptable to conservative theologians we do not know. On the one hand, it has the weight belonging to a judicial voice, removed beyond suspicion of interest or affection. On the other hand, it is pronounced with such qualifications as to take away almost as much as it gives. When the gospel is discharged of all its miracles and all its discourses, the residuary shreds scarcely retain any characteristic value. And not even these are left intact, as honest remnants of reality. The suspicion is raised against the Apostle, of deliberate falsehood in stating that he was present at the crucifixion, and that the mother of Jesus was then consigned to him as a sacred trust;—of falsehood prompted by the wish to make himself important:

"His disciples had fled. John, however, declares that he was present, and remained throughout standing at the foot of the cross. With better assurance we may state that the faithful women of Galilee, who had followed Jesus to Jerusalem and attended on him, still did not desert him. Mary, wife of Cleopas, Mary Magdalen, Johanna wife of Chuza, Salome and

others, kept some way off, with eyes fixed upon him. Were we bound to accept John's statement, we should add that Mary too, the mother of Jesus, was at the foot of the cross; and Jesus, seeing his beloved disciple and his mother together, said to the one, 'Behold thy mother,' and to the other, 'Behold thy son.' But it is inconceivable that the synoptic evangelists, who mention the other women, should have omitted her whose presence made so striking a feature. Nor perhaps is such a trait of personal tenderness in Jesus itself accordant with his extreme loftiness of character at the moment when, singly absorbed in his work, he ceased to be but for humanity."

To this passage is appended the following note:

"Here, in my view, is one of the traits revealing the personality of John, and his desire to give himself some importance. It appears to have been a fact that, after the death of Jesus, John received and in a manner adopted the mother of his master (xix. 27). The great consideration enjoyed by Mary in the rising church induced him doubtless to pretend that Jesus, as whose favourite disciple he gave himself out, had in his dying moments commended to him what he held most dear. The presence about him of this precious deposit secured him a sort of precedence of the other apostles, and gave a high authority to his doctrine" (pp. 421–423).

On these terms the apostolic authorship guarantees us nothing historical; if the pen claimed as original is liable, at the seduction of vanity, to become mendacious. Where is the advantage of securing an eye-witness, if, when you have him, he does not tell you the truth? What ground of confidence can there be in an apostle who would tamper with the most sacred affections, and abuse his power of pathetic imagination, in the service of a boastful lie; who could look upon the self-sacrifice of Calvary with self-glorifying gaze; and either live in the house with Mary the life of mutual dissimulation, or, if she were gone, make a dishonest investment in her repute? Must we not say, that what our author's critical conservatism attempts to keep, his moral scepticism here throws away?

In the treatment of literary and historical questions, we look with distrust on all pretensions to divination; whether it be rationalistic, reducing everything to the "common and unclean"; or devout, exalting every thing into an intangible holiness. Refined and delicate indications, combined by the hand of a master-critic, may often no doubt lead to momentous conclusions which are not easily justified to untrained apprehensions: but under the mask of these rare cases it is easy for gratuitous conjecture and arbitrary assumption to obtain unmerited respect. As M. Renan can see the veins and feel the pulses of fiction beneath the surface, so can more evangelical critics discover the apostolic author by the mysterious sympathies of piety, and verify the narrative by its own self-light. The secrets of the past, the problems of history, are not amenable to this clairvoyance: and whoever appeals to it applies a subjective test to objective facts; which is to invert the Divine order of things, and set up himself and his wishes as the measure of God's transactions. No doubt it is a tender reverence, which clings to each long-consecrated scripture: but the piety which dominates evidence, and must have it so, is less noble than the piety which submits to it and lives with it as it is. When, in discussing such a question as the origin of the fourth gospel, a theologian becomes pathetic about "robbing the Christian of his treasure," and drops into commonplaces about "destructive criticism," we see at once, beneath that saintly perturbation, the inner heart of unbelief, the absence of repose upon realities, the secret purpose to remain within some nimbus of coloured dreams. Cleared vision can "rob" us of nothing, except as daylight "robs" the night of ghosts. "Criticism" can "destroy" nothing but illusions; the disappearance of which either restores the substituted truth, or at least leaves its place duly "swept and garnished" for its return. Criticism can "construct" nothing but hypotheses; which are not divine facts, but mere human representations, and at best can only fill the chasms of

knowledge with ideal shadows of probability. The reproach of "negative," the boast of "positive" theology, are alike intrusions, under disguise, of personal desires on the very field consecrated to self-sacrifice. Nothing is "positive" or "negative" except in relation to *our pre-conceptions*, according as they are affirmed or contradicted: and to use such words as tests of merit and expressions of what "we need," is tacitly to stipulate with the nature of things to let our dreams alone. This is the very idol-worship and pride of intellect: and we have yet to learn our first lesson in the religion of thought till we feel that it is not ours to choose where the light shall fall or how much of it there shall be; still less to play tricks with it, and fling its images hither and thither with the mirrors and lenses of our own desires; but to watch it as the dawn, and let it steal in where it will, and show the solid forms of things, though it turn the dark hollow into a nest of beauty, and melt our visionary mountains into clouds.

In the absence of all historical sources (for the stories in Matthew and Luke, of the nativity and infancy, are plainly legendary), there can be no proper "Life of Jesus" beyond the brief period of his Ministry. That he was born in Nazareth about three years before our ill-computed era, that his parents' names were Joseph and Mary, and that he had brothers (James and Joses, Simon and Judas) and sisters, and that his father was a carpenter, is all that we really know.* Scanty, however, as the personal data are,

* That is, if we limit ourselves to the synoptics. M. Renan adds (p. 24) that Mary had a sister, *whose name was also Mary*; whose two *sons* bore the same names as are, perhaps erroneously, given to their cousins *James* and *Joses*, and, under the title of "*brothers of the Lord*," became "bishops of Jerusalem," the *real* brothers remaining unbelievers; and whose *husband* went by two unconnected names, Alphæus (*Halphaï*) and Cleopas (Κλεόπατρος). This tissue of confusion, whose "enormous difficulty" no hypothesis relieves, comes entirely of "harmonizing." Keep the fourth gospel apart, and the threads of relation remain clear. (1.) As to the *two sisters* with the *same name:* John alone mentions the *sisterhood* (xix. 25); the synop-

and impossible therefore as any proper biography is of the youthful Jesus, much may be said of the conditions, material and spiritual, surrounding his early years: and from these exterior circles, scrutinized with penetrating skill, and exhibited in vivid lines, M. Renan makes what approaches are possible to the irrecoverable life within. The aspect of nature that looked down upon the infant Christ, the simple social life of a Galilean village, the Oriental training, less by book than by oral wisdom and human intercourse, the lessons of the synagogue, of the festivals, of local tradition, of national faith, are all presented to us in a series of pictures as fascinating as they are faithful. The author's familiarity with the whole theatre of

tists alone identify *the names* (Matt. xiii. 55. xxvii. 56; Luke i. 27. xxiv. 10): for it is remarkable that the fourth evangelist never gives the name of "the mother of Jesus," and doubtless thought of it as something other than *Mary*, which he applies to her sister (ii. 3. 5. 12; vi. 42). With him the two women had different names: with the synoptics, they were not sisters: and so the incompatible phenomena never meet. (2.) As to the *namesake brothers* in the two families: John, who makes them cousins, never gives their names: the synoptists, who give the names (Matt. xiii. 55. xxvii. 56; Mark xv. 40; Luke xxiv. 10), do not make them cousins. (3.) As to *the two names* for *the same man:* it is only in the fourth gospel (xix. 25) that he is called *Cleopas:* it is only in the synoptics (Matt. x. 3; Mark iii. 18; Luke vi. 15; Acts i. 13) that he is called *Alphæus*. The person named Cleopas in Luke xxiv. 18, the evangelist cannot have identified with the father, whom he always calls Alphæus, of the Apostle James mentioned just before (xxiv. 10). In these cases,—and they are only a sample,—either account may be taken, but not both, without outraging probability. In choosing between them, shall we say, then, that the fourth gospel may have been written by the Apostle John, to *correct and complete* the others, and so deserves preference in case of variance? If so, why did he, with whom the mother of Jesus lived, not tell us her real name, instead of merely remarking that it was her sister who was called Mary? and also the real names of her sons, if, as M. Renan supposes, Matthew, confounding them with the cousins, had given them wrong? A gospel which on these points, specially known to the Apostle, creates instead of clearing confusion, can never have come from his correcting hand.

the history gives a special value to such a sketch as the following:

Nazareth was a small town, situated in an elbow of country opening wide to the top of the mountain-group which bounds the plain of Esdraelon on the North. At present its population, which may well have remained without great variation, is from three to four thousand. The cold of its winter is keen, and the climate very healthy. Like all the Jewish villages of that time, the town was an aggregate of cottages without physiognomy, and must have presented the dry and poor aspect belonging to the villages in Semitic countries. The houses, it seems, differed little from those cubes of stone, without pretensions to elegance within or without, which, in our day, cover the richest parts of Lebanon, and which, amid vines and fig-trees, are still very agreeable. The neighbourhood too is delightful, and no spot in the world was ever so made for dreams of absolute good. Even in our days, Nazareth is a delicious retreat,—the only place perhaps in Palestine where one feels a little relief of soul from the oppressive burden of an unparalleled desolation. The people are kindly and cheerful; the gardens are fresh and green. Antoninus Martyr, at the end of the sixth century, draws an enchanting picture of the fertility of the neighbourhood, comparing it to Paradise; and there are valleys on the western side which fully bear out his description. The fountain, which once collected round it the life and brightness of the little town, is destroyed; its cracked channels yield now nothing but turbid water. But the beauty of the women who gather there in the evening,—a beauty noticed as early as the sixth century, and regarded as a gift of the Virgin Mary,—is strikingly preserved; it is the Syrian type, with all its languishing grace. Mary doubtless was there almost every day, and took her place, pitcher on shoulder, in the line with her forgotten companions. Antoninus Martyr observes, that the Jewish women, elsewhere disdainful to Christians, are here full of graciousness. And, to the present day, religious animosities have less life at Nazareth than elsewhere.

Contracted as the horizon of the town itself is, a short climb brings you to a plateau swept by a perpetual breeze, and looking down on the highest of the houses; and thence the perspective is splendid. On the west the fine lines of Carmel open

out, abruptly terminating with a point that seems to plunge into the sea. Next appear the double summit above Mageddo; the mountains of the Sichem region, with their holy places of the patriarchal age, the Gilboa hills, the picturesque little group associated with the sweet or awful memories of Shunem and of Endor; Tabor, with its fair form swelling like a bosom, as the ancients said. A depression between the Shunem hill and Tabor opens a glimpse of the Jordan valley and the high plains of Peræa, which form a continuous line on the East. On the North, the Safed hills, trending to the sea, intercept the view of Acre, but leave to the eye the outline of the bay of Khaïfa. Such was the horizon that lay around Jesus, the enchanted circle, cradle of the kingdom of God, that for some years stood to him for the world. Nor did his life ever take him far from the bounds familiar to his childhood. For yonder, Northwards, a glimpse is caught, almost on the flank of Hermon, of Cæsarea Philippi, his furthest point of advance into the Gentile world; and here, Southwards, the more sombre aspect of these Samaritan hills foreshadows the dreariness of Judæa beyond, parched as by a scorching wind of desolation and death.

Should the world, grown wiser in its reverence for the germs of sacred things, yet Christian still, ever want authentic "holy places" instead of the mean and apocryphal sanctuaries consecrated by rude ages, it will build its temple on this height of Nazareth. There, on the spot where Christianity arose and in the focus of the Founder's agency, should the great church be raised in which all Christians might pray. There too, on the soil where Joseph the carpenter sleeps and thousands of forgotten Nazarenes who never looked beyond the horizon of their valley, would be a better station than any in the world beside for the philosopher to contemplate the course of human affairs, to find solace for their contingency, to gain assurance of the divine end which the world pursues through countless falterings and in spite of the universal vanity" (pp. 25–29).

On Joseph's death, while Jesus was still a youth, Mary removed, our author supposes, from Nazareth to Cana, her original home: and there we are to think of the young prophet as maturing into manly life, as exercising his father's trade, and as making the first tentatives in his

religious career. This conjectural history is doubtless suggested, though in no way necessitated, by John's "first miracle" at Cana. Without stopping to criticize it, we advance to the more solid ground of the proper ministry of Jesus. His whole public life is reckoned, according to the Johannine scheme, to extend over three years (p. 270, note) closing with the passover of A.D. 33. But our author seems hardly to have made his measurement very exactly: for he takes Jesus, already surrounded by disciples and in the exercise of his ministry, to the passover at Jerusalem in the year A.D. 29 (p. 206, note): and establishes him yet earlier, apparently by several months, in formal relations with the Baptist on the Jordan (p. 105); to which still a Galilean prelude is prefixed, sufficiently prolonged to form a body of disciples who accompany him to Judæa (pp. 77–90. 104). The chronology is thus extended (without, apparently, the author being aware of it) to between four and five years. This whole period divides itself, in M. Renan's view, into two grand stages, separated rather by a moral than an external division, yet furnishing a distinct pause in the natural development of the drama. The first is the season of growing conceptions and deepening fervour in Jesus, during which not only his piety set into its characteristic forms, but his ideas of his own mission passed out of their indeterminate state and took possession of phrases unalterable and definite. It brings us to the spring of the year A.D. 31. The second, extending thence to the end, adds no new ideal element, but is occupied with the struggle to realize his inner thought in the outer world, and gain for it the victory to which sooner or later it was appointed. During the first stage, John the Baptist exercised a dominant influence, and, if not himself the most conspicuous figure, regulated the movements of his greater successor. In the year A.D. 28 his reputation as a second Elijah, on whose rugged model he had formed himself, had spread through Palestine; and stirring the heart of Jesus, who had already become the centre of a school,

induced him to change the scene of action, and settle, with his disciples, in the immediate vicinity of the prophet of Judæa. There, accordingly, on the banks of the lower Jordan, the two schools exercised their functions side by side during the first half of the year A.D. 29; except that in the spring we find the Galileans visiting Jerusalem for the Passover.* They returned, however, and continued to baptize like John, till, during the absence of Jesus for fast and prayer in the desert, the Baptist was arrested and imprisoned in the Midsummer of A.D. 29. Informed of this on issuing from his retreat, Jesus breaks up from Judæa, and, adopting Capernaum as his centre, devotes himself to Galilee for the next twenty months or so; vainly trying to win his native town; preaching in the village synagogues; reporting his progress to the doubting messengers of John; and only retiring for an interval to a desert place on the news of the Baptist's execution in the year A.D. 30. This again, like the imprisonment before, is the signal for fresh and bolder speech, and upon a more conspicuous theatre. At the passover of the year A.D. 31, he makes his most important visit to Jerusalem; dissipates there all his illusions of reverence for the reputed sanctities of priest and temple; and with a settled antipathy to the whole type of metropolitan religion, closes the first stage of his career, and retreats for relief into his native province. Thus far then his public life includes two periods of action in Galilee, alternating with two in Judæa: the transitions, except the last, having their cause in the history of John the Baptist.

Quitting Jerusalem in the spring of A.D. 31, repelled by its pretentious and hollow life, and not without presentiment of its fatal enmity, he throws himself for eighteen months into a bolder and more excited ministry in Galilee; declaring open war against Pharisaism and the Law; hinting at his own probable death, but also at his speedy and glorious return; not declining the Messianic titles or

* John ii. 13.

the repute of miracles increasingly thrust upon him; and organizing his chief disciples into a college to multiply the voices of his message and the ramifications of his influence. In the autumn of the year A.D. 32 he leaves his native hills to return to them no more, sending his disciples before him to the Feast of Tabernacles at Jerusalem, and following alone, to evade the snares laid for him by hostile members of his family. Several months were passed in the capital, till after the Feast of Dedication towards the end of December; his usual place of resort being Solomon's Porch, where the incidents of the hour alternately entangled him in controversy and drew forth lessons of divine wisdom. One interval still parted him from the last act, and Jerusalem from its supreme crime. In January A.D. 33, he spent a few weeks in Peræa and near the Jordan, not without a last returning glow of public enthusiasm and personal ascendency. The miracles of Galilee were renewed; and the reception by Zacchæus at Jericho was but an example of the spirit he everywhere met. In February he is recalled to Bethany by the illness of Lazarus; who, really convalescent before the arrival of Jesus, conspires with his sisters to get up a sham resurrection, and consenting to be shut up in the sepulchral cave, duly acts the part of resuscitated corpse. Jesus, more than half imposed upon, acquiesces in the dangerous repute of the miracle, and becomes at once the object of warring passions from the neighbouring city; revered by the multitude, dreaded by the aristocracy of the Temple. As early as the beginning of March his death was resolved on. A short retirement to Ephraim does but keep the storm suspended, he is aware, over the approaching Passover. On returning by the northern road he announces his near death: the congenial home at Bethany, the devotion of Mary, even the triumphal entry into Jerusalem, cannot deceive him: the sadness never deserts his tone again; though the incidents of those closing days,—the betrayal,—the seizure, the trial, the cross,—assail in vain his lofty serenity and trust. His

body was hastily interred in a provisional tomb, and left over the Sabbath. Next morning it was found to be absent; and, probably on an impulse given by the excitable and visionary Mary Magdalen, the story obtained currency that he was risen from the dead.

This second stage of the public life thus consists of a final eighteen months in Galilee, followed by a closing half-year in and near Judæa, and chiefly in Jerusalem.

Without exhibiting M. Renan's ground-plan of the great drama, it would be impossible to explain adequately his theory of the character of Jesus. But as it is chiefly in subordination to this ulterior point of higher interest that we have sketched the outline of his narrative, we shall not pause to examine it in detail, but shall venture one or two remarks on the distribution of its larger masses and the handling of its main difficulties.

Preferring as we do the simplicity of the synoptic narrative, we find our author's protracted chronology difficult to fill; we feel ourselves tossed about in an objectless way between two scenes of action, Galilee and Judæa; we miss any progressive sequence in the drama; the development of which, amid the fermentation of Jewish enthusiasm and the heats of oriental passion, was less likely to hang back season after season than to hasten to its end. Matthew's story in two acts, of the provincial prophet winning the villages of his country for the kingdom of heaven, and then perishing at Jerusalem, has a naturalness in it which looks much more like history than the rambling intricacies of our author's scheme. Most of these, but not all, arise from his embarrassing pledge to the fourth gospel. His account of the earliest relations between Jesus and John the Baptist does equal violence to all the records, and substitutes for them a purely imaginary picture. One of the few points on which the Johannine and the synoptical recitals concur is this, that when Jesus was drawn to the scene of baptism on the banks of Jordan, he went alone and undistinguished; that that visit was the means

of first indicating him as marked out for a divine function; that the two signs of his selection were the testimony of the Baptist and the descent of the Spirit in visible or audible form; and that not till after this inauguration was any disciple called or any beginning made of his works or words of power. The whole scene stands forward as the appropriate prelude to his public life: and the prophet's instant recognition of him as his superior is given as a supernatural foresight of an unsuspected vocation. Strip the narratives of this idea, and their meaning is entirely lost. But, according to M. Renan, Jesus goes to the Jordan already surrounded by his school; he has for some time been teaching and gathering disciples in Galilee; and the Baptist's "good reception" of him is due to a reputation established and the fellow-feeling of a kindred work. It is a welcome extorted not by the future, but by the past. And then the two "schools,"—both of them constituted at a distance from each other before they meet,—sit down together as neighbours for many months, without apparent distinction of message or usage, and, in spite of some mutual jealousies among the followers, kept in good relations by the deference of Jesus to the superiority of John (p. 107). What now is the inducement thus to turn the history upside down? Simply this. The fourth gospel brings Jesus and the Baptist together *twice;* first (i. 10–34) like the synoptics, prior to earliest rudiments of Christian action; then (iii. 23–30) after the passover of A.D. 29, and shortly before the prophet's imprisonment, when the ministry of Christ was in full operation and his followers around him. By throwing away the first of these, and introducing the Baptist to the Christians with the second (though it refers back to the first and builds entirely upon it), our author obtains the extraordinary results we have described. The passage which he retains is one of the most questionable specialities of the fourth gospel; that which he rejects is not only a modified version of the tradition sustained by the synoptics, but is a minute account of

day-by-day transactions, which, if really proceeding from the apostle, cannot be discredited without fatally impairing his historical authority. Had M. Renan, who calls Jesus "the imitator of John" (p. 107), represented him as receiving his first impulse from the rugged energy of the new Elias, and merely placed the greater spirit, in virtue of its ready susceptibility and its unfound depth, at disposal for awhile of the sterner and the less, we could understand the temptation to such inverse construction of the personal relations assumed in the gospels. So far, contact with the Baptist would remain the starting-point. But to interpolate the term of intercourse with him as an episode between two acts of an independent public ministry in Galilee, to make it the means of at once interrupting and deteriorating a sacred career already begun, turns it into an arbitrary arrest of natural development, in defiance of whatever evidence we have. The two missions, it seems to us, must be conceived as having some ground of separate operation. If they were not distinct in their idea, if both of them were alike announcements of an impending Messianic crisis, without indicating the personal agent in it, they must either have been successive in time or separate in place, the one taking up what the other dropped, or else dividing the work in different fields. Their co-existence for many months in the same district, with independent organizations and indistinguishable teaching, would leave the more recent of them without any adequate *raison d'être*.

Another feature of our author's biographical program occasions some natural disappointment. If there are any moments in the experience of the Galilean prophet which, as inevitably critical, we watch with intensest interest, they are those which present him to Jerusalem, and bring around him the representative persons and fermenting ideas of the nation. These times we expect to be fullest in incident, deepest in significance. Nor is there any want of room in them for the play of action and character. Some six months in A.D. 29 were spent, we are

told, at a spot on the Jordan whither the city population freely came, and whence the disciples accompanied their master to the first passover of his public life. Two years later, at the same annual festival, occurred his "most important sojourn" at Jerusalem. And the whole of the autumn and part of the winter of A.D. 32 were passed in the city. The last of these visits is partially filled in by transferring to it incidents which the synoptics refer to the crucifixion week. But the other two remain nearly blank; and the only details given, the "cleansing of the Temple," and the interview with Nicodemus, are transposed from the second to the first, where the fourth gospel places them. As these Jerusalem visits appear in that gospel alone, and as M. Renan can receive neither its miracles nor its discourses as historical, there is scarcely any thing left in occupation of them; and precisely the great crises of the drama, passed in very focus of trial, are little else than empty spaces of possibility. Once away in Galilee, we are again surrounded by the stir of life and the fulness of human detail.

In every way it would be far better, we think, to be, on critical grounds, independent of the fourth gospel, than to adopt it as a main-stay, yet cut it down to the slenderest proportions, and even transmute its very substance. Above all do we feel this in our author's treatment of the raising of Lazarus. Rather than refer the recital to the post-apostolic age, he refers it to an apostle who cannot have given it in good faith. Rather than dismiss it as unhistorical, he receives the history and blackens it; turning the pretended house of mourning into a chamber of plotters; the confidants of Jesus into his deceivers; his crowning miracle into a wretched trick, of which, having been at first the victim, he at last accepted the success. If the history cannot stand, let it be taken down, stone by stone; but to build it up again in this style is to substitute for the credulity of piety the credulity of cynicism. That a man, dwelling in the innermost circle of Christ's personal affec-

tions, should consent to be buried alive in order to force him into imposture and advance him by its fame; that the sisters who had tended his illness, and to whom his pale features were the memorials of breathless watching and of answered prayers, should contrive this clever mode of turning his sunk cheeks to good account; that the funeral rites, the lying notices to friends, the visits of condolence, and all the shameful mockery of woe, should be got up and got through without a slip in the hypocrisy; that the central figure, so simple and sublime, he who was so impatient of the appetite for miracle and had mercy for every thing but falsehood and pretence, should stoop, when his sorrows had been practised on, to whiten that unclean sepulchre and by connivance decorate the cheat; that when the fraud was plainly preparing the cross for him and threatening it to Lazarus, the secret should still have been kept, and have been finally handed down to history by an apostle nearest to the scene if not behind it;—involves, as it seems to us, a complication of improbabilities rarely united in a single hypothesis. We are far from desiring to test it by compelling the author to put the story unconditionally under one or other of the two categories,—"imposture" or "enthusiasm." We own the truth of those more subtle readings of human nature which modern interpreters apply to religious phenomena, and which allow for many intermediate shades between pure sincerity and calculating artifice. In minds capable of being absorbed at times in divine realities, yet descending again to the inevitable human level, there is a kind of double consciousness which too readily carries with it two ethical weights and measures; and may often blend strange contradictions of faith and doubt, of artlessness and scheming, of self-homage and self-surrender. Still, there are limits to the possible combinations of feeling and motive: there is such a thing, in the creations of the drama and the reproductions of history, as truth of character: and, refine as you will upon the varieties of our nature, laws of harmony

remain, by neglecting which you may cover your canvas with a monstrosity. Partly in reaction from the narrow logic of books of "Evidences," partly from a pantheistic tendency weakening the lines of human personality as well as of the Divine, modern critics of historical religion appear to us increasingly liable to lose the tact of psychological probability, and put the elements of humanity together *ad libitum*. The instance which we have just adduced from M. Renan's book is not, we think, its only example of this wildness of fancy.

We have to thank him however for at least a definite conception of the individuality of Jesus; and for the firm and sincere application of it as a key to the evangelical history throughout. The ecclesiastical theory of the person of Christ, making him the unique synthesis of two natures, is fatal to any living apprehension of him as he was: inasmuch as it lifts him out of every analogy, and, in the absence of all measures of verisimilitude, leaves us at the mercy of any impression delivered to us. How should we know what would agree with likelihood in such a being, and what would contradict it? Accordingly, the mixed products of successive and even opposite traditions are poured upon our ear from Scripture, without any consciousness of inconsistency, or any such desire to clear the image as we should feel in an undivine biography. The process of metaphysically glorifying a nature unsettles the outline of its moral type. The Christ of the fourth gospel is already pale and characterless. And three centuries were devoted to wrapping up his real history in fold after fold of dogma, and rendering him invisible except through a refracting atmosphere of ideas: and any one who sincerely tries, by removing these, to reproduce his actual figure, as he lived and thought, as he looked and spake, among the villagers who loved and the city-priests who hated him, brings an incipient health and truth to the sicklied imagination of Christendom. Without being able to accept the portrait on M. Renan's canvas, we own the force and grace with

which it is drawn, and the reverential feeling which has seldom failed to guide his hand. Evolving Christianity in its essence from the personality of its Founder, and only in its transitory form from the ideas afloat in the atmosphere of the times, he restores the just balance of causation which Strauss's theory had disturbed, and recalls the religion from the cloud-region of myth, to the homesteads and fields of human history.

Three stages are marked in the development of Jesus' character and views: we may call them,—the Ideal,—the Messianic,—the Passionate and Thaumaturgic. A deep and tender piety, fed by the solemn and winning aspects of nature around him, rendered thoughtful by the rich sentences of Hebrew wisdom, and humane in the school of domestic love, took early possession of him and moulded his whole belief, affections, and will. One simple formula condenses the essence of it all: God was a Father; not distant and hard to find; not even external, coming in vision or by word; but a Father within, communing with the pure in heart, and abiding with living, pitying, loving presence in our humanity. This characteristic faith, remote alike from the Jewish and Pagan type,—was indigenously his; not learned by tradition, not found by reasoning, but presenting itself as a clear consciousness of God, blending in one the light that shows and the vision that sees. He thus felt himself in direct relations of sonship to the Father, not specially his, but such as all men would find true. From this central faith flowed all his conceptions of the government of the world, the maxims of duty, and the spirit of human life. The universe was no mechanism of relentless Fate, nor even an empire of inscrutable Will, but the theatre of a moral drama, a home of domestic discipline, ruled with impartial love. In the face of this sublime affiliation, common to all, the distinctions of social life disappear, and no ranks have any reality except the gradations of inward similitude to God: the only rich is the poor in spirit: the only great, the servant of all: the

supremely wise are the pure in heart: and the sole hierarchy is hierarchy of graces. The same truth is the solvent of enmities, as it is of distinctions: your anger knows no what spirit it is of, and observes not the Eternal Father's ways: does not the sunshine sleep and the rain descend on the offender's fields as well as on your own? Reserve the severities for sins in which you cannot be deceived,—your own; if hand or eye betray you into wrong, be as unsparing as you will. But leave a brother's guilt to Him who seeth in secret: and never shut the fountains of pity and forgiveness. Humility, self-denial, disinterestedness, may well be called the special Christian virtues: for they come spontaneously from the soul that lives filially with God, and are the fruits of faith that were most welcome to the eye of Christ himself. With a spirit thus tempered, he carried his affections behind the showy veil of life, and redressed the strong world's scorn by searching out the little and the weak: he loved the child, the poor that rested in their lot, the fallen that were in tears for their sin. His lessons moreover, even where they seemed to say what the wise and humane had said before, escaped the level of all ethical maxims, and rose into a diviner light and glow. Drawn from the contemplation of Infinite Perfection, they aspired thitherward again: hence their unspeakable poetic depth of tone; from his lips the rule of duty is a breathing of humility, a sigh of eternal hope, a vision of ineffable beauty. To find the Founder of the true kingdom of God, the kingdom of the gentle and lowly, we must go, says M. Renan, to

"the Jesus of these early days,—days chaste and without alloy,—when the voice of his Father resounded in his breast with purer tone. There were then some months, perhaps a year, when God truly had abode upon the earth. The voice of the young carpenter suddenly assumed an extraordinary sweetness. An infinite charm diffused itself from his presence; and those who had previously seen him no longer recognized him. As yet he was without disciples, and the group that pressed around

him was neither a sect nor a school; but already there is a common spirit discernible there, something gentle and penetrating. His winning character, with doubtless one of those charming figures at times presented by the Jewish race, threw around him a circle of fascination, which hardly any one, among those kindly and simple people, could escape. Paradise would have been actually brought to earth, only that the ideas of the young Teacher went far beyond that level of moderate goodness above which it has hitherto been impossible to raise mankind" (pp. 79–81).

And here is the nursery and the theatre of this pure life:

"Among the influences that formed this far less austere, less harshly monotheistic spirit, if I may venture to say so, was an aspect of nature truly delightful, which gave an idyllic character and charm to all the Galilean visions. The dreariest country in the world perhaps is the country near Jerusalem. Galilee, on the contrary, was very green, very shady, very bright, the true country of the Song of Songs and the lyrics of the poet 'after God's heart.' During the two months of March and April the ground is a dense mass of flowers, unmatched for freedom of colour. The animals are small, but charming in the extreme. Slender and sprightly turtle-doves, blue blackbirds so light as to perch upon a grass-blade without bending it, crested larks that come and almost put themselves under the traveller's feet, the little river-tortoise with its quick and gentle eye, storks with their grave and modest air,—laying aside all fear, allow the close approach of man, and seem to call him. In no country of the world do the mountain-lines dispose themselves with more harmony and stir the mind to higher thought. Jesus seems to have particularly loved them. On the mountains occurred the most important acts of his divine career: there it is that he was best inspired; there that he had secret converse with ancient prophets, and appeared to his disciples' eyes already transfigured" (pp. 64, 65).

During the time of his fresh enthusiasm, the Messianic visions of the Jewish apocalyptic literature,—the books of Daniel and Enoch especially,—slept in the background of his imagination; or threw forward only their ideal elements,

their images of pure worship, of compensated sorrow, of everlasting righteousness. But from the moment of contact with John the Baptist, an unfavourable change began. Into the kingdom announced to be so near it became necessary to look with distincter scrutiny: its blank outline must be filled: its chief figure must be determined. It could not coexist with tetrarchies and hierarchies and procuratorships as they were, and carried with it suggestions of political revolution. The Messianic circle of ideas drew more closely round Jesus: and though insurrectionary force was uncongenial to him,—though the heroism of Judas the Gaulonite came from the thought of "God is *King*," while now it was the truth of truths that "God is *Father*,"—yet somehow,—in ways that would declare themselves,—the kingdoms of this world would have to vanish and leave room for the divine age which would wait no more. On returning from the Jordan, this prejudicial influence of the sterner prophet on the gentler became evident. His preaching was more and more definitely about the "kingdom" to come; and its advance in force and decision was at the expense of breadth. He did not refuse the Messianic titles; speaking of himself as the "Son of Man," and suffering others to draw the inference contradicted by his birth and call him "Son of David." With deepening sympathies for the village people among whom he moved, and delight in the simple love they gave him, he met the frowns of the decorous classes with less reserved antipathy: he openly disregarded their outward usages of homage to religion in their daily meals and their periodic fasts: he took pleasure in breaking through their Sabbath rules: he let a strange mixture of people draw around him by the natural ties of inward trust and need, and paid no regard to "respectable" objections. In the body of more intimate disciples, whom he now organized into a fraternity, the majority were quite poor and untaught; and its aristocracy consisted of a customs' officer and a land-steward's wife. The native affinities of good and pious hearts, the immeasurable

superiority of Jesus, the resistless charm of his word and look, and his deep insight into character, held them to him as by a divine spell.

"It was in truth," says M. Renan, "childhood in its divine spontaneity, in its brilliant bursts of simple joy, that took possession of the earth. Moment by moment, they all believed that the kingdom so longed for was on the point of dawning. Each saw himself already on a throne beside the Master. They allotted the seats: they reckoned the days. This is what they called the 'Good News' (Gospel): the doctrine had no other name. An old word 'Paradise' which the Hebrew, in common with all the Oriental tongues, had borrowed from Persia, and which originally denoted the royal parks of the Achæmenidæ,—gave the sum of the universal dream:—a delightful garden prolonging for ever the charming life spent here below. How long did this intoxication last? We cannot tell. No one, while this magic vision ran on, measured time any more than we measure a dream. Time was stopped: a week was an age. But whether it filled years or months, so fair was the dream that humanity has lived on it ever since, and still our consolation is to gather its attenuated perfume. Never did so much joy lift the heart of man. Humanity for a moment, in this the most vigorous effort it has made to rise above its planet, forgot the leaden weight that holds it to the earth and the sorrows of life below. Happy he whose eyes were permitted to see this divine blossom open, and to partake, were it only for a day, this unexampled illusion! But happier still, would Jesus say, is he who, free of all illusion, can inwardly reproduce the celestial vision, and, without millennial dream, without imaginary paradise, without signs in the heaven, can, by the rectitude of his will and the poetry of his soul, create anew in his heart the true kingdom of God!" (pp. 192–194.)

Once having committed himself to the realization of these visions, Jesus could not for ever linger in his beloved Galilee. They pointed to the citadel of the nation's history; and thither he must carry them to win a further way. But Jerusalem, by its very look, stripped them of their joy: the temple-buildings, the priestly pomps, the Pharisaic sanctities,

had no charm for him: the keen malicious eye, the quibbling intellect, the professional contempt of the scribe, disturbed him. His disciples, derided for their patois and their rusticity, were uneasy and out of place; and his own spirit, alone lofty and simple amid the odious grimaces of conventional religion, could hardly move with freedom and effect. The chief influence of his visit (A.D. 31) was reflex upon himself: he renounced allegiance to the whole system that had crystallized itself into the Jerusalem he saw: and having vindicated the forgotten *idea* of the temple by whipping out the traffic from its courts, left his protest behind, and resought clearness and composure on the familiar beach and hills. Even they had come to be invested in a light less pure. He had claimed the Messianic character: he had let it mean more than he could always hope; he had broken with the Law, and, beyond the basin of the lake below him, he stood alone. A shadow was on his path. He had a baptism to be baptized with: and how was he straitened till it was accomplished!

The next stage took its commencement in this recoil from Jerusalem. Surrounded once more by those who trusted him, he was unable to retreat, and found courage to advance. What though the proud heirs of the kingdom would not make ready for its approach? It should be taken from them and given to others: for Gentiles and Samaritans too were God's children, and had often a truer heart of faith than Israel. What even though his way should lie through hands of violence and he might have to die? The pious dead too were to live again to share in the kingdom to come: and Messiah beyond the verge of death would be in the right place to lead the way for their return. And so, our author thinks, Jesus advanced to bolder self-assertion, and compensated incipient forebodings of the cross by predictions of return in glory. The higher titles of Messiah sounded with fuller sweetness in his ear: he more freely fell in with the demand for miracles, and bore with the uneasy exigencies and feverish half-faith which

they imply; sustained by the belief that through prayer and fasting such works were given to men. In his most exalted moments, however, there is not the slighest approach to those conceptions of Incarnation or equality with his Father in heaven, by which the exaggerations of a later time sought to glorify him: on the contrary, he distinctly repels such idea: he is simply and at the highest "Son of God,"—as all men may become in various degrees.* With the expectation of his own death and return came the assurance, solemnly announced, of the end of the world within

* The judgment of M. Renan on this point, being that, not of a theologian, but of an impartial scholar, who brings to the Scriptures all the knowledge that can clear and none of the prepossessions that can obscure their doctrinal meaning, is so important, that we quote it *in extenso:* "That Jesus never dreamt of giving himself out as an incarnation of God himself, is beyond all doubt. Such an idea was completely foreign to the Jewish mind: there is not a trace of it in the synoptic gospels: we find no indications of it except in some portions of John's gospel which cannot be regarded as reflecting the ideas of Jesus. At times Jesus even seems to take pains to repel such a doctrine. The imputation of making himself God or the equal of God, is treated, even in John's gospel, as a calumny of the Jews. In this last gospel, he declares himself less than his Father. Besides, he avows that there are things which God has not revealed to him. He deems himself more than ordinary man, but separated by an infinite distance from God. He is Son of God: but so are, or may become, all men in various degrees. All are every day to call God their Father: all, when risen from the dead, will be sons of God. In the Old Testament divine sonship was ascribed to beings whom no one ever affected to put on an equality with God. The word '*son*' in the Semitic languages, and in that of the New Testament, has the widest meanings. Besides, the idea of man which Jesus had is not that low idea which a cold deism has introduced. According to his poetical conception of nature, a single breath pervades the universe: the breath of man is that of God: God dwells in man, lives by man, in the same way that man dwells in God, lives by God. The transcendent idealism of Jesus never allowed him to have a very clear notion of his own personality. He is his Father; his Father is he. He lives in his disciples: he is every where with them: his disciples are one, as he and the Father are one. With him, the spirit is everything: the body, which makes the distinction of persons, is nothing" (pp. 242–244).

that generation : a marvellous belief, the disappointment of which the religion could never have survived, but for the imperishable spiritual elements mingled with its illusions and remaining as its essence. The more definitely Jesus became committed to these views, the more imperative was the necessity of action in advance : he sent out therefore bodies of disciples in all directions, empowered to speak and act in his name ; associating them as partners in his miraculous power, he evidenced the sincerity of his own feeling with regard to it : they were to be safe from the scorpion's sting and the poison cup ; and to carry healing to the sick as well as hope to the heavy-laden. It is impossible, M. Renan thinks, to relieve Jesus, at the expense of the Evangelists, from the weakness implied in the pretension to miracles ; but quite probable that it was the result of a genuine though not unfaltering illusion. Indications are not wanting of a certain uneasy consciousness on this matter, as if the answer of experience was liable to fall short of his full faith. His prayers and inward strife before the act, his frequent wish for privacy during it, his prohibition to report it afterwards, his inability amid the cold unbelief of Nazareth, his sharp rebuke of the desire for signs, are all natural, if the effects which, in his fixed idea, ought to arise were slower or less certain to appear than was good for the faith : while, on the other hand, the real influence, on the nervous disorders brought to him, of his soothing and authoritative presence, his look, his word, his touch, would afford sufficient confirmatory phenomena to sustain his inward persuasion. Still, the thaumaturgic character, like all the more definite Messianic pretensions, had its miseries for him : and the near escape of death looked welcome. He became excited and passionate, provoked by opposition, terrible in invective, advancing from defence into attack that left him no retreat : yet withal, on the first invitation from anything pure and simple, returning, only with sadder voice, to a tone of singular sweetness and repose. With an infinite delicacy of mind, catching

every shade of feeling, and drawing women and children towards him with unspeakable attraction, he united an unsparing harshness towards opponents: and it was inevitable that the irritation of the Pharisaic bourgeoisie, whom he abhorred as the very antithesis to his religion of the silent heart, should at length come to a head, and bring the catastrophe which his last visit to Jerusalem almost courted. For himself it was time to close a career no longer sustainable. Almost without fault of his, his conscience had lost its transparency: he had become committed to impossibilities: but in accepting the relief of martyrdom, he did not despair of his work: love for it and faith in it enabled him to rise above suffering and identify his darkest hour and his sublimest triumph.

It is impossible not to perceive in this sketch a gradual declension of character: the brilliant and dewy morning is overcast with noonday clouds; and the bursts of sunset light shoot through wild winds and threatening storm. The struggle of ideal faith to penetrate and mould the actual world involves, it is said, an inevitable descent: it can wield mankind only on condition of falling in with their illusions: and in deadly contest with them it has no effective force, but by clothing itself with the energy of their passions. Forced from his early dream of undefiled religion into the narrower conditions of the Messianic doctrine, Jesus fell into a false position; and as its necessities closed around him, was urged, by partial loss of inward clearness and simplicity, into a more feverish enthusiasm, solving by self-sacrifice a problem else inextricable. We venture to affirm that this theory has not been drawn from the history, but is a preconceived formula applied to it; and that no semblance of support can be given to it, except by transposing the evangelists' memorials to suit its exigencies, and forcing upon them a grouping which they will not bear. Left to their own natural voice, they attest, we believe, a moral order the very reverse; exhibiting, in the person of Jesus, an ascent from the higher levels of his inherited faith

to an ever loftier sense and wider view of the spiritual relation between man and God; and with this, an inward sincerity steadfast against increasing strain, and leading up at length to the last sacrifice.

How does M. Renan know that Jesus had his year of "idealism," and then exchanged it for Messianic visions? John the Baptist, we doubt not, is responsible for this fancy: he is the preacher of the "kingdom": from him the impulse passes to his successor: and as the contact between them does not stand at the beginning of our author's chronology, there is an antecedent stage to be provided for, which, being itself imaginary, is not unnaturally treated in this poetical way. To find materials in illustration of this earliest teaching, our author resorts to the Sermon on the Mount: he selects from it the Lord's Prayer and some of its purely ethical and spiritual sentences: he leaves behind him the verses which say anything Messianic of the "kingdom of heaven": and, possessed of his "ideal" anthology, he carries it backward past the Baptist, and prefixes it to what the gospels tell us of the ministry of Christ. The residuary elements of the Sermon, which have any tincture of the Jewish theocratic idea, he holds in reserve, as examples of the post-Baptist preaching. There is no pretence of any critical ground for this re-distribution of parts: it does not result from any discovery of the incidents to which the words of Christ, collected yet unarranged by Matthew, most naturally belong: and, in the case of the Lord's Prayer, which it transposes to a time prior to the gathering of any regular disciples and to any contact with the Baptist, it doubly contradicts the statement of Luke (xi. 2), that the prayer was given *at the disciples' request*, on the ground that *John also had taught his disciples to pray*. In fact, this ideal period on the threshold of public life is simply an artist's fiction: and, once set up, it draws to it at will whatever is congenial. Historical truth however resists this appropriation, and claims its stolen treasures again for their own place. The very saying which appears as the

motto on the brow of this young time, "The kingdom of God is *within* you," belongs to the life's last chapter, not the first. And when, to adorn and consecrate this shrine of his fancy, our author has laid his hands on all that seems available, what he leaves witnesses against him scarcely less than what he takes. The very deepest words of Christ, the lessons and images held in everlasting remembrance, the parables that never tire,—the Good Samaritan, the Returning Prodigal, the Pharisee and Publican,—the incidents of divinest meaning,—the Rich Youth, the passionate Penitent, the blessing on the Child, the Widow's mite,—are scattered over his later ministry, and even grow in number to the close.

As the ideal essence of Christ's life cannot be exhaled and condensed into the first stage, so neither can the passionate elements be thrown preponderantly into the last. M. Renan's evidence of an increasing exaltation, enthusiasm, and harshness towards the end is gained only at the expense of chronology. The passages cited in support of the idea (ch. xix.) are almost all drawn from the address to the Twelve in Matt. x.: they are picked out from the midst of others already adduced in proof of just the opposite mood: and they belong to a time prior to the Baptist's death, and to the day of parables (Matt. xiii.). The demeanour of Jesus in his last days seems to us quite at variance with the phenomena of excitement and eager rush to the release of death. The ensnaring questions brought to him in the temple day by day are met with collected thought and quiet feeling: nor can our author himself, in reciting the answer about the tribute-money, refrain from exclaiming,—"Deep words; decisive of the future of Christianity! Words of marvellous justice and perfected spirituality, which have established the separation of spiritual and temporal, and laid the foundation of true liberality and true civilization!" (p. 348.) The only apparent exception to the serene temper of that time is the invective against the Pharisees (Matt. xxiii.): which however does not arise

as an expression of personal irritation against opposition, but as the recoil of a guileless and tender spirit from the type of character most odious to it and most blighting to the public conscience. The discourse, moreover, transferred in great part by Luke (xi. 37) to a much earlier occasion, is of doubtful chronology; and has probably been intensified not a little by the sympathetic anger of the reporters. Of the examples usually cited to support the charge against Jesus of harshness and self-assertion,—the reply to his mother at Cana (John ii. 4),—the repulse of an application from his mother and brethren (Matt. xii. 48),—the cleansing of the temple (Matt. xxi, 12; John ii. 14);*

* For this incident, however, M. Renan chooses an original position. The fourth evangelist places it at the beginning of Christ's ministry (Passover of A.D. 29); the others at the end (the last Passover): our author assigns it to the middle (Passover of A.D. 31). In his account of that second visit to Jerusalem, he omits the only incident,—the Bethesda cure,—by which the evangelist marks it (John v. 2); and supplies its place by transferring from the first passover its two characteristics,—the cleansing of the temple, and the visit of Nicodemus. We readily concede that so high-handed an act of authority as the expulsion of the traders from the temple-court is unsuitable to the opening days of the public life of Jesus; but what fault is to be found with the choice given us by the synoptics,—of placing it at the end, when the breach with Jerusalem and the heart-weariness with its insincerities, were complete,—we cannot understand. Again: in John this incident is immediately followed by the remarkable saying, "Destroy this temple made with hands, and in three days I will raise up another made without hands" (ii. 19: comp. Mark xiv. 58). The synoptics do not append this saying, which comes in only at second-hand, as part of the testimony against Christ at his trial, and is called "*false*" evidence. If the saying was uttered, it self-evidently belongs to the cleansing of the temple, as John has it; it is plainly an expression of sublime impatience with the material sanctuary and all the hollow pretences which it sheltered, and of longing to deal,—apart from such hindrance,—with the naked human heart, which, in almost no time, would at the appeal of Christ become a purer shrine. • "Away with your manufactured symbol, that stands instead of the love of God: and soon enough I could show you a holier place of prayer, emerging from the spirit." Not perceiving this meaning, which connects the saying with the cleansing of the temple, M. Renan divorces the two, and assigns the

—there is not one that, according to our author himself, did not occur in earlier stages of his ministry. Nor is there anything to justify the statement that he acquiesced more and more in the claims upon him as a thaumaturgist. No part of his ministry is less marked by miracle than the last: no part is more full of it than the first. True, there is in the Johannine gospel a certain progression of supernatural acts, not in their frequency, but in their magnitude: and with our author's view of the raising of Lazarus,—which constitutes their climax,—he may well treat the ingenuous Galilean days as gone. But this artificial construction should itself induce us to rely rather on the synoptical accounts, and to hazard no conclusion to which they refuse support. The difficulty of the miracles, whatever it be, is equally diffused over the whole history; and encounters us in full force at the feast of Cana and the synagogue of Capernaum, no less than at the grave of Lazarus. We wonder that M. Renan has not made more use of his own just remark (p. 294) that, in the early memorials of Christianity, we find the thaumaturgic pretensions grow, as the time-distance increases from the person of Christ. This surely indicates that with him they were at their minimum; and that the responsibility for them rests much more with the reporters of the second age than with the Agent in the first.

The time and sense in which Jesus assumed the Messianic character, and propagated the Messianic ideas, are so difficult to determine that the problem might be deemed hopeless, but for a few streaks of light detected within it by the refined instruments of modern criticism. To suppose, with M. Renan, that his mind was first turned in this direction by John the Baptist, and reduced from a lofty spirituality into the narrow channels of theocratic

words to Christ's last days. The enigmatical expression and the depth of the sentiment caused the fourth evangelist to misunderstand, and the rest to disbelieve, the saying. It affords us a glimpse of the things they could not tell us.

zeal, seems to us quite arbitrary. That the burden of their preaching was the same,—"the kingdom of God is at hand,"—indicates, not any imitation of the one by the other, but simply the one great thought of the time, that was in the very air. The phrases flung from the incisive voice of the ascetic on the Jordan were repeated from gentler lips in Galilee, because there was but one message to be delivered: and had there been a thousand prophets in the villages of Israel, they must all have been as a chorus with a common song. The monotheistic faith which had emerged into singular purity from ages of eventful strife, and which had gathered from its heroic traditions and its prophetic guides the sublime assurance of a Providence in history, turned all the religion of that generation into a theocratic vision: the heathen ages approached their term: the world was ripe for judgment; and would soon be cleared for the reign of Everlasting Righteousness. So possessed had the national mind become with this conception, that its images were everywhere: they peered through words of Scripture that were quite innocent of them: if they were not *in* the lines of prophets, they were found *between* them: they had created a literature for themselves,—sheltered by the names of Daniel, Enoch, Ezra: they had coined a language for themselves, and given it universal currency,—"waiting for redemption," "looking for the consolation of Israel,"—"the kingdom of God,"—"the son of Man,"—"the son of David," "the last days," "the end of the ages," "the day of wrath," "the days of refreshing," "the regeneration." Into this mould all the piety of the place and time inevitably flowed: it gave a channel now to the molten fire of some scorching fanaticism, and now to the sweet waters of a fertilizing inspiration. That Judas the Gaulonite, that John the Baptist, that Jesus of Nazareth, shared this common element, however differently they used it, cannot be doubted. If Satan had sent an emissary of temptation, if God had sent a messenger of redemption, without it,

both alike would have been without a medium of approach to the souls they would reach, and would have returned to their place frustrated. Jesus then had nothing to learn, still less to unlearn, from the Baptist, on this head : it was because that stern voice echoed his own thought that he went to Jordan : it was because he too would publish the same tidings that he preached in Galilee. The difference alleged between them, viz., that from the first the one disclaimed, while the other claimed, the place of personal Messiah,—is probably the after-creation of disciples interpreting by events. If it was the distinction of Peter to have first breathed the truth of what Jesus was ; if this confession was reserved, as the records tell, till the last journey to Jerusalem ; if, still, the startling statement was to be held as a secret and "told to no man" ; he cannot possibly have appeared all along clothed with Messianic pretentions. Could we indeed remove altogether the retrospective haze of interpretation with which the formed doctrine of the compiling evangelists has enveloped the history, could we see and hear the great realities as they arose, it may be reasonably doubted, whether we should ever find Jesus directly identifying himself with the Messiah whom he preached ; and should not rather see that his definite investiture with that character was the later work of disciples to whom he was "declared to be the Son of God by his resurrection from the dead." From the first, he preached the Messianic kingdom as near : to the last it is doubtful whether he gave himself out as Messiah. We can find no date when he began the former topic ; nor any when he passed, with intenser self-assertion, into the latter.

Even if we could feel sure of having in the synoptical gospels the unaltered language of Christ, we should still be unable to speak confidently of his state of mind, unless we could determine the precise import of the phrase "Son of Man." It is commonly assumed that, like the other

titles, "Son of God" and "Son of David," this term,—occurring some fourscore times and always on the lips of Jesus,—is tantamount to "the Messiah," and uniformly employed with reference to the Book of Daniel and in the sense which interpreters had put upon it there. If so however, the three titles would be interchangeable, and could be resorted to indifferently. Yet "Son of Man" is the only one which Jesus himself uses: "Son of David" is given him only by others, the blind by the wayside, the children that cry 'Hosanna'; it is evidently the *popular* designation: "Son of God" is applied to him by unearthly beings, and seems to be characteristic of *superhuman testimony;* being used (1) by the Spirit at his baptism, (2) by the Devil in the Temptation (Matt. iv. 3), (3) by the evil spirits in the demoniacs, who "knew him" (Matt. viii. 29), (4) by Peter in his "confession" (Matt. xvi. 16), who is expressly said to have been led to it by revelation. This rule indeed is not absolute; for the phrase bursts from the disciples after the walking on the sea (Matt. xiv. 33): but on the whole it is evident (1) from Peter's confession that this term alone is the full equivalent for "the Christ," (2) from the other instances, that to discern Jesus in this character was a matter of superhuman, secret, or exceptional knowledge. The abstinence then of Jesus from the use of this term requires to be explained. It looks very like an *avoidance* of that unhesitating claim of Messiahship which M. Renan attributes to him.

The term "Son of Man" evidently falls short in some way of the Messianic meaning, and has a less limited application. M. Renan (pp. xi. 132) indeed says that we know perfectly from the book of Enoch that it was a mere synonym for the Messiah. But it so happens that the particular section of that work in which alone it occurs (viz., The Similitudes, ch. 37–71) is exposed to reasonable suspicion of being a Christian addition to the original production, as late as the closing decades of the first

century :* and by that time the phrase had certainly settled into its purely personal meaning. In the gospels themselves (written after the doctrine had set and possessed itself of the phraseology) the term is often,—in John always,—thus used. But there are instances which clearly escape from this rule, and betray a wider significance in the phrase, rescuing it from its restricted place among the titles of Messiah. When Jesus inquired of his disciples (Matt. xvi. 13), "Who do men say that the Son of Man is? and they said, Some, John the Baptist; some, Elias; and others, Jeremias, or one of the prophets"; and when further he asked, "But whom say ye that I am? and Simon Peter answered, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God"; it is evident, as Baur has well pointed out,† that the expression "Son of Man" cannot mean specifically "the Messiah," but is large enough to cover several alternative personalities; and that, in order to pick out from among these possible significates the Messiah in particular, Peter has to employ the phrase "Son of God." His daring to find, under the safe and unpretending designation which Jesus applied to himself, the Messianic-character which it did not put forth, constitutes the startling feature of his own confession. The peculiar humanistic sense of the phrase comes out clearly in several deep and pathetic passages, where Jesus at once takes and

* The date seems fixed at some point later than A.D. 79, by an allusion (ch. 67) to a volcanic mountain in the West, apparently Vesuvius, and the hot sulphur-springs at Baiæ. Vesuvius, it is well known, was not an active vent till the eruptions which destroyed Herculaneum, A.D. 79. See the whole case ably made out, though not without some overstraining, in Hilgenfeld's *Jüdische Apokalyptik*, 148 seqq. The use, in the same section of the book of Enoch, of the phrase "Son of the *woman*," to denote the Messiah savours strongly of Christian influence.

† See an excellent paper, "Die Bedeutung des Ausdrucks *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*," in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift* for 1860, pp. 274 seqq.; and compare Hilgenfeld's critique in the same *Zeitschrift*, 1863, pp. 327 seqq.

consecrates the common level of our life, with all its needs and affections: *e.g.*, "The foxes have holes, the birds of the air have nests; but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head" (Matt. viii. 20): "John came neither eating nor drinking, and they say, He hath a devil. The Son of Man came eating and drinking, and they say, Behold a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners" (Matt. ix. 18). The whole sentiment of such passages would be lost, were we to read "Messiah" for the "Son of Man." On the other hand, where announcement is made of the "coming of the Son of Man on the clouds of heaven," and "sitting on the throne of his glory," we have the expression in the mere Jewish or Messianic sense familiar to the disciples, and not in that which characterized it in the genuine speech of their master. The contrasts presented in this group of phrases were, at a latter time, artificially resolved by a dogmatic key. When the contemplation of the risen Christ had produced its counterpart in the idea of his preëxistence, and his life on earth was conceived as a disguise of heavenly glory, the opposite turns of meaning, by which even the same title appears now to claim and now to disclaim, were distributed between his two natures. To import such ideas into the synoptical gospels is to blot out the simple historical Christ, and over that grand figure to paint a stiff ecclesiastic form, with nimbus round the head and clouds beneath the feet, instead of the firm step of nature and the living light of our humanity.

Jesus, we conceive, took the designation "Son of Man" rather in avoidance than in assertion of Messianic claims; because it carried him furthest from the national expectations embodied in the term "Son of God." An indeterminate consciousness of his Divine call drew him with sympathy towards an indeterminate phrase; which echoed the innermost secret of his nature, and said for him how little his eye was drawn to any thing out of the plane of human life; how its tender lights of need and love and

sorrow, shed from the smallest and the darkest things, found in him the seats of unspeakable Pity, and made him desire only to be one with all he saw: and which yet, at the same time, by this very intimation of a distinctive humanism, gave him in some sense a representative character, and answered to his feeling that he was not his own, but called to be the organ of a higher will. An ordinary man would have no occasion to designate himself as human. But one who continually referred to supramundane things, who announced an approaching kingdom of heaven, might well wish, in speaking of one world, to keep his place in the other, and to let it be understood that,—whoever he was,—his work was here; and he was one with those whom he was sent to prepare. If he penetrated, through the obstructions of Rabbinical interpretation, to the true meaning of the vision in Daniel most associated with the phrase, he would see that, as its brute forms were but symbols of the great empires of the unregenerate world, so, when "*one like* the Son of Man" was substituted by the Ancient of days, that figure also stood (not for any person, but) for the *realm* of final Righteousness, and signalized its character by making it no longer *brutal*, but *human*. In this view, "the kingdom of God" was the reign of humanity: and he who proclaimed it fell in with its nature, by asking only to be Son of Man. It was the name too by which already the Divine word had addressed the ancient prophet:* and why should not the organ of a living inspiration rest in it as his own?

This name however, though recommended to the feeling of Jesus by such characteristics, has certainly another side. Its vagueness saves it from asserting, but also prevents it from excluding, the Messianic attributes. Whether, under cover of it, these were held in reserve; or whether, without being at all intended at first, they were afterwards developed from it in the mind of Jesus himself, so that he became the Messiah whom he preached, we do not think there are

* See Ezekiel ii. 1, 3, 6, 8, and passim.

reliable materials for deciding. Even where, according to the evangelists, he says things about "the Son of Man" in the obviously Messianic sense, it is by no means evident, that he is speaking of *himself:* the language is usually what it would be if the person were some one else. He does not say, "Ye shall see *me* coming on the clouds of heaven"; and the avoidance of the first person in such connexions is the more noticeable because it contrasts him with the disciples, who are described as asking him, "What is the sign of *thy* coming, and of the end of the world?" (Matt. xxiv. 3.) This distinction, we are aware, cannot be absolutely carried through: but that it survives at all, after the large accumulation of free composition round the historical nucleus of the gospels, is highly significant; and justifies the question, whether, after all, the Messiahship may not rather have been put upon Jesus, than claimed by him.

We are not however particularly anxious to relieve his life of this claim. In announcing the kingdom of God, he doubtless shared the Messianic illusions of his native land: and it is only part of the same phenomenon, if his profound personal consciousness of union with God expressed itself in terms of the same theory. Spiritual insight, though carried to the highest limit of inspiration, can only sanctify, not cancel or transform, the scenery of objects, the picture of the world and its history, the images of what has been and what is yet to come, by which the mind is environed. Moral perfection, within the bounds of our nature, has not to wait, till the universe is scientifically conceived: the tones of Conscience may be infallibly interpreted without knowing how long the world is to last: the true relation between the human and the Divine may be revealed, though the measures of space and time at the disposal of fancy are ever so inadequate. It is not with the objects thought, but with the ways of thinking, that the truth, the beauty, the goodness of the inner life have to do: and the essence, as of genius, so of religion, come whence it may, lies in subjective harmony and creativeness. The seat of original

power is ever in the unconscious background of the soul, in that which thinks and reveres and loves, and not in the elaborated things which, thus moved, we purposely construct: we spend ourselves on what we *do;* God, if any word of his issues from us at all, speaks through what we *are.* And so, while the whole Messianic drama that engaged the early Christianity, and more or less fixed the gaze of Jesus himself, has dispersed as a cloud-picture, a divine light, of which neither he nor others dreamt, has emanated from his person, and has toned anew all the colours and the shadows upon life ever since.

It was inevitable that contradictions should arise between the outer and the inner kingdom of God in Christ; between the exigencies of the Messianic theory and the promptings of a conscience under holiest inspiration. M. Renan thinks that he went with his published doctrine and compromised his private sincerity. Reversing this judgment, we maintain that the theory gave way, and the inward reverence disposed of his life to the last sacrifice. The people around him were for carrying out the doctrine and pushing on to the theocracy: he restrained and corrected them, not by refuting their assumptions, but by the intuitive recoil of higher affections from methods unworthy of him. The multitudes wanted "to make him a king": and he withdrew to the mountains to pray. His disciples were always taking care of his dignity and his repute: they drove the children away; he took them in his arms and blessed them: they were scandalized at the presence of a woman who was a sinner; he accepted her passionate homage, and put their officiousness to shame. His apostles had the orthodox susceptibilities towards Gentiles and Samaritans, who had nothing to do with "the kingdom": he loved to draw forth their faith, to commemorate their gratitude, to offer himself to their reception, and rebuked the fiery anger at their refusal. Drawn by the thirst of compassion and the trust in simplicity, he lived among social elements that could do nothing to realize any

Messianic dream. The moment he was brought by the theoretic program of "the kingdom," to a point at which popular favour might be turned to account, and the place of leader of the saints of God seemed to invite, an infallible purity of feeling rectified the traditional conception, and made him shrink from any but spiritual methods. The time came,—it is marked by the Transfiguration,—when persistency in this holy abstinence could plainly lead to but one result: the very moment of Peter's exulting confession is the moment of the Master's foreboding of Calvary: and Peter's instant expostulation shows how sharply the two feelings clash. The conflict of that crisis is little penetrable by us: must he disclaim the place which the apostle gave him?—that might be to betray his appointed part; *who* precisely he was in the Divine reckoning he could not tell; but that he was the organ of his Father, and had a witness to bear, he knew assuredly: out of that inner guidance he must live on: if it dissappointed apocalyptic visions, apocalyptic visions must step aside and wait: men should force nothing upon him: and if already in view there was "a decease which he must accomplish at Jerusalem," it would but associate him with Moses and Elias, immortal prophets who also were in reserve for the great day of the Lord. So far therefore as the Messianic idea affected him then, it affected him thus; that rather than realize it unfaithfully, he dismissed it to the other side of death, and would not suffer an imagination of God's outward Providence to disturb the clear tones of his inward Spirit. And so the Messianic theology, without formal cancelling, was from hour to hour neutralized and negatived by the pure ascendency of diviner light. And the *via dolorosa* was all the darker, that it had no ideal light of theory upon it, but was rather a passage right away from theory, into a night that was only not terrible because it was the hiding-place of God. That the great controversy and agony of Christ's spirit was essentially of this nature is suggested even at an earlier period than the transfiguration. Whatever

other meaning may be drawn from the remarkable scene called the Temptation, it plainly denotes the dismissal of seducing proposals from the Messianic side,—the rejection of all questionable means,—of ostentation or compromise, —for advancing the kingdom of heaven. That Satan of the wilderness, abashed before the pure eye of the Son of God, departed "for a season." Doubtless there were moments when he returned: he spoke again in Peter's word, "Be it far from thee, Lord: this shall not be unto thee." But the answer is ever the same, "Get thee behind me, Satan: thou savourest not the things that be of God, but those that be of men." And these are words plainly revealing the nature of the conflict in the soul of Jesus. They are not the words of one embracing death because it cut the knot of a hopeless entanglement, and ended the fever of a conscience no longer transparent: but of one to whom the path of sacrifice was the only heavenly road; who must decline deliverance by "self-assertion" not compelled by inward authority. The feeling which they express is not, that he has become committed to pretensions which at all hazards he must press into the advance: but just the opposite resolve, of abstinence, in the face of death, from every claim, even though it might be true, which would turn outside the "kingdom within," and make dependent upon "signs" the divine things he had to signify. It is needless to point out how that resolve was kept. The last period is full of a sad and tender inspiration. The reported miracles visibly abate. He parries questions about his "authority" without a self-assertive word. He speaks the pure truth of heaven, and applies it straight to men and things around, heedless whom it may provoke. He brings his unsullied "idealism" into the very throng of Solomon's porch, and abashes beneath his clear eye the priests' officers, if not the priests;—and falls at last through that sublime saying about the built and unbuilt temples, which expresses the imperishable essence of his religion.

Perhaps, after all, M. Renan's suspicion of a decline in

the character of Jesus from its first pure enthusiasm springs less from study of the history, than from a certain melancholy theory of his own, to which more than once he gives pathetic expression. "At bottom," he says, "every ideal is a eutopia." Rather would we say, "At bottom every ideal is an inspiration." He looks with sympathy indeed, but with poetic sadness, on the aspirations of devout and prophetic men after a more satisfying life and a more righteous world than ours; and regards them as unsubstantial fancies of the human mind. We know not why we should part with the natural trust that they are divine glimpses rather than human illusions, escaped rays from the higher light instead of dreams painted on the night; or cease to recognize, in the intuitive visions and untiring prayer of the supreme spirits of our race, the border-land of communion between the immortal thought and the mortal eye that scans it. Here surely, if any where, on the commanding summits and in the unclouded moments of prophetic minds, is the meeting-place of Man and God, where the real meaning of the world is seen, and the stream of tendency may be widely traced. And if it be so, then the so-called "idealist" is, in the end, the truest realist: for the essence of the universe,—the Eternal Will,—is on his side: he speaks to the most enduring affections: he touches the latent powers whose time it is to wake. Nor can we allow that "every ideal must lose something of its purity" in its aim at realization. On the contrary, we say, it is cleared and ennobled by its perpetual strife with resisting conditions; *suffering*, it may be, under limiting necessities and painful incompleteness, but in proportion as it is faithful, made perfect by suffering; glorifying reality without quenching itself. Did our author mean no more than that in actual execution something must always remain behind the original thought, he would truly enough describe the hindrances of a refractory world. But the application of his maxim gives it a more questionable meaning. It is his general formula for proving that

Jesus could not fail, unless he died in his early "idealism," to descend to a lower level of conscience; humouring, for instance, the popular demand for miracles, and otherwise tampering with veracity. He could not otherwise, it is said, have acted on mankind at all; and we have no right to find fault till we have done as much with our scruples as he with his imperfect sincerity. In this sense we must dispute both the fact and its maxim. Jesus, far from condescending to any moral compromise with the Messianic idea, declined its requirements, and became a sacrifice to his refusal; he could not stoop, but he could die. Instead of sinking deeper and deeper into the traditional illusion, he rose higher and higher above it. If, like a mirage inseparable from the atmosphere of his land, it still hovered before his eye, he followed it not, but step by step surrendered himself to the guidance of the Holiest within. As he thus advanced, it receded from him into the distance: it passed beyond the margin of this life; and so, flying before his personal perfection, began that retreat from the earth which left at last the spirituality of the gospel disengaged from the dreams of Judaism. As for his action on the world, he acted on *that* age precisely because he *sincerely* shared some of its transitory ideas; he has acted upon every other, because he was faithful to a divine light, lonely for the moment, but revealed in him for all time. Not humouring and connivance, but truth in every way,—truth with his age, truth with his God, truth with himself,—was the condition of his power, as indeed of all moral power. The managers of the world, hour by hour, must act by adaptation to lower minds; its saviour and inspirer, who lifts it into a new mood for ever, must be the pure organ of a Will higher than his own. He will never reach the seats of any fresh original reverence in others but by artless simplicity of faith and devotion; he is what he is because he just reports eternal things which he did not make and cannot alter: did he even think for a moment of trimming them to his will, he would sink from the prophet

to the charlatan. In *administering* an established system, resting on existing pieties, there may be fearful mixtures, as the history of every priesthood shows, of enthusiasm and artifice; but to extend such experience to religious *creation*, to suppose that the purest truth can flow from the courses of a turbid conscience, and the highest worship be raised from the wreck of a ruined "idealism," is to throw all ideas of moral causation into the dreariest confusion. This is to us the most painful feature of M. Renan's book. That he is Platonist in taste does not restrain him from cynicism in morals; his imagination lingers in the upper world of divine ideas, but his belief keeps its footing on the ground, and trusts no power but the mixed motives of an infirm and self-deceiving humanity. We venture to say that his *real* world lies in the wrong place for an historian of religion; the true causes of what he seeks he leaves behind in his dream-realm, and descends for them to a level where they are not to be found. His moral construction is, in consequence, deficient in compactness. He combines incompatible attributes in one person, and then apologizes by commonplaces about the contradictions of human nature. At one time he seems to attribute the marvellous success of Christianity to the fortunate errors and fanaticisms, perhaps even unscrupulousness, of its Founder: at another to the sublimity of his character and the imperishable truths at the heart of his religion. That ultimately he will rest, with less wavering, in the higher doctrine of moral dynamics, we cannot but hope when we read such a comment as the following on the words of Jesus to the woman of Samaria, "Woman, believe me, the hour is coming when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father"; "but the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth" (John iv. 21, 23):

"The day when he pronounced this word he was truly Son of God. He spoke for the first time the sure word on which the edifice of eternal religion shall rest. He founded

the pure worship, of no land, of no date, which all lofty souls will practise to the end of time. His religion that day was not only the religion good for humanity, it was Absolute Religion : and if other planets have inhabitants endowed with reason and morality, their religion can be no other than that which Jesus proclaimed at Jacob's well. Man has not been able to abide by it, for the ideal is tenable but for an instant. The word of Jesus has been a gleam in a dark night ; it has needed eighteen hundred years for the eyes of mankind (what do I say?—of an infinitely small part of mankind) to accustom themselves to it. But the gleam will become the full day ; and, after having run through the whole circle of errors, mankind will return to that word as the imperishable expression of its faith and its hopes" (pp. 234, 235).

IX.

WHEWELL'S MORALITY.*

I.

In his inaugural Address at the last meeting of the British Association, Sir John Herschel said :—

"The fact is every year becoming more broadly manifest, by the successful application of scientific principles to subjects that had hitherto been only empirically treated (of which agriculture may be taken as perhaps the most conspicuous instance), that the great work of Bacon was not the completion, but as he himself foresaw and foretold, only the commencement of his own philosophy; and that we are even yet only at the threshold of that palace of Truth which succeeding generations will range over as their own,—a world of scientific inquiry, in which not matter only and its properties, but the far more rich and complex relations of life and thought, of passion and motive, interest and action, will come to be regarded as its legitimate objects."

This distinct recognition of the moral sciences, by the representative of an association which refuses to notice their existence, is at once the sign and promise of an improved conception of Philosophy. Not that such a man as Sir John Herschel can ever have doubted the reality of

* "The Elements of Morality, including Polity." By William Whewell, D.D., Master of Trinity College, and Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. In two volumes. Parker, 1845.—*Prospective Review*, November, 1845.

natural laws, ruling among the phenomena of the human mind and life, just as among the objects of physical research. But so little progress has hitherto been made in ascertaining them, and so little positive inconvenience has been felt from our ignorance, that psychology has been put off with complimentary acknowledgments, or even narrowly escaped *ignoring* altogether: it has been allowed its title, but not its territory, in the domain of knowledge: it has been admitted among the sciences, possible or impossible, on condition of its making no pretension to anything actual, and has occupied a place on the intellectual map, not precisely like the Atlantis of Plato, but at least like the North-west passage, discoverable, perhaps, by adventurers who can find their way between a floor of ice and a roof of northern lights, but useless to men whose element is in the sunshine and the warm earth. A different feeling is now manifested, and is plainly demanded by the existing state of knowledge. In some of its departments, physical science,—becoming, in its progress to greater refinement, more and more dependent on the *language* in which its abstractions are conveyed,—has got entangled with its own phraseology and notation, and can advance no further till this is revised and its meaning analysed. The proposal of M. Comte to expunge the word *Cause* from the vocabulary of philosophy,—the increasing latitude given to the term *Law*,—the attempt of Dr. Whewell to impose new names on certain parts of the inductive process, have combined with other influences to draw attention to the grounds of human belief, and the procedure of the human understanding. This ill-explored region, condemned for its barrenness, contains, after all, the secret spot of polar attraction, to which the magnetic lines of science, wherever you examine its indications, are all found to point. And when one so capable as Sir John Herschel, of surveying and combining the results of almost every science, proclaims the *need* of a better logic and psychology, the announcement must be regarded as, in the natural

course of things, the herald of their advent. It were to be wished that some philosopher, of mind as calm, and range of view as large, as may be traced in the writings of this distinguished man, might undertake the task which he has indicated; and forever set at rest the doubt, whether the phenomena of human nature are too complex for reduction by our established methods of research. Hitherto the moral sciences have had no fair chance. They have fallen into the hands either of men like the phrenologist, accustomed only to physiological inquiry, and carrying it with them as their type of all philosophy; or of metaphysicians, untrained in habits of cautious induction, unused to the ways of nature in other fields, and intent on pushing some one favourite principle, by the infinitely fine insinuations of analysis, through all the intricacies of thought and will. Hence, we suppose, the offensive dogmatism and affected precision, often so disproportioned to the value of the results, by which works on mental and moral philosopohy are distinguished from the modesty apparent in the great models of physical research. The habit of system-building, so tempting to self-reflecting minds, is unfavourable to docility; and while great metaphysicians,—Hobbes, Spinoza, Des Cartes, Kant, Hegel, James Mill,—deliver themselves as if they were the legislators of nature,—great natural philosophers,—Kepler, Newton, Herschel, Dalton,—present themselves in the attitude of her pupils. On both sides there are doubtless exceptions; no reproach can lie against the noble names of Berkeley, Locke, and Hartley; and a living writer,* throughout a work which stands almost alone, certainly pre-eminent, among treatises on philosophical method, manifests a spirit worthy of the various masters of thought, whose excellences he unites and improves.

* J. S. Mill. "System of Logic." The quietness with which this book has been received affords no test of its destined influence. We believe there are not half a dozen persons in England capable of reviewing it.

The reputation of Dr. Whewell for energy of understanding and variety of attainment led us to his work on morals with no little eagerness of hope. We forgot for the moment the questionable symptoms presented in his former works. We forgot his republication of Mackintosh's Essay,—an essay so pleasant in its gossip, so slender in its philosophy. We remembered only his position as Professor at Cambridge, and his judgment as an admirer of Butler; and expected to find the hints of that great writer worked out at length into a consistent theory of human duty. The expectation has been disappointed; and that manifest chasm in our literature remains to be filled. The present work does not appear to be a true product of the philosophical spirit at all; but to be a premature result of an *aversion to the conclusions of Locke and Paley*,—an aversion more resembling a distaste than a conviction. Hence, to find a set of principles that might serve as prefixes to the opposite conclusions, seems to have been the author's problem. We are sure that neither he, nor any man in his senses, ever was convinced of a moral doctrine by the sort of process here called "rigorous reasoning." The assortment of confused definitions and misty abstractions at the beginning have the same sort of connection with the Church and State morals at the end, that the gourmand's "grace before meat" has with his dinner,—a decent preface to the turtle-soup and venison. It is painful to meet with men who are ashamed to state the real grounds on which their convictions rest, and must contrive some artificial logic "more rational than reason." They offer you the spectacles they did *not* use, and say nothing of the eyesight they *did*. In the present instance this propensity strikes us as particularly unfortunate. When Dr. Whewell forgets what is expected of him as a metaphysician, and writes out his unelaborated sentiments on the actual interests and pending questions of the world,—Slavery, Church Establishments, Public Education,—there is a vigour and directness in his treatment which, though

sometimes vehement and overbearing, is never inefficient. But in our estimation there is something inexpressibly ungainly in all his movements "on the *à priori* road." With constant exercise he makes no way; but after the boldest feats of verbal conjuring, in which energy of resolve is more remarkable than subtlety of execution, remains, so far as common eyes can measure, precisely where he was. Before proceeding to justify this general estimate by particular criticisms, we must say two or three things as to the proper mode of handling such subjects as are discussed in this book.

Morality is not a system of *truths*, but a system of *rules*. In other words, it is not a *science*, but an *art*. Every art is a method of accomplishing some *end;* the mechanical arts, some outward end of utility, as the building of a house, the weaving of a dress, the guidance of a ship; the fine arts, some inward end of feeling, consisting essentially, amid all accidental varieties of material and means, in satisfaction to the sense of beauty. It is plain that the end must be given, before the means can found; no method of doing can be laid down till we know what is to be done. There can be no art of tailoring for a man who never saw a coat; or of navigation for a people who never heard of the sea. To say then that the first requisite in a treatise on any art is a definition of its object is only to affirm that a problem must be *stated* in order to be *solved*.

A distinction may indeed be suggested, separating in this respect the useful from the fine arts. In the former, the end, as we have remarked, is some external product, which is necessarily fabricated according to a pattern or preconception. But in the latter, the end is internal and subjective; it is rather an unconscious *tendency* of the faculties, than an *aim* "*aforethought*" of the will. Creations of genius cannot,—it may be urged,—be "made to order," like the manufactures of industry: poetry spun by the line, painting worked off by the square

yard, would be unlikely to result in an Iliad or a transfiguration. A certain spontaneity, a working from within outwards, a pushing forth of some appetency for beauty into a growth definite at last, but indeterminate at first, is essential to our idea of perfection in imaginative productions. And if so, the artist fulfils his office best, when he does *not* realize to himself the finished task to which he tends; and in proportion as his skill is directed by a purpose and restrained by a model, he loses his proper character, and becomes the imitator and the journeyman.

Whatever truth there may be in this statement, it only proves that genius cannot work by rules, and that the precepts which may arise from the criticism of Taste are rather an incumbrance to it than a help. Still, whether these rules are useful or not, the person who frames them must know the end they are to serve; and they must be constructed with constant reference to that end. It may be impossible to reduce the processes of nature and instinct under the control of the will: if so, art cannot exist. But to whatever extent it becomes practicable to mark out a voluntary method, it becomes indispensable to define the object at which it aims.

It is further evident, that the rules of every art arise from the truths of some science or combination of sciences. Every end we can propose to ourselves is dependent upon a certain set of conditions, the observance of which is essential to its achievement. The materials we employ, the physical forces we command, the mental faculties we engage, have all their laws and limits; and in proportion to our knowledge of these will be the perfection of our rules of practice. Art without science is impossible: they necessarily advance *pari passu*: and though the man who invents practical methods may be unable to state the truths involved in them, he is really their discoverer, so far as they are yet known in relation to his particular art. Most of the mechanical crafts depend on several sciences; the æsthetic and moral arts, chiefly upon one. Navigation

borrows its rules from astronomy, hydrostatics, pneumatics, magnetism, optics, and other departments of physical knowledge. Sculpture, while it implies a secondary reference to the properties of the minerals it employs, mainly rests upon the laws of beauty, whose seat is in our perceptive nature. And education and government have a still more predominant correspondence with the single science of psychology. A man may be trained in the *practice* of these arts, without any connected regard to the *rationale* of his procedure. But an author who should write a treatise upon their methods, with total omission of the theory which justifies his precepts, foregoes the title of philosopher, to enlist himself among compilers of receipt-books.

In fact, the main difference between a treatise on science and a treatise on art is a difference of arrangement only. Truths and rules are found in both; but the former follows the order of the truths, annexing the rules as they happen to arise; the latter follows the order of the rules, referring each to the truths on which it depends.

In treating of systematic morality, there is not the least reason for abandoning these plain principles. An exposition of it which declines entering on the theory of morals, can have no value to the understanding, however monitory to the conscience. The first step required of the teacher is to lay down the definition of his subject; and as this, which is the beginning of his teaching, is the end and result of his learning and reflection, it implies a previous survey, and for its vindication, a previous discussion, of the whole contents of ethical philosophy. Before we can define æsthetics, we must know that the phenomena included under the name are all referable to the particular *feeling of beauty*, and follow its laws. Before we can define political economy, we must be aware that the *desire of wealth* is the sole producing cause of all the effects which it reviews; and that its business is to trace the influence of this desire on the production and partition of wealth. And

before we can define ethics, we must find the *special quality* in human nature on which moral phenomena depend. Whoever cannot name this has no more title to draw up a code of precepts, than the empiric to prescribe for diseases of whose organic seat he has no idea. And whoever can, has a theory as to the grounds of moral obligation and the origin of the moral sentiments, which gives a vital connection to his system, and saves it from being a mere congeries of arbitrary imperatives.

There would seem to be some extraordinary difficulty in naming the common characteristic of all moral phenomena, and separating the property or endowment of man to which they belong. That they are distinguished from *un*moral phenomena, by their *voluntary* nature, is indeed universally admitted. But there is no concurrence among philosophers as to the feature which distinguishes them from *im*moral phenomena. Their tendency to happiness, their conformity with order, their agreement with reason, have been severally made the basis of their definition. According as we adopt one or another of these, we take a different view of the capacity which renders us liable to obligation. Assume the first; and then to qualify us for moral action, we have only to be susceptible of happiness. Assume the second, we must have a perception of order; the third, and we must have rational thought. Which of these, or whether any one of them, is really the quality that puts us under a law of duty, can only be ascertained by a course of experiment such as every man of common sense employs, and such as Bacon,—the great analyser of common sense,—suggested, in order to detach, from a combination of agencies, the particular cause to which any set of effects is due. The experiments are not the less legitimate instruments of induction, because in this case they are necessarily experiments of inward reflection, not of outward observation. Among the various elements of human nature, put forth as claimants of its moral phenomena, we must imagine each in turn to be excluded from the mind,

and take notice whether it carries away with it the sentiments of right and wrong; and again, we must let in each in turn upon a nature empty of these sentiments, and observe whether they follow in its train.

Try by this test the moral claims of our *susceptibility to happiness*. Conceive this ingredient to be cancelled from our constitution. It is plain that none of the feelings which constitute *character* would remain. No act could longer be regarded with satisfaction or remorse,—pleasurable and painful emotion being shut out by the hypothesis. *Sensitive* indifference therefore comprehends and involves *ethical*.

Reverse the fancy. Into some unfeeling organism, some locomotive automaton, some Promethean clay, admit the sentient fire; and consider whether you thereby attain the characteristics of a responsible being. Manifestly you do not. The creature thus imagined would exist under similar conditions with the dog or the ape; possessing impulses, whose gratification gives enjoyment,—whose denial, uneasiness; capable of directing action towards the attainment of a desired end; susceptible even of discipline by hope and fear, yet remaining *unmoral* after all. Sensitive distinctions and the power of regulating activity by reference to them may therefore be present, in the absence of ethical differences. "Give us only," say the philosophers of the Hartley school, "give us only the capacity for pleasure and pain, and the law of association, and we will show you how the whole complex and noble man follows by necessary consequence." How strange and adventurous is this promise,—to account for whatever is special to man by causes which are common to the brutes!

If the "idea of order,"—which Jouffroy espouses as the ground of all moral phenomena,—is subjected to the same process, it falls under a like disqualification. It cannot indeed be banished without destruction to the sentiments of duty; for a good life must be a life according to rule. But it may be present without introducing any sense of

obligation. Order exists wherever there is a disposition of objects or events according to a uniform law, or with a view to a determinate end; and there are innumerable laws and ends entirely destitute of moral character. There is order in the habits of the beaver and the bee; in the flight of migratory birds; in the composition of a geometrical treatise; nay, in uniformity even of *wrong doing*. The "idea of order" secures a reference to *some* rule; but whether rule of the moral sort remains still to be decided by other conditions co-existent with it.

The same things may be said as to the claims of "reason" to be admitted as our lawgiver. Words of this kind may of course be so defined as to make them include all that we want to explain. But in that case they give us no information; instead of helping us to a true cause, they put us off with a bad phraseology. We are persuaded that there is in the human mind no conception, no attribute, out of the circle of the moral sentiments, which can be justly regarded as their source; that they are phenomena *sui generis*, separated from the appetites and affections, no less than from the processes of reasoning, by an interval which no known transformation of feelings can serve to bridge over. Yet analysis need not be pronounced, in this case, altogether at fault. We are not compelled to retire in discomfiture and cover our retreat with verbal pretences; summing up the very facts which we are investigating under the general phrase "moral sense," and then pleading the phrase as an explanation. While, on the one hand, we cannot attribute the feelings of right and wrong to mental powers concerned at the same time in producing very different effects, and are ready to maintain that there is a distinct provision in our nature for their production, we object, on the other, to the language in which this distinct provision is habitually described. It is represented by all the writers who acknowledge its reality, as a separate faculty, performing its function in a way analogous to the procedure of our other faculties; some,

after Butler, classing it with the *active* principles, making it monarch of the instincts, and assigning τὸ δίκαιον as its appropriate aim; others, with Shaftesbury, giving it a *perceptive* character, treating it as a supreme taste, and regarding τὸ καλὸν as its peculiar good; and not a few, like Price, comparing it with *intellectual intuition*, by which we have cognizance of good and evil, no less than of *number* or *possibility*, as absolute qualities of things, and discern τὸ ἀληθὲς as our proper end. If moral good were a quality resident in each action, as whiteness in snow, or sweetness in fruits; and if the moral faculty was our appointed instrument for detecting its presence; many consequences would ensue which are at variance with fact. The wide range of differences observable in the ethical judgments of men would not exist; and even if they did, could no more be reduced and modified by discussion, than constitutional differences of hearing or of vision. And as the quality of moral good either must or must not exist in every important operation of the will, we should discern its presence or absence separately in each; and even though we never had the conception of more than one insulated action, we should be able to pronounce upon its character. This however we have plainly no power to do. Every moral judgment is relative, and involves a comparison of two terms. When we praise what *has been* done, it is with the co-existent conception of something *else* that *might have been* done; and when we resolve on a course as right, it is to the exclusion of some other that is wrong. This fact, that every ethical decision is in truth a *preference*, an election of one act as higher than another, appears to us of fundamental importance in the analysis of the moral sentiments. It prevents our speaking of conscience as a *sense;* for sense discerns its objects singly, conscience only in pairs. It forbids us to identify it with reason; for reason has only a twofold division of things into true and false, without any degrees of comparison; while this power distributes its good and evil along an ascending scale, and

always thinks of a better and a worse. And it goes far towards sweeping away casuistical discussions, with all their mischievous subtleties; for they are raised on the assumption that every act which is not bad may be pronounced good. It is no slight benefit to be rid of the large portion of these "cases,"—the produce of jesuitry and the confessional,—which are not, as they are called, "cases of duty," but cases of speculative temptation, where a retaining fee is given to Satan, to say what he can for us in the court of conscience. The preferential character attaching to all moral judgments is implied, and yet, as it seems to us, very inaccurately represented, by Butler. It consists, in his view, of a uniform postponement of all sorts of natural good to one and the same moral good; and in the comparison from which we make our election, one of the terms is constant and invariable,—virtue rather than appetite,—virtue rather than resentment,—virtue rather than affection. In describing the constitution of our nature, he presents to us first of all, as springs of action, a system of "particular passions" and desires, such as the bodily appetencies, pity, anger, social affection, each pursuing an end appropriate to itself; and then, as a supplementary and crowning spring of action, conscience, having also its own separate end, namely, right voluntary dispositions and actions. The collection of ends embraced by the former constitutes *natural good*, of which each ingredient in its turn is equally eligible: so that thus far our nature is a

republic of equal principles. The single additional and of



own private and paramount end. We regret to say, that the forces that impel us to act are invariably to be found in the set of "particular desires," and that we never have succeeded in turning these out to clear the way for conscience; nay, the case is so bad with us, that when we have run over in fancy all the sorts of natural good appropriate to the appetites, the understanding, the imagination, the affections, we come to a stop, and can form no notion of an extrinsic lot of good, over and above these, under the name of moral good. Between virtue and a good dinner, or virtue and a full purse, we never experienced a rivalry; and were such a controversy and Hercules-choice to be proposed, we much fear, looking at the phantom-like character of the other disputant, that the dinner and the purse would win the day. But we remember a boy who once went on a day's excursion among the lakes and hills, provided with an excellent luncheon, calculated for a mountain appetite. He had gone an hour or two beyond his reasonable time, and just unpacked his store beside a stream, when a little girl approached, half-leading, half-dragging an old man evidently collapsing from exhaustion. They had attempted a short cut over the ridge the day before, lost their way, and spent the night and noon without food or shelter on the hills. The boy divided the contents of his basket between them; the "particular passion," pity, getting the better of the "particular appetite," hunger, and making itself felt as having the higher claim. And we have seen a father punish a child, till the cries melted the man's heart, and he snatched up the lad and embraced him in a paroxysm of remorse,—a case in which resentment was overcome by compassion, and made to confess the nobler nature of its conqueror. Having regard to which things, we think that pity (for example) does not want a new power, called moral faculty, to speak for it, but, once confronted with appetite and passion, is perfectly able to speak for itself. If, indeed, it acted quite alone, without the presence and competition of any other principle,—if, for the time

being, it occupied us wholly, like a solitary impulse possessing a wild creature, it would say nothing to us of its worth; but the instant it solicits us with a rival at its side, it reveals to us its relative excellence. And it is the irresistible sense we have, in this case, of its superiority that is properly denoted by the word *conscience;* the *knowledge with ourselves*, not only of the fact, but of the quality, of our inward springs of action. To state the matter in a more general way. We think that, in common with the inferior animals, we are created with certain determinate propensities to particular ends, or with provisions for the development of such propensities; that, in the lower animals, these operate singly and successively, each taking its turn for the command and guidance of the creature, and none of them becoming objects of reflection; that in us also this instinctive impulse is the original type of activity, and would become permanent in a solitary human being, or in a mind with only one propension at a time; but that with us, the same occasion calls up simultaneously two or more springs of action; that, immediately on their juxtaposition, we intuitively discern the higher quality of one than another, giving it a divine and authoritative right of preference; that, when the whole series of springs of action has been experienced, the feeling or "knowledge with ourselves" of their relative rank constitutes the individual conscience; that all human beings, when their consciousness is faithfully interpreted, as infallibly arrive at the same series of moral estimates as at the same set of rational truths; that it is no less correct therefore to speak of a universal conscience than of a universal reason in mankind; and that on this community of nature alone rests the possibility of ethical science. From these propositions it will be evident that the moral constitution of the mind presents itself to us under the image, not of an absolute monarchy over equal subjects, such as appears in Butler's scheme, but of a natural aristocracy or complete system of ranks, among our principles of conduct, on

observance of which depends the worth and order of our life.

In this consciousness, then, we recognize the psychological fact which is the ground of all moral phenomena; and which should appear in any definition of the science which deals with them. That, by the award of a true analysis, it really holds this position, we feel no more doubt, than that the feeling of beauty is at the foundation of æsthetics, and the desire of wealth, of political economy. But our object now is, not to establish this point, but merely to exemplify what we mean by the process of investigating the definition of moral science. It traces, at all events, the effects of *some* fact in our nature; if not of the one we have selected, then of some other: and we must ask, of *what* other, before we follow a writer, who proposes to lay down rules determining the perfect form of the moral phenomena. Either the mental law announced above, or some other educed by more correct analysis, stands in the same relation to human sentiments and character that the law of mutual attraction bears to the free movement and pressures of bodies; and a disquisition on morality which is silent of any such law is on a par with a treatise on celestial mechanics which omits to mention the force of gravitation.

Suppose, however, this part of the work achieved; suppose the true source of the moral phenomena reached, and laid down in the definition: the remainder of the inquiry becomes comparatively easy to trace. It must follow an inverse order; and having, from experimental facts, arrived at a general law, must compute and classify the particular results of this law. Assume, for instance, the doctrine advanced above; let there be in men a self-consciousness of the comparative worth of their several springs of action. A being must be conceived, wholly and always under the influence of this consciousness, abstraction being made of every interfering agency; and the system of effects which would arise in such imaginary case be regularly deduced.

For this purpose a table of the springs of action must be drawn up, in the order of their natural ranks; and once furnished with this, we find the obligatory value of every action by the following rule: "Every action is *right* which, in the presence of a lower principle, follows a higher; every action is *wrong* which, in the presence of a higher principle, follows a lower." This, however, though of very wide application, will not serve for the solution of every problem. There are cases in which one and the same principle has the choice of several possible actions; and among these the election must be made by the balance of pleasurable and painful effects. There is no question of duty which will not find its place under one or other of these two rules, of which the first might be called the canon of principles, and the other the canon of consequences; the former being the true ethical criterion, determining the morality of an act; the latter, the rational criterion, determining its wisdom.

The results of such a process have then only to be translated into the imperative mood, and the propositions of science become rules of art, and the required system of morality is constructed.

We have thus endeavoured to give some idea of the *path* of investigation which alone promises success to the moral philosopher. On the particular doctrines to which the need of illustration has obliged us to refer, we lay no stress at present. But we think it undeniable that something like the *method* we have sketched,—which is just what is followed in physical science,—is the only rational one. The first part of it,—the ascent to the definition,—pursues an *a posteriori* course; the latter part, an *a priori*, deducing necessary consequences from an assumed law. Now Dr. Whewell precisely inverts this order of processes, and by this alone invalidates them both. He begins by laying down a set of axioms, or "elementary notions and definitions," of which we will only say here, that, so far from *giving certainty* to anything, they seem to us greatly

to want it themselves. From these arbitrary data, he then professes to demonstrate the two following propositions: that "moral rules necessarily exist"; and that "rights must be realities in human society"; using the word *rights* in the narrow sense of *legal* rights, historically acted on. Now, supposing these two vague propositions to be proved, in any one of the several senses of which they admit, what is the next step to be taken by the philosopher? Having found in human nature a provision for morality, and a necessary source of law, would he not proceed to deduce what the rules and rights in question must be,—to determine the proper effects of the cause so happily found? Whatever it be in us that "must have" rules has, we presume, some preference for one kind of rule rather than another, and some voice in the enactment: it is not an impartial taste for regulation, careless whether it fit God's world or a devil's. Does then our author investigate the conditions imposed by our constitution on the license of action, and draw up the code of natural law? Far from it. He pronounces this to be impossible. "I have consulted nature and my definitions," he virtually says, "and I find we must have some rules and rights; but I really cannot tell you *what;* there seems nothing to settle that; we may as well ask Tribonian." And so, turning his back on axioms and definitions and "rigorous reasoning," our author takes a sudden leap from the *à priori* ground of his two demonstrations to the pandects of Justinian. He gives the substance of Roman and English law; and on this historical basis avowedly erects his whole structure of human duty. All virtue is made to grow out of judges' decrees, and the will of Heaven is reached through the Institutes. And so insecure seem the steps of this strange ascent from the Basilica and Westminster Hall to the throne of God, that we are astonished at the intrepidity that trusts to them. We are afraid indeed that, if the stringency of our higher obligations depended on the cogency of Dr. Whewell's arguments, we should be in danger of never doing another duty. It

has been usually imagined that the moral sentiments of mankind were the original source of law; and that a certain "sense of justice" found its expression in the usages and jurisprudence of nations. It is also generally believed, that it is not even the *whole* of men's natural morality which embodies itself in legal rules; that there is a more comprehensive feeling of right and wrong behind, contenting itself with opinion without insisting on enactment. This is all wrong, according to our author. Till there are positive laws, he maintains, there can be no duties; legal rights are prerequisites to moral obligations; a man for or against whom the legislature has done nothing is incapable of a conscience; and the code is the seed-vessel of all the virtues.

"Moral rules," says Dr. Whewell, "necessarily depend on rights actually existing. Further, it has been stated that men's actual rights are determined by positive law; men's rights in each community are determined by the positive law of that community." § 95. Again, he affirms that "morality depends on the laws" (95); that "the morality of the individual depends on his not violating the law of his nation" (105); that "we are morally bound to conform our desires and intentions to the law" (229); that "we must conform our dispositions to the laws" (232).

Having laid down the principle that ethical relations and feelings wait upon *de facto* social arrangements, ere they can begin to exist, our author traces the ulterior steps thus: First, "the *existence* of rights gives rise to a *Sentiment of Rights* and a *Sentiment of Wrongs*" (98), which "operate powerfully in supporting rights when they are once established, and in maintaining that peace and order of society which are the proper atmosphere of man's moral nature" (100). And, "secondly, these, which may be called *Jural Sentiments*, are the germs of moral sentiments" (101). The manner in which this expansion of character from legality to duty is presented to us is perhaps one of the most curious pieces of philosophy in these two volumes. Finding ourselves in the midst of a number of legal obligations,

we want a meaning for them. It cannot be supposed that they are to be construed literally; something "more than meets the ear" must be wrapped up in them. Not that those who defined them had anything in their minds beyond what is manifestly declared. But still we must *make them mean* what hitherto has not been thought of: we "must give them a moral significance"; and "duties give a moral significance to (legal) obligations.* Thus I have obligations as a father, or as a son. And these obligations determine certain good offices which are to take place between the father and the son. But my duties as a father, or as a son, must give a moral significance to these good offices" (279). We have always supposed that, in the order of nature, the thing signified existed before the sign. And though quite accustomed to the notion of interpreting a symbol, or *finding out* its significance, this process of "*giving*" it a significance is new to us. The only analogy by which we can help our conception of it is that of the Cabalists and mystical interpreters of Scripture; who assumed that they "must give" a meaning to the words and elementary letters of the Bible more recondite than the writers had any purpose to convey; and who thus found a vehicle for any amount of their own nonsense under the shelter of prophets' and apostles' speech. With scarcely less disrespect is the inspiration of nature treated by Dr. Whewell's allegorical theory of morals.

This preposterous method of "establishing" the moral duties is not merely stated in general terms, so that we can suppose ourselves misled by our author's habitual want of precision in the use of language; but it is applied in detail to recommend the several classes of duties. They are all urged as indispensable contrivances for getting up a "moral significance" on behalf of family relations, or the structure of society. Thus, "reverence for superiors" "is requisite to invest with a moral significance the obligation of

* The word "obligations" is used throughout Dr. W.'s work in the restricted sense of "*legal obligations.*"

obedience to the governing authorities of the State. For such obedience must be a duty, as well as an obligation, *in order that it may be a moral character*" (283). And "filial affection" "gives a moral significance to the family relation. Such an affection in the child towards the parent, combined with parental affection on the other part, are ties of affection which must exist, *in order that* the members of the family may have moral relations to each other, such as correspond to the obligation of obedience in the child, and support and care in the parent" (283).

If our author were intending to build a house, we think he should reason in the following way: "By the law of England, windows are taxed. But in order to be taxed, they must exist; windows therefore are necessary. But windows by themselves are without significance; in order to give them illuminative significance, they must be apertures in walls which enclose space; hence such walls are necessarily to exist. But walls in the air cannot enclose space; moreover they are not realities; in order that they become realities, there must be terrestrial foundations. Hence, we must buy a field, as a condition implied in the window-tax."

Indeed we do not know that we can better state our impression of Dr. Whewell's manner of constructing his philosophy than by saying that he endeavours to build from the top downwards. Instances of this inverted procedure are of continual recurrence. Thus, children are to love their parents,—why, does the reader suppose?—because it is necessary for us to have the operative principle of universal benevolence, which is not to be had by any other means. The proof may be very convincing to celibates who, in default of family ties, have fitted up in their hearts a capacious nursery for the human race; but in our narrow domestic way of viewing things, it seems much plainer that good children should love good parents, than that they should set out on their way to universal philanthropy, and take up with filial affection as their first

stage. Again, we have been accustomed to believe that "equal laws" were good for "the protection of property." But we are now assured that *property is good for the sake of equal laws;* that no man can innocently take pleasure in his possessions, except as occasions of good government, and affording the legislature the privilege of protecting him. His passion for justice is to be so warm that he will disinterestedly acquiesce in being a possessor!

"Each ought to cling to his own, not from the love of riches, but from the love of justice. It is the love of equal and steady laws, not of possessions, which makes a good man appropriate what is his. This rule does not require us to abstain from the usual transactions respecting property;—buying and selling, getting and spending; for it is by being employed in such transactions, that property is an instrument of human action,—the means by which the characters and dispositions of man manifest themselves. A rich man may employ many men in his service by means of his wealth; nor does morality forbid this; but then, they must be employed for moral purposes."—(307.)

Thus, lest it should occur to "the good man," that even if he were to part with his possessions the laws would remain no less just and equal than before, our author reconciles him to the burthen of his riches by assuring him that they are an excellent disciplinary instrument for the formation of character; so that he really ought to submit to keep them. It is afflictive to meet with this style of argument in a work professing to guide the judgment of the student and the clergyman. It has the fatal stamp of moral affectation, that worst and standing vice of ecclesiastical teaching; and throws around momentous obligations an air of unreality and pretence. It is in part a consequence of the erroneous opinion before adverted to; that life has *separate moral ends, over and above the proportioned and regulated pursuit of its natural end,* and that duty, instead of being a *method* imposed upon our activity, and ordering its forces, is itself a substantive object and business. This

error is not only implied by Dr. Whewell, but is embodied in a fundamental rule, called "the principle of moral purpose."

"The supreme law of human action requires us to consider moral good as the object to which all other objects are subordinate, and from which they derive their only moral value. Morality cannot allow us to desire external things, as wealth, power, or honour, for their own sake, but only as means to moral ends. And we may state this as a moral principle, that *things are to be sought only as means to moral ends.*" (271.)

No ascetic doctrine, propounded by the severest fanatic, has ever demanded an abnegation so impossible as this. The *mortification* of natural desires has often been claimed from the conscience; but never the absolute and universal *extermination*, here insisted on, of every feeling of affection or want, to make a desert where duty may reign alone. These moralists may well appear to common men to have neither body nor soul, when they can propound rules so wide of nature. Were they ever hungry? and did they make a point of "seeking the things" upon the table, "only as means to moral ends?"—and provided the end (say, of recruiting their strength) was accomplished, did they survey the dishes with ghostly impartiality, or reproach themselves with a sinful preference of roast mutton over gruel? Did they ever take a fancy to a fine picture? and did they succeed in desiring it exclusively with a view to encourage art, or educate the taste of the visitors to their drawing-room? Did they ever long for a bunch of grapes for a sick child, or a carriage for an invalid wife, and feel remorse because the wish had no "moral end," and came only of pure affection? Surely, this attempt to overrule and bind down all the primary springs of action has its source in a superstitious confusion, and its issue in hypocritical constraint. Morality fulfils its office, not when it has suppressed the natural ends, but when it has prevented

any one from being disappointed of his natural ends, and awakened every one to seek them with earnestness proportioned to their worth.

Our author appears to have been drawn into this error by an ingenious argument adduced by him to prove that there must be a *summum bonum* in human life, and a supreme rule of human conduct for reaching it.

"It has been said also that we may have a series of actions, each of which is a means to the next as an end. A man labours, that he may gain money; he wishes to gain money, that he may educate his children; he would educate his children in order that they may prosper in the world.

"In these cases the inferior ends lead to higher ones, and derive their value from these. Each subordinate action aims at the end next above it, as a good. In the series of actions just mentioned a man's gain is regarded as a good, because it tends to the education of his children. Education is considered as valuable, because it tends to prosperity.

"And the rules which prescribe such actions derive their imperative force and validity, each from the rule above it. The superior rule supplies a reason for the inferior. The rule, *to labour*, derives its force from the rule, *to seek gain;* this rule receives its force (in the case we are considering) from the rule, *to educate our children;* this again has for its reason to forward the prosperity of our children.

"But besides such subordinate rules, there must be *a supreme rule of human action.* For the succession of means and ends, with the corresponding series of subordinate and superior rules, must somewhere terminate. And the inferior ends would have no value, as leading to the highest, except the highest end had a value of its own. The superior rules could give no validity to the subordinate ones, except there were a supreme rule from which the validity of all of these were ultimately derived. Therefore there is a supreme rule of human action. That which is comformable to the supreme rule is *absolutely right;* and is called *right*, simply, without relation to a special end. The opposite to right is *wrong*.

"The supreme rule of human action may also be described by its object.

"The object of the supreme rule of human action is spoken

of as *the true end of human action, the ultimate or supreme good*, the *summum bonum*."—(71, 72, 73.)

Now, that there may be a series of actions, each of which derives its value from its agency in producing the next, until we reach a result which is *intrinsically good*, is perfectly true. But that there can be *only one* intrinsically good end is neither proved by this argument, nor probable in itself. In the passage just cited it is not even pretended that there exists but a single series of voluntary means and ends, along the line of which all possible human actions find a place, and whose uppermost term legitimates all the rest. Nor is it shown that, in case of there being a plurality of such series, the authenticating extreme must be the same in all. Yet one of these two positions is manifestly requisite to sustain the conclusion of a *summum bonum*. That they are both false will readily appear, if we only ask ourselves what we mean by a thing *intrinsically good*. Surely we apply such terms to *whatever is the object of a natural desire, or gratifies a natural affection*. Nature has made such objects good to us, by establishing a relation of want and supply between ourselves and them. Water is "intrinsically good" to the thirsty; relief of suffering to the pitiful; caresses to the affectionate child. Whatever then be the number of our natural tendencies, the same number will there be of "things good in themselves" and each of these will be a separate *summum bonum* in relation to the chain of instrumental actions by which it is reached. Thus, a man may open his cupboard that he may get a cup; he gets a cup, that he may fetch water; he fetches water that he may drink it; he drinks it because he is thirsty. Again, a man puts on his hat, that he may go into the wood; he goes into the wood to cut a stick; he cuts a stick, that he may beat his dog; he beats his dog, because he is angry. And once more; a man runs to the shore that he may launch his boat; he launches his boat that he may go to the wreck; he goes to the wreck that he may help the crew; he helps the crew

because he has pity. Here are three *summa bona*, at the head of so many independent series of acts. Have they then no relation to one another, no order *inter se?* Assuredly they have; but it is a relation of inferior to superior, not of means to ends,—a subordination of excellence, not of causation; the higher surpassing the lower, but not including it. And this arrangement of rank does not come into operation till two of the *summa bona* present themselves for choice at the same instant. When this takes place, a new intrinsic good arises, namely, the voluntary preference of the higher of the two to the lower; for such preference is essential to satisfy the moral consciousness of the agent. If, for example, the man who might have saved a drowning crew, employed himself instead in beating a delinquent dog, he would have attained a "good in itself" at the expense of another immeasurably higher. Hence, the conception of a supreme good, terminating and authenticating all the series of subordinate ends, and constant for every system, appears to us a misrepresentation of nature. You may indeed frame a true general proposition, stating, that "the supreme good of a human being consists in his uniform obedience to the highest spring of action admitted by the external conditions around him." But, in detail, this good will require the preference now of one natural end, now of another, according as the comparison which occasions it shifts with varying circumstances up and down the scale of impelling principles.

The supreme good and the supreme rule, which Dr. Whewell conceives himself to have demonstrated, perform a great part in the subsequent construction of his system; and as they seemed to promise, more distinctly than any other of his characteristic phrases, some insight into this theory as to the grounds of moral obligation, we have bestowed some pains on their interpretation. We can present our readers, however, with no consistent account of our author's doctrine on this point. Strange to say, the supreme rule, which is perpetually referred to, which

necessarily exists,—which gives authority to everything,—from which all the propositions in the book are said to be "deduced,"—keeps entirely out of sight. It is our philosopher's Mrs. Harris, vouching for whatever he inclines to say, but leaving everything to him, and never condescending to a personal appearance. We were never more astonished than on learning from Dr. Whewell, at the end of his first volume, that he had been all the while deducing rules of action from a supreme rule of action.

Flattering as it was to think that we had been "deducing" at all, it was mortifying to have no recollection of the proposition which had imparted legitimacy to a whole system of morals. Whether it has appeared in the body to any other reader of these volumes, we cannot tell. If not, it is to be hoped that the author will serve it with a summons for his next work. So far, however, as we can penetrate this obscurity, the supreme rule is Dr. Whewell's name for the precept, "We ought to do what we ought." We should decidedly say so from the passage last quoted, and its sequel; and our only difficulty is, that we do not see how this proposition, which strikes us as of a barren kind, can be so prolific in deductions as our author's supreme rule appears to be. Happily, we are left in no doubt as to the supreme good :—

"Happiness is conceived as necessarily an *ultimate* object of action." "The desire of happiness is the supreme desire." "Happiness is our being's end and aim." (544.) "The supreme object of human action is happiness." (573.)

Moreover, the relation in which these two (rule and object) stand to one another is plainly stated to be that of means to end, the instrument deriving its value from the good to which it leads :—

"The supreme rule of human action may also be described by *its object*. The object of the supreme rule of human action is spoken of as the *rule end of human action*, the *ultimate or supreme good*, the *summum bonum*." (73.)

"Human action may be contemplated, not only as governed

by rules, successively subordinate to each other, and ultimately, to a supreme rule; but also, as directed to objects successively subordinate to each other, and ultimately to the supreme object. The supreme object of human action is happiness." (573.)

We must observe, in passing, that, in spite of the "*but also*," these two views are manifestly one and the same. The series of *rules* is not different from the series of *objects*, but identical with it, that which is a *rule* in relation to the term above being an *object* in reference to the term below; it gains the former, and is gained by the latter. Take, for instance, our author's own illustration. "A man labours, that he may gain money; he wishes to gain money, that he may educate his children; he would educate his children, that they may prosper in the world." Here the "gaining money" is the *object* of the "labour," and the *rule* for getting "education for his children"; and the "education of the children," again, is the *object* of the "gaining money," and the *rule* for obtaining their "prosperity in the world." When therefore, it is said that "the rules derive their imperative force and validity each from the *rule* above it" (71), it would be more correct to say "each from the *object* above it"; and in the case of the uppermost pair we can say nothing else, since the ultimate term, which gives validity to the penultimate, is from its position an object only, and never becomes a rule.

Let us now put together the fragments we have gathered of our author's doctrine. Supreme rule is the means to supreme object as end; and the value of the end gives all its "imperative force and validity" to the means. Supreme rule, being interpreted, man's "duty" or "rightness"; supreme object is happiness. It seems to follow, that duty is to be treated by the moralists as the means of happiness, and derives all its "imperative force" from its tendency to this end. Our author therefore entirely coincides with Bentham as to the foundation of morals; and the renowned "happiness-principle" could not find in the "Deontology" itself a more unqualified, though doubtless

a clearer, announcement. Yet our author is entirely unaware of the banner under which his propositions do battle. Having dressed them in a loose livery of words most unlike the tight fit of Paley, he cannot doubt, when he looks at them, that they are on the opposite side, and will put the archdeacon's shabby dogmas to the rout. It is but too plain that they have gone over to the enemy. The arguments, however, are pretty impartially divided. There are some vigorous paragraphs of specific attack on the system to which, as we have shown, the fundamental principles give their support. On these it is not our intention to comment,—we should find it easier to answer than to commend them; but will leave the criticism to those who will rejoice at the inconclusive reasoning so grievously disappointing to us. How far Dr. Whewell succeeds in separating his scheme from the systems which find their ultimate obligation in happiness, may be judged by a few sentences in which he contrasts them. "They seek to deduce the rules of actions from a supreme *object of desire;* whereas we have deduced them from a supreme *rule of action.*" Yes, but have you not yourself made the supreme rule of action a dependent term on the supreme object of desire? and is it any merit in a "deduction" to stop with the penultimate, instead of going back to the ultimate, premiss? "They direct men to aim at happiness; we direct them to aim at acting rightly." True; but you also assure them that the "rule of rightness *points* to happiness" (573), and that if it did not, it would not be the right rule. Where is the difference between *aiming at happiness through a rule of action* and *aiming at a rule of action which points to happiness?*" "We deduce our rules from the constitution of man's nature; they, from the objects of his desires" (552). And how is there any contrariety in this? Sketch for us a "constitution of man's nature," without naming the "objects of his desires"; or make a list of the "objects of his desires," observing silence as to "the constitution of his nature"; and we will then

admit your distinction. Meanwhile, we discern in it only this: you examine human feelings as craving the objects; they examine the objects as craved by the feelings. What would be thought of two rival schools of magnetic science, of which one, in its anxiety to disclaim all connection with "the house over the way," should announce, "They measure the force with which the loadstone attracts iron; we measure the force with which the iron tends to the loadstone"? Dr. Whewell, with every disposition, has found no better reason for quarrel with Dr. Paley.

We have now seen the way in which Dr. Whewell derives the moral sentiments from the jural sentiments; the jural sentiments from positive laws; and positive laws from—nothing or "necessary existence." We accompany him up the next step of his ascent with no increase of security; and fear that he has not succeeded in establishing a true connection between morals and religion. From the frequency and emphasis of his appeal to what is "absolutely right," or "right in itself," we were led to hope that moral distinctions would be treated as *ultimate*, that all inquiry into their credentials would be foreclosed, and no parley be held with those who asked for something more right than rectitude. This hope seemed to derive encouragement from such passages as the following:—

"With regard to the supreme rule, the question *Why?* admits of no further answer. Why must I do what is right? Because it *is* right. Why should I do what I ought? Because I ought. The supreme rule supplies a reason for that which it commands, by *being* the supreme rule." (75.)

We were mistaken, however; and the illusion was effectually dissipated by this short sentence,—the text of a great deal which follows in the fourth book:—

"The supreme rule of human action derives its real authority, and its actual force, from its being the law of God, the Creator of man. The reason for doing what is absolutely right, is, that it is the will of God, through which the condition and destination of man are what they are." (344.)

The supreme rule then is not the supreme rule; and a

reason is discovered for that which can have no reason. By what inscrutable process of mutual concession these dicta are brought to sit quietly side by side, and travel over the world in a vehicle of the same philosophy, we are unable to conjecture. There is, however, a kind of partition or local separation, interposed between them. The former of them rules in the first volume, where an authority which must not be questioned is wanted for the author's morality; the latter has its way in the second volume, where a similar divine right is required for his religion; and it is only by an imprudent anticipation that this last prefers its claim, in the passage we have cited, before its antagonist has done its work and fallen asleep. In one point of view there is some consistency between Dr. Whewell's theories of obligation at the two ends of his ethical exposition. He rests every obligation upon positive law as its foundation. Nothing is right until it can get enacted. As the historical constitution of a community determines all human rights and duties, so the actual constitution of the world is the beginning of all moral distinctions. Social man finds the ultimate ground of his duties in human legislation; responsible man, in divine legislation. It is with great concern that we see this doctrine of "sovereign will" revived. We protest against the notion that a Being, by acting as our Creator, and putting us under a certain constitution of things, becomes morally entitled to our obedience. Were it so, any superhuman force, capable of systematic agency, might equally command our conscience; and the only reason why men should not love and serve the devil is that he is not *strong enough* to substantiate his claim. If there are no moral distinctions *in rerum naturâ*,—if they date their origin from the creation of man,—if this recent and local act is the limit of their history and their range; they are entitled indeed to respect as the municipal by-laws of the club in which I live, but I see beyond them on every side. Geology makes me familiar with immeasurable times,

astronomy with infinite spaces, to which they are strange; every railway-cutting takes me to an age, every telescope conveys me to some world, where they are not. They shrink within the sphere of my personal presence, and run down with the time-piece that measures mortal things. And if they cannot be affirmed of the pre-existent creation into which man was born, much less can they be referred to the nature of the creative God. Say that he caused them, and you deny that he followed them. Deduce justice from his will, and his will ceases to be just. Let him precede good and ill, and his eternal Spirit is exempt alike from the one and from the other, and recedes from our aspirations into perfect moral indifference. If wisdom and holiness are historical births from his volition, they are not inherent attributes of his being. On this theory you forego all title to praise the system of things; for had it been quite different and even opposite, it would have been equally perfect, tried by the gauge of its own self-contained rule. He and his works, who by arbitrary choice can shift, or reverse, or destroy the separating lines of good and evil, can never be the object of trust or veneration It is therefore an utterly suicidal act of ambition on the part of religion to demand precedence of morals; and instead of proclaiming that the laws of the world are good because they are established, it must teach that they are established because they are good. God must be presented to our faith, as having *recognized*, not as having *originated*, the moral distinctions, through which we love and worship, as well as fear and obey him.

The connection between the parts of Dr. Whewell's system becomes slighter and less secure as we proceed. So frail and slender is the thread by which he unites revealed religion with natural, that it is scarcely possible to speak of it without making a vibration to which it yields. Two elements are twined together to form it. Our natural resources leave us doubtful (1) how far repentance and amendment can restore the lapsed soul; (2) whether any

supernatural aids are accorded to our honest but feeble will; and our defective knowledge in these respects it is the design of revelation to repair. On the second point, we will only observe, that it is with the work of the human will alone that the moralist has to do; that as any agency within nature or from beyond nature, which is extraneous to his voluntary powers, is no object of ethical consideration, so ignorance of it is no defect in ethical knowledge; that we are responsible only for the power which is our own, and can acquit ourselves of the responsibility, whether able or not, by analysis of consciousness, to disengage our personal activity from the co-operative agencies of God. As to the other point, our author, after Butler, in the most questionable part of his "Analogy," observes:—

"The moralist is thus led to teach, that after transgression, repentance and amendment are necessary steps in our moral culture. But the moralist cannot pronounce how far these steps can avail as a remedy for the evil; how far they can repair the broken completeness of man's moral course; how far they can restore the health of man's moral life; how far they can finally, and upon the whole, avert the consequences of sin from man's condition and destination." (357.)

Now here we have, under a single description, *two* incapacities charged upon the moralist. He cannot pronounce upon the present moral health of penitents; and he cannot predict their lot of future recompense. *Why* can he not judge of their moral health? Is not this "moral health" an ascertainable spiritual *matter of fact*, indicating itself by perceptible symptoms, just as much as health of body; and like that, declaring itself to the conscious patient and the vigilant observer, quite as plainly after disease as before it? If wickedness were, as this doctrine assumes, a secret, impalpable poison, that could exist and give no sign, it might lurk unsuspected in the soul *before* transgression no less probably than *after;* and this anxious misgiving, in which morality cannot help us, would not attach peculiarly to the case of the repentant. But we hold this

theological theory of sin to be an enervating superstition, the sure mark of a sickly unreality in morals, and an unloving fear in religion. Sin is nothing else than moral evil; and moral evil is a broad black fact, visible enough in shades of every hue on the life and the affections; whoever teaches that it is a ghostly mystery withdraws men in quest of a fiction from conflict with the dark reality. Whether the moralist can foretell the future destination of the penitent transgressor, we will not attempt to decide. We only say, that the grounds, such as they are, on which he may venture to judge of *any* man's futurity, do not fail him in this particular case. The state of the character *here* regulates, in every instance, our anticipations of the *hereafter;* and we conceive the character of the repentant offender to be as distinctly legible as that of any other being,—if indeed such other there can be. And at all events there is one thing which the moralist *can* affirm; namely, that penitence and amendment constitute the *only human* remedies. They exhaust our resources. Whatever portion of the evil these fail to repair is *irreparable* by our volition, and therefore the source of no further *duty*, but only of regretful sorrow.

We have now examined the several steps by which Dr. Whewell rises from his historical basis of Roman and English law to the highest sphere of human duty. We must turn back, before we conclude, to the portion of his work which introduces this series, and say a few words on its *a priori* reasonings. It contains, as we have stated, two fundamental propositions, besides the "elementary notions and definitions" assumed as media of proof; that "moral rules necessarily exist"; and that "rights must be realities." The first of these is demonstrated by the help of two definitions; one fixing upon *reason* as the *personal element* and *characteristic* of man (10); the other, proposing *power of applying rules* as the distinction of reason (21). These things having been premised, the proof runs thus: without reason, man does not act as man; without rules,

he does not use reason: therefore rules are necessary to his acting as man (66). If our readers can discover in this demonstration anything but a reprint of the definitions; or, in the definitions anything but an assumption of the point to be proved, they must transfer upon us the charge of confused thought which, meanwhile, we must leave at Dr. Whewell's door. He appends another proof of the same proposition: of which we will only say, that, with strict adherence to the author's own definitions, we have read it over, substituting throughout the word "magpie" for the word "man"; and it is pleasing to find that "moral rules necessarily exist" for magpies no less than for the human race. The other proposition reaches its conclusion by a more intricate process, of which we believe the following to be a faithful report. Moral rules, by the force of the terms, must *regulate action*, and must not have anything in their structure to unfit them for this end. Now this structure requires the use of general terms, and implies general conceptions. These conceptions are either of real things, or they are not. If they are not, they can have no force to regulate action, which has to do with real things; therefore they *are* conceptions of real things. Now the kind of conceptions which enter into moral rules are these, —*property*, *family*, *contracts*, etc., or, generally, "abstractions vested in persons"; these therefore are real things. But "abstractions vested in persons" are *rights*; therefore "rights must be realities." Q. E. D. This demonstration we present simply as a natural history specimen of the *a priori* species of argument; into its physiology we do not propose to enter, as we question whether it ever performed, or was even intended to perform, a living function. One satisfactory assurance, however, comes out in the course of it, namely, that a thief is metaphysically impossible. It is the "conception of property" which "has power to suppress" the acts arising from "the desire of having." Now a thief must have the "conception of property," in order to steal *meum* or *tuum*; therefore the acts arising from

"the desire of having" are suppressed in him; and thief as thief cannot exist.

All this sort of "rigorous reasoning" we cannot but regard as mere verbal legerdemain; a perversion of the genuine *a priori* method no less unhappy, than are the remaining books, of the *a posteriori*. In the one case, the *deductions*,—besides starting from a system of first principles so loosely stated as to open questions of interpretation at every step,—are only so many contortions of the original definitions. In the other, the *intuition* proceeds, not by analysis of a selected moral phenomenon into its elements, but by accumulations of unanalysed experience, by a mere enumerative classification of the complex historical facts of Roman and English law,—facts, mixed throughout with matter not moral at all. And, if our view of the true procedure in the moral sciences be not entirely wrong, Dr. Whewell, besides mismanaging both methods, has destroyed their mutual relation by inverting their proper order.

The wide dissent from our author's system which we have been obliged to express, narrows itself to a single point in a criticism which we must briefly make upon his preface. He there disclaims any intention to enter upon the "philosophy of morality," that is, the psychological laws on which moral phenomena depend; and proposes merely to construct a body of morality, "in which moral propositions are deduced from axioms, by successive steps of reasoning, so as to form a connected system of moral truth." When this has been done, and not till then, he thinks we shall be prepared to examine the faculties which make us responsible agents, and the conditions under which they act. This postponement of the whole theory of the moral sentiments he justifies by the example of geometry. All inquiries into the laws of geometrical reasoning, and the mental powers and processes engaged in it, imply the previous existence of a body of geometry. As Euclid had to demonstrate before there could be a philosophy of

geometry; so Dr. Whewell must moralize, before there can be a philosophy of morality.

Now the fallacious character of this analogy is evident from a remark already made, namely, that morality is not, like geometry, a *science*, but an *art*. It is not a system of *truths*, but a system of *rules*. To the *theory* of morals it stands related, as *mensuration* to geometry. To talk of framing a body of morality by "deduction from axioms" is not more absurd than to project an *a priori* treatise on land-surveying or barrel-gauging. The order wanted in manuals of art is not the *logical* order of thought, but the *practical* order of execution. Hence Dr. Whewell's whole conception of the task before him, as resembling the procedure of Euclid in the composition of his elements, appears certain only to mislead him. If he has written the system of morality he intended, there *cannot be* the catenation of deductions he supposes; and if there be such catenation of deductions, then he has written, not the work of rules which he intended, but the work of philosophy he disclaims.

"Still," it may be said, "this only shows that he described his first step in terms of science, instead of the more applicable terms of art; and that, from this cause, he may have aimed at the wrong kind of arrangement of internal parts in this preliminary work. But is not his main idea of order well-founded? Must not art precede philosophy? and did not mensuration exist before geometry?" Yes; but not *books* on mensuration. The attempt to compute and compare spaces of different dimensions was certainly prior to any treatise on the properties of figure; the measurer's *act* to the geometer's thought; for in an analysis of this act did the said thought at first consist. And, in like manner, morality must exist *in fact*, deeds just and unjust must awaken their appropriate sentiments in men, before these sentiments can be made objects of self-consciousness, and be reflected on in relation to the causes that excite them. But, in either case, *verbal lists and descriptions*

of the actions done, whether mensurative or moral, are by no means requisite to the origination and growth of science. It is the *life* of man as a voluntary agent, not any *treatise on that life*, which ethical philosophy undertakes to analyse.

One remark more will perhaps bring us to the source of suggestion, which supplied this unfortunate analogy. The "philosophy of geometry," that is, the theory of mathematical evidence, is a *psychological* study; it is an examination of the procedure of the human understanding, when making or when communicating discoveries about quantity. The "philosophy of morality," that is, the theory of the sentiments of right and wrong, is also a *psychological* study; it is an examination of the procedure of the human conscience, when judging the springs of action and their results. From this resemblance of the two "philosophies," —both dealing with the faculties of man,—arose, no doubt, our author's impression that they must hold corresponding positions on the spheres of knowledge to which they respectively belong. And so in truth they do; only, let us observe, the thing studied by the first of these "philosophies" is, "*man geometrically thinking;*" the thing studied in the second is, "*man morally acting.*" The prerequisite of the one is geometrical thought; the prerequisite of the other is moral action. These are the *human arts*,—the one intellectual, the other practical,—which supply materials to the analytic skill of the philosophers undertaking their investigation. But between these two arts there is this difference: the practical one is an art *simply*, going straight among external conditions, and at a single step putting the will in possession of its end. The intellectual one, on the other hand, is the *art of constructing a science;* the art of geometric thought is not hand-work, but head-work; the head-work must have taken place, the science must be formed, before the art which has wrought it can be examined. A science, an organized system of truths, cannot be formed without registering the successive

steps as they succeed each other,—in other words, without making a book; nor can we enable another person to examine our intellectual actions, to see how we perform them, if we do not record them in language. With practical processes it is evidently otherwise; they display themselves, and dispense with the medium of words. This is the reason why books on geometry are prerequisites to a "philosophy of geometry"; while books on morality are not necessary to a "philosophy of morality." For these reasons we think that the analogy which Dr. Whewell has adopted as the corner-stone of his system is entirely unsound.

In treating this work of an eminent and able man, we have deliberately avoided the course which would have been most easy to ourselves, and, we fear, most agreeable to our readers. We might have given ourselves no concern about the way in which he lays out his subject; have slurred over the loose junctures between the parts; have lightly sped across the slippery logic; and stopped our breath till we were clear of the metaphysic fogs. There would have remained room enough, and more than enough, for a critical ramble through the particular moral and political tenets which characterize the book. The author's leaning towards the highest doctrines of authority, and the evident zest with which he propounds them, are remarkable even in a churchman. Not Wolsey himself could find more magnificent pleas for state prerogatives; and scarcely Innocent, had he lived now, made grander claims for an exclusive church. Passive obedience, or something which we cannot distinguish from it, is enjoined; no scope is allowed to individual conscience in resistance to any law, however iniquitous. The governors of a country are to select one church as the true one; to endow it with wealth and dignities; to entrust it with the education of the people; to limit all national offices to its members; to protect it by a law against "religious sedition." We should gladly have adverted to these symptomatic peculiarities of

doctrine, and to some better things, equally earnest and hearty, especially the indignant severity with which slavery is everywhere treated. But we thought it our duty to look rather into the structure of the book, on which its pretensions mainly rest, than into the details, which, unless the method be good, become a collection of unauthorized opinions. We shall watch the destination of this work with some anxiety. The author has distinguished himself, with some other members of his university, by his strictures on the moral studies entering into the Cambridge course. He occupies a position likely to give effect to his opinions. We do not profess to think that Locke, much less Paley, presents the best guidance to the young man of the present age into the domain of intellectual and moral philosophy. But we should be sorry to hear that the "Elements of Morality" had taken any portion of their place. The "Moral and Political Philosophy" at least starts courageously, and pursues with some freedom questions of civil right and religious liberty. And the "Essay on the Human Understanding" can never be read without giving clearer insight into the contents of the mental world within us, and a nobler ambition to devote the powers it reveals to the fearless pursuit of truth and the free service of God.

WHEWELL'S MORALITY.*

II.

AMONG various recent signs of a humane and thoughtful spirit extending in the upper ranks of English society, there is none more expressive, or of greater promise, than the increasing regard for moral and political studies in the old Universities. The change is not spontaneous and accidental; it is not one of those caprices of taste, which, especially in secluded societies, may be introduced by the ascendent genius of one or two men: it is manifestly concurrent with the rise of new questions and the growth of nobler sentiments, in the world around; and must be ascribed to causes social rather than academic. The legislator and the clergyman, educated in these retreats, and adorned with the accomplishments in highest favour there, found themselves afterwards thrown upon a life in which their attainments left them hopelessly at fault; whose problems of action no philology could interpret and no calculus solve; and in whose controversies they were overmatched by men of very inferior culture, only possessed of the right instruments of thought, and using them with more dexterous faculty. The whole range of modern interests, from the topics of political economy to the highest discussions of speculative religion, lies beyond the

* "Lectures on Systematic Morality, delivered in Lent Term, 1846." By William Whewell, D.D., Master of Trinity College, and Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. London: Parker, 1846.—*Prospective Review*, August, 1846.

routine which makes the "senior wrangler" and the "double-first." The characteristic changes of the last half-century, the rapid increase of large towns, the augmented power of capital and labour, the growth of our colonial empire, the altered proportions of sects, have started a number of social questions respecting the functions of government, the rights of industry, the means of public education, and the proper office of a church; demanding for their treatment a combination of historical knowledge with habits of philosophical reflection. The new want has been felt even at Oxford and Cambridge, difficult as it is to penetrate their college walls with any influence from without: and the fact that the ancient learning of the one, and the modern science of the other, are used, no longer as the mere study of words and symbols, but as lessons in human nature and the Divine plan, as aids to the judging of living interests and duties, as no less rich in suggestions for the future than in treasures from the past, is an emphatic sign of progress in the new generation towards an earnest and manly mind.

The peculiar mental discipline of the Universities is very apparent in most of the metaphysical and ethical literature proceeding from their distinguished men. They apply Greek or mediæval doctrine directly to the exposure of existing fallacies and the correction of existing opinion. They leap down from Aristotle to Bentham, from Plato to Coleridge, with the fewest possible resting-places between. With the exception of Hooker, Locke, Butler, and Paley (an exception far from constant), the series of great writers who have formed the methods of speculative thought in Protestant Europe is but little known to them. Hence, they rarely appear at home in the province of modern philosophy; they enter its fields as strangers and emigrants; and betray how difficult is the transition, for a mind trained, in the schools of Athens and of Rome, to the work of the Christian moralist and the Anglican ecclesiastic. There is an historical chasm manifest in their modes of thinking,—

an anachronism of argument,—a mixture of the Peripatetic and the Churchman, which, we are persuaded, must produce an odd effect upon continental readers unfamiliar with the cause. How can it be otherwise? Two grand agencies, the growth of the Inductive Sciences, and the spread of a Pauline Christianity, have impressed the most marked characteristics on the mind of modern Europe. Hobbes, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, were present at the infancy of these powers, and preserve the traces of their earliest direction. Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, and Helvetius, display, in further advance, some of their main lines of tendency; Reid, Kant, Fichte, and Cousin, mark the reaction towards an opposite point; while Mill and Comte, on the one hand, Schleiermacher, and Coleridge, on the other, exhibit the extreme development of these influences at their negative and positive poles. These are the main links through which the light and force of philosophical reflection have been transmitted to our own times; and without familiarity with this series, it is impossible to effect a communication between ancient wisdom and modern wants, or to apply an instrument of analysis powerful enough for the resolution of the problems that await us. The subordinate place assigned in the English Universities, when compared with the Scotch and Continental schools, to the study of philosophy and morals, may have the advantages claimed for it by Dr. Whewell.* But he ought not to be surprised if there be a price to pay for these advantages. The system may protect us, as he believes, from a race of conceited students; but it also lessens the chance that, in the teachers, we shall have eminent philosophers, and accounts for the fact that for the last century Cambridge and Oxford have produced no names that can be mentioned with Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, Jouffroy, Schelling, or Ritter.

It might be expected that the deficiency to which we refer would be least conspicuous in the University which is renowned for its *scientific* training; since mental science

* See his English University Education, p. 46, seq.

does not differ from physical in its methods, but only in its phenomena. The presumption however is disappointed by a countervailing advantage on the other side. The studies prevalent at Oxford are *human*, and keep the mind in communication, not with *nature*, but with *men*;—the literature which speaks their feeling for truth and beauty; the logic which analyses their processes of thought; the history which records the aims of their social life and polity. The practical sympathy with the sentiments and affairs of mankind which is thus maintained is, in our opinion, of far more importance for the purposes of psychological and moral investigation, than mere skill in the forms of scientific procedure. Accordingly, whatever recent contributions from churchmen to our philosophical literature contain the promise of enduring reputation, are the work of Oxford divines; at least the declamation of Sedgwick, and the ambitious confusion of Whewell, contrast unfavourably with the moral thoughtfulness of Coplestone, and the perspicuous good sense and scholastic precision of Whately.

The eight lectures referred to at the head of this article form a kind of appendix to the large work, by the same author.* With the exception of the last two (on International Law, and the Relation of Church and State), they are simply a defence of the treatise on the "Elements of Morality" from certain objections advanced against it. The first half of the defence is directed against some critic imbued with Mr. Carlyle's mode of thought, and sympathizing with his aversion to all systematic definitions of human duty. The remainder is a manifest reply to our review; unless, indeed, the very same series of strictures has been repeated in some other quarter unknown to us. The lecturer excuses himself from all distinct reference to the criticisms which provoke his defence by the following plea:—

"I have endeavoured to remove some objections, which may

* "Elements of Morality."

be made to the *Elements of Morality*, but which are, I think, unfounded. Many of the objections thus noticed have appeared in print; but I have not thought it necessary to refer more particularly to the quarters from which they have been urged. It appears to me that, in all subjects, the more *impersonal* our controversies can be made, the better they will answer all good ends; and certainly controversies on morality are most likely in this way to be really moral."—*Preface.*

This plea reads very amiably; but it upholds a practice essentially unjust. An author, who takes upon him to represent in his own language the objections of an opponent, is surely bound to provide the check of an exact reference. Few writers can be trusted,—wise men will hardly trust themselves,—to state with force and fairness the arguments which bear against their favourite positions; and to attempt this on mere credit, in evasion of the recognized securities, appears an unwarrantable demand upon their readers' confidence. No high-minded person will take offence at the restraint we would impose. Honourable men do not wish their accounts to pass unaudited. The desire for a purely "impersonal" discussion looks very charitable, when stated in the abstract; and readers who suppose Dr. Whewell's reply to be directed against some nameable man, may be tempted to praise his forbearance. But how a controversy could become *personal* by referring to an *anonymous* writer, is a thing obscure to us. Our author, commenting upon an invisible critic, was at all events safe from the danger and the charge of "personality"; and, as he has not concealed himself, he has done nothing to deliver *us* from such temptation to this fault as our infirmities of disposition may occasion. The scruples which have prevailed with the author of the "Elements of Morality" were unknown to the author of the "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences"; who has replied (Book II. ch. 5) openly to an article in the "Edinburgh Review," citing chapter and verse; and if he has thus been tempted to a pungency of which, in the present case, we have no occa-

sion to complain, he has also preserved a brevity for which, in these lectures, we vainly sigh.

In these animadversions, we do not impute to Dr. Whewell the slightest degree of conscious injustice. He has no doubt represented our objections as they appeared to him. That he has not represented them with invariable fidelity, may be the fault of the original, not of the version; only, while the original is kept out of sight, the translator plainly has the matter all his own way.

Nothing that appears in these lectures at all relieves the first and fundamental objection to our author's "Elements of Morality." He seems to us to misplace his whole subject upon the map of human knowledge; to exhibit it in false and fanciful relations; especially, to proceed upon its assumed analogy to geometry; and, in consequence, to force upon it a method of treatment of which it is entirely unsusceptible. Let us put before us the design which he wishes to realize; and examine it in relation to the method adopted for its accomplishment. What is our author's *proposition?* To construct a "body of morality," avoiding and postponing the "theory of morality." And how does he attempt this? By the geometrical course of deduction, beginning with certain so-called "axioms," and proceeding, by logical derivation from these, to draw up a complete system of precepts for the regulation of human life. And in what way does he describe the result supposed to be obtained by such process? As a "system of truths," analogous to the collection of propositions in which an optical treatise expounds and reasons out the laws of light; distinguished from this not by any peculiarity of *method*, but only by having to deal with a different subject-matter, with volitions not with rays. Now we do not hesitate to pronounce the whole undertaking impossible, and the author's conception of it absurd. He cannot construct a "body of morality," of any higher value than a catechism or book of proverbs, except as the result of a previous and complete "theory of morality." He cannot connect the

parts of such a "body" together by logical filiation, or commence it with self-evident first principles. And when it is produced, it will not be a series of truths at all, and will differ from a scientific treatise, not less in its structure, than in the matter of which it treats. We will begin with the last point, and ascend to the first.

Let the supposed "body of morality," whether put together by Solomon or by Dr. Whewell, have been produced. What is it? How does it read? "Lie not. Lust not. Hate not. Train the children in thy house. Succour the wretches at thy door." Here is a set of precepts, a directory of action; but no truths. And such as the sample is, will the entire assortment be. It will not contain a proposition susceptible of proof or of contradiction; but will be wholly made up of *rules* of conduct. Can it be necessary to insist upon the difference,—fundamental in relation to the present argument,—between a system of instructions for the guidance of the will, and a series of beliefs recommended to the Understanding? Of the former, you cannot affirm, as of the latter, that they are *true or false;* but only that they are fit or unfit for a certain end. Except in relation to that end, no judgment of them can be formed; their validity being not logical, but practical. To collect and arrange them is the business, not of science, but of art; a distinction not arbitrary and verbal, but founded upon an essential difference of procedure in the two cases. If I attempt to exhibit a system of truths, what order shall I follow?—the order of demonstration, by which thought advances step by step in apprehension and discovery. But what, if I frame a body of rules? I shall follow the order of action, by which the will advances step by step in execution. Many of the truths in the former series afford reasons for the rules in the latter; and all the rules in the latter find their ground among the truths in the former. Pick out the rules, as they incidentally arise, from the first, or the truths from the second, and they will present an example of utter disorder,—practical confusion in

the one case, logical incoherence in the other. The scientific elements that lie scattered along the path of art may be rudely compared to types disposed in alphabetic succession for the convenience of the printer's hand. When presented in the order of knowledge, they are like the same types thrown into words and propositions, and suggesting a connected sense. Or the difference may be illustrated by the arrangement of articles in a cyclopedia of reference, contrasted with the exposition of the same materials in a systematic work of science. That the order of the *things to be done* for any end must be widely different from the order of the *reasons for doing them*, can hardly require proof or even illustration. Take the case of a treatise on land-surveying. It explains the instruments for measuring lines and angles, the chain, the theodolite, the repeating circle, the mode of using these for altitudes and for the horizontal plane; the formulas for the computation of triangles, the processes of verification, the correction for the spheroidal form of the earth. Gather together the principles on which these operations depend, and into how many sciences, remote from each other, are you obliged to dip? The plumb-line or the level bid you expound the law of terrestrial gravitation; your precautions in taking your base refer to the effects of heat; the observing instruments are constructed in adaptation to the properties of light; the trigonometrical equations are all a digression from the 4th proposition of Euclid's 6th Book, and the logarithmic tables from the principles of geometrical progression; the vertical heights go for their standard to the half-tide law, while latitudes and longitudes are determined by assuming the rotation, the shape, and the astronomical relations of the earth. The scheme of truths in which a body of *moral* rules find their scientific ground, is not indeed so amorphous and heterogeneous as this; but is equally incapable, till entirely recast, of forming a logical whole. The classification of *precepts in a code* will follow the order of our external business and relations; a classifi-

cation of the *reasons* for those precepts will follow the order of our internal moral constitution. The one will regulate its divisions by the *occasions* of action, the other by the *principles* of action. And since the same spring of volition, involving cases of moral choice perfectly similar in complexion, may manifestly run through all sorts of outward occasions, in the home, in the market, in the commonwealth, and on the theatre of nations, it is plain that the *objective* arrangement suitable for a body of rules cannot coincide with the *subjective* arrangement requisite for a system of truths.

Dr. Whewell then may take his choice, to give us a body of rules, or a system of truths; but he cannot give us *both* by one and the same operation. If this be allowed, then the next point clears itself without further trouble. Truths organize themselves into a "system" by being disposed in logical series. And since rules follow a different principle of arrangement, their order is *not* logical, and the claim to a nexus of ratiocination among them is an idle pretence. Precept is not deducible from precept, as truth is from truth. From the command, "Do not kill," I can no more infer (the very phrase is absurd), "Do not commit adultery," than from the rules of perspective I can learn how to mix colours. There is indeed a certain inferior department in the business of art, into which deduction may enter. When I have learned the general rules of linear perspective, and am called upon to apply them to a particular drawing which I propose to make, it becomes necessary to translate the comprehensive terms of the rule into the special conditions of the present case, to look out the actual positions and directions of which these terms give the generic description. This exercise, of fitting a mark of wide scope to the individual object or subordinate group of objects qualified to receive it, is undoubtedly a process strictly logical. Nor do we deny that there is room for it in morals, when once we have secured a complete and inflexible set of precepts, requiring only verbal inter-

pretation. This is the main business of the magistrate and the judge, when administering a statute law, and adapting it to cases brought into their court. This would be the main business of the Christian moralist and divine, if there were a verbal revelation, infallibly defining all possible positions of the human will and conscience. And no doubt it is the prevalence of this view of Scripture that has so completely pervaded the ethical theology of Christendom with exegetical acuteness and judicial logic, and left it so empty of the philosophical spirit. It is obvious that the moralist's work, as far as it consists of this operation, is concerned, not with the relations of things, but with the meaning of phrases; it simply determines whether this or that case does or does not come within the scope of a certain definition. If that definition was framed by some omniscient mind, whose intent must be an unerring guide, and whose formulas can be neither too narrow nor too large for the cases they are designed to embrace, then will this process of legal construction yield us verdicts of absolute right and wrong. But the value of the subordinate decisions is entirely measured by that of the general rule; and if, instead of being the true expression of natural law, it is only a rough generalization of our own, picked up from common life, hitting off the majority of instances, but having no pretension to unimpeachable precision, what do we gain by finding that here it fits, and there it fails? We see something of the contents, but learn nothing of the merits, of our arbitrary rule; we judge by the datum of enacted law, instead of approaching the *quæsitum* of perfect and unwritten law. The great office of the moralist is antecedent to this, and bears analogy to the task, not of the magistrate, but of the legislator. He has far other work than to weigh expressions and analyse definitions; namely, to shape into language a code yet unformed, faithfully representing the moral sentiments that characterize and consecrate human nature, and embracing the problems of external action that can be foreseen in human

life. We must get our rules before we can interpret them.

Now, incredible as it may seem, we believe that Dr. Whewell has no other idea of his function as a moralist than this of interpretation. He fancies himself not in the senate, but on the bench. In his circuit of human affairs he carries about with him certain ready-made formulas, into the origin and worth of which it is not his business to inquire; and supposes that, by trying the measure of these upon every problem, all moral doubts must vanish. Several examples indeed are given in the fourth lecture of the manner in which he resolves knotty questions of duty; any one of which will sufficiently illustrate our meaning. He first states that he is furnished with *five rules*, about which we must ask no questions; "*I have found them*,"—and that is enough. They are: "Be kind, be just, be true, be pure, be orderly." Once supplied with these, we have only "to discover their import in particular cases," to learn *what is just*, *what is true*, etc. (p. 92), and we get an infallible answer to every perplexity. Here is an example

"Of our mode of dealing with moral questions; and especially questions concerning duties of truth. For instance, take a common question: May I tell a lie to preserve my secret? I am the author of an anonymous work,—Junius, Waverley, an article in a review;—it is important to me to remain unknown as the author. I am asked if I am the author; or I am charged with being so. Am I compelled to confess; am I allowed to deny? To this I reply negatively to both inquiries. I am not compelled to confess; but I am not allowed to deny. I am not allowed, by the rules of morality, to say what is not true, because to tell the truth is inconvenient or disagreeable. The rule of truth, the conception of truth, admits of no such exception. The rule cannot be, never tell a lie except when to tell the truth is inconvenient or disagreeable to you. Such a rule would destroy the very nature of truth. It is not what we mean by truth; it is a rejection of the universal understanding which prevails among mankind. It is using words in a sense

in which I know mankind do not understand me to use them; I may not therefore deny; I may not say *no*, when they ask me if it is so."—(P. 95.)

We have no quarrel with our author's verdict in this matter; only with his mode of getting at it. "In the course of deduction by which we have been led so far" (p. 94), does our reader find any satisfactory answer to the original doubt? What does it all prove?—that if Sir Walter Scott denied the authorship of Waverley, he said what was not true. It needed no ghost,—and no professor,—to tell us that. Whoever doubted it? The question is not the ridiculous one, "whether a lie would, in such case, be *true*"? but "whether a lie would, in such case, be *right*"? Upon which our author laconically remarks, "Be true"! What possible help to the moral embarrassments of life can arise from this method of verbal equivalents? We do not want to have our rules construed, but shown to be trustworthy. Their meaning is usually plain; their obligation sometimes obscure. This obscurity is of a kind which no mere interpretation can clear up. It arises from the concurrent demand upon the same point of action of *two* rules, contradictory in their suggestions, but apparently equal in their obligation. Grotius is pursued by the officers of justice. His wife shuts him up in a box; and saves him by declaring it to be full of old divinity. Was she right? Dictionaries and deduction will hardly serve us here. Consuming the day in interpretations of "be kind," "be true," we make no progress; seeing that this adroit lady certainly *was* "*kind*": certainly was *not* "*true*." There is nothing for it but to effect a choice between our rules, for one of them, unhappily, must go to the wall; and it is the moralist's business to find some just ground of choice. It has entirely escaped Dr. Whewell (even while using the phrase "conflicting duties") that this is the real nature of all "cases of conscience." He treats them as arising from the obscurity of a single precept, instead of from the

collision of two. Accordingly, while he labours hard at the *construing* of his "five rules," he makes no provision for *comparing* them, and assigning to them an internal order of precedence. Evading thus the major duty of the real moralist, to trifle amid the minor business of the verbal interpreter, he is hardly entitled to plead against us for the dignity of casuistry, and to rebuke us in the following terms for our estimate of its Jesuitical tendency. We have at least set it upon a more respectable foundation than our author.

"The moralist must have some method of solving cases of conscience. When a man, wishing to do right, and labouring in the agony of a struggle of apparently conflicting duties, asks the moralist, what he ought to do, it will not suffice that the moralist should tell him that cases of conscience are mischievous and corrupting things; that they arise out of some sinister influence, some vicious propensity lurking in the heart. This may be so; but this, uttered in general terms, with whatever vivacity of imagery and vehemence of manner, does not help the poor inquirer in the particular case. He wants to learn *which* is the sinister side of the question; which is the worse, and which the better way. If the moralist cannot tell him this, how is he a moralist? or what is the value and application of his speculations"?—(P. 98.)

If the man in an agony were to carry his "case" to our author, we happily know,—for the next page informs us,—how conclusive an answer he would get.

"Our replies to questions as to what men must do, will necessarily take this aspect; *they must do that which will tend to make their moral being most truly moral*"!—(P. 99.)

If the moralist can tell them *this*, is he not a moralist?

Interpretation, then, will only distribute ethical precepts to their several cases; but will not enable us to deduce rule from rule. And if our "body of morality" have not the structure of a chain of reasoning, its primary elements cannot be related to the rest, as its supporting links. It

does not take its commencement from "*axioms*." There can be no axioms in art, for every rule has its reason. They belong exclusively to science, where *not every* truth can have its reason, but some must stand at the fountain-head of evidence, and be assumed as possessing a maximum of certainty. Our author's account of axioms in his "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," has always appeared to us open to conclusive objections; but we were not prepared to find, in a writer of such eminent attainment, the confused apprehension of their nature which these lectures betray. "Fulfil your promises"; "give to each man his own"; "love men as men," are here called *self-evident truths*. Why, they are not truths at all; they are injunctions, which an opponent might dispute as unsound advice, but could not contradict as false propositions. As well might we designate as an axiom the precept, "Do not build your house upon a swamp." The counsel is obviously good in all these instances; but it is good in reference to a certain end, readily conceived of by the mind, though suppressed in the exhortation. This peculiarity,—the reference to a suppressed end,—attaches to all *imperative* forms of speech, distinguishes them from the *indicative*, and makes it improper to treat them as statements of truth. Nor does a mere grammatical metamorphosis from mood to mood at all get rid of this impropriety, as Dr. Whewell seems to imagine. The precepts just enumerated do not acquire the character of axioms by being translated into the following categorical form: "Promises are to be performed"; "each is to have his own"; "man is to be loved as man"; "to build your house upon a swamp is stupid." The suppressed end is not shaken out into the light by this change; nor is it cancelled; it still lurks in the expression, and detains it from being the assertion of a truth. As the word "stupid" denotes that the act to which it is applied secures the needless *failure* of certain ends assumed to be desirable; so the phrases, "*are to be* performed,"—"*is to* have,"—"*is*

to be loved,"—mark the *necessity* of the actions named, as conditions of some unquestionable good. In order to convert the precept of art into a proposition of science, this suppression must cease; the end must be named; and the relation to it of the prescribed act as its condition must be affirmed as a matter of fact. Thus we obtain truths, instead of rules, when we say: "To build your house upon a swamp is the way to loss of health"; "to perform your promises is a thing which you feel to be obligatory." It is not necessary that the implied *end* which is to be sought or avoided should be an external consequence of the act, like the loss of health caused by the pestilential site of a dwelling. It may be an internal accompaniment or character of the act, like the feeling of violated obligation attendant on a breach of promise. And this, we conceive, is the peculiarity which distinguishes from all others the two arts of æsthetics and morals. Their rules are good, as satisfying the feeling of beauty in the one case, the sense of authority or higher worth in the other. The *truths*, therefore, which supply the reasons of such rules, must be the stated laws of our imagination and conscience. If those laws are ascertained by *immediate* self-consciousness, so as to be recognized without any perceptible analysis and induction, then the propositions affirming them may be properly called axioms. But at all events, to possess this character, they must cease to be *precepts* and be *bonâ fide indicative* predications.

Do we then "deny that there can be moral axioms"? Not in the least. We only say that, if there be such, they are statements of *psychological facts*, belonging to the province of knowledge; and that the treatise at the head of which they stand, must either be a theory of moral sentiments, or a production anomalous and incoherent. Do we "deny that there can be a rationally connected system of moral truths"? Far from it; we only say, that whoever exhibits such a system does *not* give us a "body of morality," but a chapter from the science of human nature and society. What is the use then of our author's pro-

tracted labours, to prove "that there are moral truths"; and "that these should be definitely expressed and rationally connected"? Nobody questions it; but only whether "thou shalt not kill" is a moral truth; and whether it is logically connected with "thou shalt not steal." There may be plenty of deduction and demonstration possible; and yet it may be an instrument wholly unfit for constructing a code, with omission of a theory, of morals. It *cannot* do what Dr. Whewell would attempt with it; it *cannot help* doing what he has omitted.

The fifth lecture of the present series is intended to explain the author's views of the relation between law and morality. He complains of having been misapprehended upon this matter; disclaims any design to make law the basis of morality; and thinks that he ought to have been safe from such a charge, because the second book of his Elements, though entirely devoted to an exposition of Roman and English law, is put to no use in the succeeding parts of this work of "rigorous reasoning." Without remarking upon this extraordinary ground of defence, we will proceed at once to the corrected account now given of the relation between moral duties and legal obligations. After the most careful attention to our author's statements, we find it extremely difficult to say precisely what he means; but the following three things do appear to be distinctly affirmed upon this subject: That the difference between law and morality is the difference between external action and internal principle; that the law must define men's outward rights and relations, and morality adopt these definitions in its rules; that law being compared to an inscription, morality may be said to give the interpretation.

The first of these positions lies at the foundation of a large portion of Dr. Whewell's system. Yet when we begin to point out its unsoundness, we are met by expressions indicative of an opinion less open to objection. We find this variance from himself a phenomenon of such frequent occurrence in our author's writings, that we have ceased to

lay any stress upon particular phrases or even entire propositions, till we have tested them by comparison with the general currency of his thought. In the present instance, if he were to quote, in evidence of his opinion, the following sentence: "In our code, law is *a portion* of the letter, morality is *the whole* of the spirit" (p. 113), we could only say, that if this happy statement had been steadily adhered to, the criticism we are about to make would have had no place. But we venture to affirm that our author habitually presents the matter before his mind in this way: "Law is the letter, morality is the spirit"; and that some important fallacies are introduced by this curtailed conception. Take the following passage, remembering that the word rights denotes only *legal rights*:—

"What guidance do we obtain from comparing the narrow range of rights [that is law], with the wide expanse of what is right [that is morality]? What is *the* reason of the great difference of compass in the terms?

"The reason is plainly this: that men in determining rights, have selected only such portions of the supreme rule as bear upon visible and tangible things; and upon such actions relative to these, as are of an external and obtrusive character, introducing evident disturbance into the system of which men are parts. Hence they forbid theft, but not covetousness; adultery, but not lust. They are content to keep men's material interest in tolerable balance; they do not deal with the heart and mind. They regulate the external conduct, but do not attempt to reach the internal principle of action.

"This satisfies *them*. It is well that it does so; for it is all that they can do. Human laws cannot do much, in the region of internal principle. But though this satisfies law, it does not satisfy morality. *She* must go deeper than this. That she must do so is evident from what I have said already, of the extent of her domain; everything which is or may be right or wrong belongs to her. Hence, she must have something to do with intentions, as well as acts; for those, too, may be right or wrong. It is wrong to intend to steal, though I do not;—to put my hand in a man's pocket for that purpose, though I find nothing there;—to watch him with that intent, though the eye

of the policeman withholds me. Not only intentions, but desires and emotions, are wrong; it is wrong to grudge another man's happiness; to have a spite at him. There is a vast and varied field of desires, affections, sentiments, mental processes, all which must be subject to morality, for all may be right and may be wrong; and the supreme law must include all these; and must, according to the case, decide which of these two, right or wrong, each of these things is."—(P. 83.)

The same distinction is stated in the Elements of Morality:—

"Law deals with matters external and visible, such as objects of desire (things), and actions, and thus creates rights. Morality has to do with matters internal and invisible; with desires and intentions, as well as with laws and rights."—(§ 460.)

Once more:—

"We know that morality must go far beyond law, *and must do this in an inward direction*. It must go to virtues of the heart, as well as actions of the hand."—(P. 101.)

This is the only boundary ever drawn between the two provinces, that offer themselves for definition. It did not occur to Dr. Whewell to ask, If law is but *a portion* of the letter, what is *the rest* of that letter; and what separates the part *within* the law, from the residue *without*? These omitted portions of external conduct, which are not spoken of at the Inns of Court, are worth a little inquiry. It is unfortunate, we think, that our author, having indirectly recognized them in one transient expression, never approaches them again; for they spoil his whole project for marking out the field of human duty.

That the qualification for coming under the notice of law is *not* the "external and visible," or even the "obtrusive," and "disturbing" character of an action, must be evident on the slightest reflection. The very examples adduced do not support the assertion. All the *vices* of lust are equally overt acts, and sources of wide-spread and devastating

wretchedness; why is adultery made the only *crime* of lust? The scolding of a vixen is of a highly "obtrusive character, introducing evident disturbance into the system of which men are parts"; yet, we lament to say, no law forbids it. Instances may be accumulated without end, of outward actions highly detrimental to the right order, the security, even "the material interests" of society, which legislation passes by in silence. In primitive communities, there is undoubtedly a tendency in the lawgiver to provide enactments suitable to all these cases, and extend his cognizance over the whole of human life. But by degrees it is found that some offences evade definition; others are beyond detection; yet more are best encountered by the retribution of private sentiment; till in the codes of civilized nations a very large portion of conduct is entirely dropped from magisterial care. No classification, therefore, of existing legal obligations can give more than a *selection* from the table of contents which exhibits our *actual*, and perhaps once enacted, obligations.

Yet our author's whole scheme of duty is so framed as to cover only this narrow base,—indeed to grow up from it by the mere protrusion and parallel fluxion of its outline into higher regions. His morality is, in its very nature and by the necessity of its structure, a mere elongation of law, without the possibility of any widening of its compass. For it is raised by the following process: First, the analysis of law presents us with five classes of rights: of person,—of property,—of family,—of civil authority,—of contract; which are defended by a corresponding number of precepts: do no violence; do not steal; do not commit adultery; do not disobey authority; do not break a contract. Secondly, law being the police of action, morality, of intention, the five prohibited offences of the one must have, answering to them, five dispositions prohibited by the other; drawing these out, we have this set of moral precepts: bear no malice; do not seek what is another's; do not deceive; do not lust; do not desire to break the

law. Thirdly, these negative prohibitions, translated into positive injunctions of the contrary dispositions, present us with the five cardinal virtues: be benevolent; be just; be true; be pure; be orderly. These fill up the entire scope of "the supreme rule." (Pp. 87–90.)

Now what are the objects upon which, in this scheme, the ban of morality is set? *the mental springs of legal offences.* And what are the objects that lie within the circle of its approbation? *the mental states that indispose for legal offences.* Within the limits of the one is comprised all that is wrong; within the limits of the other, all that is right. Here then, undeniably, we have a morality precisely, and by its own gauge, coextensive with law; with background indeed *behind* the law, but with no margin *beyond* it. Extra-legal conduct, with its sources in the mind, contributes nothing to it, is wholly omitted from it, and might as well have no existence. For this would make no difference; the symmetry and proportions of our author's system would remain exactly as they are. He manifestly forgets, throughout this stratification of duty within the framework of obligation, that "law is" but "a *portion* of the letter"; and that its projection can give but a portion "of the spirit." The shadow of a fragment cannot have the form of the whole.

Is, then, Dr. Whewell's morality of so low a cast, that a legal conduct, backed by a legal spirit, satisfies all its claims? Far from it. His bad method would make it so; but his better mind forbids it. He gives you a beggarly account of his resources to begin with; and comes out very handsomely in the end. The narrow plot for the foundation gets covered by a capacious and disproportioned roof. He effects this, so as to evade the consequences of his false commencement, by stretching his terms at every stage, and making them take in more than they profess. Thus the mental source of adultery is first described as "desire of her who is another's"; for which, on the next page, is quietly substituted the far more comprehensive

word "lust,"—a word, however, still limited in its meaning to *one* passion. Then, when prohibition of the evil has to be turned round into command of the good, instead of naming the *right* state of this one passion as contrary to the *wrong*, our author slips in the word *purity;* thus stealthily widening his empire over *all* the bodily appetities; nay, over every desire that can be classed with "the lower parts of our nature"; for his own definition of purity is the "control of the lower parts of our nature by the higher." If all this can be made out from the prohibition of adultery, it is easy to see, how, by the stretching system, any magnitude of morality, however great, may be elicited from any quantity of law, however small. The fact is, no real and honest deduction has any place in all this system-building. That law serves in the capacity of guide to morality, and conducts our author to the provinces of duty, else undiscovered or inaccessible, is all a pretence. It is a piece of capital acting, we confess: still we never quite forget that the professor is on the boards. He and jurisprudence put on the air of meeting for the first time; are in the charming excitement of a first acquaintance; he is in raptures at her hidden knowledge, and vows to resign himself to her direction. But all the while they understand one another very well. Affecting to be led, he is the real conductor of his guide. With all his solemn, blindfolded look, he has excellent peep-holes for seeing his way. Mesmerized by the Pandects, he passes, through curious attitudes of logical catalepsy, into a state of ethical clairvoyance; push a pin, shallow or deep, into the book of morals, and he will tell you the doctrine which it pricks; the sly Alexis possessing a certain private acquaintance with the volume, and having shuffled the leaves till he caught the page.

The next relation between law and morality on which these Lectures insist can be presented in a brief quotation:—

"Law supplies the definitions of some of the terms which morality employs, and without these definitions, moral rules

would be indefinite, unmeaning, and inapplicable. Morality says, you shall not seek another man's property; law defines what *is* another man's property, and what is mine. Morality says, you shall not desire her who is another's wife; law determines whether she be his wife. Morality says, willingly obey or wisely rule, according to your station in civil society; law determines what your station is. In this way, certainly, our moral precepts depend for their actual import upon law. But I do not see how we can have any moral precepts which do not depend upon law in this sense. To what purpose does morality say to me, Do not desire the house, or the field, or the wife, or the authority, which is another's; if I am allowed to take out of the hands of the law the decision of the matter, what or who is another's and to determine it for myself, in some other way? I certainly do not pretend to make morality independent of law to this extent. Our morality does not think it a degradation to listen to the voice of law, when law pronounces about matters which especially belong to her;—matters which no other voice can decide, and which must be decided. So far, we accept from law the determination of certain fixed points in the external world of things, in order that, in the internal world of thought and will, there may be something to determine the direction which thought and will must take."—(P. 103.)

Now, if to this extent morality *is*, in our author's view, dependent upon law, we should be curious to see the range of its *independence* defined; and to know what prerogatives it can ever acquire *against* the law, whose definitions it is obliged to accept. The way in which these definitions are mentioned, as if they merely named certain indifferent external objects, about which, as the physical materials of action, morality has occasion to speak, is altogether misleading. To say that law is the mere lexicographer, engaged prior to the formation of ethical rules, in preparing the terms which morality, on her entrance, must combine into rules, is to degrade *both*;—law, by depriving it of its moral character;—morality, by binding it to legal interpretations. The definitions of law are nothing but so many moral rules complete, and not the mere vocabulary

for their construction. When, for example, it "defines what is another man's property, and what is mine," it declares what *he is to have*, and what *I am to have;* and what is this but to prohibit our interference with each other, and the interference of any one else with us? From the very nature of the case, to define rights is to make rules; these are but different designations of the same real thing; views of the same human relation from its opposite ends. A *right* names something as an object of defence; a *rule* names the same thing as not to be an object of offence. If therefore the moralist is to wait for the definitions of jurists, he is entirely superseded; there is nothing remaining for him to do, unless he choose to repeat their words, and say Amen. If he is "to accept from the law the determination of certain *fixed points*," what is left to him, within the province of jurisprudence, but to register its edicts? How can he pronounce a law *immoral*, adopting all the while its "definitions" and "accepting its points" as "fixed"? Try the question in the very cases adduced by Dr. Whewell as illustrations. "Morality says, you shall not seek another man's property; law defines what *is* another man's property." A female captive from Dacia is given to a lady of fashion about Trajan's Court, as her *ornatrix*, or lady's maid. The lady is passionate, and particular about her headdress; and day by day the poor maid is submitted to the thong for the imperfection of a braid, or hung up by the hair to be lashed for the scratching of a comb. The humanity of a Christian neighbour is excited by her cries; and he secures her escape and restores her to her country. Is he a thief? and have moralists nothing to say about him, except that, having interfered with what the "law defines to be the property of another," he has violated their rules? Terence, the poet, was a free Carthaginian; but was kidnapped and sold into slavery. By the Roman law, the offence of his kidnapper was precisely the same as that of Trajan's Christian neighbour; both were man-stealing, and came under the definition of

plagium. Is morality "to accept the definition," and treat it as a "fixed point" that the two acts are on a level? Again, if a captive girl is sent into the harem of an oriental tyrant, and a noble-minded youth, knowing something of her history, and regarding her with pity and affection, rescues and marries her, is the moralist to accept the legal determination that she is another's wife, and to pronounce the young man guilty of adultery? If he is not, then jural definitions may be disregarded in ethical judgments, and are *not* "the fixed points by which moral positions must be determined." But if he *is* (and this certainly ought to be Dr. Whewell's decision), then how can it be denied that the morality expounded in this book *does* "substantially depend upon law"?

In reading the "Elements of Morality," no part of its peculiar phraseology and reasoning appeared to us more original and less admirable than that in which moral affections are shown to be indispensable, because, without them, jural commands would be in the sad plight of having "no significance." This language is explained and defended at considerable length in the fifth lecture; with no result discoverable by us, except a new and ampler evidence of the author's inexactitude of thought and expression. With the familiar comparison evidently running in his mind, of "the letter and the spirit," he presents us with the following illustration of the relation between law and morality,—or, as they are here termed, obligations and duties; in which law is presented as an unintelligible inscription which we have found; morality, as the key discovered for its subsequent interpretation.

"To obligations there must be duties corresponding, though reaching much further into our being. The obligations are superficial, but they may serve to mark the direction and position of the duties; they are like buoys, which float on the surface, and mark the place of the anchor below. They are like some of the easiest words in an inscription which we are trying to decipher; the inscription speaks of things the most

profound and abstract, but there are also terms which signify wood and stone, loaves and houses. If we succeed in discovering the key to this inscription, we probably find out, first, the meaning of these terms of common use; and these thus understood confirm us in our belief that the alphabet and vocabulary which we have adopted are the true ones. And thus we hold that our moral alphabet and vocabulary are true, because, according to them, the laws which have universally prevailed among mankind have a moral meaning. Our duties, I have said (*Elem.* 279), give significance,—a moral significance,—to our obligations; and we must have such duties as shall give meaning to our legal obligations. Our moral system must be such that the obligations between men, acknowledged as binding by the law of all societies, shall correspond to duties of the affections by which such men are bound according to their social relation."—(P. 113.)

Whether our readers, more accustomed than we to "things the most profound and abstract," more familiar, it may be, with our author's hieratic style, can decipher this illustration in a way convincing to themselves, we cannot tell. But we must freely confess our own failure;—puzzled chiefly by this; that the key which promises the most satisfactory results at the beginning, leaves us quite at fault towards the end. First, the inscription is resolved into two groups of terms, namely: (1) certain "easiest words," signifying "wood and stone, loaves and houses"; and (2) certain abstract words, denoting things "most profound." Asking ourselves what these are to stand for, we find a direct answer as to the *first:* the "easy words" are the "obligations" of law. Nothing remains for the *second*, then, but the contrasted "duties" of morality; and this, undoubtedly, was the author's meaning. The whole inscription has of course to be read off; so that the moral duties are here described as the more recondite *objects of interpretation*, remaining obscure *till after* we have got at the meaning of the legal obligations. As *both* parts are successively submitted to study and explanation, *neither* can be treated as the *key* applied to the deciphering process; but if either

could be loosely designated in this way, it would be the *easy part*, first read, and so assisting us through the darker portion that remains. That is to say, law helps us to the meaning of morality. Unhappily, however, this is just the opposite to the doctrine which was to be illustrated. The lecturer, having apparently some obscure sense of this, and feeling that the split inscription does not answer, shuffles it all together again into one, and adjusts his pair of types and antitypes after a fashion entirely new. And *now*, the words of the inscription as a whole are made to stand for legal obligations; and duties become the *key*—"the moral alphabet and vocabulary"—by whose tentative application the cipher gives a sense. Thus duties, which, six lines above, were the most *abstruse objects* of interpretation, suddenly turn out to be the *given instruments* of interpretation. A writer whose mind can thus slip about among images and relations, without consciousness of the incompatibility of their parts and the shifting of their terms,—and this at the very moment of elaborate vindication of his own precision,—betrays, in our opinion, a deficient command of the first requisites for successful philosophic thought.

Gathering together what Dr. Whewell has to say upon this part of his subject, we obtain the following luminous results:—

That law enjoins only *some* things that are right; but the intention to do this part is coextensive with the intention to do the whole.

That morality must accept the moral determinations of law; yet law is not the basis of morality.

That we must get at our morality through law; yet law is without meaning till we have got our morality.

Since the days of the Sphinx, we have heard of no enigmas more perplexing than these, which harass the gates and intercept the paths of philosophy at Cambridge. We trust they may raise up some Œdipus to unriddle them. It is enough for us to have explained why we cannot solve them.

It is a favourite doctrine of Dr. Whewell's, that human life has a certain *summum bonum*, towards the attainment of which all our voluntary powers should be directed. He conceives it to be nothing else than *rectitude* or "*rightness*," and regards this as the positive and purposed object at which, in every department of our agency, we should deliberately aim. Thus morality is, in his view, not the RULE of life, presiding over our pursuit of natural good, and preventing the lower from encroaching on the claims of the higher; but the END of life, which insists on having all natural good as its instrument, and is jealous of anything but itself being loved for its own sake. Hence we are never to be let alone in our affection for the most innocent objects or the dearest and most unexceptionable persons. Not only is our clinging to them to give way, when they would detain us from objects of higher claim; but our ordinary and unoffending attachment to them is not to remain simple and unanxious. It must be used and studied as a means of self-construction; instinct and affection are not merely to be restrained from transgressing their proper limits, but to be stiffened into the pedagogic character, and through life keep us locked up at school. "Things are to be desired as means to moral ends"; "property," for instance, "for the sake of equal laws"; and persons are to be loved *en passant*, as we proceed to universal benevolence.

Of this doctrine, which appears to us radically fallacious, Dr. Whewell renews his defence:—

"The possession of wealth may be a discipline of internal justice. Each man may have his own. Each man desires his own, by a natural desire, in which there is nothing moral, any more than there is in hunger or thirst. But each man may also desire to possess his own, because he desires that all men should possess their own; and thus, the desire acquires a moral character. And except the love of wealth and the use of wealth tend to this character, it cannot enter as an element into our moral education, as these, along with all other desires and

actions, ought to do. The love of equal and steady laws, in the progress of man's moral culture, tends to supersede the love of the wealth which such laws give him. This is evident; for, in a moral man, if it once appear that such laws give a portion of his wealth to another, the love of justice at once overcomes the love of riches, and he resigns without a struggle what he so possesses. And in order that this may be clearly brought into view, as a consequence of our principles, I would place, among those principles, this: that all external *things are to be desired as means to moral ends;* and this I would call the principle of moral purpose."—(P. 112.)

Surely the reasoning here fails to support the rule. The "moral man," throwing up the possessions in whose title he finds a flaw, gives no proof of loving his wealth as a *means* of just law; but only in *subserviency* to just law. There is no relation of *means to ends* in the case; but simply this, that, of two things good in themselves,—say (for shortness) property and justice,—the lower is not permitted to have preference over the higher. The error of the lecturer consists in the assumption that one thing cannot be *subordinate* to another, unless by being its *instrument*,—an error which we trace through his whole system, —a perpetual source of fallacy and paradox.

The instrumental position and culture of the *affections* is justified by similar and not more conclusive considerations:—

"To love our brethren is a step towards loving all mankind as brethren; a step which helps us to the next. We see then that family love, besides the recommendation of being natural, which, taken simply, is not a moral recommendation, has the recommendation of being capable of forming a part of the moral progress which leads us towards that universal love to which morality points as one of her cardinal objects. To love well the members of our especial family is a good way of learning to love all the members of the great human family.

"In saying this, do I offer this universal benevolence as a consideration which is to lead us to the love of the members of our family; of father or of brother? Plainly not."—(P. 117.)

We should have said, "Plainly yes." Why offer us a consideration, showing the love to be a duty, *if not* "to lead us" to cultivate that love? What is the use of telling us that we must not be content with the natural feeling, because it is not moral, but must work at it deliberately, as the best way to philanthropy, unless you mean to present the affection to us as a proper object of quest and care?

It will be observed that our author's great anxiety is to impart to the affections a *moral* character, which, in their natural state, they do not possess. He proposes to effect this by making them instrumental to "the cardinal objects" of morality, and recommending them to us in that view. Good. Only, if this instrumentality can *moralize* a feeling, there is no sentiment in our nature which has not the same title of cultivation as a duty. Even resentment is put, by Dr. Whewell's own hand, on this precise ground of claim:—

"Resentful affections, I grant you, *have* a rightful office in man's nature. That office is to give energy to the love of justice. This is done, when such affections are no longer personal, but simply moral; when our swelling heart no longer impels us to the revenge of our own injury, but to the redress of all wrong; when resentment for offences is absorbed in indignation against all injustice. This is the office of the angry affections; and in this direction they are to be permitted and confirmed."—(P. 117.)

Resentment then, it would seem, is to be cherished as leading to that love of justice, which is one of the "cardinal objects" of morality. The same plea will obviously avail for every component element of our constitution. There surely is *no* primitive affection of which it may not be said, that it "has a rightful office in man's nature," and that it must exist as an operative influence in a perfect character. If this be the test by which we recognize a moral quality in our springs of actions and emotion, they are all moral alike; and nothing can be more futile than the attempt, by

such means, "to determine *which* of our natural affections may be recognized as being also duties, and which may not."

But while we deny that an affection is made moral by its "cardinal" tendency, we do not maintain that it becomes so by simply being natural. The philosopher, we conceive, might hunt forever among the different properties of an affection, taken by itself, without finding the source of the *approbation* it may receive; for this plain reason,—that *no one thing*, but only *one of two*, can be approved or disapproved; and a moral character can never be recognized in a propensity, till it comes into comparison with another, inferior to it, which vainly disputes with it for the same point of action. A being with *one* instinct only could not be a moral being. A second being, with *another* and *higher* instinct, operating also alone, would lie under the same disqualification. But a third being, endowed with both, and able to feel their relative worth, is introduced, by their coexistence, into a responsible life; and comes under an obligation to confine the lower of the two within the range of action in which the other finds no field. The moment he fails to do this, the usurping affection becomes, simply by its usurpation, *immoral*. It is vain therefore to attempt a classification of our springs of action as moral and immoral. All, above the lowest, may be moral; and all, below the highest, may be immoral. But whenever they assume either the one character or the other, it is not in consequence of any permanent quality, but a result of relative place; it does not befall them taken singly, but in pairs. The attempt to give to certain affections a standard moral character, without any regard to the competing feelings which they exclude, seems to us to lead our author, in common with other writers of equal name, into much fallacious reasoning. In dismissing that which he has connected with the present topic, we have only to add, that we do not wish him to admit all natural affections, as such, to his approbation. They do not want to be

approved. We would simply have them let alone, till a worse excludes a better, for then only do they become immoral, and want to be condemned. Moralists, like physicians, are too apt to push their prescriptions upon the healthy, instead of reserving themselves for disease; to invent artificial reasons for what everybody, unless annoyed by exhortation, will do of his own accord; and to fancy themselves the improvers of nature, rather than her vindicators and interpreters.

We are obliged to leave unnoticed many topics touched upon in Dr. Whewell's explanations. His doctrine of the Supreme Rule,—an incongruous agglutination of Aristotle and Butler,—must pass without further analysis. Nor can we ask our reader's patience, while we unravel the tangled thread of reasoning in the sixth lecture on the connection between virtue and happiness. The particular relation of the Cambridge professor's system to that of Epicurus, we will leave it to the future historian to discuss; with the greater willingness, because not ambitious to appear as champions of the philosophy of the Garden. Enough perhaps has been said to sustain the positions which we deemed it right to take up in our former review; and only enough omitted, to prevent questions permanent for the philosopher disappearing in the transient interests of the polemic. The necessities of self-defence, and the peculiarities of our work have led us, more than we could desire, into criticism of expression, and animadversions upon method. To a superficial reader these things are apt to appear like a mere estimate of an author, rather than an examination of his doctrine. Even were it so, Dr. Whewell is a man whose pretensions are so well established in some walks of science, that his just place in others is a matter not indifferent to European literature. But every student in philosophy will admit, and no one more readily than our author himself, that, in psychological questions, the sifting of language is the weighing of thoughts, and that judgment upon the method of a system may carry with it a verdict on the contents.

X.

THEORY OF REASONING.*

WHEN a gentleman of Sheffield publishes a reply to the Tutor of Alexander the Great, there is enough in the mere chronology of such a controversy to induce a spirit of caution and respect. It is no blind veneration for antiquity, but only a rational estimate of the forces operative in human nature, to feel, that a philosopher who, like Aristotle, has propagated an influence through upwards of two thousand years; who has formed the scientific vocabulary of nations and languages foreign to his own; whom neither the officiousness of idolatrous admiration nor the reaction of extravagant contempt has been able to displace; and who still distributes to his commentators and interpreters the freshest palm of intellectual fame,—must have possessed a marvellous depth and variety of endowment. No accidents of civilization, no fashion of academic pedantry, can account for an agency so powerful and prolonged; nor can any genius, capable of moulding and enriching such men as Hegel, Brandis, Trendelenburg, and Sir W. Hamilton, be other than comprehensive and penetrating. To such considerations, however, the critics of the Aristotelian logic are usually quite insensible. They are apt to look upon it with compassionate scorn, as a miserable child's-play, with whose profitless manœuvres no manly intellect will entangle itself.

* "The Theory of Reasoning." By Samuel Bailey. London: 1851.—*Prospective Review*, 1852.

From the time of Bacon to the present day, it has been the accepted mark of a "sound" and "practical" understanding to despise the Organon and ridicule the "Schoolmen." For a while, this feeling was more or less identified with the cause of the Reformation; which, in attacking the Dominican system, discredited the philosophy, no less than the theology, of the middle ages; and, in revising the doctrine of the Eucharist, disturbed the established realism, and demanded a new theory of universals. But in the present day, the polemic against Aristotle proceeds mainly from the disciples of the "positive philosophy," and is identified with no religious interest. It is conducted by the great expounders of the inductive method; the exclusive dominance of which over the whole realm of human thought requires that syllogistic be degraded and deposed. Of recent attempts to reduce the laws of deduction and the principles of mathematical evidence to the same type with the logic of natural science, Mr. J. S. Mill is by far the most searching and ingenious. Mr. Bailey now brings to the illustration of the same doctrine his peculiar gifts of patient analysis and lucid exposition. He gives it the advantage of many felicitous statements, and relieves it of some paradoxical accessories with which his predecessor had burthened it; but its essential evidence receives, so far as we can discover, no accession at his hands; and, notwithstanding a strong predisposition to follow in a track protected by such powerful authorities, we are constrained to confess that we rise from the "Theory of Reasoning," as from the second book of the "System of Logic," with a feeling quite unsatisfied as to the soundness of their fundamental position. The nature of that position and of the scruples which deter us from admitting it, we will endeavour to make clear.

When reasoning is employed to establish a particular fact, the reasoner's mind follows a certain method which it is the aim of logicians to define. Often at least the particular fact seems to be authenticated to us by a general

law which includes it, and the preconception of which contains the secret of our assent to the conclusion. Thus we may accept the proposition, "The Swallow is a warm-blooded animal," on the strength of a rule previously known, but hitherto not specially applied, that "All birds are warm-blooded." To bring "the swallow" within the scope of the rule, nothing more is needful than that it be recognized as a "bird." When this recognition has been embodied (in the minor premiss), and the rule expressed (in the major), the conditions of belief are completely stated. In explaining the principle of this example, the common treatises would pronounce "Bird" to be the name of a class intermediate in magnitude between the larger one denoted by "Warm-blooded," and the smaller by "Swallow"; and would resolve the mental process into the axiom that whatever lies within a contained sphere lies within the containing. According to the prevalent doctrine, strenuously advocated by Archbishop Whately, this is the type of all reasoning whatsoever; and by no other method can any proposition, not a first truth, obtain credence. Mr. Bailey, on the other hand, while admitting it, under the name of "class-reasoning," to a real place among the methods of cogent proof, yet assigns to it a very insignificant range; and Mr. J. S. Mill denies to it the character of reasoning or inference at all; maintaining that it is absent from every acquisition of really new truth; and regarding it, when present, as a mere *interpretation* by the mind of its own past record as pertinent to an existing case. Neither writer would allow that, in the example just adduced, the general law, "All birds are warm-blooded" forms any essential element in the procedure. It is no part of the ground on which the conclusion actually rests; it probably may not come into thought at all, and only usurps the place, and disguises the aspect of the real evidence. That evidence will be found, not in the assumption about *all* birds, but in the observation of *other* birds, that they are warm-blooded. The universal rule itself is

presumed only on the strength of a limited induction of instances; and if the examination of a few hawks and sparrows and ptarmigans, etc., suffices to establish a property for birds in general, it cannot be inadequate to prove it of swallows in particular. It is in the discretion of the naturalist whether from his past experience he shall frame a rule for all similar cases, or form a judgment restricted to the nearest instance that occurs. He may reason in direct course from particular to particular, from his limited store of known facts to the unknown one awaiting his inference,—without calling by the way at the station of any general law. Thus to the conclusion, "The swallow is a warm-blooded animal," the proper major premiss is, not the *universal rule*, "All birds are warm-blooded." but the *collective fact*, "The hawk, the sparrow, the ptarmigan, and other birds hitherto examined, have proved to be warm-blooded," The joint and co-ordinate dependence on this collective fact of both the universal law and the particular inference, at the same time that they are independent of each other, Mr. Bailey illustrates by disposing them in the following order:—

"COLLECTIVE FACT.

All men, as far as observation has extended, have been found fallible.

Universal Law.	*Particular Inference.*
Therefore all men are fallible,—[*i.e.*, men of past times beyond the reach of observation, as well as those observed, *were* fallible; men of the present time, whether observed or unobserved, *are* fallible; and all future men *will be* fallible.]	Therefore the man Peter is fallible; *or*, The next generation of men will be fallible; *or*, Socrates, who lived more than two thousand years ago, was fallible.

"It is obvious," our author remarks, "that both these con-

clusions, both the universal law and the particular inference, are deduced from the same fact or collection of facts; they are, if I may so express it, abreast, or co-ordinate; one is not, or needs not be, logically subsequent to the other; or, to vary the language, both are probable inferences, for which the real evidence is the same. The mental process, too, is alike; it does not consist in the mind's discerning one thing to be implied in another, but in its being determined by known facts to believe unknown ones."—(P. 12.)

Not only does our author substitute in the major premiss the collective fact for the universal law, but he strikes out the minor premiss altogether; and regards the whole mental process as perfectly represented, when instead of a syllogism, we have an enthymeme drawing its conclusion from an incomplete enumeration. He says:—

"As a further illustration, let us examine a piece of reasoning often cited in logical treatises:

All horned quadrupeds are ruminant;
Therefore this horned quadruped is ruminant.

Whether we take this enthymeme as it is, or make it, by the introduction of a minor premise, into a regular syllogism, the conclusion drawn is irresistible. You cannot admit the premise and deny the conclusion, without self-contradiction.

"But the form into which the reasoning is thrown by using the general law as a major premise marks the real nature of the evidence for the conclusion. The real argument is,—

All *other* horned quadrupeds have been found to be ruminant;
Therefore this horned quadruped is ruminant.

It is because we have found horned quadrupeds to have been ruminant in all *other* cases, as far as our knowledge has extended, that we conclude that the horned animal before us is ruminant. The fact or collection of facts gathered from observation, without any contrary instance, is sufficient to determine the mind to believe the conclusion; but there would be no self-contradiction, although a want of sound sense, in admitting the premise and denying the inference. The reason is, not what is usually designated logical or demonstrative, but material or contingent. It is, nevertheless, all that we can possibly have in the case.

"Laying down the general law, that all horned quadrupeds are ruminant, has not the slightest power to change either the character of the facts of which it is the indication, or that of the conclusion to which it may lead. Material arguments cannot be converted into demonstrative proofs by any arrangement of propositions, or by any translation from one form into another."—(P. 46.)

The very language in which it is here contended that deduction is only induction in disguise, appears to us to betray a misapprehension of the purpose and the pretensions of logical science. The author complains that the metamorphosis of a collective fact into a general law creates no new evidence, and that a syllogistic disposition of parts cannot turn probability into certainty. Who ever professed any such art of intellectual legerdemain? What logician has failed to explain that his business was not with the *matter* but the *form* of thought,—not to change or strengthen the grounds of conviction, but to trace the mode of their mental operation? There are two conditions of all derivative belief; first, certain data objectively presented to the mind; secondly, a certain subjective manner of dealing with these. The former is the *thing thought;* the latter, *the rule by which we think it.* The one is the *evidence,*—the *proof;* the other is that peculiarity in the constitution of our faculties which makes it to *be* evidence and proof. It is with the latter alone that the logician is concerned; he adverts to the former merely as the instrument of his exposition; the relations involved in thinking requiring for their display a reference to some matter given to be thought. What he proposes to exhibit, when he manœuvres the elements of an argument into strange forms, is not the facts or considerations which establish the conclusion to a mind like ours; but the natural moulds of the mind itself into which the facts flow down, and without which they would not assume the shape of ratiocination. To tell him that the propositions which he offers, in order to lay bare the type of the reasoning process, never occur

to you at all,—that you do not bring before you a general maxim every time you judge of the future by the past, but directly transmute your particular experience into particular expectation,—is altogether irrelevant. He does not aim at reporting *what* you think, but *how* you think it; and it is not surprising that a record of your subjective action should appear to you no true account of the objects upon which it was engaged. The test which Mr. Bailey applies in order to estimate the merits of the syllogistic procedure is, in this view, completely erroneous. He evidently asks himself, "What statement will suffice to render a conclusion inevitable?" and limiting himself to the most frugal allowance that will put his hearers into condition to draw the inference, he charges everything beyond as a logical profuseness and impertinence. By this rule, however, he necessarily misses everything which logical investigation has any interest in discovering. For nothing requires *statement* to me except that which is absent from my mind and must be introduced in order to operate,—the external evidence *about* which I am to think;—this once given, the spontaneous action of the mind itself *silently* does the rest; the law of my own thought, being ever self-present, takes effect on the simple condition of having something delivered to its operation; it is secured to me in its latent reality, and dispenses, therefore, with all patent expression. It follows that when Mr. Bailey tries the experiment, how much can be spared from the statement of an argument without detaining the hearers from the conclusion, he incurs a logical blindness by his own act, and blocks out the whole sphere of knowledge professedly engaging his quest.

The effect of this error is, simply, that the evidence which he calls in order to destroy the case of the logicians is precisely what they require for its establishment. "We may score out," he says, "the minor premiss as a redundance"; —"certainly," they reply, "for, whether you speak or whether you suppress it, it lies provided for in the rules of intelligence itself." "The collective fact," he insists, "serves

perfectly for major premiss, though a mere record of particular experience";—"assuredly," they say, "and for this very reason, that without your aid it will pick up its universality within the mind itself, which cannot be hindered by any checks of language from reading off the particular into the general." That it is *competent* to us thus to generalize from partial experience, is of course admitted by Mr. Bailey, and is implied in all inductions whatsoever; the only question is, whether it is an invariable *essential* of all contingent reasoning. Our author contends that without any general conception of horned quadrupeds as ruminant, and, while as yet we are only on our way to such a conception, we may infer from past examples that "this horned quadruped is ruminant." We submit that the very language in which the reasoner is obliged to state the collective fact contradicts his doctrine. Does he describe it by simple enumeration of its component instances, left, as they occurred, in their crude individuality, and say, "The ox, the ram, the stag, is ruminant; so, therefore, is the elk"? Had the single cases been not yet made up into a class, or thought of under the notion of a certain nature, he must have resorted to language like this, if not to names more purely denotative still. Instead of this, he first uses words which travel out indefinitely beyond the record of his experience, and which designate a type ("horned quadrupeds"); and then ties them down by limiting epithets ("other" or "hitherto observed") to the definite past. The collective fact itself is thus conceivable only as a sub-case under a general law, and bears witness in its enunciation that that law is already extant in the mind. No one who had not the generic notion of "horned quadruped," could understand the phrase "horned quadrupeds *hitherto observed*"; it is intelligible only by limitation superinduced on a prior universal. It will, perhaps, be granted that this genus is already constituted in thought, but denied that it has mentally been pronounced "*ruminant*." It is plain, however,—for it is the very thing

affirmed as the collective fact,—that the ruminant property has never been enabled hitherto to absent itself from the notion of the genus, but has invariably coexisted with it. Wherever the one goes, the other attends; and as the idea of a class is always an open one,—not an enclosure of registered individuals, but a scheme potentially unlimited, —the concomitant ruminant attribute has been invested with similar universality. It is very possible, indeed, that it may never have been detached and made into a distinct predicate for "all horned quadrupeds"; it may have slept undisturbed till now within the notion of the genus, whose proper designation, therefore, would be that of "horned ruminant quadrupeds"; the present new case may happen to be first in which (from our having, for example, only the fossil remains) the attribute in question, suppressed from view, has parted company from its associates, and required to be separately supplied. But it never could be so supplied by the mind, did not the conception of the genus lay claim to it. It is the incompleteness of the type without it that necessitates the inference. The horns of the new animal would confer upon it no title to its ruminant character, but for the previous coexistence of hornedness and rumination in our conception of a certain indefinite class, exemplified in past instances, yet not restricted to them. It is evident, therefore, that the collective fact itself, used as a premiss, presupposes and represents the very generalization which it is introduced to supersede.

A fallacy, in short, lurks in the assertion, that men constantly reason from particular to particular. It is true if understood of the objects of thought; false, if of the mode of thinking. From particulars, *quâ* particular, nothing whatsoever can be inferred; they cease to be sterile only when accepted as signs of a general law. Mr. J. S. Mill tells us that the proposition "The Duke of Wellington is mortal" is an inference not from the universal rule "All men are mortal," but from the detailed observation that "John, Thomas, and Company, who were once living, are

now dead."* It is plain, however, that, if John, Thomas, and Company were taken merely as *individual objects* (which might be anything indifferently; *e.g.*, one, a horse, another, a dog, etc.), they would yield no conclusion. Their power to do so depends on their being *men*, samples of the same general type to which the Duke of Wellington is referred. It is this apprehended community of nature which spreads over *him* the attribute discovered in *them*; and if so, it is to that nature, as represented in them, and not to them as "particulars," that the mind attaches the notion of mortality. It will not be denied that, unless we could say to ourselves, "Now the Duke of Wellington also is a man," we should be precluded from all inference. In this minor premiss, however, the particularity is dropped, and the general word "man" is openly substituted for the individual names occurring in the major; the "humanity" is here picked out and confessedly put forward as the universal on which the conclusion hinges. Can there be a clearer proof that past dead men are available as evidence in this matter, only so far as they are translated out of their individual character into official specimens of a race? It is a matter of perfect indifference to this logical question, whether the words of the premiss proclaim the "collective fact" or the "general law," or even whether the imagination does or does not figure to itself actual past instances. Acts of special memory or conception do not exclude concurrent generalizations of thought, and can no more be construed into disproof of a deductive process, than the John Doe and Richard Roe of the lawyers can be regarded as private individuals. Indeed, this doctrine cannot even describe itself without using language which virtually surrenders it. "From observed instances," it is said, "we reason to unobserved." "*Instances*" of what? Is it not of a general law? The word is relative, and expresses "particulars regarded as standing under a comprehending rule, and presenting that rule to the mind." Where facts are taken

* System of Logic, Book II. ch. iii. § 3.

as "instances," it is the rule involved in them that yields the inference; and facts not taken as "instances" yield no inference at all.

Our author regards it as the distinguishing excellence of his inductive doctrine, that it relieves the reasoning process of the charge of *Petitio Principii* to which it is liable. So long as the premiss merely recites past facts, whose analogy the conclusion carries into a fresh case, the inference which arises really constitutes a new discovery. But if the premiss states a universal law, then the conclusion in announcing a particular example of it, furnishes, it is said, nothing that was not already assumed at the commencement. Whoever has warrant for saying that "All birds are warm-blooded" must know that "Swallows are warm-blooded": if the fact is undetermined respecting the species, it is so far impossible to affirm it of the genus. We find it difficult to understand Mr. Bailey's exact position in reference to this well-worn objection to the syllogism. In more passages than one (pp. 39, 51) he pronounces it unanswerable, and stigmatizes all deduction of a contained proposition from a containing one as a gratuitous begging of the question. This verdict certainly reads like a sentence of condemnation; yet within a few pages we find the author defending this very process against Mr. J. S. Mill, claiming for it the honourable titles of "inference," "reasoning," "demonstration," and pronouncing it "convenient" and "useful." It would seem to follow that the "Petitio Principii" is often, in our author's opinion, a "convenient and useful" form of "demonstrative reasoning"!

A thorough examination of this celebrated objection to the syllogism would carry us into metaphysical questions from which we must at present refrain. The first thing necessary for its correct appreciation is a precise answer to the inquiry, "What is, and what is not, a *petitio principii*, *τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν*?"* Mr. Bailey admits that

* Aristot. Anal., pr. II. 16. Top. VIII. 13. Comp. Biese; Philosophie des Aristoteles, I. iii. 2. § 2.

the mere *implication* of the conclusion in the premiss would afford no ground of objection against the syllogism; since this is a feature inseparable from all demonstration whatever. But he insists that there is here something more; "that the major premise not merely *implies* but *contains* the conclusion; that the conclusion is in reality a constituent or integrant part of the major premise, without which the latter would not be completely true" (p. 39). We will not dispute this distinction between "implying" and "containing"; we will allow that the latter is a mode of implication having special features of its own; but, we submit, it is not in these special features, but in the generic characters of all implication whatsoever, that the essence of the *petitio principii* is found. If the charge is good against the syllogism, it is good against all demonstration whatsoever. To render this apparent we have only to cast our eye over the series of implying and implied facts which Mr. Bailey introduces with the following remark:—

"That all demonstrative reasoning consists in discerning, and, when expressed in words, in asserting, one fact or one proposition to be implied in another, is plain. If we call one the implying fact, the other will be of course the implied fact, as in the following examples.

Implying Facts.	Implied Facts.
1. All horned animals are ruminant.	This horned animal is ruminant.
2. The lines A and B are severally equal to C.	The lines A and B are equal to each other.
3. The three angles of every triangle are together equal to two right angles.	The three angles of the triangle A B C are together equal to two right angles.
4. The culprit at the bar was in Edinburgh at one o'clock on the day named.	He could not be guilty of the offence committed at that time in London.
5. The traveller had no money with him.	He could not be robbed of a large sum.
6. The portrait resembles two different persons.	They must resemble each other."

It will be seen at a glance that Nos. 1 and 3, in this

series, afford the only examples of "class-reasoning,"—the only ones therefore in which the conclusion is "*contained*" in the premiss. In the rest it is "implied" otherwise than by inclusion within the sphere of the "assumption." Yet in all the instances alike a person who should use the implying fact, without offering evidence for it, as a medium of proof, would be liable to the charge of a *petitio principii.* If I am not satisfied of the equality of A and B, it must be *shown* to me that they are severally equal to C. If you merely take this for granted, shall I not say that you do but trifle with me and beg the question? When, in order to prove the apple-tree exogenous, I say "All deciduous trees are exogenous," am I more guilty of *petitio principii,* than when I prove two apples to be in the same dish by saying that each is in the same dish with a certain peach? The attempt of our author to save other demonstrative reasoning from the imputation which he reserves for the syllogism appears to us altogether futile. His indictment applies to all, or to none. Wherever such a relation subsists between premiss and conclusion that the denial of either is a contradiction of the other, there you can never assume the ground, yet leave the inference unassumed. There are several categories of thought, within whose sphere this necessary consecutiveness is possible. The notion of *substance and attribute,* with the relations of genera and species to which it introduces us, is but one of these. It is the basis of all class-reasoning, and supplies the common logical canon of necessity, that "what is true of the containing is true of the contained." The attempt to coerce all reasoning into this single type,—comprehensive as it is,—appears to us arbitrary in itself, and precluded from success except on condition of much violent psychology. The ideas of space and time, of cause and effect, of resemblance and difference, seem to involve distinct laws of thought, to create for themselves special elements and functions of language, and to require separate canons of logic. In all these spheres there is room for

such a necessary nexus of conceptions as demonstration requires; yet the rules of class-reasoning have no natural application. Such maxims as that a body cannot be in two places at once,—that *Causa causæ causa causati*,—that two things of which the first is like and the second unlike a third are unlike each other,—are not less really the basis of frequent reasoning than the dictum that what is true of genus holds of the species. They furnish inferences which are "implied," but not "contained," in the premisses,—which are sequent upon them by another law of thought than that of classification. Still, however much we may enlarge the canons of demonstrative reasoning, they afford us no escape from the accusation brought against the syllogism. To the existence of the *petitio principii* it is indifferent whether the necessary connection of inference with assumption be due to this law of thought or that; it is the connection itself, whencesoever necessitated, that constitutes the alleged fallacy.

Not only does this celebrated objection prove too much, by importing a disqualification into all demonstrative reasoning, whether formally syllogistic or not; but it extends still further: it virtually condemns induction itself, and so leaves us without any access whatever to rational belief in universal propositions. For what does our objector say?—"If you have not yet ascertained that *Swallows are warm-blooded*, you are not entitled to assert that *All birds are warm-blooded:* and, in announcing the general law, you unwarrantably take for granted the special case afterwards drawn out under the guise of a conclusion." Is it then true that no general law can be legitimately affirmed, so long as a single instance comprehended under it remains unexamined? Is the "*enumeratio plena*" an indispensable condition of its rational acceptance? And is there no rule of thought provided for bridging over the chasms of our defective experience, and giving us an authorized passage from the particular to the universal? Then is all induction manifestly impossible; for it consists

in nothing else than extending to the unknown the rules gathered from the known, and thus obtaining, through a general formula, a mediate intelligence of that which is immediately inaccessible. Mr. Bailey himself has defended the right of a mere "collective fact" (such as, "Men, so far as hitherto known, have died") to yield a "universal law" (such as, "All men are mortal"). With what consistency then can he now turn round and charge every such law with *petitio principii* on the ground that, while universal in itself, it can appeal only to an experience short of universal? With a singular confusion of thought, the avowed champion of induction, in urging this objection, places himself in direct revolt against the fundamental principle of his own philosophy. He proves all *deduction* to be fallacious, by assuming all *induction* to be fallacious too; and thus cutting off the approaches to truth altogether, simply "takes away the key of knowledge, neither going in himself, nor suffering them that were entering to go in."

From the embarrassment of this objection we may extricate ourselves at once by simply remembering that, in the nature of things, or in the sight of a perfect intellect, whose processes are unconscious of succession or delay, *all* reasoning must involve a *petitio principii*, the conclusion being already discerned on the first announcement of the premiss. Ratiocination itself becomes nugatory in presence of a mind seizing by intuition what others reach by sequence. As soon as we descend to a more tardy and limited intelligence, there will be *some* beliefs that are only mediately reached: the same truths which to one being are contained within their ἀρχή are seen by another lying at some distance from it. The *petitio principii* is thus entirely relative to the state and range of the individual understanding; and cannot be established as a fault against an argument by merely showing that the inference *might* be thought already in the assumption; but only by showing that it *must* be. If Mr. Bailey can convince us that it is

impossible to conceive the proposition, "Birds are warm-blooded," without simultaneously contemplating the particular case of the swallow, we will grant that the conclusion, "Swallows are warm-blooded," is a mere inference of *idem per idem*. But if not,—if the general law can be formed, and, as he allows, rationally formed, without the mind having ever encountered this special instance,—it is vain to pretend that the conclusion only repeats in part the thought contained in the premiss. This is true no doubt of the reasoner, who, to bring conviction to others, invents the syllogism in question: he selects his general rule precisely *because* he foresees what it contains; but in using it he assumes in his hearers a different state of mind,—in which the law has been apprehended and the example has been missed. Wherever a teacher and a learner are engaged together, the arguments comprehended in the didactic process involve a *petitio principii* to the former, but not to the latter. Upon this difference, the consciousness in one man, the unconsciousness in another, of what, according to the laws of thought, a given proposition may imply, depends the whole business of reasoning as an instrument of persuasion. Mr. Mill, we are aware, treats this doctrine with no respect, and calls Archbishop Whately to severe account for sanctioning it. "When you admitted the major premiss," contends Mr. Mill, "you asserted the conclusion; but, says Archbishop Whately, you asserted it by implication merely: this, however, can here only mean that you asserted it unconsciously; that you did not know you were asserting it; but if so the difficulty revives in this shape,—Ought you not to have known? Were you warranted in asserting the general proposition without having satisfied yourself of the truth of everything which it fairly includes? And if not, what then is the syllogistic art but a contrivance for catching you in a trap, and holding you fast in it"? * This is clever scolding, no doubt; but, as it seems to us, indifferent logic

* System of Logic, Book II. ch. iii. § 2.

The phraseology itself is highly objectionable. In order to make out that the conclusion is anticipated in the premisses, though not foreseen by the reasoner, Mr. Mill resorts to a doctrine of "*unconscious assertion*," which we can only compare with the "hidden sense" of prophecy imagined by divines. "Assertion" not being an automatic articulation by the lips, but a mental act,—the intentional predication of a certain attribute present in thought respecting a certain subject also present in thought,—cannot be "unconscious"; and the epithet does but evade the fact that the assertion in question is not there at all. To another mind, indeed, and to the same mind at a future time, the proposition may suggest the application which the sentence, as uttered, did not contemplate; but these are phenomena foreign to the immediate act of predication, and not entitled to be imported into its description. And as to Mr. Mill's demand, that no general proposition shall be uttered, till the speaker holds in his thought all the instances to which it may be applied, we know of nothing more simply impossible or more entirely destructive of all scientific method whatsoever. The foresight of its particular cases is *not* "fairly included" in the meaning or in the evidence of a general rule; and a person may reasonably assent to the law of refraction without any suspicion of the vast compass of facts over which its interpretation ranges. There are grounds,—whatever account we may give of them,—for ascribing attributes to certain *natures* or *kinds* of being, without going through the objects included under them or having any prescience of their actual contents. It is not necessary to know the natural history of all the varieties of mankind before we can venture to affirm mortality of human beings in general. To revert to our old syllogism:

All birds are warm-blooded:
Swallows are birds:
Therefore Swallows are warm-blooded:

It is surely possible (1.) to think the attribute "warm

blood" of the genus (bird) without thinking it of the species (swallow),—that is, to have the *major* premiss without the conclusion; (2.) to ascribe to the species (swallow) the nature of the genus (bird), without therewith ascribing to it all the concomitants (as warm blood) of the genus,—that is, to have the *minor* premiss without the conclusion. But is it *not* possible to do *both* these things, without at once recognizing the conclusion? This is all that is required by the theory of the Syllogism; and against this Mr. Mill can only urge, that *if* it be true,—why, it *ought not* to be true.

The celebrated *dictum de omni et de nullo*, which plays so important a part in many logical treatises, is a favourite topic of criticism and ridicule with the school of writers to which Mr. Bailey belongs, and does not escape from his hands without a stroke of fresh indignity. There is, however, a peculiarity in his mode of disparaging it. Mr. Mill, in order to deprive it of authority, had deposed it from the rank of an axiom and reduced it to an identical proposition. Mr. Bailey includes it among axioms, and makes this the very ground of his attack; pronouncing all such general maxims absolutely sterile and worthless. In his treatment of this topic, however, we not only find nothing new; but we are carried back to the position which it occupied in the time of Locke; and even Mr. Stewart's important investigations are used only so far as they corroborate the doctrine of his predecessor, to the neglect of all that is original in them. The allegations against axioms, whether in mathematical or any other demonstrative reasoning, are two; (1) that by themselves they are barren of result, yielding no inference: (2) that their *à priori* pretensions are false, as they are but generalizations of particular arguments, which pre-exist and take effect without their aid. Thus, if the lines A and B are known to be severally equal to C, their equality to each other is instantly discerned; nor does the general maxim, "Things equal to the same are equal to each other," shape itself into expression till it is required to sum up the aggregate of many such par-

ticular instances. Both these allegations appear to us entirely to mistake the point at issue, and to contest a doctrine which no competent logician ever intends to maintain. They betray indeed the very same *ignoratio elenchi*, which has been already noticed as vitiating our author's preference of collective facts over universal propositions as the ground of reasoning. We do not claim for axioms any power to evolve a science from themselves; they are not *data* or *matter* of thought at all; they do but express the *rule* according to which,—matter of thought being given,—the mind proceeds to think. They state the subjective side of the conditions under which knowledge is gained; and it is no more reproach to them that, without objective considerations, they can take no effect, than it is to the laws of digestion that they fill no larder and grow no crops. Nor again, in maintaining the *à priori* character of axioms, do we mean that, as objects of thought and assertion, they chronologically precede the particular arguments which exemplify them; they would incur no forfeiture of this character, though they were afterthoughts not embodied till rendered familiar by a thousand instances,—nay, even though they never came before the thought at all. D'Alembert's remark, that there is no necessity even to enunciate them,—a remark quoted by our author in proof of their puerility,—is the most perfect vindication of their logical position; if the mind will go on without them exactly as if they were there, they must give an unimpeachable account of the laws of spontaneous thought. We deny, then, that the place of axioms in science is a question of mental chronology at all. Nevertheless, we are not disposed to allow that they are posthumous generalizations of particular arguments. Generalizations are gathered from an extended survey of instances no one of which would of itself suffice to establish the rule; and which even collectively do not exclude its future modification. But to the axiom, "Things equal to the same are equal to each other," it is indifferent, whether

it has been exemplified once or a thousand times,—nay, whether it be offered to the mind *before* or *after* its examples; it is equally sure of immediate assent. It depends for its recognition on nothing special, or which can be conceived to be special, to any particular instance; but wholly upon the notion of *equality* which repeats itself in each case and which is as well apprehended at first as it is at last. The presence of this notion is the only condition required: wherever two equalities are conceived with a common term, there, by a necessary law of thought, a third cannot but arise. Whatever be the actual order of date in which we acquire these maxims, they differ from inductive generalizations in this;—with an inductive rule, we do not know *till the end* of our experience, that the rule is general and that nothing was contingent upon the particulars constituting each case; with an axiom, we know positively *from the first*, that nothing does or can depend on the particular things related, but everything on the relation itself. This, and not any chronological antecedence, is what is meant, when an *à priori* character is attributed to any universal maxim. The rule of thought which it expresses is neither *before* the particular arguments, as their premiss; nor *after* them, as their generalization; but *in* them, as their form.

So far then as the *dictum de omni et de nullo* shares the fate of all axioms, it is not endangered, we apprehend, by our author's disaffection towards its authority. His own attack upon it is indeed as good an example of conformity with it as we could desire to find; and it rules nowhere more completely than in the very camp of rebel argument assembled to destroy it. When Mr. Bailey reasons thus:—

All axioms are worthless;
The *dictum* is an axiom;
Therefore The *dictum* is worthless,

he contends, we presume, that "what is true (worthlessness) of a class of things (axioms) is true in like manner of any-

thing comprehended (the *dictum*) in that class." Now this *is* the *dictum;* which our author therefore, instead of manfully annihilating by chivalrous blows *ab extra*, cruelly compels to commit suicide in his relentless presence.

But, besides this general argument, Mr. Bailey urges against the *dictum* the same objection which Mr. Mill and other writers had previously pressed, namely, that it is founded upon a false view of classification. If a "class" were a substantive existence, separate in some way from that of its constituent individuals, there would be no tautology in saying that what is true of the class is true of the individuals under it. But since "the class *is* nothing but the objects contained in it, the *dictum de omni* merely amounts to the identical proposition that whatever is true of certain objects, is true of each of those objects;"* or, as Mr. Bailey expresses it, "What belongs to every individual of a class must belong to any individual of a class." (P. 65.) The *nonchalance* with which these critics assume,—as if some philosophic "Rome had spoken" and heretics must hold their tongue,—that "a class *is* nothing but the objects contained in it," cannot but amuse those who are cognizant of the history of realism, and aware how little that doctrine has lost its hold upon the speculative intellect of Europe. Into so deep a question, however, it is not necessary to enter, in order to deal with the present criticism. Whether, *in the nature of things*, a class be or be not anything different from its constituent individuals, we will not discuss; but we submit that, *to our thought* (and with this alone is logic concerned) it certainly *is* something different. The act of the mind in making a *universal* affirmation is not the same as in making a *distributive* affirmation. If there were a post-office directory of all mankind, past, present, and to come, and I were to read over all the names and say, "These are mortal," my mental act would not be identical with that of a person saying, "All men are mortal." Mr. Mill indeed would acknowledge this; but

* Mill's System of Logic, Book II. ch. ii. § 2.

then he would dispute our account of the difference between the two cases; he would say, "This is not the difference between the idea of the individuals and the idea of the class; when you read from the directory, you no doubt enumerate the individuals; but when you enunciate the subject 'All men,' you do not suggest any class; you only refer me to certain *attributes*,—the attributes constituting *humanity*,—in virtue of which objects become entitled to the name *Man*." We are thus compelled,—in completion of our notice of this controversy,—to advert to the nature of predication, and to define, if possible, what precisely the mind does, when it makes a simple affirmation, such as "Birds are warm-blooded." To obviate possible misapprehension, we must premise that

(1.) All significant words are either *names* or *attributives*; of which, names *indicate* an object (as *London*, *Peter*, *Nile*, etc.); while attributives *characterize* it (as *red*, *sleeps*, *struck*, *warm*, etc.).

(2.) A word which serves *merely* for a name or sign arbitrarily put upon an object, that we may know it again and be able to point it out to others, is a *denotative* word; and its force or marking function is its *denotation*. All *proper names* are of this kind.

(3.) A word which serves *merely* as an attributive, to express some character (or attribute), as such, apart from any object having it, is a *connotative* word; and its power of suggesting such attribute to the mind is its *connotation*. All *adjectives* are of this kind.

(4.) A word which serves *both* these purposes, *marking an object by giving its characters*, is a *connotative name*; its power of indicating the object is its denotation; of suggesting the attributes, its connotation. All *common nouns* are of this kind.

(5.) A connotative name, marking only by designation of characters, becomes applicable wherever those characters have been, are, or may be found; the list of *objects* on which it may be put is always an open one; while the

number of *attributes* by which it indicates is fixed and definite. The range of objects in its denotation is called the term's *extension;* of attributes in its connotation, the term's *comprehension.* Thus, if the definition of "*bird*" be "*oviparous biped*"; the notions of *birth from an egg* and of *having two legs* constitute the word's comprehension; while the species *hawk*, *dove*, *swallow*, etc., constitute its extension.

Now, taking as the type of all predication what is usually (though questionably) regarded as its simplest form, namely, an affirmative sentence ("Birds are warm-blooded") in which the subject is a common noun and the predicate contains but one word besides the copula, we find among logical writers two doctrines extant as to the nature of the predicative act. The great majority fix their eye exclusively on the *extension* of both the terms, and consider the subject as naming *a class*, the predicative word as naming *another* class; and the copula as expressing that the latter is capacious enough to contain the former. Thus the example just given states that within the class of "warm-blooded creatures" will be found the class "birds." Applying this explanation to a second proposition, "Swallows are birds," we find it affirmed that the class "birds," before *contained*, now in its turn *contains* the class "swallows"; and the inference, "Swallows are warm-blooded," follows as a geometrical or numerical necessity. Were the *dictum* of Aristotle shaped into perfect conformity with this theory, it would be expressed thus: Whatever is found in a contained class is in the containing. When, instead of this, it is said, Whatever is *predicated of* a class, is predicated of the individuals or species within it; the expression is of a mixed kind. It begins, in its description of the major premiss ("whatever is predicated of a class") without committing itself to any particular theory of predication; but immediately, in its description of the minor premiss (the individuals or species within it) it adopts the doctrine we are expounding, of subject within predicate, as class within class.

Accordingly, the ablest critics of the *dictum* deal with it as if pledged to the *denotative* doctrine of predication, and regard its authority as destroyed when this doctrine is refuted. Thus, Mr. Mill says: "Those who considered the *dictum de omni* as the foundation of the syllogism, looked upon arguments in a manner corresponding to the erroneous view which Hobbes took of propositions. . . . . If no further account than this could be given of the import of propositions, no theory could be given but the commonly received one, of the combination of propositions in a syllogism. If the minor premiss asserted nothing more than that something belongs to a class, and if as consistency would require us to suppose, the major premiss asserted nothing of that class except that it is included in another class, the conclusion would only be, that what was included in the lower class is included in the higher; and the result, therefore, nothing except that the classification is consistent with itself. But we have seen that it is no sufficient account of the meaning of a proposition to say that it refers something to, or excludes something from, a class."* What, then, is Mr. Mill's own theory of predication, on whose appearance the *dictum* is deposed? It is the second of the two doctrines which we said had been advanced to explain the nature of a proposition. Reversing the procedure of the former theory, it looks exclusively to the *comprehension* of both terms; regarding the subject as the expression of a certain *attribute*, the predicative word of *another* attribute; and the copula as declaring the *coexistence* of the two. Thus, in the syllogism:—

"All men are mortal;
All kings are men;
Therefore All kings are mortal,

the minor premiss asserts," says Mr. Mill, "that the attributes denoted by kingship only exist in conjunction with those signified by the word man. The major premiss

* System of Logic, Book II. ch. ii. § 3.

asserts, as before, that the last-mentioned attributes are never found without the attribute of mortality. The conclusion is, that wherever the attributes of kingship are found, that of mortality is found also."* In conformity with this *connotative* doctrine of predication Mr. Mill substitutes for "the unmeaning *dictum de omni et de nullo*," the maxim (limiting ourselves, for brevity's sake, to the *affirmative* form) that "things (attributes) which coexist with the same, coexist with one another." He gives also another resolution of the case, which he regards as an equivalent version of it. The syllogism just quoted may be understood as follows:—

"The attributes of man are a mark of the attribute mortality;
The attributes of a king are a mark of the attributes of man;
Therefore The attributes of a king are a mark of the attribute mortality."

Drawing out the general law of this construction, we obtain the maxim, which Mr. Mill appears to regard with greatest favour, "Whatever is a mark of any mark, is a mark of that which this last is a mark of."†

All that is here achieved is, avowedly, the substitution of the maxim of comprehension for the maxim of extension; and the author imagines that by doing this he cancels the *dictum*. His own final and favourite rule is nothing but a translation of Kant's "Supreme Rule of the syllogism," "Nota notæ est etiam nota rei ipsius; repugnans notæ repugnat rei ipsi."‡ Kant himself, after enunciating this rule, immediately proceeds to show how the *dictum* arises from it as a direct corollary. And subsequent writers have very properly given both the scholastic and the Kantian maxims

* System of Logic, Book II. ch. ii. § 3.

† Ibid. § 4.

‡ Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren. § 2. In the Rosenkranz and Schubert edition of Kant's works, vol. i. p. 59.

as two representations of the same truth, whose equivalence is apparent the moment you reflect that the comprehension and extension of a term vary inversely as each other Aristotle himself is not in the least pledged to the one form of the axiom more than to the other. His clearest and most concise expression of it is perfectly neutral; "Whatever is said of the predicate is said of the subject."† Nay, the two modes of statement are adverted to by Aristotle, and are expressly declared to be equivalent: "To say that one thing is completely included in another, and to say that this other is universally a predicate of the one, *amount to just the same thing.*"‡ The theory of predication therefore, gains nothing at Mr. Mill's hand, except a reaction from the exclusive doctrine of extension to a doctrine of comprehension equally exclusive; both of which are provided for by Aristotle himself, and equally compatible with his much renowned and much abused *dictum.* We think it evident that the dictum is no more an identical proposition in the one form than in the other; and that to infer the inclusion of A within C from their relation to B as holding the smaller, and held by the larger, is not less positive a step of reasoning, than to infer the coexistence of A with C from their joint copresence with B. The former, indeed, if there be a difference, is the richer inference of the two; inasmuch as inclusion carries coexistence with it, but not *vice versâ.*

* See, for instance, Twesten's Logik. § 105, and Drobisch's neue Darstellung der Logik. § 72, where the rule which Mr. Mill rejects as "unmeaning," and that which he adopts as the true base of all syllogistic reasoning, are *both* given, as the *dictum de omni et nullo.* "These fundamental propositions," says Drobisch, "the older logicians expressed in the following formulas, which bore the name of the *dictum de omni et nullo*:—in relation to the *comprehension* of the terms, *Nota notæ est etiam nota rei, repugnans notæ repugnat etiam rei;* in relation to the *extension* of the terms *Quidquid de omnibus valet, valet etiam de quibusdam et singulis; quidquid de nullo valet, nec de quibusdam nec de singulis valet.*"

† Arist. Cat. § 5. ‡ Arist. Anal., pr. I. 1.

We must confess that neither of the two doctrines of predication which we have noticed appears to us psychologically true. In saying, "Birds are warm-blooded," we neither think of class within class, nor of attribute with attribute: The word "warm-blooded" presents to us no conception of a *genus;* it is not a name, but a mere attributive. The word "birds" expresses to us no *attribute* as such; it is not a mere attributive, but a name. The term in the predicate acts upon the mind by its connotation, or in its comprehension; the term in the subject, by its denotation, or in its extension; and the foregoing sentence has its import in this,—that we refer the *attribute* "warm-blood" to the class of objects "birds." Hence it is, that, while a purely connotative word (an adjective) is all that is required in the predicate, a denotative term is indispensable in the subject. For "The horse is a quadruped" you can substitute "The horse is four-footed"; but the attempt to cut down the proposition to a coexistence of attributes does not succeed;—"Equine is four-footed." The mind predicates nothing except about substantive objects of thought; and of them (in the class of propositions now under consideration) it predicates nothing but attributes. This obvious fact would have been less disregarded, had not logicians allowed their theory of the simple proposition to wait upon their analysis of the syllogism. When the three propositions (say of *Barbara*) are once before them, they see the middle term, now in the subject, then in the predicate; and the identity of word suppresses all suspicion of diversity of function. Yet when we say,

All birds are warm-blooded;
All swallows are birds;
Therefore All swallows are warm-blooded,

it is evident that in the major premiss the term "birds" is wanted in its denotation; in the minor, in its connotation. No doubt also the syllogistic axioms admit a briefer expression, when propositions are forbidden to speak in the

mixed dialect of nature, and forced, like French voters, to be all for extension, or all for its opposite. Conformed to the doctrine which we have laid down, the *dictum*, for instance, in its affirmative relations, would appear in some such form as this: "Where the same nature both has an attribute and is one, the attribute it has belongs to the substance in which it is." The law of the second figure would be: "If an attribute be present with one nature and absent from another, neither of these can be the attribute of the other." That of the third,—in its affirmative part,—would be: "Where two attributes are copresent in the same sphere, each is an attribute of something having the other." These rules are perhaps less easy to follow than those usually given; the reason is, that when you move exclusively within either comprehension or extension, you can obtain a purely quantitative conception of the syllogistic relations, and represent them to yourself by geometrical or numerical images. These images, however, are psychologically false; and the logical systems founded on them supply an account, not of the real living acts of the mind in its use of language as an instrument of reasoning, but of a set of processes by which these might be replaced without altering the result. The principle of equivalent or substituted ratios, powerful in other sciences, is fatal to all truth in intellectual philosophy, and has been indeed the bane of psychology in every age. On this ground we cannot reconcile ourselves to the recently elaborated doctrine of the quantification of the predicate. In spite of the simplification of logical forms it produces in the hands of Sir W. Hamilton, and the enlargement of their range in those of Mr. De Morgan, its product appears to us but a *quasilogic* after all; and its method, a development of precisely what is least true in the doctrine as Aristotle left it. So profound is our respect for both these writers, and especially our admiration for the philosophical judgment as well as the vast knowledge of the Edinburgh Professor, that we make this confession with the utmost reluctance, and

with full consciousness of the imprudence of dissent from such authority. We can only say that, in this matter, we have not turned sceptic without trying our hardest to believe.

With this discussion of the *dictum* we must take our leave of Mr. Bailey's book. Other topics are treated in its pages, and especially the relation of language to reasoning, with much more ability and success, as it appears to us, than the doctrine of the syllogism. But we have thought it well to confine ourselves to the examination of the author's characteristic tenets; the more so, from their partial coincidence with tendencies impressed by other and more powerful causes on English philosophical opinion. In parting from the authors we have ventured to criticize, we do not forget that the subjects on which they fail to convince us are subtle and difficult. We look back with grateful memory to the rich debt we owe them for much past training of thought and opinion; and remember, with satisfaction, that our closest agreement with them has ever been in matters remotest from metaphysics and nearest to human life.

XI.

SIR W. HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY.*

THESE goodly volumes have in their very aspect an interest independent of the rare value of their contents. They are the record of a life, devoted with singular faithfulness to an unambitious, yet laborious and noble work; and no studious man can turn over the pages, crowded with the proofs of conscientious care, without profound respect for a teacher who so honours his task, not with a high estimate only, but with thorough and unsparing achievement. Should the reader, instead of turning over the pages with modern levity of hand, effectively master them by patient toil of mind, and should he be at all qualified to appreciate the cost of gaining, and the value of possessing, the erudite and disciplined intellect implied in these discussions, he will scarcely be untouched by a certain sadness in the homage which he pays to the author's genius and accomplishment. It is impossible to doubt that, in all the higher essentials, Sir W. Hamilton is fitted to be more faultless as a teacher, and greater as a philosopher, than at any earlier

* Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform; chiefly from the *Edinburgh Review*. Corrected, vindicated, enlarged, in Notes and Appendices, by Sir William Hamilton, Bart. London: 1852.

The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D., now fully collected, with selections from his unpublished letters. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations, by Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Edinburgh. 1846. —*Prospective Review*, 1853.

period of his career: yet when the ripeness is most complete, and the balance best adjusted between the material of knowledge and the force of thought, there comes some presage of a close; and we find him engaged in the most dignified and significant act of a professor's history,—the gathering together of his scattered stores, and the transference of them from the class-room to the world. Seldom, indeed, does human life appear less adequate to the enterprises it suggests than when it is measured against the comprehensive aspirations of a mind competent to philosophy. In no other intellectual pursuit,—still less in any active occupation,—is length of time so sure a gain of faculty. There is a term of middle age, beyond which, it is probable, the memory will be apt to play the historian false, and to require redoubled precautions against mistake; and we remember hearing Sismondi, when appealed to for some fact or date, make the memorable confession, "Alas! all history divides itself for me into two parts,—that which I have written and forgot, and that which I wish to write and have not learned." For the poet there is a season of inward fire which must not be permitted to damp itself down; its later gleams are fitful, and do not suffice to conquer the colder colouring of mere thought. The student of physical science, having strung its facts together on the hypotheses in vogue when he was thirty, finds his mental cabinet disarranged, and his picture of nature confused, by the new theoretical conceptions which, ere he is sixty, supply the catchwords of analogy and connection. But in logical and metaphysical studies (as in the functions of the statesman and the judge) a slower law of maturity appears to prevail; and the tendency, always to represent the sage as an old man, is not an unmeaning accident. Plato's Laws astonish us less as the production of an octogenarian than the Œdipus in Colonus. The habits of reflection, which are the great instruments of success in the *Prima Philosophia*, scarcely reach their meridian till sense and imagination begin to pale; the tact of fine discrimina-

tion first attains its rights when the fondness for analogies has abated its temptations; and the universe of ideas, like the vault of the nocturnal sky, reveals the more clearly its relations and its depth, as the shadows fall upon the concrete world, and deaden the colours of the noon of life. Moreover, the very purpose of intellectual philosophy,—to detect and exhibit as an organic whole the grounds of certitude and the methods of thought common to all the sciences,—is one which, it is evident, will be prosecuted with increasing promise of success, in proportion as a man's view over the whole field of knowledge becomes wider, and he bears within his living experience more various samples of its culture and products. A certain encyclopedic breadth of intelligence and sympathy is of more avail to the higher speculation than any affluence of special endowment or erudition; and this expansion, formed as it is by the confluence of many currents of thought from the narrow passes of our impetuous years, first assumes its full volume in the later reaches of life, as it nears the sea. Nor, in any society old enough to have produced metaphysic systems, will the largest amount of other knowledge qualify the inquirer for his proper success. He cannot proceed as if no one had tried the work before him. He must see how predecessors have answered the problems which he hopes to solve; and, whether he follows or deserts their clue, the mere act of tracing it will afford an inestimable guidance to himself. Without a large acquaintance with the history of philosophy, the greatest inventive power will but elaborate some one-sided theory; and the utmost acuteness and depth may waste themselves in reproducing doctrines which have run their cycle, and been forgot. In an age inheriting so many literatures as ours, this survey is in itself the work of half a life; and not till it approaches completion do the great cardinal tendencies of human thought, —Idealism and Realism, Pantheism and Dualism, Necessity and Free-will,—so mark themselves out as to show the symmetry of their relations and the multitude of their

varieties, and become intelligible at once in their root and in their blossom. In apparent consciousness of the immaturity of their earlier genius, the greatest philosophical writers have reserved their chief efforts for the period of approaching age. Eminent names may, indeed, be cited to prove that the metaphysic laurel does not wait for grey hairs on the head which it adorns. Berkeley was only twenty-six on the appearance of his "Principles of Human Knowledge"; nor was Hume older, we believe, when he published his "Treatise on Human Nature"; nor Brown, at the earliest date of his essay on the "Relation of Cause and Effect"; and though the "Ethics" of Spinoza was a posthumous publication, the author's early death (at forty-five) compels us to refer it to the mid-term of ordinary life. Hegel, also, was not more than thirty-seven when his "Phänomenologie des Geistes" foreshadowed the system which, ten years later, appeared complete in the "Encyclopädie." But in each of these instances the author has followed out some single line of thought to the opening of which his immediate predecessors had brought him, and appears as the organ of a necessary, but one-sided development. Berkeley's idealism and Hume's scepticism were both reached by a single step of inference from the received doctrine, that the only objects of knowledge were not *ipsissimæ res*, but certain representative ideas; and Brown's Essay was but a re-written chapter of the empirical psychology introduced by the authority of Locke. Spinoza's task was accomplished by evolution of the Cartesian notion of "Substance." And notwithstanding the universality which Hegel undoubtedly attained, and his constant boast that all previous systems are absorbed into his own, he started, no less than his forerunners, from the assumption that it is the business of philosophy to abolish the antithesis of thought as knowing, and existence as known; and, finding the separate paths of subjective and objective solution preoccupied by other explorers, simply struck into the only third device, and resolved them both

into one. Logical feats like these, accomplishing the residuary work of previous thinkers, are perhaps the appropriate function of younger minds,—open, as they usually are, to the fascination of coherent system, and willing to look on the symmetry and grandeur of an ideal architecture as evidence enough that it is the very temple of truth. But the great writers to whom we turn, less for displays of inventiveness than for stores of wisdom, and who rather spread thought in many directions than elongate its consistency in one, have left their chief works as the legacy of age. Half of Plato's long life was over before the gardens of the Academy were opened; and his finest productions were undoubtedly his last. Aristotle's literary period is said to have begun from his fiftieth year. Bacon wrote his Novum Organon, Locke his Essay, Leibniz his Nouveaux Essais, Kant his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in the sixth decade of life; nor was it till late in the seventh that the Critical Philosophy received its completion (in the Kritik der Urtheilskraft) at Königsberg, and the Monadology its best exposition at Hanover. Dugald Stewart produced little more than the first volume of his Elements till an age equally advanced; and Reid was past seventy before he began to embody the results of his experience and reflection in the Essays on the Intellectual and Active Powers. The vast superiority of these Essays to the "Inquiry," which he had brought out more than twenty years before, affords a curious testimony to the progress which may be made in philosophical aptitude after passing the confines of old age. His distinguished editor gives, in the volumes before us, abundant evidence of the same fact, —that his latest meditations are his best; and, were it not that no vain wish can be a good one, we could desire nothing better for British philosophy than that the career were now commencing of which these pages fore-announce the end.

Yet not precisely for "British Philosophy," but rather for philosophy in Britain; for it is the distinction of Sir. W.

Hamilton that from his scheme of thought national limitations and pecularities fall away; and that, of all our metaphysical writers, he first has sufficient appreciation of every "school," and sufficient independence of all, to assume a cosmopolitan character, and produce disquisitions that may travel without a passport, and be at home in every civilized land. Of whom else among our countryman could we say,—what surely may be said of him,—that if there were to be a congress of all the philosophies, he would be chosen universal interpreter? In this respect he occupies, in the series of British professors, nearly the same place that we must assign to Aristotle among the Greeks. Previous to the time of the great Stagyrite, all Hellenic speculation bore some special impress from the genius of a particular race, or the habits of a particular science. The Ionian tendency displayed itself in the search of some material ground or element of things, and produced a physical history of nature. The Doric precision and severity broke into the Pythagorean veneration for quantity and measure, as containing the principles of ideal harmony and moral proportion. The synthetic impulse of religion to deduce all finite appearance from infinite reality, shaped itself into the Eleatic doctrine of absolute existence; on which the analytic temper of science revenged itself by resolving everything into relative phenomena. All these elements flowed together and sought reconciliation in Plato: but he also showed himself still a Greek,—nay, an Athenian,—in spirit; for he held them together by the band of *beauty;* made philosophy a work of highest art; in seeking the true, never lost from his hand the clue of the fair and good; and when he could not make fast a holy thing by dialectic, still kept it afloat before the soul upon the wings of myth. Aristotle escaped even the magic of this last restraint, unconditionally looked to universal reason for the ground of all, and betrayed no sign of time or place. Hence his world-wide influence; the products of his thought having been stored and distributed in every

literature, and nourished the intellect of Arabia and Islam not less than that of Germany and the church. Plato was the blossom of the pure Hellenic mind in its fullest bloom, —which is only to be seen upon the native soil. Aristotle is the useful fruit, which may be gathered for the commerce of thought, and exported to every land. A similar disappearance of national in universal method may be remarked in Sir. W. Hamilton. He is the first eminent writer of his class, in our language, over whose imagination Lord Bacon has exercised no tyranny; and who has therefore been able to appreciate the problems regarded in other countries as the very essence of "philosophy," but treated as its delirium in this. All that is elsewhere included in the name had been dropped out among us, except psychology alone; which is much the same, in reference to metaphysics, as if, in physical knowledge, we were to cancel every thing but natural history. And even psychology itself, affected by the realism engendered in the pursuit of material laws went to work on the assumption that mental facts must be explained by physical, and detected among the contributions of outward experience; and thus lost its proper character of a purely observing and classificatory study, embodying the reports of an accurate self-consciousness, and became a conjectural history, of the genesis of conceptions. From the time of Locke to that of James Mill this passion for empirical deduction has prevailed in England; nor did it receive a check till it struck upon results startling to the moral and natural faiths which have so sturdy a hold of the national mind. When thought turned out to be a chemical compound of animal sensations, conscience but the showy flower fed by the sap of self-love, and the knowledge of causation but the customary transit of associated "impressions," the direction of this downward path became evident. All the solid ground of life was pulverizing itself away into unattached phenomena; and to find again some base and hold for human belief, the Scottish school, under Reid's guidance, began at the

beginning once more; put themselves back to the initial point of self-knowledge; and, extinguishing the lamp of hypothesis, entered the mind to explore it with only its native light. The result was, in the main, a true psychology,—a faithful natural history of the mind,—and with it the means of restoring the truths which had threatened to dissipate themselves. Led astray by its bias towards physical realism, British speculation recovered itself by the force of its moral realism. Still, *nothing but* a psychology was produced; and even the very existence of any other mode of intellectual philosophy was hardly recognized. The mind, when taken up for study, was regarded merely as *an object or energy in nature*, whose processes furnished materials for a separate science in the same way as the laws of life supplied distinctive contents for physiology; those of affinity among the kinds of body, for chemistry; and the general properties of matter, for mechanics. In this view, "mental philosophy" does but form,—as indeed its very name implies,—the apex of the several physical sciences, leaving them undisturbed beneath, and constructing itself out of the residuary object-matter which they have not pre-engaged. This mode of conception must be totally changed before the true character of logic and metaphysics can be understood. The mind must be imagined, not as the crown or any other part of nature, but as standing over against nature, and outside of it, all the time; not as a thing that can be separately and subsequently known, when the sciences have made themselves up, but as a being that in knowing aught else knows also itself; not therefore as furnishing different materials for study, but only the inner side of the very same series of phenomena. In this way, intellectual philosophy is but the self-knowledge of physical science, proceeding *pari passu* with it, having a voice in all its methods and an interest in every step. When the mind and nature are thus placed opposite each other, there arise, besides the transient phenomena, and as conditions of their apprehension, certain

notions of permanent existences,—space, time, substance, soul, cause. With these, so far as they enter into the forms of thinking irrespective of the matter of thought, *logic* concerns itself as with subjective facts, without, however, any inquiry what they are objectively worth. *This* question it is the proper business of *metaphysics* to take up,—to pronounce upon the validity of these notions as revelations of real existence, and, if they be reliable, use them as a bridge to cross the chasm from relative thought to absolute being. Once safe across, and gazing about it in that realm, the mind stands in presence of the objects of *ontology*, under which category must be entered whatever it may find to say respecting these objects. Thus the complete conception of the higher philosophy contains the following elements :—

(1.) PSYCHOLOGY, the descriptive knowledge of mental phenomena, examined as they occur, and distributed into their several *kinds*. This is the natural history of the world within. Its business of classification is coextensive with the facts of self-consciousness, and addresses itself to the affective states and springs of the will, not less than to the intellectual procedures. It is therefore the common prelude to all departments of the science of human nature, whether concerning themselves with the laws of *cognition* (logic), of *admiring* (æsthetic), or of *obligation* (morals).

(2.) LOGIC, which investigates the ultimate laws of *thinking*, so far as it has a cognitive character and is constant in its method, whatever be the matter thought. It is thus purely a *notional* science; and among its results presents us with a list of the fundamental forms of thought underlying, as conditions, the operations of intelligence. These primary notions, however (substance, cause, etc.), though detected among our *ways of thinking*, appear to us also as if they were *things thought*; and we cannot divest ourselves of the belief that they are *more than notional*. At this point step in—

(3.) METAPHYSICS, to ascertain whether they be, as we imagine, also *real*, belonging to existence as well as to

thought. Here, therefore, we have a science which is not exclusively either *notional* or *real*, but occupies the transition space from the one character to the other. It endeavours to settle accounts with reality on behalf of the ideal objects given to us by our reason, and determine whether they have an existence independent of our faculties. Should they prove to be only the mocking image of those faculties themselves, then the only result of metaphysic research is to dissipate its own objects; it springs into life for no other purpose than to commit suicide, and consign all its affairs, by process of relapse, back into the hands of logic. But should they, on the other hand, legitimate their claim to be regarded as objects, and obtain a footing on the ground of positive existence, they forthwith become the concern of—

(4.) ONTOLOGY, which endeavours to evolve true propositions respecting God, the soul, and nature, as *à priori* objects of knowledge, and whether by deduction, intuition, or dialectic, to reach the essence of their necessary being. It is therefore a *real* science: accessible, however, only from the *notional* territory of logic, and contingently on some means of transport being found;—a divine Elysian land, longed for by shades of thought on the hither side of Styx, and destined to be touched perhaps, provided the metaphysic boat of passage does not leak.

Now of this range of investigations, in their scientific relation to each other, no British writer, earlier than Sir W. Hamilton, appears to us to have had any clear conception; and the problems they involve, if touched at all, have been fortuitously treated, by way of irregular *excursus* from the classificatory business of psychology. The confused notions of the scope and contents of logical science sufficiently betray themselves in the absurd rivalry set up between Aristotle and Bacon. And the great question, whether our ontological faiths are exploded or established by philosophy, has furnished no inspiration except to continental speculation. The systems born under its influence

in Germany, and partially reproduced in France, were simply laughed at or stared out of countenance, till our author set the example of understanding them, and treating them with discriminating and respectful dissent. Dugald Stewart's criticism, in his historical dissertation, on Kant, Fichte, and Schelling,—a criticism strangely blending modest confessions of ignorance with scornful indications of temper,—shows how slight an appreciation of the state of European philosophy was compatible, thirty years ago, with the highest reputation for copious reading and accomplishment. Without a wide sympathy with the efforts of human reason, however unsuccessful they may be, to determine the limits of knowledge or to push them beyond finite things, it is impossible for the teacher to obtain more than a provincial hearing; and, what is worse, no less impossible to understand the great courses of human thought, and trace their windings through ancient, mediæval, and foreign history. In largeness of theoretic groundplan, of historical knowledge, and of genial admiration for various merit, Sir W. Hamilton exceeds all his predecessors, and, quitting the limits of a school, makes us feel that nowhere within the community of civilized nations does Philosophy stray from its native land. It was time that the ignorant airs of contempt, assumed by our professors of wisdom towards speculations they did not take the pains to comprehend, should cease; that the common-councilmen of a municipal philosophy should no longer mock at august dynasties of thought bearing the kingly names of Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Spinoza, Kant and Hegel; that reputations, so long achieved by abusing the Organon and ridiculing the schoolmen, should at length be deserved by understanding them. There had been enough of logicians who disparaged logic, and metaphysicians who did not believe in metaphysics. How can any branch of human culture fail to pine away, when trusting for its nutriment to the acrid juices of an inner scepticism? That for some time past a better spirit

has prevailed is largely due to the influence of our author; whose hearty loyalty to his work, and clear insight into the nature of its claims, are conspicuous in all his writings, and find distinct expression in the following sentences:—

"Plato has profoundly defined man, 'the hunter of *truth*'; for in this chase, as in others, the *pursuit* is all in all, the *success* comparatively nothing. 'Did the Almighty,' says Lessing, 'holding in his right hand *Truth*, and in his left *Search after Truth*, deign to proffer me the one I might prefer, in all humility, but without hesitation I should request *Search after Truth*.' We *exist* only as we energize; *pleasure* is the reflex of unimpeded energy; energy is the *means* by which our faculties are developed; and a higher energy the *end* which their development proposes. In *action* is thus contained the existence, happiness, improvement, and perfection of our being; and knowledge is only precious, as it may afford a stimulus to the exercise of our powers, and the condition of their more complete activity. Speculative truth is, therefore, subordinate to speculation itself; and its value is directly measured by the quantity of energy which it occasions—immediately on its discovery—mediately through its consequences. Life to Endymion was not preferable to death; aloof from practice, a waking error is better than a sleeping truth. Neither, in point of fact, is there found any proportion between the *possession* of truths, and the *development* of the mind in which they are deposited. Every *learner* in science is now familiar with more truths than Aristotle or Plato ever dreamt of knowing; yet, compared with the Stagirite or the Athenian, how few, among our masters of modern science, rank higher than intellectual barbarians! Ancient Greece and Modern Europe prove, indeed, that 'the march of intellect' is no inseparable concomitant of 'the march of science'; that the cultivation of the individual is not to be rashly confounded with the progress of the species." . . . "It is as the *best gymnastic of the mind*, —as a mean, principally, and almost exclusively conducive to the highest education of our noblest powers, that we would vindicate to these speculations the necessity which has too frequently been denied them. By no other intellectual application (and least of all by physical pursuits) is the soul thus reflected on itself, and its faculties concentred in such inde-

pendent, vigorous, unwonted, and continued energy; by none, therefore, are its best capacities so variously and intensely evolved. 'Where there is most life there is the victory.'"—*Discussions*, p. 39.

The original researches of Sir W. Hamilton may be said to have reference to three related topics: the GROUND of knowledge; the LIMIT of knowledge; the METHOD of knowledge; so far as these are determined by the constitution of the human faculties. The first is discussed in his doctrine of perception; the second, in his refutation of Cousin's Ontology; the third, in his logical discussions, especially his controversy with Professor de Morgan. This last field is strewed with thorny technicalities, and, unhappily, too, not without its nettle-growths of temper; and in spite of a perverse propensity thither, we shall not ask our readers to enter it just now; but shall confine ourselves to some account of our author's doctrine on the first two points.

The one great question which mankind, when brought to the mood of reflective wonder, are never tired of preferring at the oracle of philosophy, is this: How can I *know?* So long as our faculties are engaged with concrete affairs, and learning particular matters, they are troubled with no such inquiry, and work on with a healthy dogmatism, accepting their light without analysing it. But the moment arrives when the mind wakes up and halts at the thought, "What *is* knowledge? what is there *in me* that fits me to have it? what is there *out of me* that is given to me by it?" That these two factors are inevitably present in it is manifest. But how are they related to each other, and qualified to join, as constituents, in the same acts, and merge in a unitary result? Are they quantities of the same kind, capable of yielding a product by their concurrence? or do not their spheres belong to different universes, which co-exist but cannot interact? These perplexities, however, though proposed in general terms, have not affected every part of the problem in an equal degree. There are three possible objects of our cognitive faculties,

namely: (1.) Ourselves. (2.) Nature. (3.) God. Respecting the first of these, the mystery has been little felt: the mind, being ever present with itself, can scarcely fail, it has been supposed, to become at home there, and be cognizant of its own events, especially as those events are just of its own sort, neither more nor less than the old familiars of consciousness turned out before the eye of self-consciousness. Hence of all knowledge, *self*-knowledge alone has been regarded as inherently intelligible. But the approach to the other two kinds seemed beset with obstacles insuperable in both instances, though different in each. To know *Nature* is for mind to apprehend matter,—for incommensurable things to measure themselves against each other. To know *God* is for the finite to take in the infinite,—for a relative act to achieve the absolute. From the world the soul would appear to be cut off by contrariety of essence, though akin to it in limitation of scale; from God, by disproportion of scale, though allied to him by congeniality of essence. Either by qualitative or by quantitative incapacity, we seem to be detained at hopeless distance from all that lies beyond ourselves. To remove the first of these impediments is the purpose of every doctrine of perception; to remove the second, of every theory of ontology.

The first evidently rests on the assumption that "like only can know like,"—a maxim which, consciously or unconsciously, has never ceased to control the processes of philosophy. It is the want of homogeneity between the knowing mind and the known thing, the total absence from the former of all the predicates (extension, externality, solidity) of the latter,—that perplexes men about their mutual relation. There are but two ways of possible escape from the difficulty,—to deny the maxim, and dispense with all likeness between subject and object as a condition of knowledge; or else, retaining the maxim, to destroy the *primâ facie* unlikeness. By a perverse aberration philosophers have, with few exceptions, struck into the latter path; and

have exhausted the varieties of ingenuity to cancel the primary antithesis of all intelligence. They have not questioned the fact that, in the exercise of perception, a man supposes himself to gain assurance, equally strong, of two opposite existences,—of himself as perceiving subject; and of an external reality as perceived object. But, as if they could not let this belief alone, they have conspired to worry and torture it in all conceivable ways. To get rid of the opposition between the two existences some have erased the existences,—one or both (Sublatâ re, tollitur qualitas rei); others have explained away their opposition. The former is the resource of the idealists; who either with Berkeley content themselves with abolishing the given object and resolving it into an ideal state operated in the human mind by the agency of the Divine; or, with Fichte, proceed further to abrogate the reality of the subject too, by denying it as a persistent entity, identifying it with its momentary condition, and treating it as a mere train of phenomena. As Berkeley had lowered the objective *esse* to the *percipi*, so Fichte, to complete the process, reduced the subjective *esse* to the *percipere:* both resorting to the same argument that the interaction of heterogeneous natures, was inconceivable; the one asking how material things could produce what is so unlike themselves as sensations and ideas; the other laying down the rule that the effect of existence could only be existence, and not thought. It is curious to notice the subtle disguises under which this doctrine continually reappears. Who would expect to find in the empirical psychology of England any kindred with the extreme idealism, or rather *nihilism*, of Fichte? Yet what else can be made of an "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," which, like that of Mill, disowns, with Hume, all *perceptive* knowledge whatsoever, and compels the very word to abdicate and take its heavy troops away in favour of *sensation*, and its *garde mobile?* In this system, my "idea of an object" is but the coexistence, in a state of fusion together, of my separate ideas of its so-called

qualities; and when I predicate redness of a billiard ball, I merely refer the colour to the group of companion-attributes amid which it will be found; I intend to say that along with the sensations of smoothness, hardness, roundness, etc., which exhaust the meaning of the word "ball," the further sensation of redness will also be experienced. Nor are the "qualities," even when set afloat from their substratum, allowed to stand, in the registers of this school, among things *known;* they are but empty names for the *unknown* objective counterparts of our sensations,—not even figments of thought, but only contrivances of speech. Thus is all my supposed perception of an outer world fetched back into the mind, and resolved into the grouping of synchronous sensations, beyond which I am cognizant of nothing but myself. Then, again, what is this *self?* Has it any firmer moorings in reality than the objects with which it deals? Not a whit, so far as philosophy can tell. The passing phenomenon of my consciousness is that which constitutes my present self; its predecessors make up my past, and its successors my future self; and whenever I apply to any part of this procession words of *personality*, it is only that I would fling the element of which I speak into the right series, and keep the line of beads called "*Me*" clear of that other which is called "*You*," and of that third which we call "*Him.*" A scheme which in this way resolves all things into clusters, and persons into files, of subjective phenomena, is coincident in its results with Fichte's; and the comparison affords an instructive example, how the same false postulate, simultaneously manœuvred by material and by ideal thinkers, will work its way from these opposite ends of the diameter of being, and fall at last into the same gulf of negation.

But the more favourite and less daring way of destroying the antithesis between mind perceiving and matter perceived, is to leave the two terms standing and deny their

opposition. As the only ground for affirming their existence is furnished by the very same act of consciousness which equally pronounces on their opposition, this device is really less philosophical than the other. It is worked out by introducing a third term, either *above* the subject and object, to serve as a point of unity whence they divaricate into the sphere of consciousness; or *between* them, so as to furnish a neutral ground on which they may meet and come to an understanding. The former is the method of Hegel, and, in the last resort, of Spinoza; indeed, deducing as it does mind and matter, as mere phenomenal opposites, from a common substantive being, it is a speculation on which Pantheism must ever look with filial affection. To trace the latter through its metamorphoses would be little less than to write the history of philosophy. From the εἴδη of Plato,—thoughts incarnate in matter to render it intelligible to mind,—down to the mesmeric fluid,—a physical conception to serve as the *nidus* and vehicle of thought,—the theories of mediation for conciliating the incompatibilities of the percipient and the perceived have been innumerable. The principle or feeling to which they all owe their origin is strikingly apparent in a speculation on the nature of vision contained in the Timæus. According to Plato, there is treasured *within* us a store of pure fire, which streams out through the centre of the eyes; while *without*, there is the open illumination of day, which awaits and envelops the current of *eye-light* ever flowing into it. On the concurrence of the two, like being mingled with like, the conditions of an active result are complete; and there arise the counterpart phenomena of visibility in objects and vision in us. But when the gentle light of day no longer flows around, the beams of the eye, passing out into the night, meet with nothing congenial with themselves, and realize no illumination, but ineffectually perish. In consequence of this frustration, the eyelids close in sleep; and shutting in the light from its

fruitless exit, let it employ itself in painting for us the images of our dreams.* In this graceful attempt to explain the process of visual perception, the assumption is manifest enough, that for the purposes of communication between the mind and the outward world some common medium is required; and to effect the mediation *light* is the element selected, as occupying the border territory between the spiritual and the material. At other times, *form* is invested with this reconciling function; being recommended to choice by its neutral character, as at once a physical condition of body and a geometrical object of pure thought. It carries with it, however, peculiar difficulties when used as a representative medium; for it must be *located* somewhere; if fixed in the object, how can it carry a message to the subject? If in subject, who can tell whether it be a true copy of the object? If it be a volatile form transmitted from the one to the other, where can the unextended mind store all the diagrams of extended things? These perplexities, it has been supposed, might be escaped by resorting to *motion* as the element of mediation. Under favour of the ambiguity of the word κίνησις (which is used of mental modification as well as of local change), even Aristotle has lent, we think, an unfortunate sanction to this notion. Motion, objectively considered, he regards as one of the things of which *all* the five senses† are cognizant, and classes accordingly among the "common sensibles" (κοινὰ αἰσθητά); and to motion, as subjectively involved in the action of all the senses, he attributes our perception, by any of them indifferently, of these common sensibles,

* Timæus, § 45. For Aristotle's polemic against the doctrine, see his Treatise de Sensu, c. 2.

† He elsewhere appears to limit the apprehension of the κοινὰ αἰσθητά to the *two* senses of sight and touch, as if conscious that, in allowing it to *all* the senses, he was extending the prerogative too far. 'Magnitude and form, and the rough and smooth, and the acute and obtuse in angles, are common to all the senses; or, if not to all, at least to sight and touch."—*De Sensu* 4. 5. Bekker.

namely, motion and rest, form, size, and number. This hint has not been permitted to remain unfruitful; but, in the hands of Aristotle's distinguished living commentator, Professor Trendelenburg, has been worked out into an elaborate metaphysical theory; in which motion (*Bewegung* conveniently responding to the ambiguity of κίνησις) plays the part of the unitary element belonging equally to existence and to thought, generative of real space and body and form in the one, and of their reflection by geometry and the natural science in the other.† No one has asserted with more emphasis than this learned and strenuous opponent of Hegel the fallacious principle which is the beginning of the Hegelian aberration, and which has so long stood unquestioned as the open portal of a thousand labyrinths. "Without an activity," he says, "in which existence and thought are equal partners, it was impossible to understand how the thinking principle conceives given objects in afterthought, or designs them in forethought. Neither the *a priori* procedure of mathematics, nor the *a posteriori* of experience, nor the constructive power of final causation, could be understood without such a common activity."‡ If however, this maxim is to usurp a dictatorial power in philosophy, we must say we had rather see it at work upon a grand scale, proclaiming its rights aloud and setting up sublime tyrannies on the scholastic thrones of Heidelberg and Berlin, than creeping in at the back door of empirical psychology and corrupting the simplicity of its faith in consciousness. If motion can do nothing more to bring matter and mind to a compatible disposition than set a-going an "agitation in the *animal spirits*," or "vibrations and vibratiuncles in the nerves," its mediation, always ineffectual, is sure to be inglorious too. Not only does it fail to be a fact, but it has the additional disadvantage of not even seeming to explain anything, if it were so; and can have no effect

* De Animâ, III. 1. 5.

† See his Logische Untersuchungen; especially Band I. § 4–6.

‡ Log. Unters. B. II. § 12, p. 139.

but to betray the wider empire of philosophy into the special hands of physiology.

The last and most refined effort of the doctrine of mediation recedes, however, in its quest of a vicarious element, further from matter than to be content with form or motion; it seizes on the *idea* of the object, and insists that this, imparted by the object, and contained in the act of perception, is the only thing present to the cognitive subject, and known by him. Thus, Professor De Morgan states the following, as "an important distinction, which we must carry with us throughout the whole" of his work (Formal Logic). "Besides the actual external object, there is also the mind which perceives it, and what (for want of better words, or rather for want of knowing whether they be good words or not) we must call the *image of that object in the mind*, or the *idea* which it communicates.

"The word *idea*, as here used, does not enter in that vague sense in which it is generally used, as if it were an opinion that might be right or wrong. It is that which the object gives to the mind, or the state of the mind produced by the object. Thus the idea of a horse is *the horse in the mind*; and we know no other horse. We admit that there is an external object, a horse, which may give a *horse in the mind* to twenty different persons; but no one of these twenty knows the object; each one only knows his *idea*."—*Formal Logic*, p. 29.

Here, then, the representative medium is fairly withdrawn from the physical end of the perceptive relation, and becomes a spiritual thing,—an affection of the intellect itself. Does it accomplish its end any better for this? Not in the least. It stands, indeed, in closer kindred to the percipient subject, but proportionally further in estrangement from the object it pretends to represent. It is certainly easier to negotiate with *thought* through an *idea* than through a *motion* or a *vibration*; but just in the same degree does the negotiation with *reality* become more difficult. Who shall guarantee the relation between the immediate idea and the inaccessible thing for which it stands? If the percipient

mind itself is hopelessly cut off from the outward object, is the "idea" involved in the act of perception any less so? Can the subject be doomed to darkness, and yet his subjective act be let into the secret? Either, in spite of the "idea," objects remain unknown; or, by means of it, they become known. To maintain the first is unqualified idealism. To affirm the second is to pronounce on the likeness between an image and invisible reality; to profess in the same breath that the same things are immediately, and yet only mediately, accessible; to avow an utter ignorance of the external world, and yet go bail for the only reporter of it. Thus, for absurdity and contradiction, the last state of this doctrine is worse than the first.

And what is the exigency which has called into existence these multifarious systems, whether of idealism or of mediation? They have sprung up, merely to humour the maxim, that, "like only can know like,"—a maxim absolutely groundless, and whose long despotism in the schools is the opprobrium of philosophy. Of this "crotchet of philosophers" Sir W. Hamilton says, that

"Though contrary to the evidence of consciousness, and consequently not only *without* but *against* all evidence, it has yet exerted a more extensive and important influence than any principle in the whole history of philosophy. This subject deserves a volume; we can only afford it a few sentences.—Some philosophers (as Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Alcmæon) maintained that knowledge implied even a *contrariety* of subject and object. But since the time of Empedocles, no opinion has been more universally admitted than that the *relation of knowledge* inferred the analogy of existence. This analogy may be supposed in two potences. What knows and what is known, are either, 1st, *similar*, or, 2nd, the *same;* and if the general principle be true, the latter is the more philosophical. This principle it was, which immediately determined the whole doctrine of a representative perception. Its lower potence is seen in the *intentional species* of the schools, and in the *ideas* of Malebranche and Berkeley; its higher in the *gnostic* reasons of the Platonists, in the *pre-existing species* of Avicenna and the Arabians, in the *ideas* of Descartes and Leibniz, in the

phænomena of Kant, and in the *external states* of Dr. Brown. It mediately determined the *hierarchical gradation of faculties or souls* of the Aristotelian, the *reticular media* of the Platonists,—the theories of a *common intellect* of Alexander, Themistius, Averroes, Cajetanus, and Zabarella,—the *vision in the deity* of Malebranche,—and the Cartesian and Leibnizian doctrines of *assistance*, and *predetermined harmony*. To no other origin is to be ascribed the refusal of the fact of consciousness in its primitive duality; and the unitarian systems of identity, materialism, idealism, are the result."—*Discussions*, p. 60.

Undeterred by the ruin of falling systems, Sir W. Hamilton boldly tears away the maxim on which they rest, and exposes it to distinct view, instead of leaving it to crumble obscurely away beneath the superincumbent weight of absurdity and contradiction raised upon it. That he well knew how vast and lofty was the metaphysic Babel which he thus destroyed, how many wise and great had their chambers in it at various heights, believing it a watch-tower of heaven, is evident from the passage just cited. But where the mind is clear, the heart is strong, and the largest collapse of error is not a terrible or destructive phenomenon to the eye pure to discern the disengaging forms of truth. Flinging away the assumption of the schools, our author reverts to the simplicity of nature; and declares that in perception the mind, with equal *immediateness*, knows itself as subject and an outward reality as object; and in knowing this, knows their relation to be one, not of analogy, but of antithesis. He puts sheer out of existence all *representative* apparatus devised for whispering into the mind's ear the state of affairs without, and affirms the *ego* and *non-ego* to be face to face,—co-present realities in every phenomenon of perception. Consciousness, so far from revealing only our own existence, and leaving us to gather all other existence by *inference* from this, cannot give us the percipient *self* except in simultaneously giving us the perceived *other-than-self;* and we are as directly cognizant of the one as of the other. Both must be accepted as

primary data involved in the exercise of our perceptions, and liable to no doubt which does not perish of itself by impugning the veracity of the doubter's own faculties. It is not therefore true that a man is *surer* of his own existence than of anything else; he is simply *as sure* of it as he is that something else exists. The certainty he feels in either case is precisely the same; and is the very highest that can be had, with only one exception, in which doubt is not simply suicidal, but impossible. The exception is,—the bare *fact of the perception* as a felt phenomenon, apart from the contents or necessary self-interpretation it carries with it. To have a certain consciousness, and to doubt whether I have it, are incompatible conditions. Nor can I call in question the description given of what this consciousness includes, in the case of perception: it assuredly says,—truly or mendaciously,—that it is the direct product from two opposite factors, a self that has it and a not-self that gives it,—both of which are alike present in it and known in it, as real existences. That there is the phenomenon, and that this is what it says, is beyond denial. The first possibility of scepticism opens with the query, "Whether this which the phenomenon says be true? or whether perhaps the self alone be not competent to the whole fact, by illusive creation of the other factor among its own ideal states?" This doubt, however, is possible only at the expense of arraigning consciousness as a deceiver, and assuming that the very faculties of knowledge may be but an organism of mendacity. There is but one conceivable plea which could justify so monstrous a suspicion; that the original data of consciousness directly or in their legitimate consequences contradicted each other. No such plea, however, can be advanced; and though in its absence the bare possibility will always remain presentable to imagination, that we may be coherently and systematically imposed upon, and our whole intellectual life but a mocking dream, yet in such a fancy there is no logical base, for it demands a disbelief of everything, even

of itself; and no philosophical recommendation,—for it places *ab initio* out of reach that *truth* which all philosophy assumes to be attainable. Our author therefore claims unconditional assent to the primitive beliefs given in consciousness itself; places among these, as contained in the act of perception, the faith in a personal subject and in an outward object; and thus vindicates a doctrine of "Natural Dualism" against all the mere hypothetical impeachments brought against it by the "Unitarian schemes of idealism, materialism, and absolutism."

"What is all this but mere common sense, spoiled by metaphysic jargon?" perhaps our readers may say. Be it so; if only it supersede a much more voluminous amount of nonsense not better phrased, the gain is undeniable. But it claims a higher praise,—a praise which indeed the objector unconsciously bestows. It is the glory of philosophy to end where common sense begins; to evolve as ἐπιστήμη that which had existed as ἀληθὴς δόξα; to find and lay bare the ground of all derivative beliefs, and sweep away the clouds that hang around the margin and make it indistinct. Those who know how rarely the truth upon this matter has been found, and how variously it has been lost, will not be tempted, by its extreme simplicity, to undervalue the precision with which Sir W. Hamilton has seized it, the incomparable subtlety with which he has discriminated it from all counterfeits, the multifarious learning with which he has tracked the aberrations from it, and the skill which he has displayed in insulating and fencing it all round. Nor can any competent judge fail profoundly to admire the courageous intellectual integrity which, in loyalty to truth, vows to restore the modest empire of natural dualism, at a time when the continental schools use the very name as a by-word of contempt, and England has ceased to confer reputations in philosophy.

In the development and application of our author's doctrine there are, however, some details which, it appears to us, may require revision. We cannot accept, without

some modification, the line of separation which he draws between the cases of presentative and representative cognition, between immediate and mediate objects of knowledge. With perception as immediate he contrasts memory as mediate, in its mode of apprehension; and repeatedly censures Reid and Stewart for their disregard of this distinction.

"Memory is defined by Reid 'an *immediate* knowledge of the *past*'; and is thus distinguished from consciousness, which, with all philosophers, he views as 'an *immediate* knowledge of the *present*.' We may therefore be conscious of the act of memory *as present*, but of its object as *past*, consciousness is impossible. And certainly, if Reid's definition of memory be admitted, this inference cannot be disallowed. But memory is not an immediate knowledge of the past; an *immediate knowledge of the past* is a contradiction in terms. This is manifest, whether we look *from the act to the object*, or *from the object* to the act. To be known immediately, an *object* must be known *in itself*: to be known in itself, it must be known as actual, now existent, *present*. But the object of memory is *past*,—not present, not now existent, not actual; it cannot therefore be known in itself. If known at all, it must be known in something different from itself; that is, *mediately*; and memory as an immediate knowledge of the past is thus impossible. Again: memory is an *act* of knowledge; an act exists only as present; and a present knowledge can be immediately cognizant only of a present object. But the object known in memory is *past*; consequently either memory is not an *act* of knowledge at all, or the object immediately known is present; and the past, if known, is known only through the *medium* of the *present*; on either alternative, memory is not 'an *immediate* knowledge of the *past*.' Thus memory, like our other faculties, affords only an immediate knowledge of the present; and, like them, is nothing more than consciousness variously modified."—*Discussions*, p. 48.

In spite of the acuteness with which the argument is here and elsewhere stated, we suspect that the reader's feeling will persist in taking sides with Reid. It is no doubt competent to Sir W. Hamilton to define the phrase

"*immediate* object," an object *now* and *here;* and if it is thus to include in its meaning proximity to the cognitive subject in *time and place*, no argument is needed to show that what is absent in either relation cannot be immediately known. But Reid, who in his use of the word "immediate" was thinking only of *direct* as opposed to circuitous or *indirect* knowledge, would not have admitted the propriety of this definition; and in our author's hands, who consistently carries it out in its several applications, it leads to results repugnant, we think, to the common consciousness of men. For instance: if nothing can be an "immediate" object of knowledge except what is separated from the knower by no space at all, it follows that I cannot either smell or see the orange in my hand, or hear the wind that beats against my window. Accordingly Sir W. Hamilton pronounces it "wrong to say that '*a body is smelled by means of effluvia.*' Nothing is smelt but the effluvia themselves. They constitute the total object of *perception* in smell; and in all the senses *the only object perceived is that in immediate contact with the organ.* There is, in reality, no medium, in any sense; and, as Democritus long ago shrewdly observed, all the senses are only modifications of touch." * This doctrine is naturally held by James Mill,† who resolves all perception into sensation, and who, therefore, in allocating the word "object," can find nothing on which to fit it except the nearest cause of the sensation; but it surprises us greatly in a philosopher who is distinguished for his skilful discrimination of perception proper from sensation proper. Surely the *object of perception* is the *thing perceived;* and a thing perceived cannot be a *thing unknown.* But the majority of men know nothing of the effluvia of the orange, the vibrations of the air, the luminous undulations, or of any of the proximate agents in sensation. Their minds are running on the remoter realities,—the scented fruit, the ringing bell, the shining fire,—of which

* Hamilton's Reid, p. 104, b, note.

† Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, vol. i. p. 6.

they learn something by the use of their senses; and except of these as known, and of themselves as knowing, they have no cognition at all. Psychologically, the ethereal emanations make no appearance, and are as though they did not exist. If, therefore, in the ordinary exercise of their senses, men do not perceive what is at some distance, either they perceive nothing, or they perceive something without knowing it. The very word "object," indeed, implying as it does what is *there* as opposed to *here*, recalcitrates against this statement, and refuses to settle on anything which is *not* at *some distance*. The proposed phraseology confounds together the *cause* of a sensation and the *object* of a perception: the former is that *from which a feeling is derived;* the latter is that *to which a feeling is directed*. And it is only under cover of this confusion that the word "*immediate*" is brought to claim direct contact as indispensable to its meaning: a *cause*, it is supposed, must *be* where it acts; but an *object* need not be where the thought or perception of it is. Nor does an object necessarily cease to be *immediately* known by quitting the *now*, any more than by absenting itself from the *here*. I remember seeing a house on fire last week. That past event is the thing which in my present act of memory I *immediately* contemplate, and which alone is known in it. My consciousness in remembering refers as directly to the event, without any vicarious interposition, as my consciousness in perception to the thing perceived. In both cases the relation of the mental phenomenon to the external datum appears to us precisely the same. If not, if the past occurrence be mediately known,—where is the *medium?* Is it my own act of memory? Is this the *object of my immediate knowledge?* On the contrary, it is not the object of my thought at all, but my very thought itself; just as much the momentary form of my own subjective activity, as in the act of perception my perceiving consciousness is. In neither instance do I first attend to my present state of mind, and then, stepping on this as evidence, pass at one

remove to the ultimate fact; but that fact, dispensing with mediation, emerges of itself into knowledge in being remembered or in being perceived. Have we not here fallen again on the traces of confusion between the *cause* and the *object* of a mental state? In perception, the cause and the object of my knowledge are the same, and are finished off at the same point; my consciousness is the *causa cognoscendi* in relation to the external reality: and this reality is the *causa essendi* in relation to my consciousness; and the fact has no reference beyond this. In memory, also, my present knowledge has the same thing, namely, the past event, for cause and for object; but what is that past event? It is a *former perception of my own*, my presence, for instance, and experience at the burning of the house; for we need hardly say that the mere mental picture of the fire without reference to one's self as witness would be no case of memory at all, but only of free imagination. Thus the very thing known is here a prior act of knowledge, which act had its own object, the ulterior cause, through our then-perception, of our present memory. Descend then from the past in the order of experience, and pick out the whole *causa essendi* of my present consciousness; and you pass from the physical fact, through a former perception, into the existing remembrance. But ascend from the present, and find the whole *causa cognoscendi* of the past event I am contemplating; and you proceed direct from the memory I have, to the perception I had; and *this* immediately arrests and satisfies my search for the *object* of remembrance, for this experience of mine *is* the past event which I recollect; and only as lying within this and appearing among its contents does the mere physical fact figure in my cognitive act. Certainly, if you take the physical fact, the burning house, apart from my perception of it, as the *object remembered*, you may obtain the same number of steps upwards as downwards; but even then the result, illegitimately obtained, will not answer the conditions required; for the *mediate phenomenon*, through which

I step from the present to that past fact, turns out to be my former perception, and not, as the theory demands, my existing memory. For these reasons, we feel disposed to place the difference between the two faculties, considered as cognitive, not in the *mode of their knowing*, but only in the *object of their knowledge;* which, in the case of memory, is always egoistic, one's own perceptions in the past; in the case of perception, non-egoistic, an outward reality given in the present.

The question whether a rose, or the effluvia from it, should be regarded as the object smelt, merges in a larger question, whether smell has any object at all. We cannot but think that such language is the relic of an erroneous doctrine of the senses; and that if Sir W. Hamilton's admirable hints for discriminating sensation from perception were followed out to their legitimate results, the impropriety of this phraseology would be immediately apparent. We are profoundly sensible of the value of this part of his philosophy, which is a treasury of original reflection and research; and our only doubt is, whether his law of the inverse variation of sensation and perception ought not to be pushed to its ultimate ratio, or at least carried beyond the limits at which he arrests it. We see no reason for regarding the two functions as necessarily coexisting; and are inclined to think that what are called the "ignoble senses,"—which agree in not being at the disposal of the locomotive power,—are wholly *impercipient;* and would never, by the mere succession of their feelings, waken into consciousness the distinction between subject and object, or reveal their own organic seat. Plato reproaches Protagoras with reducing human cognition to a level with "*the tadpoles*";* and certainly, if we want to estimate the resources of sensation, as such, apart from the uses to which it is put by higher faculties copresent with it, we ought to carry our experiments down to the creatures where it is most unmixed. Without pretending to pronounce upon the psychology of the tadpole, we may reasonably doubt

* Theætetus, 161. D.

whether an animal of that class can say to itself, "*I* feel a good taste"; or, "this taste is *from my food*"; and if so, sensations may exist, without involving any cognition, even of themselves. If they fall upon a creature purely recipient,—merely lying still to feel,—they will simply come and perish, like a train of sparks issuing, one by one, out of a dark tube, and falling extinguished in water as fast as they appear. They will be carried back to no source whence they are administered, and home to no being to whom they belong. To *have sensations* is a state far short of *knowing that one has them.* The self-consciousness which this would imply does not spring up without another element, opposite to this sensitive receptivity; namely, a spontaneous *nisus* of the mind, proceeding from within outwards, and at one time completely executing itself, at another arrested by an impediment. The moment this condition is added, and the inner activity meets obstruction, the unity of consciousness breaks into subject and object; we know that an act has gone forth from us, and that a counter-act is delivered upon us. The opposition thus gained of the ego and the non-ego contains two momenta. (1.) It appears as a *dynamic* antithesis, namely, subjective *force* and objective *force.* (2.) It appears as a *mathematical* antithesis, namely, subjective *position* (here) and objective *position* (there); for in thinking of something *independent* of ourselves we necessarily represent it as *external* to ourselves. We are thus introduced, in one and the same act, to the two great notions within which these antitheses respectively lie, namely, of CAUSE and of SPACE; and are provided with the needful conditions for deducing the primary qualities of body from the data of resistance and extension. Short of this apprehension of body, there is surely no perception; and without perception, no apperception (to borrow a word from Leibniz); neither the *self* nor the *other-than-self* yet exists as a sphere to which phenomena are referred; and whatever sensations may passively occur will simply alter the sentient condition, without being referred to any seat,

without starting any question of causation, without awakening any act of attention. The contrary lines of direction taken by the mental spontaneity and the sensitive receptivity must meet and cross, before we can make an *object* of any phenomenon, or have a place, whether inner or outer, in which to look at it. Sensation, therefore, as such has no *object;* and this word acquires its first title to appear, when some point comes into view on which an energy of attention can direct itself. In proportion as a sense,—smell, for instance,—is more entirely receptive, does it remain impercipient; and when Kant makes the categories of space and time conditions of the exercise of *sense in general*, without excluding even its most passive changes, he misses, as it seems to us, their precise nativity. Nor does it suffice to fix, in more recent fashion, on the *muscular sense* as the exclusive source of our primary perceptions. The muscles, after long neglect, have become the psychologist's favourite resource, and have just reason to complain of being greatly overworked. Taken merely as a sixth *sense*,—as the seat of certain feelings during the execution of a movement,—they are no more competent than any of their five old fashioned companions to call up before us the spectacle of the world as antithetic to ourselves. There is no magic in the distinctive sort of sensation they give us; it might be altered into any other sort,—nay, might be extinguished in stupefaction,—without forfeiture, on their part, of the perceptive prerogative attached so pre-eminently to them. The peculiarity resides not *in* them, but *behind* them;—in the antecedent *nisus* or mental energy which initiates their action and goes before their sensations. The feelings of any other sense come upon us with surprise; in their case alone is a prior signal passed in the mind, which they do but follow. Were this spontaneous activity prefixed to any other sense instead,—were it transferred, for example, from the muscular to the auditory system, so as to make hearing, like motion, partially voluntary, partially obstructed,—we apprehend that the perceptive power would change its

lodgings to the ear, and space and causation be known to us by a new medium. Under such conditions we should of course be precluded from knowing several qualities of body now familiar to us, in the appreciating of which,—and still more of their degrees,—the tactual and muscular sensations are specifically indispensable. But the fundamental bases of cognition, the subjective and objective antithesis, on both its dynamic and its mathematical side, would be secured. For these reasons we think that perception should be wholly denied to sensation, as such, and referred not to the mind's receptivity, but inversely, to its spontaneous activity; that self-consciousness belongs to a being as percipient, not as sensitive; that, in the partnership and co-operation of the two functions, perception gives us direct cognizance of objects, we know not, subjectively, how; while sensation (now self-conscious) presents us with feelings of our own from objective causes, we know not what; that the primary qualities of body, being given us in the former, are known as realities, while the secondary, belonging to the latter, are thought as hypotheses. In this view, objectivity does not belong to sense at all, but must be sought at the terminus of that perceptive attention which streams out through the instruments of sense; and wherever that attention alights, there and no nearer is the only proper claimant of the word "*object*"; nor does its possible remoteness in time or place disqualify it for the name "*immediate* object."

From our author's doctrine as to the ground of knowledge, we proceed to his estimate of the inherent *limits* of knowledge. Ourselves and the external world we know by direct presence with each other, and in equipoise of conscious certainty. We know them, however, only under *relation*; of subject, for example, to object; of succession in time; of co-existence in space; of phenomenon to cause. Yet, in pursuing this relative course of cognition, we are apt to be struck with the belief that one of the two terms in each of the primary syzygies transcends relation at the

very moment of creating it; that the soul, discovered by physical plurality, is a hyper-physical unity; that time and space, apprehended in the conception of finite positions, are actually infinite; that causality, evinced only in phenomenal manifestations, has an absolute self-subsistence. In what light are we to regard these entities of our thought? Are they cognizable by us, and may we credit them with real existence? Or must we pronounce them the mere mental conditions under which alone our faculties can conceive the objects of their positive knowledge? In our own time Schelling has vindicated the possibility of knowing the absolute; but only by arbitrarily assuming for the purpose an impersonal intellectual intuition above the reach of consciousness, and as little within the sphere of knowledge as that which it is set to know. Hegel has applied the skeleton keys of his counterfeit logic to pick every lock that detains him in the prison of the relative. And Cousin has contended that, in the very act of recognizing the inner and the outer worlds as finite and mutually conditioning, the mind becomes aware of God, as the infinite and unconditioned into which both are taken up. In opposition to all these, and with special regard to the last, Sir W. Hamilton recalls, with modifications, the critical conclusions of Kant, and pronounces ontology a series of optical illusions spread as shadows upon the bounding walls of reason. The necessary correlations of thought on which Cousin insists,—which render it impossible, for instance, to conceive the finite without the infinite,—are not, he remarks, to be confounded with an equal reality in the things. We apprehend nothing except by differencing it from what is other than itself; yet, in affirming its existence, we do not affirm also the existence of its "other"; and the paradox of Hegel, that contradictories are compatibles, refutes itself. The ideal entities with which ontology concerns itself are only the negatives which the mind sets up as a background on which to define its objects of positive knowledge. Relations of succession require for their dis-

cernment an underlying non-succession or duration; and those of position, an indeterminate sphere which holds all places and is in none, namely, space. But the infinitude which we ascribe to these is not an objective reality, but the mere product of a subjective incapacity; it results from our inability to think except by relation, and consequent necessity, in order to appreciate relation itself, of feigning an unrelated. Two opposite incompetencies shut us in; we can neither finish off our conceptions of quantity, and set them in a definite frame, nor let them work out their inexhaustible progression. A minimum or a maximum of time; an irresolvable nucleus or a bounded whole, is inconceivable and contradictory; as *absolute*, it defies our faculties. Nor less so, on the other side of the alternative, —as *infinite;* for to continue the increment of any given quantity to its ultimate possibility would require an eternity of addition. On the one hand, therefore, absolute commencement and absolute close,—on the other, infinite non-commencement and infinite non-close, are impossible to thought; yet as contradictories must, one or the other of them, be true. Our only positive conception is found as an unfinished section between the two extremes, and is expressed by the word "*indefinite.*" Nor is the rule confined to the case of quantitative conception; it applies equally to quality and degree. To *think* is to *condition;* and thought must cease to be thought, or the unconditioned must accept conditions, ere they can have any dealings with each other.

By this "law of the conditioned," which confines the free play of positive knowledge between two extremes, both impossible yet mutually contradictory, Sir W. Hamilton dissipates all the objects of ontology, and reduces it from a *science* to a *nescience.* The most curious and important application of the doctrine is found in the appendix to his "Discussions," and is new to those who have not enjoyed the privileges of his class-room. In this essay he resolves the principle of causality,—the mental necessity of referring every phenomenon to a cause,—into one of the two

counter-imbecilities of reason, which bound our relative field. Debarred from conceiving any absolute commencement of existence, we are obliged, on the occurrence of a phenomenon, to attribute to it a pre-existence ere yet it had attained its manifestation; and this is nothing else than to *assign it to a cause.* But of this interesting speculation our author must give his own account.

"The phænomenon of causality seems nothing more than a corollary of the law of the conditioned, in its application to a thing thought under the form or mental category of *existence relative in time.* We cannot know, we cannot think a thing, except under the attribute of *existence;* we cannot know or think a thing to exist, except as in *time;* and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in time, and think it *absolutely to commence.* Now this at once imposes on us the judgment of causality. And thus: an object is given us, either by our presentative, or by our representative, faculty. As given, we cannot but think it existent, and existent in time. But to say, that we cannot but think it to exist, is to say, that we are unable to think it non-existent,—to think it away.—to annihilate it in thought. And this we cannot do. We may turn away from it; we may engross our attention with other objects; we may consequently, exclude it from our thought. That we need not think a thing is certain; but thinking it, it is equally certain that we cannot think it not to exist. So much will be at once admitted of the present; but it may probably be denied of the past and future. Yet, if we make the experiment, we shall find the mental annihilation of an object equally impossible under time past and present and future. To obviate, however, misapprehension, a very simple observation may be proper. In saying that it is impossible to annihilate an object in thought, in other words, to conceive as non-existent what has been conceived as existent,—it is of course not meant that it is impossible to imagine the object wholly changed in form. We can represent to ourselves the elements of which it is composed, divided, dissipated, modified in any way; we can imagine any thing of it, short of annihilation. But the complement, the quantum, of existence, thought as constituent of an object,—*that* we cannot represent to ourselves, either as increased, without abstraction from other entities, or as diminished, with-

out annexation to them. In short, we are unable to construe it in thought that there can be an atom absolutely added to, or absolutely taken away from, existence in general. Let us make the experiment. Let us form to ourselves a concept of the universe. Now, we are unable to think that the quantity of existence, of which the universe is the conceived sum, can either be amplified or diminished. We are able to conceive, indeed, the creation of a world; this indeed as easily as the creation of an atom. But what is our thought of creation? It is not a thought of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the contrary, creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity. Let us place ourselves in imagination at its very crisis. Now, can we construe it to thought, that the moment after the universe flashed into material reality, into manifested being, there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its Author together, than, the moment before, there subsisted in the Deity alone? This we are unable to imagine. And what is true of our concept of creation, holds of our concept of annihilation. We can think no real annihilation,—no absolute sinking of something into nothing. But, as creation is cogitable by us, only as a putting forth of divine power, so is annihilation by us only conceivable as a withdrawal of that same power. All that is now *actually* existent in the universe, this we think and must think, as having, prior to creation, *virtually* existed in the Creator; and in imagining the universe to be annihilated, we can only conceive this as the retractation by the Deity of an overt energy into latent power. In short, it is impossible for the human mind to think what it thinks existent lapsing into non-existence, either in time past or in time future. Our inability to think what we have once conceived existent in *time* as in time becoming non-existent, corresponds with our inability to think what we have conceived existent in *space*, as in space becoming non-existent. We cannot realize it to thought, that a thing should be extruded, either from the one quantity or from the other. Hence, under extension, the law of *ultimate incompressibility;* under protension, the law of *cause and effect.*" . . . "An object is presented to our observation which has phænomenally begun to be. But we cannot construe it to thought that the object, that is, *this determinate complement of existence*, had really no being at any past moment;

because in that case, once thinking it as existent, we should again think it as non-existent, which is for us impossible. What then can we—must we do? That the phænomenon presented to us did, *as a phænomenon*, begin to be,—this we know by experience; but that the elements of its existence only began when the phænomenon which they constitute came into manifested being,—this we are wholly unable to think. In these circumstances how do we proceed? There is for us only one possible way. We are compelled to believe that the object (that is the certain *quale* and *quantum* of being), whose phænomenal rise into existence we have witnessed, did *really* exist, prior to this rise, under other forms. But to say that a thing previously existed under different forms, is only to say, in other words, that *a thing had causes*."—*Discussions*, p. 591.

It is with the utmost diffidence that we confess our doubts of the correctness of this doctrine; affirmed as it is by a philosopher who has tested it, he assures us, in all its applications, and whose judgment always prevails with us as far as authority can fitly go. But it certainly does not speak home to our consciousness; and strikes us as an instance,—not solitary,—in which our author's logical acuteness is too much for the soundness of his psychological interpretation. Without calling in question the general "law of the conditioned," we are far from being convinced of its complicity with the principle of causality. Granting for the moment that we cannot conceive the existence of a phenomenon without also conceiving of its pre-existence, we cannot allow that this evolution of being is at all equivalent to the exercise of causation. That there was something *ready to be evolved* gives no satisfactory account of the *evolution itself;* and this is what we want to know. When we would learn the διότι,—to send us up to the previous ὅτι,—what is it but, on our asking for bread, to give us a stone? A cause is demanded, to explain precisely and only that which in any case did *not* pre-exist, namely, the *new* element, the form of fact which now *is* and *was not* before. To say that the difference of the present from the past has its solution in the identity of

the past with the present, is surely a paradox. Indeed, sameness in the quantum of existence is not less compatible with the absence of all fresh phenomena than with their manifold occurrence; and cannot therefore account for either the fact or the nature of their change. An equation contains no force; and to balance the amount of being is no provision for its transmigration into altered forms. Even if we allow this equipoise to be a condition of our judgments of causation, we cannot make it the sole condition, unless we are prepared to contend that the potentiality of a thing is the cause of its actuality. Thus the theory seems to render no account of the essential element in the fact proposed for explanation.

But is any quantitative judgment at all involved in the principle of causality? We greatly doubt it. Were there any mental affirmation of identity in the sum of being before and after a phenomenon, we should regard the effect as evolved at the expense of the cause, and cancelling a portion of its existence; and no such mensurative comparison appears to us to belong to our causal faith in its inartificial form. Originally, cause and effect are incommensurable; and in its explanation of all phenomena the mind draws on the same fund of power, and that an infinite one, without supposing it ever to be diminished. The scientific reduction of force to quantitative rules is a subsequent and empirical result, not involved in the axiom of causation, but depending on the muscular limitations imposed on our own *nisus*, and the tendency on this hint to detach from the infinite fund, and set up apart in our thought, certain delegated *stocks* of force, susceptible, through analogy among the phenomena, of an apparent common measure. Even then, however, the causal judgment extends in every direction over fields which dynamic mensuration cannot approach; and imagination is as little provided as science with any metre for estimating the causality which gives to a plant yellow blossoms instead of white, or which produces a poem, or keeps a resolve. Thus,

the theory seems to insist on a non-essential element in place of the essential, which it has cast out.

Again; what, according to this doctrine, is the *contradictory* of the principle of causality? what must we say, if we would flatly deny the proposition, that every phenomenon must have a cause? We must affirm,—so our author assures us,—that man is a free agent, and God the source of all! These beliefs, which certainly *mean* to vindicate causality in its highest and only genuine sense, are said to destroy it; and though set up expressly to prevent the whole universe filing off in a dead march of mere effects, are made responsible for the affirmation of lawless fortuity. So far from having any conflict, in the common consciousness of mankind, with the causal faith, they are the very form which that faith assumes in its utmost intensity; and whatever finds itself in contradiction to them cannot well be the real law of the mind's feeling and procedure. The nature of the contradiction is thus expounded:—

"Fatalism and atheism are convertible terms. The only valid arguments for the existence of a God, and for the immortality of the human soul, rest on the ground of man's moral nature; consequently, if that moral nature be annihilated, which in any scheme of thorough-going necessity it is, every conclusion, established on such a nature, is annihilated likewise. Aware of this, some of those who make the judgment of causality a positive dictate of intelligence, find themselves compelled, in order to escape from the consequences of their doctrine. to deny that this dictate, though universal in its deliverance, should be allowed to hold universally true; and, accordingly, they would exempt from it the facts of volition. Will, they hold to be a free cause, a cause which is not an effect; in other words, they attribute to it the power of absolute origination. But here their own principle of causality is too strong for them. They say that it is unconditionally promulgated, as an express and positive law of intelligence, that every origination is an apparent only, not a real, commencement. Now, to exempt certain phænomena from this

universal law, on the ground of our moral consciousness, cannot validly be done; for, in the first place, this would be an admission that the mind is a complement of contradictory revelations. If mendacity be admitted of some of our mental dictates, we cannot vindicate veracity to any. If one be delusive, so may all. 'Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.' Absolute scepticism is here the legitimate conclusion. But, in the second place, waiving this conclusion, what right have we, on this doctrine, to subordinate the positive affirmation of causality to our consciousness of moral liberty,—what right have we, for the interest of the latter, to derogate from the former? We have none. If both be equally positive, we are not entitled to sacrifice the alternative, which our wishes prompt us to abandon."—*Discussions*, p. 595.

If the judgment of causality is tantamount to a denial of origination, it certainly cannot coexist with a doctrine of free will. This, however, is a postulate which we are not disposed to concede; least of all to Sir W. Hamilton, who condemns the only scheme that has a right to it, namely, Dr. Brown's resolution of causality into invariable phenomenal antecedence. To the *phenomenon*, as a realized fact, we no doubt do deny the power to originate itself; but to the *cause*, as a realizing agency, we do not deny, but, on the contrary, directly affirm, the power of absolutely originating the phenomenon: only in virtue of this prerogative is it presumed to be a cause at all. The true notion of causation in all men's minds, till science substitutes for the faith in origination the mere study of premonitory signs, is that of a power necessitating but not necessitated;—capable of determining one actuality out of a plurality of indeterminate possibilities,—of turning up into existence something rather than nothing, and *this* rather than *that*. We never ask for a cause except to resolve a question of *comparison*,—"why *this* and not *other than this*"? and the function which we demand from it is precisely that of elective determination. Hence, among the assemblage of conditions which are collectively indispensable to a given result, we attach the name "*cause*" distinctively to that *one*

which has overset the equilibrium of possibilities, and precipitated the actual fact. Whence this notion of *preferential* agency? To what point does it refer us as the nativity of our causal belief? Can it be denied that in the exercise of our own WILL we are conscious of this very power,—of fetching a single fact out of more than a single potentiality? that nowhere else than at this fountain-head of energy *could* this notion be got, requiring access, as it does, to the occult priorities of action, as well as to its posterior manifestation to the eye? and that only in so far as we interpret Nature by the type thus found, can we recognize there the characteristic element of causality? The will, therefore, we submit, so far from being the solitary exception to a universal rule of necessary causation, is itself the universal rule which makes all real causation free. Volitional agency is that which the mind originally sees in nature as in itself,—the opposite term in that dynamic antithesis on which the obstructed *nisus* of perception lands us; and never does the inquisitive "whence?" find repose along the linear ascent of antecedents, till it reaches the only power intrinsically capable of fetching the determinate out of the indeterminate, namely, a MIND. The advocate of free will, instead of standing in contradiction to the principle of causality, thus regards himself as in possession of its only key; he retorts upon his opponent the charge of corrupting the psychological text of nature's definition in order to find his own interpretation; and protests that a denial of all origination is but a poor account of how a phenomenon came to be. He identifies the causal law with the faith, not in necessity, but in freedom, and dates the semblance of contradiction between them from the moment when the observed rule of phenomenal succession, required for purposes of scientific prediction, usurped the place of the real principle of causality, which is the living essence of all ontological faith.

What, then, are we to say of the asserted psychological fact, that an absolute commencement of existence is intrin-

sically inconceivable? Is it a fact at all? We believe not. *Of* time itself indeed no beginning can be thought: but a beginning of existence *in* time, the apparition of a phenomenon perfectly new, appears to us to contradict no law of imagination or belief. In demanding a *cause* for such phenomenon, we do not wish to make out that it is the disguised reappearance of a quantity already there; nor does any mental necessity constrain us to compare the amount of existence before and after its manifestation. The theist who holds the doctrine of a positive creation of all things by an act of volition, does not suppose that the divine nature suffers decrement by the sum of created existences; nor does he think of God as now, in part even, metamorphosed into the universe; but as having made space richer by an absolute augmentation of being. Whether this mode of conception is, on religious or philosophical grounds, better or worse than the doctrine of evolution and transmigration, we do not inquire; we only submit that it is psychologically possible.

The "law of the conditioned," therefore, appears inadequate to solve the mystery of causation. It only remains to ask, whether it closes the door of hope against all ontological inquiry? Are the boasted entities of pure thought mere negations obtained by abstracting all the conditions of positive cognition? and is the "indefinite" the only notion we can have of the "infinite"? On these great questions we will no further presume to touch, than to suggest one or two cautionary reflections, with a view to relieve the utter despair which our author encourages of any but phenomenal knowledge. Let it be admitted at once that all knowledge is relative, and that every attempt of the mind to sink away from all relation and merge into the absolute is vain, and were it not so, would be suicidal, —a total extinction of thought, not an enlargement of it. This is not a mere provincial limitation of the *human* faculties, but an inherent character of knowledge, as such, and inseparable from it in the highest as in the lowest

mind. For this very reason, however, it appears absurd to put on the airs of modest disclaimer in professing to have no cognizance of "things in themselves." This is not a prerogative missed, but a prerogative gained; not a science beyond reach, but a nescience escaped. To know two things (for example, matter and mind) only in their relation ought to be treated as tantamount, not to an ignorance of both, but to a knowledge of both; if we are unacquainted with them *out of relation*, we are ignorant of them only where there is nothing to be known. Intellectual humility consists in a profound sense of the littleness of our actual knowledge, as compared with the possible, not with the impossible. Whoever feels humbled by the relativity of his faculties must assume that by this he is debarred from something it were well to reach; that he is hindered from getting at reality, and doomed to be content with shadows; he wants, not to know *more* (for that "more," however vast, would still be relative), but to know *differently;* and deplores the very essence of intellect itself as a hopeless blindness. What is this but the morbid lament of scepticism? Faith in the veracity of our faculties, if it means anything, requires us to believe that *things are as they appear*,—that is, appear to the mind in the last and highest resort; and to deal with the fact that they "*only appear*" as if it constituted an eternal exile from their *reality* is to attribute lunacy to universal reason. But the objects of ontological quest are not lost to us in being only relatively discerned. Being either plural themselves, or containing a plurality, they are actually charged with relations; and to know them as out of relation would be simply to *mis*-know them. Because God can be contemplated only, like other objects of thought, as differenced from our subjective selves, is it needful to say, that he is merely phenomenal to us and not cognizable in his reality?

Negatives in thought are perhaps as unjustly disparaged as *relatives*. The infinite is no doubt the negation of the finite; but so also is the finite of the infinite; the relation

is strictly convertible, and either term may be equally assumed as positive. Both are not indeed alike "*conceivable*," if by that word he meant *presentable in imagination;* but both are alike cogitable, and take their place among the objects of assured belief, at the same moment and in the same act. The experience which gives to my perception a body of certain shape and size, simultaneously gives to my knowledge the boundless space in which it lies. The definite object is seen upon the infinite ground; neither is gained before or after the other; neither, therefore, by thinking away or abstracting the conditions of the other, as prior; both are accepted as immediately known realities. The instant the ego stands consciously face to face with the non-ego, the antithesis of *here* and *there* is understood; and the *elsewhere*, which is the negative of either, is felt to be not merely an indefinite possibility to which we know *of no end*, but an infinite actuality to which we know *that there is no end.* Is this necessary faith, which comes in with the first apprehension of solid extension, and holds us by the same tenure, a mere delusion? If it be, we charge mendacity on a primary cognition. If it be not, then infinitude is affirmed as a reality, and therefore positively thought, of space. The continued additive process, never stopping except from the fatigue of going on, to which our author, like Locke and Mill, ascribes our representation of inexhaustible extension, appears to us an unpsychologic fiction; it is not under this aspect of a "growing quantity," but under that of an "infinite datum," that space presents itself in thought. Of course such infinite datum, imposed on our acceptance by necessity of thought, can be referred only to an *à priori* source; and were this an idea inadmissible in Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, we should understand his refusal to advance beyond the "indefinite." But he approves and professes the Kantian doctrine of space and time; only with the addition that we have an *a posteriori* as well as an *a priori* apprehension of them. From the one source we should

learn them to be indefinite; from the other they are given to us as infinite: why are we to register the former testimony with our knowledge, the latter with our ignorance? In showing the subjective origin of our beliefs about time and space, Kant has failed to prove their objective invalidity. Is every representation which is the pure birth of the mind untrustworthy on that account? Hegel accused Kant of assailing the most necessary persuasions of mankind with the curious argument, "It cannot be true, because *we* have to believe it." And this reproach any philosophy must incur, which is not prepared to accept as valid the objective contents of every *a priori* belief, until their credit is shaken by the appearance of contradictory claims. In spite, therefore, of its relative, its negative, its subjective character, we are disposed to vindicate the real, positive, objective validity of that infinitude which we ascribe to extension and duration. The same remarks apply to the other entities of thought, as substance and cause, soul and God. These notions are all vehicles of indestructible belief in certain ideal objects as also real; and do not present themselves as mere subjective aids to the apprehension of other related things. Why have they not as good title to be believed on their own word, as the consciousness which assures us of the existence of an external world? There would seem to be something arbitrary in our author's discrimination of what he shall take and what he shall leave of the critical philosophy. Kant's tendency to idealistic scepticism he sees and condemns on his own favourite field,—the doctrine of perception; and the justice of his verdict is rendered evident to the least discerning by the fact that, in the first edition of the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft," the philosopher of Königsberg had hinted at the possibility of resolving the non-ego, in the last resort, into the same thinking essence with the ego; and had thus furnished the text, cancelled almost as soon as written, for Fichte's subsequent speculations. But no sooner is Sir W. Hamilton clear of the senses, than the

realism with which he has protected himself against Kant is flung away; the natural faiths of consciousness, trusted hitherto in evidence of positive fact, become suspected as mere negative dreams; they are described as the blanks drawn by our imbecility, instead of the prizes awarded to our capacity; and the mind, previously guided in so sound a course, is pronounced to have no other choice, for its higher beliefs, than between two extremes both separately impossible, and, in their relation, mutually contradictory. This complete ontological scepticism we cannot fully reconcile with our author's perceptional realism; and while acknowledging the adequacy of his polemic against the modern continental absolutists, we are not yet stripped of the hope that a less precarious passage may be found from the knowledge of self to that of hyperphysical nature and of God.

Nor does our author himself esteem the gulf impassable. Like Kant, he demolishes your one bridge, and leaves you shuddering on the solemn verge; but when you are duly humbled with despair, he leads you to another spot, and shows you a footway across to which you may safely trust; only it rests, he assures you, on no arches of reason spanning the abyss and bottomed in known reality; but rather hangs from chains of obligation, whose curve dips into the clearest sight, while for their fastening they run up into the dark of heaven. What the speculative intellect dissipates, the practical restores; and the moral consciousness countermands the scepticism which had been pronounced the only wisdom of pure thought. The truths denied to knowledge are given to faith, and found to be entangled as indispensable postulates in the whole action of the will and conscience:—

"It is chiefly, if not solely, to explain the one phenomenon of *morality*, of *free-will*, that we are warranted in assuming a second and hyperphysical substance, in an immaterial principle of thought; for it is only on the supposition of a moral liberty in man, that we can attempt to vindicate, as truths, a moral order, and, consequently, a moral governor, in the universe;

and it is only on the hypothesis of a soul within us, that we can assert the reality of a God above us,—'Nullus in microcosmo spiritus, nullus in macrocosmo Deus.' In the hands of the materialist, or physical necessitarian, every argument for the existence of a Deity is either annulled, or reversed into a demonstration of atheism. In his hands, with the moral worth of man, the inference to a moral ruler of a moral world is gone. In his hands, the argument from the adaptations of end and mean, everywhere apparent in existence, to the primary causality of intelligence and liberty, if applied, establishes, in fact, the primary causality of necessity and matter. For as this argument is only an extension to the universe of the analogy observed in man; if in man, design,—intelligence,—be only a phenomenon of matter, only a reflex of organization; this consecution of first and second in us, extended to the universal order of things, reverses the absolute priority of intelligence to matter, that is, subverts the fundamental condition of a Deity. Thus it is, that our theology is necessarily founded on our psychology; that we must *recognize a God from our own minds*, before we can *detect a God in the universe of nature*." —*Discussions*, p. 298.

"To recognize a God from our own minds" is surely to discover "a passage from psychology to ontology"; and the transition which Sir W. Hamilton denies to Cousin he finds possible himself. There is a way,—and he has indicated, with the clearest discernment, precisely where it lies, —to reach the sublime truths in which philosophy culminates. Why then describe these truths as intrinsically incognizable, and draw the boundary of possible knowledge far short of them? Why denounce all claim to their discovery as a presumptuous delusion, yet hold up the disbelief of them as a mischievous ignorance; censuring at once the metaphysician for finding and the mathematician for missing them? That they are included among the contents of our moral rather than of our perceptive experience, that they are hypotheses underlying all action instead of postulates conditioning reflective thought, affords no adequate reason for withdrawing them from the category of *know-*

ledge. If they be susceptible of becoming anyhow legitimate objects of belief, if to be without them is to be in error and misconceive the universe and life, it must be a wrong definition of knowledge which excludes them; of logic, which disowns the laws of thought conducting to them; of philosophy, which deals with them as its own outer darkness. We do not believe in the mutual conflict and ultimate contradiction of the human faculties, so that the light put out by one is kindled by another; nor, if we did, should we find much comfort in the assurance that the contradiction is the result, not of their power, but of their impotence. Be their deliverances called positive or negative, if they coerce our faith into incompatible admissions, leave us no choice but between two impossibles, and amid the protests of reason against both, provoke us, by force of instinct, into one, our nature is indeed a strange confusion, and breaks into utter distortion the divine image it was created to reflect. Thus to affirm a discord of its capacities *inter se* appears scarcely a more warrantable scepticism, than to repudiate its announcements, one by one. Let a single *a priori* belief, given us by a necessary law of thought (like the judgment of causality and of the infinitude of space) be once discredited, and the moral effect and intellectual havoc are the same, whether it be treated *ab initio* as unreliable, or be convicted, at a later stage, of denying an allegation equally original and authentic with itself. The mind is in either way a shrine of falsehood; the Pythoness is drunk, and the oracles rave. Afflicted with the belief of two contradictories, neither of which we are permitted to conceive possible, how are we to choose our course? how detect the cheat that is somewhere put upon us? Shall we say to ourselves, one of these extremes must be true and the other false,—so we cannot hold both. This assumes that the *contradiction is real*, and not a phantasm of our incapacity; yet who can assure us of this? for if it be so, and we forthwith decide to drop one of the extremes, the other which we retain is still felt to be

an impossibility, while admitted as a reality. We distrust the feeling, and believe in spite of it. But why fix the cheat *there?* If the *impossibility* of either term may be treated as mere semblance, why not the *contradictoriness* between the two? And is it not as competent to us to say, "Since both are impossible, neither can be true," as to urge, "Since they are contradictory, *only one* can be false"? All sane direction of the mind is lost, if among its guiding stars there ever hangs an ignis fatuus. It behoves philosophy sooner to suspect itself, than to install contradictions within the very essence of reason; and rather than make our nature Jesuitically insinuate a lie, to persist in the hope of so interpreting the mottoes of its several faculties and combining the scattered leaves of its faith, as to bring out the continuity of truth, and its unity with all beauty and good. A philosophy which entertains antimonies may have the highest merit but one; the highest of all is reserved for a philosophy that resolves them.

We must close this notice without a word on the subject of Sir W. Hamilton's scheme of logical forms. Indeed, when we advert to the various topics elaborately treated by him, which we cannot so much as enumerate to our readers, and see how slightly we have touched his solid mass of doctrine even at the few points which have attracted us, we are more impressed than ever with profound admiration for his largeness of learning and thoroughness of mind. That the one sometimes tempts to a superfluous display, and the other to an intellectual scorn more merited by his victims than graceful to himself, will be most readily forgiven by those who understand the author and know his writings best. In him the old scholastic spirit seems embodied again; its capacity for work; its vehemence of disputation; its generous intellectual admirations; its fineness of logical apprehension; the want of perspective and proportion in its mental view. Books and thoughts are evidently the population of his world; they form the natural circle of his friendships and his enmities; their reputations touch his

sense of equity and honour; their rivalries and delinquencies furnish the needful amusement of a little gossip and scandal. Where the range of knowledge is so vast, this enclosure of the whole intensity of life within the sphere of notional speculation involves no narrowness; but can scarcely fail to impart a warmth of zeal, which others can scarcely believe to be excited by formulas and theories. Professional enthusiasm is so needful an inspiration for every effective teacher, that only those who cannot appreciate its value will be unwilling to take it on its own terms. The great critic and metaphysician of Edinburgh has rendered inestimable service by reducing the leading problems of philosophy into a better form than they had assumed in the hands of any of his predecessors, and by admirable examples of the true method of discussion. But he has rendered a higher and yet more fruitful service by awakening the dormant genius of British philosophy, rebuking its sluggishness, reviving its aspirations, and training a school of studious and generous admirers, who will emulate his example and reverently carry on his work.

XII.

JOHN STUART MILL.*

BOTANICAL students, more than thirty years ago, turning over the leaves of the English Flora encountered the frequent name of J. S. Mill, as an authority for the habitat or the varieties of flowers. Before the earliest of these papers was written, the author, stripling as he must then have been, was already known to distinguished men as a faithful observer of nature. A holiday walk through the lanes and orchards of Kent, which would have yielded to most youths a week's frolic and a bag of apples, filled his tin box with the materials of a naturalist's reputation. Nothing short of the same method of severe earnestness, carried through the whole intellectual training, and interpolating nothing between the child and the man, can well have formed the most elaborated mind of our age, and presented it almost complete at its first appearance. These volumes, indeed, bring to our recollection many an essay which, though not thought worthy to be included in their contents, would bear biographical testimony to the early richness and variety of the author's attainments. Nor was he thrown into this wide and heterogeneous culture without an organizing clue. In the analytical psychology of the elder Mill he inherited an instrument of great power for the logical reduction and

* "Dissertations and Discussions, Political, Philosophical, and Historical"; reprinted chiefly from the *Edinburgh and Westminster Reviews*. By John Stuart Mill. In 2 vols. J. W. Parker. 1859.—*National Review*, 1859.

systematic grasp of all knowledge: and his belief in it and mastery over it were complete. Limit as we may the pretensions of the Hartleyan doctrine, it affords an incomparable discipline for the first stage of philosophical reflection; and from the fascination which it invariably exercises over young intellects, its discipline is unsparingly and spontaneously applied. Its first principles easily pass unchallenged in the sensational years of life, ere the finer and deeper shades of inward consciousness have emerged. Its chemistry of ideas actually explains so many marvellous transformations and seems potentially competent to so much more, that we readily go into captivity to it at an age when ingenuity of process is more impressive to us than truth and precision of result. It has often exercised a profound influence over minds that, at a later stage, have been determined to violent re-action against it: as in the case of Coleridge, who named his first son after Hartley, and slept with the *Observations on Man* under his pillow. And of all the writers of this school, the most enchaining and irresistible is James Mill, whose *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* has always appeared to us a masterpiece of close and subtle exposition, to be dissented from, if you please, in its assumptions and conclusions, but rarely to be broken in the midst. Did the facts of consciousness stand as he represents them, his method would work. He satisfactorily explains—the wrong human nature. The mental gymnastic, however, involved in the study of such a work is invigorating, and gives command over a kind of psychological calculus to which innumerable problems yield. Furnished with this, our author tried its application over the widened field of his own generation and the richer resources of his own nature: and we are recalled to his first tentatives in the present republication.

The cold rigour of the elder Mill concealed from the world the extent of his literary knowledge; and when, now and then, he supported his political doctrines from the Republic of Plato, or dropped a tributary phrase to the

genius of that philosopher, people attributed it to some freak of pedantry, and almost disputed the right of a "Benthamite" to such an uncongenial admiration. What was begrudged to the father was freely conceded to the son, whose susceptibilities were believed to have an ampler range, who was known to have scholarship as well as science, and whose Platonic studies told not on his dialectic only, but on his style. He encountered, and to his true honour he vanquished the greatest trial that can meet the young philosopher at the outset of his career, viz., the extravagant expectations and loud-whispered praises of an intellectual coterie, accustomed to abuse and confident of triumph. Elderly prophets who had been stoned in their day fixed their eyes upon him as a sort of Utilitarian Messiah, who would take away the reproach of the school. Could he not gracefully discuss poetry with the poet, and art with the artist? Had he not an appreciative insight into the earlier philosophies, which Bentham could only laugh at and caricature? Was he not surely destined, by his high sympathies with heroic forms of character, to give the hereditary doctrine a nobler interpretation, and rescue it from the ignorant imputation of selfishness? That a young writer, in whose hearing these things were continually said or implied, should disappoint no prediction contained in them, is a rare evidence of moral as well as intellectual strength. The narrowness and perversities which had brought the Utilitarian Radicals into disrepute, never, from the first, appeared in him. There was even, we should say, a conscious revolt from them, and over-anxious care to avoid them, and a deliberate set of the will to apprehend the opposite point of view, and feel whatever truth and beauty lay around it. It was from some feeling of this kind, and especially from a determination to disown the Bowring type of Benthamism, that the *London Review* arose in 1835, under the guarantee of our author's intellect and Sir William Molesworth's purse; and the review of Professor Sedgwick's Discourse with which it

opened, though unsparing,—not to say arrogant,—as a manifesto against the rhetorical ethics of the Cambridge geologist, makes not a few concessions on the other side: it cheerfully surrenders Paley, and cautiously guards its defence of Locke; and shows a sensitiveness equally alive to the nonsense of opponents and the shortcomings of friends. So strongly are the papers of the next four or five years marked by the apparent resolution to escape from party one-sidedness, that they have almost an eclectic character,—with its usual accompaniment, an actual overbalance of candour in favour of rejected schemes of thought. The masterly article on Bentham certainly occasioned not a little flutter of displeasure among the jurist's admirers, while the corresponding paper on Coleridge was welcomed by the poet's disciples as a conciliatory and generous advance. Both of them, it is true, were written for the benefit of the author's own party: and the former therefore naturally became a criticism, corrective of what was amiss at home; the latter an exposition, reporting what truth might be fetched in from abroad: and the balance cannot be expected to hang as even as if he had been teaching each party how to take the measure of its own hero. Still it is evident that he rose from the study of Coleridge's writings with an admiration powerfully moved; that they first transferred him from an abstract to an historical theory of politics; and that, in exhibiting the speculative outline of these writings, he felt half-ashamed of the radical allies for whose instruction he performed the task. This schooling of himself into appreciation of a Conservative philosophy was not altogether acceptable to the veterans of his party; but it obtained for him a hearing where their voices could not effectually penetrate, and established literary communication between lines of thought previously closed against each other. And his influence as a writer, measured in its intensity and its kind, was singularly complete at once; none of his larger productions having produced, it is probable, a deeper impression than

the three great essays to which we have referred. This, indeed, is no more than the tribute due to the early balance and maturity of his powers. There is something almost preternatural in the singular evenness of these *Dissertations and Discussions*,—the produce of a quarter of a century,—scarcely betraying growth, because requiring none; and indicating not less severity of logic, and sharpness of statement, and authority of manner, in the first pages than in the last. And a higher quality than any of these, and equally apparent throughout, the more honourably distinguishes our author because personal to himself, and by no means habitual in his school, or indeed in any party connection, — we mean a deliberate intellectual conscientiousness, which, scorning to take advantage of accidental weakness, will even help an opponent to develop his strength, that none but the real and decisive issue may be tried. That our author is always *successful* in this we cannot indeed profess to believe; but we are convinced he always *means* it, and never misses it, unless through the involuntary limits of his mental sympathies.

These limits, however, cannot fail to assert themselves, in spite of the most elaborate culture. A catholic intellect is not to be created by resolve; and, notwithstanding his wish to interpret between "Benthamites" and "Coleridgians," Mr. Mill has still left the chasm between them without a bridge, and found neither wing nor way for bringing them together. He effected the exchange of one or two *political* ideas; borrowed the vindication of a "Clerisy," or endowed speculative class; enlarged the radical definition of the functions of the State; favoured, with St. Simon as well as Coleridge, the search for "Ideas," as well as Facts in History; qualified the austerities of Political Economy with a tinge of Socialistic humanities; and balanced the conception of Progress with that of Order. But these modifications were torn from their connection and taken over to the Bentham side without their root; fruits, as it were, plucked from the orchard of the High-

gate philosopher and stowed away in the store-closet at St. James's Park, sure to be consumed in a season and to be reproductive of no more. Accordingly, the sociological doctrine, whose first elements were taken from Coleridge, completed itself under the inspiration of Comte. We do not say that this interweaving of opposite ingredients prejudges the truth and unity of the doctrine; but if the parts do cohere in one vital organism, it can only be by grafting anew; and one or other has left its stem, to grow apart no less than before. In fact, it was only in particular results, never in fundamental principle, that our author deemed approximation possible. For himself, he surrendered no inch of his footing on the old ground of the "Experience-philosophy" and the "Utilitarian Ethics," and only aimed to enlarge its imperfect survey, and complete the edifice which had been partially raised upon it. This he has accomplished over a vast portion of the field, and his labours (with those of Mr. Austin in another department) have so far, we believe, consummated the possibilites of the system which they represent. It has attained an unexampled completeness and refinement; its subtlest corrections have been applied; its inmost resources have been strained; and now, more than ever, it ought adequately to meet the intellectual and moral exigencies of life. That it really covers the whole breadth of human want our author doubtless believes; yet the tone of his writings leaves a singular impression of melancholy and unrest. He seems rather to be making the best of the human lot as it is, than to find it worthy of a wise man's welcome. With a firm hand he draws the prohibitory circle which limits our knowledge to the field of experience, and concentrates a steady eye on his survey within it; yet not without glances of thought,—pathetic in their very anger,—towards the dark horizon of necessity and nescience around. Balanced and courteous as he is, it is always with a certain sharpness and irritation that he turns in that direction, and says, "Why look there? there is nothing to be seen." And

his moral discontent with the world is still more marked and more depressing than the speculative: his admirations spending themselves, and with fastidious scantiness, on what is wholly out of reach,—on Greek polities, that have passed out of reality, and on socialistic, that are doubtfully destined to arrive at it; and his dislikes increasing as the objects are nearer home,—England being more stupid than France, and the decorous middle class the meanest of all. Out of sympathy with society as it is, and with languid hopes of what it is to be, our author seems to sit apart, with genial pity for the multitudes below him, with disdain of whatever is around him, and in silence of any thing above him. No one would believe beforehand that a writer so serene and even, not to say cold, could affect the reader with so much sadness. You fall into it, without knowing whence it comes. All the lights upon his page are intellectual, breaking from a deep reserve of moral gloom.

The great mass of Mr. Mill's labour has been devoted to what may be termed the *middle ground* of human thought, below the primary data which reason must assume, and short of the applied science which has practice for its end. At the upper limit shunning the original postulates of all knowledge, and at the lower its concrete results, he has addressed himself to its intermediary processes, and determined the methods for working out derivative but still general truths. Does he treat of the investigation of Nature? he takes it up to the highest *laws of phenomena*, irrespective of the hypothesis of an ulterior source. Does he define the range of Logic? it is the science of *proof* dealing only with the inference of secondary truths, not the science of *belief*, which would include also the list of first truths. Does he explain the business of Ethics? it is to appraise and classify voluntary actions by their *consequences*, not to scrutinize them in their springs. This avoidance of the initial stage, this banishment of it into another field is perfectly legitimate, in order to bring each inquiry within manageable limits; and

leaves in every instance a body of researches which, in their independent prosecution, yield results of immense value and interest. A perfectly serviceable logic of the inductive sciences may be constructed, without settling the metaphysics of causation; and of the deductive procedure, without determining the original premisses of all thought. And a treatise on morals, which should establish methods of estimate for human actions and dispositions, founded on their personal and social tendency, would contribute, if not the more important, at least the larger half of a complete body of Ethical doctrine. Political Economy is not even in contact with any ultimate metaphysics at all, and can only be taken up and treated as a mid-way science, worked out, indeed, deductively, as our author has most ably shown, but only from hypothetical premisses, special to itself, and not pretending to any unqualified, much less *a priori* truth. It lies, therefore, unreservedly within the grasp of Mr. Mill's habitual method; and has accordingly been treated by him, we should say, with mastery more indisputable and complete than any other subject which he has touched. That he has somewhat relaxed the severity of abstract deduction maintained by James Mill and Senior; that he has gone beyond the rigid border of the science, and laid open to the eye and heart some neighbouring fields of social speculation; that in demonstrating natural laws he so amply dwells on the conditions of their adjustment to human well-being,—may be complained of by closet *doctrinaires*, may actually render his book less fit for a student's manual; but, in our opinion, gives a wise latitude to researches whose interest will always lie chiefly in their applications. The problems of Political Economy are peculiarly amenable to an intellect like our author's, whose characteristics are rather French than English;—sharp apprehension of whatever can be rounded off as a finished whole in thought; analytic adroitness in resolving a web of tangled elements, and measuring their value in the construction; reasoning equal to any computation by linear co-ordinates,

though not readily flowing into the organic freedom of a living dialectic; remarkable skill in laying out his subject symmetrically before the eye, and presenting its successive parts in clear and happy lights. No one has more successfully caught the fortunate gift of the French men-of-letters,—the art of making readers think better of their own understanding and less awfully of the topics discussed. It is seldom possible to read many pages of a German philosopher without suspecting yourself a fool: and even if you conquer your first despair, if you struggle and climb on, and make good your footing as you ascend, you are desired to look down so many frightful precipices and abysses on either side, that the thin ridge of science seems but precarious protection across the yawning nescience. French politeness takes far better care of your nerves, smooths and rolls your path into a gravel walk, beguiles you into every ascent above your level, plants the abysses out of sight with a laurel screen, and persuades you that you are at the top just where the landscape is clearest and you are still far below the clouds. This exclusive taste for the positive and wholly visible, this ingenuity in conducting to the best points of view, and this faculty of lucidly exhibiting it, our author pre-eminently possesses; and in the treatment of Political Economy these aptitudes are available with all their benefits and without the slightest drawback.

Logic and Ethics, however, lie at a much less distance from metaphysical reflection; and, indeed, can be cut away from it only by an artifice of arrangement. So far as they admit of the separation, and their body of doctrine stands unaffected by the metaphysical assumptions which are left outside, so far we think Mr. Mill's strength as great here as elsewhere; and it is great precisely in proportion as his *middle ground* is more or less nearly adequate. In Ethics he has aimed at no more than the rescue of the "principle of utility" from misapprehension and obloquy. The *positive* side of his vindication, legitimating the use in morals of a canon of "consequences," he has made good. The

negative side, excluding appeal to the authority of any internal rule, and resolving conscience into a reflection of the accidental sentiments of others, appears to us entirely to fail. In Logic, his exposition, considered as an *organon*, an analysis of method, a conspectus of rules for the interpretation of phenomena and the discovery of laws, is almost an exhaustive manual of procedure for the present state of science. But considered as a *philosophy*, giving the ultimate *rationale* of the intellectual processes it describes, it leaves us, we confess, altogether unsatisfied. Could he really have maintained a metaphysical neutrality,—could he have simply cut off and dropped out of view the *a priori* top of logic, the causal postulate of nature, and the inner datum of morals,—could he have carried out his work lower down with reference to them,—our obligation to him would have been scarcely qualified. But this was impossible. There are certain points of his field at which the omitted topics cannot be ignored; and here, unfortunately, our author's original silence is exchanged for direct denial: we know no *a priori* truths; no causation beyond phenomenal conditions; no inner moral rule. Not only do these negations necessarily descend upon our author's middle ground, and affect a portion of his conclusions in detail, but they express in him, as they must in every man, the grand lines in the whole configuration of his mind. Some of the directions which they take we will attempt to trace.

First, then, Mr. Mill is faithful to his antecedents in the fundamental question of all philosophy: "What is it possible for us to know"? His answer is, "We can know nothing but phenomena." In his article on Coleridge, he both presents the problem and records his reply:

"Every consistent scheme of philosophy requires as its starting-point a theory respecting the sources of human knowledge, and the objects which the human faculties are capable of taking cognizance of. The prevailing theory in the eighteenth century, on this most comprehensive of questions, was that pro-

claimed by Locke, and commonly attributed to Aristotle,—that all knowledge consists of generalizations from experience. Of nature, or any thing whatever external to ourselves, we know, according to this theory, nothing, except the facts which present themselves to our senses, and such other facts as may, by analogy, be inferred from these. There is no knowledge *a priori*; no truth cognizable by the mind's inward light, and grounded on intuitive evidence. Sensation, and the mind's consciousness of its own acts, are not only the exclusive sources, but the sole materials of our knowledge. From this doctrine, Coleridge, with the German philosophers since Kant (not to go further back), and most of the English since Reid, strongly dissents. He claims for the human mind a capacity, within certain limits, of perceiving the nature and properties of 'Things in themselves.' He distinguishes in the human intellect two faculties, which, in the technical language common to him with the Germans, he calls Understanding and Reason. The former faculty judges of phenomena, or the appearances of things, and forms generalizations from these; to the latter it belongs, by direct intuition, to perceive things, and recognize truths, not cognizable by our senses. The perceptions are not indeed innate, nor could ever have been awakened in us without experience; but they are not copies of it; experience is not their prototype, it is only the occasion by which they are irresistibly suggested. The experiences in nature excite in us, by an inherent law, ideas of those invisible things which are the causes of the visible appearances, and on whose laws those appearances depend: and we then perceive that these things must have pre-existed to render the appearances possible; just as (to use a frequent illustration of Coleridge's) we see before we know that we have eyes; but when once this is known to us, we perceive that eyes must have pre-existed to enable us to see. Among the truths which are thus known *a priori*, by occasion of experience, but not themselves the subjects of experience, Coleridge includes the fundamental doctrines of religion and morals, the principles of mathematics, and the ultimate laws even of physical nature; which he contends cannot be proved by experience, though they must necessarily be consistent with it, and would, if we knew them perfectly, enable us to account for all observed facts, and to predict all those which are as yet unobserved" (vol i. pp. 403–405).

Our author's verdict on this question is given in these words:

"We here content ourselves with a bare statement of our opinion. It is that the truth, on this much-debated question, lies with the school of Locke and of Bentham. The nature and laws of things in themselves, and the hidden causes of the phenomena which are the objects of experience, appear to us radically inaccessible to the human faculties. We see no ground for believing that anything can be the object of our knowledge except our experience, and what can be inferred from our experience by the analogies of experience itself, nor that there is any idea, feeling, or power in the human mind, which in order to account for it requires that its origin should be referred to any other source. We are therefore at issue with Coleridge on the central idea of his philosophy" (vol. i. p. 409).

Were it to our purpose to discuss this problem with Mr. Mill, instead of simply tracing its bearings upon his scheme of thought, we should require a much more precise statement of it than we find in the foregoing passage, in which the association (however qualified) of Locke and Aristotle, as giving the same suffrage in reply to the same question,—the classification of Kant with the ontologists, and the indiscriminate reference of more recent "German philosophers" to the same side,—indicate, under the form of historical error, no less loose a conception of the opposite theses than of the advocacy arrayed on either hand. Aristotle was just as much a realist as Plato, though he made the realities accessible to us by a different path. Kant was the great iconoclast who discredited all objective entities as inaccessible to the mind; and till the re-action under Schelling, there was no claim of any knowledge of "Things in themselves." In order to present the matter in a clearer form, we must disengage from each other two aspects of this problem, the ancient, and the modern; the identification of which by English writers is the source of endless confusion. Among the Greek schools, the rivalry

between the real and the phenomenal, between "Things as they absolutely are," and Things as they relatively appear, was fought out, not on the field of our cognitive faculties, but in the open Kosmos. It was a question, not of knowledge, but of being; not *logical*, referring to the limits of thought, but *metaphysical*, concerning the constitution of existence. Instead of shaping itself into the form, "*Can we get to know* any entities, or must we be content with phenomena"? it asked, "*Are there any entities to be known*, or only regiments of phenomena"? In the view of one party, time and space comprised nothing but an eternal genesis of appearance out of appearance,—wave upon wave, with no abiding deep below. In the view of the other, the succession of phenomena was but the superficial expression, the momentary and relative activity of substantive objects and permanent potencies behind, which formed the constancies of the universe, and organically belonged to its unity. By neither party was man set over against the universe to look at it across an interval, as subject facing object. By both he was regarded as himself a part and product of the Kosmos, involved in the same problem, included in the same fate. Its constitution, whatever it were, spread into him and re-appeared there in miniature, and with no modification except that of cropping-up into consciousness and emerging from simple *being* into *being known*. Phenomena, entering us, turned up in the shape of sensations; entities, if there were any, in the shape of rational thought, of ideas remotest from sense,—of the true, the beautiful, the good. If in the macrocosm around there was more than phenomena, the personal microcosm could not but repeat the tale and show these ὄντα in our intellectual history. If, on the other hand, phenomena were all, then in us also there could be only sensations and their metamorphoses. It thus lay in the very genius of the ancient philosophy that the problem of *knowledge* should be subordinate to the problem of *being*, —the mere shadow or reverberation of it in our little

grotto of consciousness; and that it should be judged downward, from the great circle to the little. That there could be any failure of concentric arrangement,—any misfit between existence and thought,—that if there were the real as well as the seeming, it could remain incognizable,—never occurred to the earliest representatives of this controversy. None were sceptics of realistic knowledge, except in virtue of a prior scepticism of real being. Aristotle certainly had no such scepticism: and his controversy with Plato never touched the question *whether* we had ontological knowledge, but only the question *how* we had it. Plato explained it by identifying the objective *ideals* embodied in natural kinds with our subjective *general ideas* of the intellectual constitution of the universe: its hierarchy of essential types came up into conscious forms on the responding theatre of our reason; so that we could read its entities straight off, in virtue of our sympathetic share in the thoughts incarnated within it. For this doctrine of *immediate* fellowship of reason with its realities, Aristotle substituted a path of *gradual* approach to them: declaring that, while nature developed itself deductively, thinking itself out into actuality from the general to the particular, and thence to the individual, we must trace the same line regressively, beginning with the sensible which is next to us, and ascending to the universals which are furthest. But this difference from Plato as to the method of knowledge involved no difference as to the things known. The goal of reason was the same for both,—the apprehension of real and ultimate entities. The thing known by the consciousness within us, itself lay in the world without us. This example shows that the denial of "*a priori* ideas" carries with it no denial of ontological knowledge.

In modern times, from causes which we cannot stop to trace, this problem has been taken in the inverse order. The battle between the real and the phenomenal has been removed from the Cosmical to the Human theatre,

and fought out on the enclosure of our faculties. Without prejudging the contents of existence, it has been asked,—"How far do our cognitive powers go? Are they fitted up in adaptation to phenomena alone? or does their competency reach to substantive being as well"? It has been supposed easier to stop at home and measure the knowing subject, than to pass out and determine the known object; and accordingly a Logical critique of Man has taken the place of a Metaphysical estimate of Nature. Such a critique (supposing that we have resources for conducting it), in giving us the measure of ourselves, gives us the measure of *our* world. Either our faculties will prove equal to the problem on both its sides; and then we shall stand where Plato and Aristotle left us; or will turn out blind to all except the phenomenal sphere; and then whatever else may lurk behind will be to us as though it were not, and the negation of knowledge will demand the non-affirmation of being. The alternative can be decided only by psychological self-scrutiny. Is the verdict given in favour of our ontological capacity? it can only be on the ground that, besides our mere sensations and their associated vestiges, we find in us an independent order of ideas, carrying with them intuitive beliefs affirmative of existence other than phenomenal, and no less entitled to confidence than the susceptibilities of sense. Is the verdict, on the other hand, a negative one? It may rest upon either of two pleas. The independent testimony of the Ideas of Reason may be denied, by resolving them back into elaborated traces of sensation. Or, again, their originality and intuitive character being allowed, they may be referred to the mere mould or configuration of our mental constitution, inevitable for us, but not on that account declaring itself necessary in nature; with authority, therefore, merely subjective, and destitute of all objective validity. It is on the former of these two pleas that Mr. Mill, in common with the whole school of Locke, takes his stand; while the latter is the ground assumed by Kant and his disciples. The same

sceptical conclusion belongs to both: and the difference as to the analysis of the knowing powers involves no difference as to the things known, or rather, not known. This example shows that the affirmation of "*a priori* ideas" carries with it no affirmation of ontological knowledge.

A problem imperfectly conceived cannot be effectively argued; and no "Coleridgian," it is probable, ever felt himself hit by our author's occasional reasonings against him. The keen aim and the steady hand are of no avail where there is an optical displacement of the thing aimed at. Be his polemic, however, against the opposite doctrine what it may, our present purpose is to track through his philosophy the vestiges of his own. Is our knowledge limited to phenomena? Then we must part with our mathematical entities,—Space, the *a priori* ground of geometry,—Time, of successive counting, or number,—with the necessary Infinitude of both. We know them only in the limited samples of experience, as attributes of body and emptiness, of events and feelings, over an indefinite field. And the pure geometric figures, with the properties they involve, instead of being truer than Nature, are false copies of physical forms, yielding only approximate inferences, whose boasted "necessity" is nothing but dependence on inaccurate hypothesis. We must part also with our Metaphysical entities,—Substance, as the ground of Attributes, be it Matter, for the properties of nature without us, or Mind, for the phenomena of consciousness within us; Kind, as the real unity of essence looking through a plurality of individuals; Cause, as a principle of dynamic origination, or more than the aggregate of phenomenal conditions. We must part with our Religious and Moral entities,—God, whether as transcendent cause of the universe, or Mind throughout it, or Living light of human Conscience; and all the ideal meanings in nature and life, whether owned as final causes by Science, or caught as the inner expressiveness of things by the intuition of Art. This copious surrender of natural beliefs is the inevitable

consequence of the primary assumption; it is shared with our author by the Nominalist Divines of Oxford; and is no further special to him, than in the unwavering consistency and absence of self-deception with which he carries it out. Hence his contempt,—the more unsparing from its professing to spare,—for the recognition of *purpose* in nature; expressed in sentences like this: "Upon this peg he" (*i.e.*, Professor Sedgwick) "appends a dissertation on the evidences of design in the universe; a subject on which much originality was not to be hoped for, and the nature of which may be allowed to protect feebleness from any severity of comment" (vol. i. p. 105). And similar is his impatience of any expression of *wonder:* "And here he" (Professor Sedgwick again) "begins by wondering. It is a common propensity of writers on natural theology to erect every thing into a wonder. They cannot consider the greatness and wisdom of God, once for all, as proved, but think themselves bound to be finding fresh arguments for it in every chip or stone: and they think nothing a proof of greatness unless they can wonder at it; and to most minds, a wonder explained is a wonder no longer" (vol. i. p. 105). It is curious to compare these scornful words with the maxim of Bacon,*—"*Admiratio est semen sapientiæ*"; with the statement of Aristotle,† that Wonder is the primitive philosophical impulse; with the graceful saying of Plato,‡—"It is a happy genealogy which makes *Iris* the daughter of *Thaumas*,"—*i.e.*, which treats the messenger of the Gods,—the winged thought that passes to and fro between heaven and earth, and brings them into communion,—as the child of wonder: "for this," he says, "is the special sentiment of the philosopher, nor has his pursuit any other source." The truth is, Mr. Mill expresses here, as in all else, the characteristics of the strictly *scientific* mind, whose work is done and whose contentment is attained when the order of phenomena is fully determined, and no premonition of

* De Augmentis Scient. lib. i., Montagu, vol. viii. p. 8.
† Metaph. i. 2. ‡ Theæt. 155.

the future remains to be gathered from the scheme of the past. Were this the end of Philosophy, as it *is* the end of Science, his view would be complete.

But not only, in our author's opinion, is our knowledge limited to phenomena. Among phenomena we can know only the internal,—our own sensations, thoughts, emotions. The whole objective world vanishes under his analysis: first, its substantive pretensions; then, even its attributive. What do we know of matter?—nothing but its properties. What do we know of its properties?—nothing but the sensations they give us. An object is no more than an associated group of qualities, the enumeration of which exhausts what we have to say of it. A quality is no more than an assumed and unknown source of some affection of sense: so that not only does the hot, round, bright sun evade us; its heat, its form, its light evade us too; and we are aware only of a co-existent warmth and visual dazzle of the circular kind. The third chapter of the *System of Logic* (book i.) expounds this doctrine with great clearness and amplitude. In substitution for the ten categories of Aristotle,* Mr. Mill distributes all "nameable things,"—all

* We are surprised that Mr. Mill should treat Aristotle's list as an attempt to classify "*Nameable things*," and drive them up into their *summa genera*. A mere glance at the list corrects this common misconception. "Nameable things" are the possible *objects of thought;* and consequently the "Names" themselves, the possible *subjects of propositions:* and were *these* the matter divided, we should have in the Categories a classification of possible *Subjects*, and in the Predicables, of possible *Predicates*, of propositions;—a very instructive pair of logical results, but certainly not what Aristotle contemplated. Without going through the list, it is evident at once that several of its terms (*e.g.*, *πρός τι, ποῦ, πότε*) do not represent any possible subjects of propositions. The assortment is in fact an enumeration, not of things signified by *Names*, but, as Aristotle himself distinctly explains, of all possible meanings of *single Words*,—including Adverbs, Prepositions, and other *relational* words which are not *Names* at all. Regarded in this light, the catalogue is not indeed unexceptionable; but does not yield the utter absurdities which Mr. Mill naturally sees in it as a list of the most extensive classes into which things could be distributed.

possible objects of thought and speech,—into four classes, viz. :

"1st. Feelings or States of Consciousness.

"2nd. The Minds which experience those feelings.

"3rd. The Bodies or external objects, which excite certain of those feelings, together with the powers or properties whereby they excite them.

"4th. The Successions and Co-existences, the Likenesses and Unlikenesses, between feelings or states of consciousness. These relations," it is added, "when considered as subsisting between other things, *exist in reality only between the states of consciousness* which those things, if bodies, excite; if minds, either excite or experience" (*Logic*, vol. i. p. 83).

Though the usages of language forbid our author to carry his reduction further, he gives us notice that the second and third terms are but sham categories, really resolvable into the first. Of "Mind" we know only the "feelings or states of consciousness"; of "Body," and its "properties," only the resulting "feelings or states of consciousness" again. The existence of myself, except as "a series of feelings,"—the existence of any thing other than myself, except as the feigned and unknown cause of

We are quite aware that Mr. Mill's "Nameable Things" are not limited to *Subjects*, but include also what is "capable of being *predicated* of other Things." Even this extension, however, does not cover the ground of Aristotle's Categories (inasmuch as the relational words cannot be predicates any more than subjects), while it disadvantageously trenches on the ground of the Predicables. In classifying *the significant atoms of language*, all mention of the two parts of the predicative relation is as yet intrusive, and is accordingly avoided by Aristotle. When we advance from the Accidence to the Syntax of Logic, we then want two new classifications: 1st, of Nameable things or possible Subjects; 2ndly, of Predicable things, or possible Predicates. From his running together of all these,—from his imperfect use of the distinction between the extension and the comprehension of a term,—and from his removal of the *adjective* out of ῥῆμα into ὄνομα, our author's account of the "Import of Propositions" seems to us less luminous and satisfactory than any other part of his "System of Logic."

sensations,—I have no title to affirm. Though the structure of human speech assumes them, it has no right to do so: and were it amenable to the true laws of our intelligence, it would leave us with only the first and fourth of the foregoing heads. We are thus shut up absolutely in Egoistic phenomena, without cognizance of any objective world beyond our own circumference, or subjective axis at our own centre. This is unqualified Idealism: the more so, because Mr. Mill does not stop with the assertion that, apart from their properties, we are ignorant of the *nature* of Matter and of Mind; but pronounces us ignorant of their *existence*. The phenomena to which we are limited are regarded by other philosophers as at least phenomena of *something;* by him, as phenomena of *nothing*. Berkeley himself did not remove the objective world and swallow it up in the subjective: he merely changed it from material into Divine, and left the Personal entities, of Man and God, undisturbed and alone with each other. And even Fichte, the most thorough-going of all Idealists, while taking every thing into the subject, still did not break the vessel of personality, and spill and scatter its living water into phenomenal spray. Our author goes further, and says: we know of nothing without; we know of only change within; and our whole cognitive life consists in the conscious comparison and orderly notice of our feelings and ideas.

There is no part of Mr. Mill's scheme of thought in which this idealistic theory of cognition does not make itself felt. It induces him, as a psychologist, to cancel the word *Perception*, and to deny that in the process it denotes there is any thing more than associated Sensations. When we seem to be carried out of ourselves and referred to a world beyond, we are in reality only referred from one of our own sensations to others,—from a single member of a cluster to the rest,—from what we actually feel in one sense to what, in suitable positions, we might simultaneously feel in another. When we attribute *whiteness*

to *snow*, we say that a particular sensation of colour belongs to a group, the remainder of which,—a coldness, a softness, a sparkle, &c.—are expressed by the word "*snow*." It is co-existence of sensations, and nothing else, that we predicate. The extreme test of this doctrine is found in our apprehension of distance, form, and magnitude. If these can be stripped of their externality and resolved into modifications of self,—if they can be turned from synchronous relations in the space without us into successive feelings along the line of consciousness within us,—the Idealist has solved his hardest riddle. Our author has attempted this in reply to Mr. Samuel Bailey's attack on Berkeley's "Theory of Vision": and, in spite of our good opinion of his cause, we are not surprised that his arguments have failed to convince the Sheffield philosopher. The question is, How do we see things to be external to ourselves? and what is our belief in their "outness"? Mr. Bailey answers: It is an immediate intuition or revelation of the visual sense, requiring no other condition. Mr. Mill first answers: It is a mental judgment, consisting in the suggestion of tactual and muscular sensations by visual which have become associated with them in experience. But then, unfortunately, the tactual and muscular sensations are *not* external, whilst our quæsitum *is*: so that the thing said to be "suggested" does not fit the case. To escape from this difficulty, Mr. Mill next remarks,—"What we regard as external is not the sensation, but the cause of the sensation,—the thing which by its presence *is supposed* to give rise to the sensation: the coloured object, or the quality residing in that object which we term its colour" (vol. ii. p. 93). The "outness" then attaches to the "object," in distinction from the "sensation"; to the object therefore not as seen, or as felt, but as "supposed." What then is this "supposition"? Does the visual impression suffice to occasion it? If so, nothing else than vision is wanted for the belief of "outness," and Mr. Bailey is right. Or, must the

supposition of an object wait for the sensations of Touch? Then upon *these*, though not upon visual feeling, a belief in "outness" must attend,—an objective apprehension upon a subjective experience: and Touch differs from Vision, in carrying with it *more than sensation.* This psychological addition to sensation, in which Mr. Mill after all has to seek his "outness," is what is commonly called *Perception* by those who trust it. With him it is part and parcel of an unauthorized "supposition" respecting an objective source of our feelings; and is not owned under any name which assigns it valid authority. But though he describes it in disparaging terms, he cannot dispense with it, and really take us out of ourselves by any manipulation of inward sensations: and the only difference between him and Mr. Bailey's disciples is this;—that while they step into externality on the *terra firma* of reliable Perception, he is carried thither at a leap upon the back of a chimera. The advantage, so far, appears to us entirely on Mr. Bailey's side. Only, we cannot think him right in attaching the indispensable *perceptive* function to the simple visual susceptibility. It is to the eyes as *moveable* organs that it belongs; and were it not for the association thus established with the muscular system, we believe with Berkeley that sight would no more give us externality than smell. Not, however, that there is any magic in the "muscular *sensations*," giving them an exceptional power to do this great thing for us. Were the muscles insensible as ropes, they would retain, we believe, their distinction, so long as they differ from all our mere *senses*, in obeying the prior signals of our will, and introducing our inner causality into collision with outward obstruction. In that experience, we believe, lies the birth-point of our objective perceptions and our subjective self-consciousness; including both the Mathematical antithesis of *here* and *there*, and the Dynamical antithesis of *our own Power* and Power *other than our own.* With Mr. Mill we deem vision by itself incompetent to give this report. With Mr. Bailey, we accept the

report as a revelation when we get it; and regard it as altogether beyond the resources of sensation, and needing description as a cognitive Perception.*

To follow the vestiges of our author's idealism through certain characteristics of his logic would involve too many technicalities, and too deep a plunge into the recesses of the Nominalist controversy. He naturally dislikes the language of classification, invented in a very different school; and, refusing to use it in defining the business of a predication, treats every proposition as declaring simply a co-existence of attributes; thus interpreting both subject and predicate in their intension rather than their extension, and giving the counter-development to the quantitative methods of Mr. De Morgan and Dr. Boole. If we are at liberty to sacrifice psychological truth to the exigencies of a calculus of deduction, either principle is adequate to its end, though the advantage practically lies with the mathematicians. But on both sides the unfortunate copula seems to us to be put upon the rack and made to say what it does not mean; and the simple fact to be overlooked, that we naturally construe the subject of a proposition in its extension, and the predicate (which therefore may be an adjective) in its intension: so that neither co-existence of attributes nor equation of groups correspond with the living processes

* How difficult it is, on Mr. Mill's principles, to deal with our objective belief, is evident on examining his account of the notions "Substance" and "Quality." In order to step on to these notions, he avails himself of the idea of *Cause*. "Quality"=hidden *Cause* of Sensation: "Substance"=hidden *Cause* of qualities. It is therefore in obedience to the exigencies of the Causal idea, that we are carried in thought *behind phenomena*, and set down on the ontological field. Yet, when Mr. Mill comes to expound this idea, he denies to it any but a phenomenal meaning: "When, in the course of this inquiry, I speak of the *cause* of any phenomenon, I do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon" (*Logic*, i. p. 358). To work this same idea both ways,—now to get up our entities, and then to knock them down,—is surely making either too much or too little of it.

of thought and language. But on this special field we must not enter.

It is the instinct of idealism, whithersoever it turns, to translate objective terms and conceptions into subjective, and to draw all reality and meaning into the inward life. To this we attribute the characteristic prominence given, in Mr. Mill's Moral doctrine, to *self-formation and individuality*. The frequency with which he recurs to this topic, and the earnestness with which he speaks of it, show how high it ranks in his estimate. It is, indeed, the great province of Ethics which he would recover from the neglect of previous utilitarians. Paley, he admits, looks too exclusively "to the objective consequences of actions, and omits the subjective; attends to the effects on our outward condition and that of other people too much, to those on our internal sources of happiness or unhappiness too little" (vol. i. p. 151). And of Bentham's theory it is still more strongly said that

"It will do nothing for the conduct of the individual, beyond prescribing some of the more obvious dictates of worldly prudence, and outward probity and beneficence. There is no need to expatiate on the deficiencies of a system of ethics which does not pretend to aid individuals in the formation of their own character; which recognizes no such wish as that of self-culture, we may even say no such power, as existing in human nature; and if it did recognize, could furnish little assistance to that great duty, because it overlooks the existence of about half of the whole number of mental feelings which human beings are capable of, including all those of which the direct objects are states of their own mind.

"Morality consists of two parts. One of these is self-education; the training, by the human being himself, of his affections and will. That department is a blank in Bentham's system. The other and co-equal part, the regulation of his outward actions, must be altogether halting and imperfect without the first: for how can we judge in what manner many an action will affect even the worldly interests of ourselves and others, unless we take in, as part of the question, its influence

on the regulation of our, or their, affections and desires?" (vol. i. p. 363.)

This is well and wisely said: and it greatly narrows the ground of difference between the opposite schools of ethics. Only secure at the outset a perfect program of human nature; take into account all its aims and affections, including its aspirations after "ideal ends"; accept these, ranged on their own scale of intensity and self-estimation, as given facts; let the whole picture, once drawn by thorough psychological survey, stand as true for humanity and unimpeachable by the defects of individuals;—and, under such conditions, Butler himself will consent to your computing your code on "the Greatest-Happiness principle." For, evidently, the "greatest happiness" of a nature which has moral aspirations to begin with, ideas of duty and aims at perfection which it feels to be authoritative,—will be very different from that of a nature simply sentient, and having as yet to determine itself hither or thither by the relish of its pleasures and the repulsion of its pains. Each propensity, separately, brings us satisfaction when it gains its end: but if we are so constituted that, taken out of a certain order and proportion among the rest, that satisfaction is again spoiled; if the same is true of all in turn, so that for the whole series there is an ideal law, the dislocation of which is the wreck of our inward peace; if, further, there is inherent in this misery the special consciousness that it is what we have no right to incur,—then you can settle the due order of life by the rule of "happiness," should it so please you; for this rule is itself but the expression of a prior scale of natural excellence and authority. All inward rightness involving satisfaction, the satisfaction may be used as its sign. Only, unfortunately, the sign cannot well be made apparent, except to those who already know the thing signified.

Notwithstanding, however, the great part which this "Self-perfecting" by an inward ideal plays in our author's ethics, and its value as a formula for completing,—we

should rather say, relinquishing,—the utilitarian theory, we find a difficulty in so combining his expositions of it as to settle it on any philosophical basis. In the passage just cited, it is described as covering one half of the whole ground of Morality. Morality is, however, in all cases but a means to an end (*Logic*, p. 385), and that end is declared to be happiness. Mr. Mill accordingly points out, as will have been observed, that, without studying the effects of our conduct on our own characters, we cannot compute even its external influence on the affairs of ourselves and others. Here the self-training is vindicated on the general utilitarian ground that, without it, there will be an omitted class of consequences. We must take care of our affections and will, as being important to the interests of ourselves and others: and this particular position, as not an end in themselves, but an instrument of something ulterior, is essential to make the care of them a moral act. Yet elsewhere our author lifts this self-formation out of all subsidiary relations, and complains of Bentham that

"Man is never recognized by him as a being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection *as an end;* of desiring, *for its own sake*, the conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence, without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than his own inward consciousness" (vol. i. p. 359).

"What is that to me?" Bentham would reply: "did you not say that all morality is directed to an end beyond it? If this pursuit of yours is good on its own account, it does not belong to morality; and it is no imputation on me, as a moralist, that I say nothing about it. A man may make it his end to conform to his own standard of excellence: so much the worse for him if the standard is a bad one, talk as he may of spiritual perfection." And in truth Mr. Mill himself elsewhere expressly treats as *un*-moral and purely æsthetical this realization of inward harmony, this conformity with ideal laws; and pronounces it sentimental "to set this aspect of actions above the moral," which looks to their consequences:

"Every human action," he observes, "has three aspects: its *moral* aspect, or that of its *right* and *wrong;* its *æsthetic* aspect, or that of its *beauty;* its *sympathetic* aspect, or that of its *loveableness*. The first addresses itself to our reason and conscience; the second to our imagination; the third to our human fellow-feeling. According to the first, we approve or disapprove; according to the second, we admire or despise; according to the third, we love, pity, or dislike. The morality of an action depends on its foreseeable consequences; its beauty, and its loveableness, or the reverse, depend on the qualities which it is evidence of. Thus a lie is *wrong*, because its effect is to mislead, and because it tends to destroy the confidence of man in man; it is also mean, because it is cowardly, —because it proceeds from not daring to face the consequences of telling the truth,—or at best is evidence of want of that *power* to compass our ends by straightforward means, which is conceived as properly belonging to every person not deficient in energy or in understanding. The action of Brutus in sentencing his sons was *right*, because it was executing a law essential to the freedom of his country, against persons of whose guilt there was no doubt: it was *admirable*, because it evinced a rare degree of patriotism, courage, and self-control: but there was nothing loveable; it affords either no presumption in regard to loveable qualities, or a presumption of their deficiency. If one of the sons had engaged in the conspiracy from affection for the other, his action would have been loveable, though neither moral nor admirable. It is not possible for any sophistry to confound these three modes of viewing an action; but it is very possible to adhere to one of them exclusively, and lose sight of the rest. Sentimentality consists in setting the last two of the three above the first; the error of moralists in general, and of Bentham, is to sink the two latter entirely" (vol. i. p. 387).

If this distinction is good in our criticism of others, it will apply no less to our own case. And surely if there be any form of our personal energy which belongs to the second head, and takes shape from the "imagination" of ethical "beauty," it is the self-approximation to an ideal standard "on its own account." In proportion as the aim *to be* gains upon the intent *to do*, does "sentimentality,"

as above defined, take place of "morals." With what consistency, then, can Bentham's disregard of this aim be treated as a curtailment of morality by full half its whole amount? It seems to us that, in our author's scheme, this aspiration after an inward perfection floats about without settling in its proper place. It is as if he felt it more than utilitarian, and so let it have an ideal end of its own; yet also more than æsthetic, and so charged it with the half of human morals. It is the old problem of the καλόν and the ἀγαθον,—difficult to Plato, impossible to Bentham.*

In truth, there is nothing in the utilitarian theory, however enlarged, for this self-formation to rest upon, beyond the exigencies of our obligations to our fellowmen. *Why* should a man mould himself under the pressure of "a vague feeling and inexplicable internal conviction"? (p. 385.) Is it to escape the uneasiness of disappointed aspiration? This can be done far more effectually by perseveringly neglecting the aspiration than by realizing it, and so advancing it to an ulterior stage. Besides, if this were all, what else would the pursuit be but the indulgence of a spiritual luxury,—the highest refinement of egoism? Imprisoned within the circle of myself, conscious indeed of differences among my affections, but not warranted in treating them as significant of anything, I am constituted of mere subjective emotions: I can but spin around my own centre,

* Mr. Mill's distinctions are usually taken with so much precision, that we hardly venture to confess our imperfect satisfaction with his account of the *Moral* as *Causative* of "foreseeable *consequences*"; and of the *Æsthetic* and *Loveable* as *Expressive* of inner "*qualities*." All three, we should say, are equally *Expressive*; and the essence of their effect upon us lies in what they severally express. The Moral expresses *preference among springs of voluntary conduct:* the Æsthetic, *inward harmony or force, involuntary as well as voluntary:* the Loveable, *paramount affectionateness, moral or not.* It seems to us quite arbitrary to say that our *Approbation* is characterized by looking away from the principle and down to the consequences of action. We should say, its sympathy goes right up to the spiritual source within the character, just as much as in the cases of *Admiration* and *Affection.*

and whether on this axis of preference or on that, I equally fulfil my law of being. Plant me alone amid a desert of negation, with susceptibilities that are the index of nothing, and powers in communion with nothing; and whatever ferment of elements there may be within me,—storms of broken equilibrium and harmonies of returning calm,—they can but constitute some form of taste and prudence, and can never make a duty: there is no rule of higher and lower that could be pronounced valid for any second nature that should enter on the vacant field. One half of self,—if it be only self,—cannot claim the worship of the other,—any more than a ventriloquist can learn anything from his two-voiced dialogue, or a single actor can play out a real drama by change of dress. For obligation we must have an authority,—for admiration, a beauty,—for reverence, a goodness,—beyond self and higher than self: and unless we may accept our subjective apprehensions of spiritual excellence as significant of objective realities, and look upon our "ideal ends" as the openings on us of a purer Will and the communion of a supreme Perfection, we do not see how they can ever be more than the phantasms of a vision or lend us any wing effectual against our own weight. Mr. Mill himself remarks, in concurrence with Mr. Grote, the fact that, in its primitive form, the sense of obligation is exclusively of the *personal kind*. "Personal feelings either towards the gods, the King, or some near and known individual, fill the whole of a man's bosom; out of them arise all the motives to beneficence, and all the internal restraints upon violence, antipathy, and rapacity: and special communion, as well as special solemnities, are essential to their existence" (vol. ii. p. 321). Is this so certainly a mere puerility of early society, doomed to be advantageously replaced by "the Impersonal authority of the Laws"? or is it only the most elementary expression of an ineffaceable feature in our nature? and do "the Laws" themselves perhaps prevail not as "impersonal" and abstract, but as the august personality of the Nation,

represented through the living voice of assembled dikasts? and does conscience itself speak in more solemn tone in proportion as it seems to reveal a Will greater than our own? And is it not then possible that we may yet return, with glorified interpretation, to that early stage, and by re-translating duties into personal relations between the Human and the Divine, restore to them the living power of affection and fidelity?

The subjective principle of our author's philosophy pervades his literary code; and very characteristically appears in an attempt, highly ingenious and suggestive, to answer the untiring question, "What is poetry?" He replies, it is the spontaneous expression of feeling; and all thoughts and words which pour out feeling, not for influence on others, but as in soliloquy, are in their essence poetry: and the poetic minds are those whose thoughts are linked by feelings, and determined into existence by the laws of emotion. Mr. Mill's poet must be all loneliness and intensity,—a kind of spiritual firework going off of itself in infinite night. So isolating a definition would in no case apply to other than lyric poetry; and our author has the courageous consistency to adopt the limitation, and to consider the drama and the epic redeemed from prose only by the intermixture of lyrical elements. Did we even accept this startling restriction, the theory, we think, makes far too much of mere quantity of sensibility; which is often strongly marked in minds eminently unpoetical. But above all it is anything rather than solitary, self-evolved feeling that constitutes the poet. He more than any goes forth out of himself, and mingles his very being with the nature and humanity around him; entering into their essence by humbling his own, and directing on them the idealizing glance which looks in at their eyes and reads their hearts. He lives, not to express himself, but to interpret the world, and become the vocal organ of the silent universe and the dumb souls of men.

The excessive appreciation of "individuality" which

pervades and animates our author's treatise on "Liberty," belongs to the same general tendency. His sympathies, —unless in the form of pity,—scarcely seem to touch the common level of human life, or to acknowledge any vital connection with the general faith and conscience. His fears, his despondencies, his precautions, all look towards the social sentiment, in whose conservative moral elements he sees little else than the joint-stock opinions of mediocrity and vulgarity: and his hopes somewhat languidly and scantily fly to eminent and exceptional personalities who can see over the heads of the crowd. The old Pagan trust in "wisdom," with pathetic or supercilious gaze on all below, reappears in him: and "*thinkers*,"—"*great thinkers*," —step forth so often upon his page, and conduct their mission with so much pomp, that the mother-wit of modest readers grows quite ashamed and blushes to the eyes. When, for instance, the announcement is made that it "is becoming more and more the grand effort of all minds of any power, which embark in literature,"—"to have something to say" (vol. i. p. 240), homely people, who never made "the grand effort," know at once that they have not "minds of any power," and naturally shrink before the knitted brows of such self-elaboration.

Many of our readers, we doubt not, will have felt a certain surprise and incredulity at finding Mr. Mill classed with "Idealists." The term seems to contradict some of his best-marked tendencies, and not at all to hit the kind of influence which his writings have exercised. Had we classed him with "Materialists,"* we should probably have

* The word "Materialism," it should be observed, stands, with a different range of meaning, in two distinct antitheses. As opposed to *Immaterialism*, it is concerned with the question of the Mind's ultimate substance, and denotes the opinion that the Mental Phenomena are referable to the same substance which manifests the Physical; not to a different one, as the Immaterialist contends. As opposed to *Idealism*, the word is concerned with another question, viz., the equal or unequal originality and trustworthiness of our Subjective and Objective knowledge. To hold the balance even between them is *Dualism:*

been thought nearer the mark. And the truth is (for we must qualify a strong assertion by a yet stronger), he is *both*, and presents, in different parts of his doctrine, two opposite sides, which often practically co-exist, whether or not they are philosophically coherent. On the one hand, we have found him resolving all our knowledge, "both materials and sources," into *Self*-knowledge; denying any cognitive access to either qualities or bodies external to us; and shutting us up with our own sensations, ideas, and emotions. But on the other hand, though we *know* nothing but the phenomena of ourselves, we *are* nothing but phenomena of the world: the boast is vain of anything original in the mind: the sensations from which all within us begins are the results of "outward experience": the pretended *a priori* ideas turn out *a posteriori* residues: the volitions that set up as spontaneities are necessary effects of antecedents earlier than we: the truths we seem to win by pure deductive intelligence are but interpretations of physical induction: and the characters we think our own are but subservient copies of the influences around us. Our author's whole picture of man exhibits him as a natural product, shaped by the scene on which he is cast; and he rejects every theory without exception which has been set up in psychology, in logic, in morals, to vindicate the autonomy of human reason and conscience. And thus we are landed in this singular result: our only sphere of cognizable reality is subjective: and *that* is generated from an objective world which we have no reason to believe exists. In our author's theory of *cognition*, the *non-ego* disappears in the ego: in his theory of *being*, the ego lapses back into the *non-ego*. Idealist in the former, he is Materialist in the latter.

This subjection of man to physical nature exhibits itself in a Sensational psychology; which, while condemning

to resolve the latter into the former is *Idealism*: to resolve the former into the latter is *Materialism*. It is in this last sense alone that we have to do with the word.

Condillac's simplification of Locke as mere verbal generalization, does but stretch the same materials upon a different loom, and weave the whole web of our mental life out of the data of sense. The nearer we are to sensation, the less room is there for error and uncertainty: as we recede from it into abstractions of the understanding and ideas of reason, the tenure of our truths is more precarious; and consciousness, however entitled to be believed about tactual and ocular impressions, is to be distrusted in all reports which decline to go back thither for authentication. In spite of Mr. Mill's denying us all legitimate access to an external world, no one allows so little that is original to the mind itself, or places so little reliance on what there is. That a belief should be provided for in the mind's own constitution, and be inseparable from the very action of its faculties, is an idea which he resents like an affront; if it be so, it is a sheer tyranny of nature: there may be no help for it; he may be compelled to believe; but he will do it under protest, and declare that he has no ground for it, and would escape if he could.

"I am aware," he says, "that to ask for evidence of a proposition which we are supposed to believe instinctively, is to expose oneself to the charge of rejecting the authority of the human faculties; which of course no one can consistently do, since the human faculties are all which any one has to judge by; and inasmuch as the meaning of the word 'evidence' is supposed to be something which when laid before the mind induces it to believe, to demand evidence when the belief is ensured by the mind's own laws is supposed to be appealing to the intellect against the intellect. But this, I apprehend, is a misunderstanding of the nature of evidence. By evidence is not meant any thing and every thing which produces belief. There are many things which generate belief besides evidence. A mere strong association of ideas often causes a belief so intense as to be unshakeable by experience or argument. Evidence is not that which the mind does or must yield to, but that which it ought to yield to, namely, that, by yielding to which, its belief is kept conformable to fact. There is no

appeal from the human faculties generally, but there is an appeal from one faculty to another; from the judging faculty, to those which take cognizance of fact, the faculties of sense and consciousness. To say that belief suffices for its own justification, is making opinion the test of opinion; it is denying the existence of any outward standard, the conformity of an opinion to which constitutes its truth. We call one mode of forming opinions right, and another wrong, because the one does, and the other does not, tend to make the opinion agree with fact,—to make people believe what really is, and expect what really will be. Now a mere disposition to believe, even if supposed instinctive, is no guarantee for the truth of the thing believed. If, indeed, the belief ever amounted to an irresistible necessity, there would then be no *use* in appealing from it, because there would be no possibility of altering it. But even then the truth of the belief would not follow; it would only follow that mankind were under a permanent necessity of believing what might possibly not be true; just as they were under a temporary necessity (quite as irresistible while it lasts) of believing that the heavens moved and the earth stood still" (*Logic*, vol. ii. p. 94).

The case of supposed intuitive belief which is here in the author's contemplation is the so-called "principle of Causality,"—the maxim that "every phenomenon must have a cause." Were we discussing this particular axiom, we should present it under another form,—"every phenomenon is a manifestation of power," in order to save it from being confounded with a very different, and by no means self-evident, proposition,—"every phenomenon has the same constant phenomenal antecedent"; and should protest against identifying the empirical expectation of "uniformity among natural successions" with the necessary belief in "Universal Causation." The first, involving a question of mere order among perceptible events, Mr. Mill is entitled to call "a fact in external nature," and to regard as waiting upon "evidence": it is for the latter alone that axiomatic authority can justly be claimed. We have quoted the passage, however, with no view to this special instance,

but solely to illustrate our author's treatment of "intuitive and necessary beliefs." We can thoroughly understand his reluctance to concede their *existence*, his precautions against installing mere prejudice and mental limitation into the honours of first principles, his scepticism of a pretension which has certainly been grossly abused. But when he says outright, that *a priori* beliefs, really inherent in the mind, are totally unworthy of trust, however imperiously they may compel submission; and when he casts about for some appeal against them,—either from thought to "fact," or from faculty to faculty,—he seems to us to lose all his logical bearings, and forget the base which he had measured with so much care. What security can there be for *any* truth,—of "*fact*" or of thought,—*a posteriori* or *a priori*,—if the positive and primary affirmations of our mental nature may be suspected of making fools of us? The assumption of unveracity, once made, cannot arbitrarily stop with the province which Mr. Mill wishes to discredit. He himself also must, somewhere or other, come to an end of his "evidence" and "proof," and be landed on principles *not* derivative, but primary: and then he must either accept their coercion "because there is no *use* in appealing from it," or unconditionally rely on them as the report of truthful faculties; and in either case is on the same footing with his *a priori* neighbour. Be the "proof" what it may which authenticates the belief, it is the faculty which, in the last resort, authenticates the proof. And whither, in the supposed cases of intuitive belief, does Mr. Mill contemplate carrying the appeal? He expresses this in two ways: (1) objectively; he would bring the belief to an "outward standard," to the test of "fact," "experience," "external nature": (2) subjectively; he would remove the trial from one faculty to another, from the "judging" faculty to "sense and consciousness." But, as to the first, have we not been already taught that we know nothing external to ourselves? and even were it otherwise, the knowledge would have no other voucher

than the instinctive apprehensions on which we are discouraged from relying. And as to the second statement, we have to ask, how are we to settle *which*, of a plurality of faculties, sits in the higher court? and by what title especially sense and consciousness are set in the chief seat, yet both of them debarred from "judging" any thing, and restricted to the reporting of our sensations and ideas as inward "facts"? If not qualified to "judge," how can they revise "judgments"? And if they are qualified, then their testimony must be accepted, with all that it carries in it,—the counter-realities of object and subject, and the very principle of causality inseparable from their discovery. By denying Perception as distinguished from Sensation, Mr. Mill himself incapacitates "sense" for bearing witness to any thing but the sensations within us: how then can he appeal to it for a verdict on a maxim claiming to be valid for the universe? He treats every thing external,—all body and all qualities,—as mentally feigned to serve as "unknown causes" of our sensations: but if the objective world is just an hypothesis invented to satisfy "the principle of causality," how can he appeal to it to pronounce sentence on that principle itself? He either disbelieves or believes this objective world. Does he disbelieve it, on the ground that all our knowledge is subjective? then his "outward standard" for testing the causal principle is non-existent. Does he believe it? then he does so on the strength of this causal principle itself, and, in accepting the hypothesis, grants the paramount necessity of "unknown causes" for known phenomena.

The dominance of Sensation in Psychology is naturally followed by the dominance of Induction in Logic. Accordingly, our author's whole treatment of this subject carries out his crusade against "the a-priorities," and his thoroughgoing determination to hunt down all general propositions into elementary concrete facts. All his characteristic opinions respecting the process of reasoning are of the same type and tendency: that we draw inferences from

particulars to particulars without passing through any generalization; that the deductive procedure has no cogency of proof, but is simply an interpretation of our notes of prior inductions; that the syllogism involves a *petitio principii;* that geometrical demonstration is only a carrying out of false physical measurements. These doctrines, though deriving fresh strength from Mr. Mill's powerful advocacy, are not new; and they are among the standing marks of what is called "the empirical philosophy." They depend for the most part on a peculiar view of abstraction, generalization, and naming, which would require us, were we to discuss it, to drag our readers into the innermost recesses of psychology. One remark only will we make in regard to our alleged inference from particulars to particulars, without use of any intermediate generalizations. All advance to new truth implies the co-operation of two conditions: viz., certain objective data or facts, as material for the mental action; and a certain subjective mode of dealing with these data,—a law of the mind's action upon them. To the first we necessarily attend, and we consciously realize them, thinking distinctly both of the known thing from which we start, and of the previously unknown on which we are landed. But the other, being the mere form of our own life for the moment, takes effect of itself without asking leave of our self-consciousness: it is not reflected on, because it is itself our reflective act. All, therefore, that we need explicitly state to ourselves, and set forth as the "evidence,"—or external inducement,—of a particular conclusion, is the particular datum which moved us to draw it: and for your belief that you are mortal you adduce sufficient reason when you say,—the people I have known and heard of have been mortal. But this would not act upon you as a reason at all, were it not a law of your mind to proceed, on sufficient hint from particular cases, to the idea of a *kind*,—in the present instance, *human kind*,—in which the same attribute inheres all through. It is only because you are an individual "*of a certain description*"

(as Mr. Mill has it),—an example of the kind,—that you know yourself to be mortal. If, therefore, the latent condition of the process is to be laid bare, if the implicit principle of the reasoning is to be made explicit (and without this there is no psychological analysis at all), it is indispensable to state the general mental law in virtue of which particular data conduct us to a particular conclusion. That we do not make the universal proposition an object of thought and visible step to our inference (*e.g.*, "all men are mortal," as proving that "we are mortal") is no justification of its expulsion from the logical analysis; the very object of which is, not to state the "evidence," but to go behind the evidence, in reasoning,—not to be content with the objective conditions of the process, but explicitly to give the subjective too. From a similiar limitation of his view to the objective side of reasoning, and an oversight of Aristotle's distinction between what the mind has ἐν δυνάμει and what it has ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ, Mr. Mill has laid, as we think, an unreasonable stress on the charge of *petitio principii* against the syllogism. The Aristotelians at all events have an easy retort. If there is no deduction without *petitio principii*, there is no induction without concluding a *particulari ad universale:* and all our reasoning, of either kind, is in violation of logical rules. There is nothing in this paradox that will frighten us, when once we apprehend the true nature and limits of logical rules. It is evident that we could never make a step in reasoning, if we *only* reasoned; if we neither add anything to our premisses *ab extra*, nor draw anything *ab intra*, that was not comprised in them before, no new thing ever can appear. So long as the mind itself is allowed to contribute nothing, out of its own modes of activity, to the enlargement or the evolution of data, these data of themselves, objectively measured, will lie still for ever and yield nothing: and it is the mutual play of comprehension and extension, the metaphysical postulate of causation, and the idea of the unity of kinds, that put the dead materials in motion, and elicit a living advance.

If, in his aim to supplement Bentham, our author yielded to an idealistic impulse, he remained true, in what he retained from the great utilitarian, to the materialistic tendencies of the school. The inward side of ethics is made, in every aspect, dependent on the outward. Do we ask what determines the moral quality of actions? we are referred, not to their spring, but to their consequences. Do we inquire how we come by our moral sentiments? by contagion, we are told, of other people's approbation and disapprobation, not by any self-reflective judgments of our own. Do we seek for the adequate sources of a man's guilt or goodness? we are presented with an enumeration of the external conditions which made his character, like his health, just what it is. Instead of the self-formation,—the evolution from within towards an unrealized type of perfection,—we have man treated as a natural product, moulded by surrounding pressures on his sentient susceptibilities. There can be no doubt about the decisive preponderance of this latter view in our author's writings. Though he is willing for a moment to borrow a light from the subjective doctrine, and find something genial in its glow, he resolves it in the end into an illusory brilliancy,—the mirage of a mental atmosphere charged with earthly vapours and disturbed with accidental refractions. Though he recognizes the *fact* expressed by the words "Conscience," "Moral Rectitude," "Principle," and insists on its importance in human nature, he allows it only actual force (such as any superstition might win), not ethical authority; and, with James Mill, psychologically deduces it, with the aid of Hartley's law of transference, from the original datum of self-love. These apparent concessions constitute but the semblance of approximation between the two doctrines: it has never been about the *fact* of a moral consciousness that they differ, but about its *value*; and distrust of it is equally produced by its denial and by its disparagement. If it is nothing but a compendium of borrowed prejudices and interested preferences, all starting from egoistic

pleasures, but by chemical combination wrought into a passion that forgets its birth, and now lords it over others with its "ipse-dixitism," it is idle to make a merit of acknowledging such a "spring of action" as this, and to imagine that, by doing so, human nature is presented in a more respectable light. Mr. Mill repeatedly protests against the common identification of the utilitarian scheme with the "selfish theory"; on the ground that the former, in determining the morality of actions, takes into account the consequent pleasures and pains to other people as well as to the agent. It certainly does so actually in Bentham's hands; and might do so legitimately under any philosophy which established an obligation other than prudential to consult for the happiness of others. This, however, is precisely what Bentham does not do: and for want of it, the unselfish superstructure of his system is simply imposed, without any logical cohesion, upon a completely selfish base. By speaking of pain and pleasure as if they were objective and impersonal quantities, carrying values irrespective of their individual appropriation, he slips into the delusive facility of treating the agent's happiness and that of others as interchangeable and homogeneous magnitudes in every problem. But in proving his first principle,—the exclusive governance of human life by pain and pleasure,—he rests entirely on the paramount value to each man of *his own* pleasures, and the impossibility that, without this element, life could be desirable to him at all. Nor was Bentham at all inclined, in his doctrine of human nature, at any time to think that the question of *meum* and *tuum* made no difference in the value of a pleasure. "Think not," he said, "that a man will so much as lift up his little finger on your behalf, unless he sees his advantage in it!"* From his premisses as they stand no rule of life can be consistently deduced, but the selfish one that the agent must be determined by a regard to his own happiness; including, of course, the portion of it that may be wrapped up with the

* Deontology, II. p. 133.

happiness of other people. Bentham's own benevolence of disposition easily carried him over from this narrow rule to that of the greatest happiness of all persons concerned But even his disciples have felt it to be one of the greatest *lacunæ* of his system, that no scientific proof identified the "happiness of all concerned," which was his rule, with the "happiness of the agent," which was his principle, It was only in so far as he was inconsequential that he emerged from the limits of the selfish system. The defect which he left has been carefully supplied in more recent developments of the doctrine,—especially by James Mill and Mr. Austin. The principle, however, resorted to for the purpose involves and allows no departure from the selfish basis. It simply avails itself of association and interdependence, to extend the sphere of our personal happiness, so as to include among its conditions the happiness of others. It justifies benevolence on the ground of self-love, —disinterestedness, as the ultimate fruit of interest. We are far from denying the importance of establishing the real harmony between the prudential and the social principles in our nature, or from doubting that a real advance towards this end is made good by the method so skilfully applied. But, after all, it leaves the "pleasure to one's self" as the actual spring and the legitimating ground of every volition: it makes the claims of others' good contingent on its identification with our own: it recommends self-denial on the plea of self-indulgence; and thus never really crosses the boundary which separates interests from obligations, but simply pushing forward the lines of prudence till they enclose the whole ethical field, adopts the symbols and landmarks of duty, with an altered significance. We must honestly say, that this sort of recognition of others' happiness, as "cause of pleasure to ourselves," seems to us still to lie within the limits of the "selfish system": by which we understand, the doctrine that the idea of pleasure to oneself is the mainspring that cannot, and need not, be absent from any act of the human will.

And though this "theory of motives" appears in literature and life much more extensively than any systematic notions on morals, it has undeniably co-existed with the utiiltarian doctrine in all the great representatives of the school. In the pages of Bentham and James Mill, the two theories advance, hand in hand, to the assault on "the ordinary morality." Why, then, if Professors Sedgwick and Whewell choose to attempt a joint repulse of them, should this be rebuked as either stupid or dishonourable championship?

There seems to be something irresistibly irritating to the utilitarian mind in the bare mention of an internal principle, known to us by self-consciousness, from which a moral theory may be developed. Paley cannot resist a quiet sneer at "the Moral Sense man." Bentham degrades him from the text into a foot-note;—will not have him in the same room, but puts the conceited fellow in the closet;—and, baiting him there with a troop of jeers, makes even that too hot to hold him. James Mill considers him only less contemptible than Sir James Macintosh. And our author, impatient, it would seem, at having to spend pains on such a fool, scarcely listens to him enough to catch his thought and answer what he means. He more than once asserts, for instance, that "the contest between the morality which appeals to an external standard, and that which grounds itself on internal conviction, is the contest of progressive morality against stationary,—of reason and argument against the deification of mere opinion and habit" (vol. ii. p. 472). Why so? Why should the appeal to a common Conscience in mankind be more egoistic and anti-progressive than the appeal to a common Reason? Does an author, who has so distinguished himself in Logical psychology, and whose writings mark an era in its "progress," doubt that there is also a Moral psychology, equally exempt from a stationary doom? What matters it to the possibilities of development, whether the data for our ethical judgments are found within or without,—in a comparison of the springs, or a comparison of the results, of action? Take which system

you will, you have, in fact, to carry your scrutiny into *both* spheres. Are you Utilitarian? in spite of your "external standard," you have to estimate "intention," "temptation," and other inward elements. Are you a Moral Consciousness man? the only thing settled for you within, is the relative authority of the several Springs of Action; and to get at the right act, out of several possible to the same spring, you must go forth and look at its consequences, like a Benthamite. Of course, if there *are* no laws of Moral consciousness within us, and what we take for such are only picked-up opinions without common ground in our humanity, a morality appealing to them cannot make scientific advance: not, however, because they are internal, but because they are illusory. To explode error, on whichever side it lies, is certainly to secure progress. But Mr. Mill's proposition we understand to be, that on the *truth* of the one or the other of the two schemes it depends, whether morals are stationary or progressive. Such an assertion cannot appear just except to those who fancy the Moral Faculty to be, in the creed of its believers, a sort of oracular Pythoness seated in the mind, to pronounce categorically on every problem brought up for solution.

In spite, then, of the opposite tendencies co-existing in Mr. Mill's mind, his sympathy with the Subjective methods is not strong enough to secure a judicial insight into their real bearings. He is in the end so completely carried off by the objective school, that we doubt whether, if Comte's influence could have preceded that of the elder Mill, any introspective side, any psychological faith (at best rather shaky after its first enthusiasm is over), would have appeared at all. Had the two tendencies found their perfect balance and adjustment in himself, his occasional descriptions of them, as manifested in the history of philosophy, would have been unimpeachably correct. Yet, notwithstanding such outward resemblance to the truth as intellectual conscientiousness and adequate reading can secure, our author's historical illustrations,—when taken from ancient

or from modern continental philosophy, — almost always affect us like a portrait in which the measurements and the features seem faithfully laid down, while the essential expression is missed. The friendly intimacy, the living communion of thought, is wanting between the artist and his subject, ere the picture can speak to you as true. We can illustrate our meaning by only one example, selected simply because it broadly generalizes the relations between the metaphysical and empirical schools, and so enables us to dispense with much critical reference to the particular philosophers named.

"It has always been indistinctly felt that the doctrine of *a priori* principles is one and the same doctrine, whether applied to the ὄν or the δέον—to the knowledge of truth or to that of duty; that it belongs to the same general tendency of thought, to extract from the mind itself, without any outward standard, principles and rules of morality, and to deem it possible to discover, by mere introspection into our minds, the laws of external nature. Both forms of this mode of thought attained a brilliant development in Descartes, the real founder of the modern anti-inductive school of philosophy. The Cartesian tradition was never lost, being kept alive by direct descent through Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant, to Schelling and Hegel; but the speculations of Bacon and Locke, and the progress of the experimental sciences, gave a long period of predominance to the philosophy of experience; and though many followed out that philosophy into its natural alliances, and acknowledged not only observation and experiment as rulers of the speculative world, but utility of the practical, others thought that it was scientifically possible to separate the two opinions, and professed themselves Baconians in the physical department, remaining Cartesians in the moral. It will probably be thought by posterity, to be the principal merit of the German metaphysicians of the last and present age, that they have proved the impossibility of resting on this middle ground of compromise; and have convinced all thinkers of any force, that if they adhere to the doctrine of *a priori* principles of morals, they must follow Descartes and Hegel in ascribing the same character to the principles of physics" (vol. ii. p. 457).

Now we fully accept the statement here made, that, in all consistency, the metaphysical method either goes into both worlds,—what *is*, and what *ought* to *be*,—or keeps out of both. We further agree, that Descartes found a function for it in both, Locke in neither. But who the nameless philosophers are that, excluding it from the one, kept it in the other, we are quite unable to conjecture: and till we are better informed, we remain sceptical of their existence. Further, we cannot acknowledge that the metaphysicians in either field ever proposed "to discover the laws of nature" "by mere introspection into our own minds"; if by this is meant that they wished to dispense with "observation and experiment," and to set up as an "anti-inductive school." They always, and without exception, so far as we know, found room, within each of the two provinces, for *both* methods,—the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*; the one being deemed proper for the detection of entities, the other for the ascertainment of phenomena and their laws. When the phenomena were mental, the result was Empirical Psychology; when external, Empirical Physics. The two modes of procedure actually sit side by side, and receive some of their most characteristic developments in the "Ethica" of Spinoza; the psychological parts of which are as completely empirical as the researches of Hobbes, and full of direct and striking anticipations of the Mill doctrines themselves. We are not aware that any metaphysician, be he ever so "Coleridgian," can be named, who has supposed that the proper work of induction could be achieved by intuition. It was not until the "Baconians" came upon the stage and acquired ascendency, that one of the procedures endeavoured totally to expel the other, and unconditionally claim the whole field. The *a priori* people never dreamt, in regard to their *a posteriori* neighbours, of trying the writ of ejectment with which they now find themselves served. The only dispute between them was a *boundary* dispute,—*where* exactly, on the ascending slope, the perceptible laws of phenomena merged

in the logical evolution of necessary being (such as space), on the descending. Haunted by the analogy of Geometry, in which sequences of pure thought seemed to open out relations and connections of real existence, the Cartesians undoubtedly pushed the *a priori* claim beyond its just limits, and attempted conquests with it which it cannot make. And it is not unnatural that, in the exultation of victory over them, their opponents should meditate dispossessing them of everything. As to the result,—if there be nothing but phenomena, these opponents will succeed: otherwise, we suppose, not. But that the result, whatever it be, will be sweeping, can be doubted by none. The "middle ground of compromise," by surrender of the natural and reservation of the moral field, is, we think, quite imaginary: and, with sincere deference to Mr. Mill's great authority, we doubt whether the position, Teutonically proved untenable to "all thinkers of any force," has ever been taken up by a single English writer, or attacked by a single German. Reid, Stewart, Hamilton, Whewell, all put limits on the resources of the *a posteriori* method: and all carry the same rule of restriction into the natural as into the moral sphere; for the most part, amid mutual differences, leaving the same fundamental ideas in the field of exemption,—Space, Time, Substance, Cause, on the one hand; Personality, Moral Obligation, Preferential Freedom, on the other.

The characteristics on which we have ventured to dwell are more discernible in the occasional writings before us than in the author's systematic works. Nowhere, however, are they so conspicuous as broadly to challenge the eye: like all foundations, they hold what is above them in the light, but lie hid themselves. They have more to do, we believe, with Mr. Mill's marked influence upon his age, with both the fear and the admiration so strongly directed towards him, than his direct contributions to Logic and Political Economy. No writer, it is probable, was ever more read between the lines: his authoritative force of

intellect, his perfect mastery of his materials, his singular neatness of exposition, marked him as a great power in the speculative world: but, as usual, the real interest felt was not less scientific than moral,—as to the direction in which that power would work. A certain air of suppression occasionally assumed by Mr. Mill himself, with hints for a revision of the existing narrow-minded morals, has increased this tendency. This suppressive air is the greatest fault we find in him: it is his only illegitimate instrument of power, for it weighs chiefly on the weak; and the shade which it passes across his face is sometimes so strong as almost to darken the philosopher into the mystagogue. Is the blame of this demeanour thrown on the tyranny of society? If that be all, tyranny is better broken in a land like ours by conscientious defiance than by ambiguous submission and argumentative complaint. It seems hardly becoming in an author who has attained the highest rank of influence in the intellectual councils of his time, to write as if there were something behind which, as a veracious thinker on human life and morals, he would like to say, but which, under the pitiable bigotry of society, must be reserved for an age that does not persecute its benefactors. Such a demeanour appears to us the counter-part, among speculative men, of dogmatic self-assurance among religious professors: and Pharisaism hurts the humanities and the humilities as much in the "*Wiser* than thou," as in the "*Holier* than thou." Nor is the effect of this manner better than its principle. Weak minds, as Mr. Mill observes of the theologians, are apt to begin wondering; and a manner so provocative of curiosity sets them thinking what these terrible secrets can be. Such questions are sure to find answerers; and among the busy-bodies and hangers-on of a school a certain cant of initiation arises which fosters every vice of the sectarian life. We have not Mr. Mill's positive faith in Discussion as an instrument for the determination of moral controversies. But still less have we faith in Reserve and supercilious avoidance.

In taking leave of our author, we repeat our grateful acknowledgment for most important light and aid from him over the whole middle ground of science which he has chiefly made his own. Thousands of students, beyond the circle of which he is the centre, are indebted to him for the power to think more closely and clearly, and the resolve to reach the ultimate ground of beliefs too lightly held. His writings are far more than the culminating expression of a particular school of thought: they are a permanent contribution to the intellectual training of the English mind. Could the haunting problems of Being be silenced, whilst we only listened to the flow and caught the rhythm of Phenomena; could we be content to hear it said that they are inaccessible to the human faculties, and not think in reply that nevertheless the human faculties may be not inaccessible to them,—no more effectual guidance need be demanded. But so long as the laws of "co-existence and succession" afford no refuge from the sense and need of a deeper beauty, right, and good, the most searching and exhaustive of scientific intellects will not persuade men to forego the hope of some higher philosophic genius to answer instead of dash their aspirations.

XIII.

BAIN'S PSYCHOLOGY.

IT is rare to find an Englishman, not a graduate in Arts, who believes in the existence,—or even the possibility,—of what are called the "Mental and Moral Sciences." The average national intelligence looks on them as the showy shams of Academic discipline, and is as suspicious of their solidity as of Mr. Gladstone's. The Scotchman, on the other hand, — by ordination of nature and University charter,—takes kindly to these studies; discusses their problems everywhere, at church, on the platform, even in the public-house; and, migrating South of the Tweed, re-introduces them, from time to time, into our literature and life. In their pure form, however, he would hardly succeed in gaining our ear for them. But, himself catching the infection of our scepticism, he adapts them to the level of our belief, surrenders their distinctive characteristics, assimilates them to physical knowledge, and reduces them from their autonomy to a mere province of the "Natural Sciences": and then, for the first time, when he has construed all that is "mental" in the phenomena into physiology, and all that is "moral" into the chemistry of ideas, we begin to suspect his doctrine of something better

* "The Senses and the Intellect." By Alexander Bain, A.M. London: 1855.

"The Emotions and the Will." By Alexander Bain, A.M., Examiner in Logic and Moral Philosophy in the University of London. London; 1859.—*National Review*, April, 1860.

than metaphysic moonshine. Both the elder Mill and Mr. Bain owe their English laurels to the remarkable skill with which they have negotiated away the claims of the native Scottish philosophy, and saved or sacrificed their science by putting it under the protection of a stronger power. In saying this, we refer, not so much to their doctrines as to their method; and especially to the preconception from which they set out, as to the nature of their study and its relative place in the scheme of human knowledge.

What is "Psychology"? Nobody would think of putting it among the Physical Sciences, or would hesitate to admit that it stands, in some sense, at the remotest point from them. Nor would the most enthusiastic disciple of Faraday or Liebig pretend that it dealt with phenomena reducible to Chemical Law; though perhaps he might claim a less distant relationship to them than that of the mere Natural Philosopher, and might even reserve, on behalf of his favourite pursuit, some contingent reversionary right of interest in them. To judge from the habitual language of medical literature, the Physiologist considers himself to be treading close upon the heels of the Mental Philosopher, and to be heir-presumptive, if not already rival claimant, to the whole domain. Between the facts of life, as manifested through the lower grades of organized existence, and the facts of mind, special to our race, he recognizes no ultimate distinction, and confidently looks for evidence of essential identity. And the destination of Intellectual Philosophy, whatever it be, draws with it that of Ethics and Religion: for, once within the enclosure of the distinctive human faculties, it is impossible for the inquirer to insulate the Reason, whilst relegating Conscience and Faith to quite another field. In this view, therefore, the study of humanity constitutes only the uppermost stratum of scientific Natural History: it deals with certain residuary phenomena left on hand when the lower organisms have been exhausted; and its separation is no less provisional and artificial than that of any one branch of zoölogy from any

other. It is thus the crown and summit of the hierarchy of Natural Sciences; emerging from physiology, as physiology from chemistry, and chemistry from physics; and differing only, as each superior term differs from the subjacent, in the greater complexity and more restricted range of the attributes it contemplates. Psychological studies, prosecuted with this preconception of their position, will naturally borrow, as far as possible, the resources of the nearest science, will seek explanation of human facts in the simpler animal analogies; and in proportion as these fail, will feel baffled, and anxious to reduce the variance to the lowest point. To bring the higher phenomena under the rule, or close to the confines of the lower; to exhibit them as woven in the same loom, only of finer web and more complicated pattern,—will be the instinctive aim of researches begun from this side. Nor will the aim be wholly unsuccessful in regard to the border phenomena,—of Sense, Propension, and Habit,—which retain us in affinity with other living kinds. If it incurs the risk of failure and harm, it will be at the upper end, among the extreme human characteristics: where, to say the least, it is strongly tempted to repeat upon psychology the same violence of which Comte complains as committed by the physicist on chemistry, and the chemist on physiology,—a coercive assimilation of ulterior to prior laws.

There is certainly a captivating simplicity in this pyramidal arrangement of all our possible knowledge around a single axis; with the base broadly laid in the universal properties of matter, and the apex rising to the solitary loftiness of Man and even crowned with his highest symbol,—the cross. It seems to promise that, by merely repeating our steps and not growing dizzy, we shall surmount all our ignorance, and find Thought and Love, as well as Force and Matter, beneath our feet. At the same time, it seems to warn us, that the special endowments of our own being are utterly inaccessible to our apprehension, till we have ascended through tier after tier of previous sciences. The

promise and the warning, if reliable, are of superlative importance. Is it true, then, that, simply and only by ascending the stair of natural knowledge,—by persistent prolongation of its familiar processes,—we reach the stage of Mental and Moral Science? Is that stage really to be found along the same line of method, only ranged around its furthest segment? We utterly disbelieve it; and venture to affirm that no refinement of growth in the other sciences has any tendency to blossom into knowledge of the Mind; and that such knowledge, instead of being doomed to wait till the alleged prior terms in the series have been built up, begins with them at the beginning, proceeds with them *pari passu*, and can no more be put before or after them than the image in the mirror before or after the object it reflects.

The ground of these assertions is simply this:—Mental Science is Self-knowledge: Natural Science, the knowledge of something other than Self. Their spheres are of necessity mutally exclusive; yet so related that, like all true opposites, they come into existence together. Wakened up by some phenomenon from the sleep of unconsciousness, we discover two things at once, viz., ourselves as recipient and the phenomenon as given: we are in possession of an external fact and an internal feeling; and have already had our first lesson in both physical and mental knowledge. Every event, in like manner, has its outer and its inner face, and is apprehended by us as existing and as felt; contributing an element, in the one aspect, to our familiarity with nature, in the other, to our acquaintance with our own mind. The same relative fact which, in the external space, is called Light, when brought home to us, is called Vision: and whilst Optics take charge of it in the former case, it belongs to Psychology in the latter. Not a single predicate attaching to it is common to both sides of the relation: on the one, it is cause,—it is in space,—it has dimension and local movement: on the other, it is effect,—it is in time,—it is a feeling, exempt from the laws of size and measure-

ment. This divarication of the phenomenon into two opposite directions is inherent in the cognitive act itself, and goes wherever it goes, constant as focus to focus in the ellipse: and this it is which constitutes the indestructible antithesis between physical and mental science, making them twins in their birth but without contact in their career. In the play of life,—the action and re-action,—between ourselves and the surrounding scene, attention may pass outward, and forgetting itself, may look at this or that; or may turn inward, and forgetting the world, may count the beads of thought and note the flush of feeling: and the results, of natural knowledge in the first instance and psychologic in the second, are absolutely parallel and co-ordinate, and can never be transposed into linear sub-ordination. Self-consciousness has one realm to construe; Perceptive observation, another. Could we always forget ourselves, and use our faculty upon objects without knowing it, we should still be competent to the "interpretation of nature": could we always forget the world, and scan the inner history alone, we should still be competent to register the laws of thought. The necessary duality of all intellectual action happily excludes this extreme, and preserves some approximate equipoise between the two momenta of our knowledge: but it is none the less true that they are perfectly distinct, however concurrent; that interchange between them is impossible; that, though they hang and balance from the same beam, the weights which are heaviest in the one have no effect upon the other; and that the attempt to treat them as homogeneous can but upset and confound the conditions of human intelligence. What is shown to us by the outer daylight of objective discovery must always be other than that which we see by the inner light of self-knowledge: and could the rays of either fall upon the other's field, there is nothing there which they could fetch out of darkness.

We submit therefore that a dualistic grouping of the Sciences, in place of a monistic, is prescribed by the funda-

mental conditions of Intelligence itself; that without a firm and absolute reliance on the postulates and resources of objective experience, Natural knowledge can make no way; that without equally firm and absolute reliance on the postulates and resources of self-consciousness, Mental and Moral philosophy must remain impossible; and that whilst neither can question, not either may borrow, the language and methods of the other. So long as we look at the extreme cases of contrast in the two series,—Astronomy, for instance, and Psychology,—this statement will perhaps challenge little objection: star-gazing taking us out pretty far, and thought-analysing keeping us pretty close at home. There are, however, several intermediate departments of knowledge which seem to give us insight into the workings of the human mind, not by introspection, but distinctly by the study of external data. Jurisprudence and Politics, History, Philology, and Art, all engage themselves upon visible and tangible products of the past, and have no less objective a look than Botany and Geology themselves; yet all issue in deeper acquaintance with humanity: they appear to be physical in their procedure, and moral in their result. Nevertheless, they do not disturb, they even confirm, the principle of our dual arrangement. What are the "external phenomena" with which they deal? Laws and States,—the embodiment of the social Conscience; Language,—the crystallization of human Thought; Poetry, Painting, and Sculpture,—the witnesses of human Ideality; Action and Suffering,—the outcome of human Life and Passion. For the purpose of our present argument, it is an abuse of terms to call these "external" facts. They are so, in the sense in which tears are drops of water, or a ship's colours a few yards of cotton rag; but their whole essence lies in the internal meaning of which they are the record and the sign, in the invisible and spiritual facts of which they compel the very elements to take charge. And all such simply *expressive* phenomena speak to us only to the extent of our sympathy, and through the medium of

our self-consciousness: did they not hold up the mirror to our inner life, and enable us better to read ourselves in their reflex image, they would tell us nothing, and would drop from the catalogue of human studies. Here, and here alone, does the maxim hold, that "like only can know like," —that the cognitive process requires community of nature between the knower and the known. In physics, it is rather the opposite rule that prevails,—of contrariety between subject and object:—at all events I need not, in order to estimate colour, have my faculty prismatically painted; or, to appreciate acids, be sour myself; or, to examine the magnetic laws, be personally liable to dip. But, if I am to know humanity, human I must be; and all its memorials, so far as they are not dumb to me, are but the extension of my self-conscious being. In this distinction we have the true dividing-line between the departments of Science and Literature, and the principle of their profound difference of operation on the minds exclusively occupied with either. It would take us too far from our proper path to work out this hint at present: it is intended only adequately to carry out the dual arrangement of our intellectual pursuits, and justify the appropriation of all the "literæ humaniores" to the side of self-knowledge.

Mr. Bain's book opens with an account, lucid, exact, and compendious, of the nervous system in man. In its proper place, beside the volumes of Bell, of Quain, of Sharpey, of Carpenter, nothing could be better; and in a practical manual for students, especially when they are to be examined by the author himself, we do not question the utility of such an exposition. It is a serviceable key to much that would else be obscure in the language of psychological writers: and just as a musician may reasonably feel some curiosity respecting acoustic laws, so is it natural that an interest in mental processes should extend itself to their organic antecedents. But, tried by any strict test of logical right, the disquisition is, in our view, altogether foreign and intrusive; and we prefer the practice of the older writers,

—Reid, Stewart, and Mill,—who take up their subject no earlier than the conscious phenomena, and leave the medullary conditions entirely out of view. It is not that we doubt the physiological importance of the modern cerebral researches, or feel anything but regret at their hitherto scanty achievements. But if they were ever so successful, —if we could get to look at all that we want,—if we could turn the exterior of a man's body into a transparent case, and compel powerful magnifiers to lay bare to us all that happens in his nerves and brain,—what we should see would not be sensation, thought, affection, but some form of movement or other visible change, which would equally show itself to any being with observing eyesight, however incapable of the corresponding inner emotion. Facts thus legible from a position foreign to the human consciousness are not mental facts, are not moral facts, and have no place in the interior of a science which professes to treat of these, and reduce them to their laws. All that could be done with such outwardly perceived phenomena, at their point of nearest approach to the psychologist, is to note down their order of succession, in parallelism with the corresponding order of the series known to self-consciousness. Supposing two such co-ordinated trains to be established, we may admit that the physical, if the better ascertained and distincter in its terms, might help us, like the clearer column of a bilingual inscription, to identify or discriminate the parts of the other. But it cannot be pretended that our acquaintance with the nervous system supplies us with any secondary ratios of this kind by which the primary can be construed into truer order. The cerebral phenomena are in an immeasurably darker state than the mental, and are even indebted to these for every hypothetic clue by which the fancy of physiologists could find a way through their relations. The grand discovery itself (still not undisputed) of separate motory and sensory nerves only follows at a vast distance, in respect of certainty and perspicuity, the conscious difference between action and receptivity. Dr.

Hartley's theory of Vibrations was not, in our judgment, a more questionable incumbrance on his doctrine of Association, than Mr. Bain's correcter physiological exposition on his subsequent intellectual analyses. While it throws not a ray of real light into them, it tinctures them with a language of materialistic description, at once unphilosophical and repulsive. When we are told of the "high charge of nervous power" needful for "susceptibility to delicate emotions,"—of the "numerous currents of the brain" involved in "wandering of the thoughts,"—of the "full development of a wave of emotion" from "the cerebral centres,"—of the "eminently glandular" nature of "the tender affections";—when it is observed that "Irascibility may draw to itself a large share of the vital sap";—and that "the tender emotion usurps largely a great portion of mankind, being so alimented by the natural conformation of the system as to maintain its characteristic wave with considerable persistence," and that "this gives great capacity for the affections," especially with "requisite support" from "the structure of the glandular organs";*—we lose all sense of psychological truth, and no more know ourselves again than if, on looking in the glass, we were to see an anatomical figure staring at us. There is no more occasion for such phraseology, than for an artist to paint his Madonna with the skin off. It is recommended neither by scientific precision, nor by illustrative good taste. The one only excellence of psychological description is to speak truly and searchingly to our self-consciousness; and of vital sap, and high charges, and powerful currents, and diffusive waves, we certainly are not conscious; nor do we know of any writer resorting to this style of exposition, without forfeiture of all fineness and sharpness in his delineations of spiritual facts, and quite degenerating from the purity of Berkeley, the neatness of Stewart, the severity of Kant, the transparency of Jouffroy.

We have said that the psychological difference between

* The Emotions and the Will, pp. 32, 193, 230, 94, 233, 232.

active power and the passive susceptibilities of Sense was familiar to mental philosophers, and was treated as fundamental, long before the physiological separation of motory from sensory nerves. Of the vast majority of writers the remark is so true, that this distinction is seldom absent from the leading divisions and even titles of their works. But there is one important class of exceptions. The Sensational psychologists have steadily resisted the claims of this distinction; have denied its ultimate reality, and by various ingenuities resolved it away; have contended that activity means only muscular movement, and that this is both set a-going and made known exclusively by sensation. From this sole source, followed by the clinging together of connected movements and the vestiges of contiguous sensations, they have explained all the phenomena of human nature. Of all the difficulties of this undertaking, no one has been more pressed upon them, and more in vain, than that of extracting from a primitive passivity the various forms of energy and struggle. At last however the conviction, which has so long stood out against psychological appeal, is yielded to physiology: and Sir Charles Bell having detached the nerves, Mr. Bain separates the functions, of action and sensation. He admits as original, along with the susceptibilities of sense, a spontaneity of movement,—a start into energy without any prefix of feeling: and this is the capital new feature,—certainly a marked improvement,—which he has added to the resources of his school. In order to turn this spontaneity,—quite random at first,—into volition, he assumes an inherent tendency to persistence in every muscular adjustment which procures a pleasure or relieves a pain: in virtue of which this class of movements, once hit upon, disengage themselves from the heterogeneous mass of possible combinations, and fall into the track, and come under the command, of regulated associations. This mode of deriving the voluntary from the involuntary phenomena is essentially the same with that of Hartley and James Mill: and though carried out

with much fuller elaboration, and addressing itself more carefully to the grand *nodus* of the problem,—the process of deliberate preference and decision,—will probably convert no one who has been left unsatisfied by the previous expositors. The real novelty lies higher up; in freeing the first involuntary movements from their dependence on any sort of feeling, and so creating a kind of spontaneity to set off against the stores of sensation, and make acquaintance with them.

This doubling of the established data of his school, by the introduction of a term distinctly antithetic to sensation, seemed to us at first to offer the means of reconciliation with the opposite philosophy. Nothing could look more like a surrender of the monistic for a dualistic principle. But, we regret to say, the promise is for the present illusory. The reason is this. Though Mr. Bain grants us a spontaneity, he plants it where we have nothing to do with it, any more than if our limbs were spasmodically stirred by a galvanic touch. In his zeal to cancel Hartley's prefix of a sensational stimulus, he forgets to leave any attendant consciousness at the fountain-head at all, and makes the movement come, *psychologically*, out of nothing. The first thing we feel is the series of muscular sensations in the execution of the act: there it is, accordingly, that our conscious life begins, and the prior word of command for the initiation of the act took place outside. The dynamics of the case are thus quite numb and foreign to us; and our experience still dates from the earliest sensation, and includes no counter element. So far as our mental history is concerned, this novelty of Mr. Bain's is therefore inoperative, and lapses back into that mere emphasizing of the muscular feelings so familiar to the readers of Dr. Thomas Brown. Could he only have burst through the enchantments of this paralyzing sensational circle, we believe him to have been on the eve of an important advance. By simply drawing his "spontaneity" and its force within the limits of consciousness, instead of

leaving it beyond the threshold, solutions arise of problems otherwise unmanageable. On one of these we will dwell for a few moments,—the origin of the beliefs respecting Externality and Space.

It is admitted on all hands,—or, at least, we shall freely concede it to our author's philosophy,—that if, like Condillac's sentient statue, we simply stood still and felt this and that sensation of smell, taste, or sound, we should have no knowledge of an outward world. The conditions of this belief first enter in connection with the muscular system; in the exercise of which we gain our apprehensions of objects distinct from ourselves, of their dimensions, forms, positions, and of the circumambient field in which they lie. So far we are agreed. But now comes the question, how are the muscles qualified to give us this special instruction? and by what process do they impart it? Brown, Mill, Bain, all concur in their answer. First, we gain the idea of *linear extension* by muscular feelings of various range, as in the slight or greater closing of the fingers, or sweep of the arm, or exploring a wire: part of a given series of sensations not being the same to us as the whole, or a less part as a more considerable, we have differences for every degree of continuance; and these are so many *lengths*. Next, we have but to give this idea numerical increase, *i.e.*, conceive of *co-existing lengths*, whether by joint action of a plurality of fingers, or by combining the movements of one over a surface, as of a pane of glass,—and we are introduced to *superficial extension*. And lastly, by letting our fancy go out with its length-idea on all radii from any point, we win at once the conception of *Space*: or again by embracing a solid object between the two hands, we discover co-existing surfaces separated by lengths, and complete our triad of dimensions. Thus our idea of Extension is built up, bit by bit, one dimension at a time; and the last to come, in the order of our knowledge, is geometrical solidity.

Every thing, in this exposition, depends on the sound-

ıess of the first step; the others, being little else than :ontrivances for multiplying lengths, disappear of themselves if the lengths are yet to seek. How, then, are they got? Merely, it is said, by our experiencing in the muscles a train of sensations, coming to an end, now sooner, now later; this variation in the protraction of the series being the gist of the whole matter, and giving us our *quæsitum* of *length*. If so, however, *any* succession of feelings susceptible of similar variation would do as well: a melody heard, now complete, now broken off; a cycle of odours, at one time half administered, at another cut short near the beginning, would meet all the prescribed conditions, and ought to furnish us with the knowledge of Extension. The liability to more or less abbreviation of the sensational thread is no peculiarity of the muscular sense: and to pitch upon this circumstance as giving us our comparison of lengths is fatal to the exclusive claim which is set up for this class of feelings. What can be more inconsistent than, first, to single out the locomotive organs as alone competent to the phenomenon, and then to refer the phenomenon to something in them which is no speciality of theirs at all? Do you fly then to the distinctive *quality* of their feelings, rather than their mere interrupted succession? Different, of course, the muscular feelings are from smells, as tastes also or sounds are from both; but so long as they are *only* sensations, delivered upon our consciousness one after another, they win no advantage, for purposes of objective disclosure, over their companions. Even could we know them by ever so perfect an introspection, they would be found in us, not out of us, and would not help us to step beyond the subjective world: their succession would be in *duration*, not in *space*, and would give us the sequent parts of time, not the synchronous parts of linear extension. Ring the changes as you will upon mere Sensation, these difficulties will shut you in. The only reason why the passive reception of odours would not reveal the outward world is, that it does not go beyond sensation; and so

long as you stop at that stage, the muscles will serve you no better than the pituitary membrane.

In what, then, really consists the prerogative distinction of the muscular system? It has an obvious and important peculiarity. In our experience of smell, hearing, &c., the first thing that happens is the sensation, which arrives at us out of the unknown, and wakes us up in an unexpected way; and any cognitive act, when we are in a condition to have one, follows on the sensitive phenomenon. But the muscular sensations occur in executing an act already ordered by mandate from ourselves; the signal for them is passed before they arise, and this mental prefix, name it as you will, prevents our being taken by surprise with the phenomenon, and provides an incipient cognitive element at the fountain-head. This inverse order of procedure in the locomotive faculty redeems it altogether from the category of the Senses. It starts from a point that is no more "Sensation" than the cognitions in which the proper Senses terminate; call it volition, or call it spontaneous energy, it is the putting forth of personal causation. This is a function beyond the province of mere Sense. A *Sense* cannot *make efforts;* nor are its phenomena causes, but effects. Not even, we believe, are sensations an essential feature in the executive stage of the operation; if the muscles were made of india-rubber, or paralyzed in their sensory nerves, their system, we conceive, would not be disqualified, provided it obeyed the mandates from head-quarters, for giving us knowledge of an objective world. This knowledge breaks on us from the collision of our own conscious force with impeding resistance: and so long as the two extremes retain this relation, the intermediary members may be many or few, sensible or insensible, without hindering our discovery of the antithetic Subject and Object: the one *here*, the other *there;* the one *Causal hence*, the other *Causal hither*. By removing the dynamical commencement of this experience out of consciousness, and beginning our psychological history lower down, in the

sensations of the executive muscles, Mr. Bain appears to us to have missed the true germ of our ideas of Personality, of Space, and of Causation.

No doubt, the accurate *measurement* of our force against variable resistances, and of the several intervals between objects, is largely dependent on the proper muscular sensations, which are invaluable as a scheme of graduated signs. But the *things measured and signified*,—apart from the appreciation of their degrees,—are cognizable through an energy behind the muscles. The collision of that energy of ours with the counter-energy of the world, as attested by Sensation, reveals to us, by the crossing lines of direction, the contrast of the Self and the other-than-Self, and gives us, as Categories for all phenomena, the two centres of Personality and Externality. The antithesis of these mutually excluding terms carries in itself both a geometrical opposition of Place, and a dynamical opposition of Force. Instead of our having to go to school for a long experience, in order to be trained into these ideas, our whole experience constitutes itself around these apprehensions, as its three grand axes; and of the two sides of each pair, neither has any advantage over the other: the outer and the inner both are given in the same act, and known by the same self-light, or rather reciprocal light; and there is no more propriety in saying, that we know the external world only through our own feelings, than in saying that we know our own feelings only through the external world. To know at all involves both terms: and the attempt to establish a subordination between them, and resolve objective cognition into subjective consciousness of our own phenomena, is nothing else than, in the very act of patronizing experience, to destroy its fundamental postulates, and open the way to every idealistic dream. The following passage is therefore, in our view, far from satisfactory:

"As our belief in the externality of the causes of our sensations means, that certain actions of ours will bring the

sensations into play, or modify them in a known manner, this belief is easily furnished to us by experience; it is no more than our experience entitles us to entertain. Having felt, again and again, that a tree becomes larger to the eye as we move; that this movement brings on at last a sensation of touch; that this sensation of touch varies with movements of our arm, and a great many other similar coincidences; the repetition of all this experience fixes it in the mind, and from the sight alone we can anticipate all the rest. We then know that our movements will bring about all the changes and sensations above described, and we know no more; but this knowledge is to us the recognition of external existence, the only thing, so far as I see, that external existence can possibly mean. Belief in external reality is the anticipation of a given effect to a given antecedent; and the effects and causes are our own various sensations and movements." (*The Senses and the Intellect*, p. 373.)

According to this, to see the sun in the heavens is to believe that, if we could only keep on walking long enough, we might burn our fingers; to descry the lark aloft, is to recite by muscular sympathy the beating of its wings since it left its nest; to think of any distant space is to run over our locomotive sensations in reaching it, and the opportunity of thrusting out our arm when we have got there. Emptiness means simply scope for muscular exercise; and the Infinitude of Space imports only potential gymnastics for us under all conceivable circumstances. This kind of "analysis" of our ideas seems to us, we must confess, a cruel operation,—a cold-blooded dissecting of them to death. The *disjecta membra* given as their equivalents, and strung together in succession to replace the original whole, defy all identification. Look down an avenue of trees, and consider whether, in appreciating its perspective, you are engaged upon the mere imagination of touches, or the computation of fatigue. Watch a lighthouse from a ship's deck, by night, laying its long line of beads towards you upon the waves, and say whether the thing denoted by this "visual sign" has any thing to do with either your

legs or your finger-ends. Can you believe that even to a blind geometrician diagrams and areas present themselves, not as simultaneous existences beyond his personality, but as possible series of tactual impressions in himself? or, that when James Mitchell, the blind deaf-mute, amused himself with picking stones out of the brook, ranging them in a circle on the grass, and then assuming the centre as his own seat, the figure of his environment did not lie in his dark imagination complete at once? For our own part, we utterly distrust this whole doctrine, which construes back the grand synchronous unity of Space into trains of muscular successions in our Sense, and interprets the objective world into cohesive relations among our subjective phenomena. How completely all externality disappears in the *Ego*, when this psychology is fairly carried out, will be evident from the following passage, in which the existence of light is made contingent on the visual feelings, and the whole language of outward being and causation is treated as an empty product of "abstraction":

"We seem to have no better way of assuring ourselves and all mankind that with the conscious movement of opening the eyes there will always be a consciousness of light, than by saying that the light exists as independent fact, with or without any eyes to see it. But if we consider the case fairly, we shall see that this assertion errs, not simply in being beyond any evidence that we can have, but also in being a self-contradiction. We are affirming that to have an existence out of our minds which we cannot know but as in our minds. In words we assert independent existence, while in the very act of doing so we contradict ourselves. Even a possible world implies a possible mind to perceive it, just as much as an actual world implies an actual mind. The mistake of the common modes of expression in this matter, is the mistake of supposing the abstractions of the mind to have a separate and independent existence. This is the doctrine of the Platonic 'ideas,' or 'forms,' which are understood to impart all that is common to the particular facts or realities, instead of being

derived from them by an operation of the mind. Thus the actual circles of nature derive their mathematical properties from the pre-existing 'idea,' or circle in the abstract; the actual men owe their sameness to the ideal man. So instead of looking upon the doctrine of an external and independent world as a generalization or abstraction grounded on our particular experiences, summing up the past, and predicting the future, we have got into the way of maintaining the abstraction to be an independent reality, the foundation, or cause, or origin, of all those experiences." (*The Senses and the Intellect*, p. 376.)

This is the old pitfall, where philosophy, too boldly stepping on its solid-looking sensational ground, has so often tumbled through into a bottomless Idealism. We are not to say, it seems, that light exists as an "independent fact." Then it exists either as a dependent fact, or not at all. If the former, it is dependent on vision, that is on its own effect, which is absurd. If the latter, then vision exists by itself; that is, effect, without the cause, perception with nothing perceived. Our author plainly confounds the two inverse kinds of "dependence,"—logical, in the order of knowing,—real, in the order of being;—the *causa cognoscendi* and the *causa essendi*. The *knowledge* of light is dependent on vision, its effect; the *being* of vision is dependent on light, its cause: whose relative "independent existence" is so far from being "contradicted," that it is directly implied, by its dependent logical position:—the two things being indeed but one and the same relation read from opposite ends. Our author, it is true, affirms that "we cannot know light, *but as in our minds*." But how so? Because, we presume, it is known by *seeing it*, and that is an act of the mind. Yes, certainly; *the seeing*:—but, on that very account, not the *things seen*: for the cognitive act, instead of implying coalescence and identity, is conditional on separation and mutual exclusion, of the knower and the known, and can reveal neither except as over against the other. Were it otherwise,—were all that we know to be on that account

seated at the cognitive point,—knowledge and being must coalesce, and could never look each other in the face: nothing could be known as existing: and nothing could exist as known. The intellectual power itself would constitute a disqualification for intelligence. If there really were external objects, and a faculty in us for their apprehension, Mr. Bain's argument would still apply: if where they are known, there we must presume them to be, our cognizance of them as external ought to be treated as false; its truth would be a proper ground for disbelieving it; and the perfect knowledge of a thing would be its absolute disproof.

A psychology which allows us cognizance only of the thread of our own feelings is obliged to account for the objective look and substantive pretensions of some portions of our knowledge, by making up aggregates of feelings, and assuming that their chemical union gives them the fallacious aspect of being more than feelings,—of being elsewhere than in ourselves,—of being one instead of many. The grand instrument of this metamorphosis, we need hardly say, is the Association of Ideas,—or, more properly, of actions and mental states; among which, either contiguous terms, or resembling terms, have a tendency to revive each other. This is a veritable and universally recognized psychological law: and to the great merits of his school in vindicating its importance and extending its application Mr. Bain has made large additions in his copious and elaborate exposition. Without the originality of Hartley (whose work, after every deduction, still stands in the highest rank of psychological literature), and without the severe precision of James Mill, our author opens a fuller storehouse of illustration, and spreads out its contents in a more telling and agreeable way. He is master of all the dexterities of this law, and prepared to show the utmost that can be done with it. Whether it is not overtasked is perhaps a natural question with even the most trustful reader. Its requirements are so

modest, and its achievements so grand, that it is apt to be suspected for the very scale of its apparent victories. "Given the rudiments of any brute,"—so it seems to state its problem,—"to construct the perfection of any angel." The five senses and ganglionic spontaneities are briskly stretched upon the Jacquard-loom: the cards, perforated according to theory, are hung upon the beam: and after a few chapters of cheerful weaving, the divine form is finished off; and you have the satisfaction not only of admiring it, but of knowing exactly what its reason, love, and goodness are made of, and how put together. The doctrine, appealing as it does chiefly to the earliest experience, and making rapid use of the years of infancy, rests, to a dangerous extent, on a conjectural psychology. It has already got over all its difficulties before the age when reflection can put it to the test: and when called in question by the mature and practised self-consciousness, glibly answers that it is too late in the day to bring up any inner evidence against it; that its wonders are all wrought within us, and can no longer be unravelled; that we have been so transformed by it, as not to know ourselves, and to be decipherable only by its light; that what we take to be the simplest mental states it knows to be superlatively complex;—what, the primary truths of reason, to be the ultimate tricks of language;—what, the native insight of conscience, to be the artificial imposition of social opinion. It is always difficult, for want of recognized criteria, to criticize hypothetical history; as, for want of common substance, to fight a duel with a ghost. Being, however, to no small extent, at one with this doctrine, we may perhaps hope to explain a scruple which checks our complete assent to it. For the sake of distinctness we limit ourselves to a certain point.

All the language of the doctrine is framed on the supposition that, a number of elements being given, and laid detached before the mind, it cements them together in groups and trains, in ever-increasing complexity. The

mental history is, in this view, a perpetual formation of new compounds: and the words, "Association," "Suggestion," "Cohesion," "Fusion," "Indissoluble Connection," all express the change from plurality of data to some unity of result. An explanation of the process therefore requires two things;—a true enumeration of the primary constituents, and a correct statement of their laws of combination: just as, in chemistry, we are furnished with a list of the simple elements, and then with the principles of their synthesis. Now the latter of these two conditions we find satisfied by the Association psychologists; but not the former. They are not agreed upon their catalogue of elements, or the marks by which they may know the simple from the compound. The psychologic unit is not fixed; that which is called *one* impression by Hartley is treated as half-a-dozen or more by Mill; and the tendency of the modern teachers on this point is to recede more and more from the better chosen track of their master. Hartley, for example, regarded the whole present effect upon us of any single object,—say, an orange,—as a single sensation; and the whole vestige it left behind, as a single "idea of sensation." His modern disciples, on the other hand, consider this same effect as an aggregate from a plurality of sensations, and the ideal trace it leaves as highly compound. The "idea of an object," instead of being an elementary starting-point with them, is one of the elaborate results of repetition and experience; and is continually adduced as remarkably illustrating the fusing power of habitual association. Thus James Mill observes:

"It is to this great law of association that we trace the formation of our ideas of what we call external objects; that is, the ideas of a certain number of sensations, received together so frequently that they coalesce as it were, and are spoken of under the idea of unity. Hence, what we call the idea of a tree, the idea of a stone, the idea of a horse, the idea of a man. In using the names, tree, horse, man, the names of what I call objects, I am referring, and can be referring, only to my own

sensations; in fact, therefore, only naming a certain number of sensations, regarded as in a particular state of combination; that is, concomitance. Particular sensations of sight, of touch, of the muscles, are the sensations to the ideas of which, colour, extension, roughness, hardness, smoothness, taste, smell, so coalescing as to appear one idea, I give the name, idea of a tree."*

To precisely the same effect Mr. Bain remarks:

"External objects usually affect us through a plurality of senses. The pebble on the seashore is pictured on the eye as form and colour. We take it up in the hand and repeat the impression of form, with the additional feeling of touch. Knock two together, and there is a characteristic sound. To preserve the impression of an object of this kind, there must be an association of all these different effects. Such association, when matured and firm, is our idea, our intellectual grasp of the pebble. Passing to the organic world, and plucking a rose, we have the same effects of form to the eye and hand, colour and touch, with the new effects of odour and taste. A certain time is requisite for the coherence of all these qualities in one aggregate, so as to give us for all purposes the enduring image of the rose. When fully acquired, any one of the characteristic impressions will revive the others; the odour, the sight, the feeling of the thorny stalk,—each of these by itself, will hoist the entire impression into the view." (*The Senses and the Intellect*, p. 411.)

Now, this order of derivation, making our objective knowledge begin with plurality of impressions, and arrive at unity, we take to be a complete inversion of our psychological history. Hartley, we think, was perfectly right in taking no notice of the number of inlets through which an object delivers its effect upon us, and, in spite of this circumstance, treating the effect as one. Had he explicitly drawn out the principle which implicitly guided him, it would have assumed perhaps something like this form: "That each state of consciousness, whether awakened through more or fewer channels, is, during its continuance, originally simple; and can resolve itself only by change of

* Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, vol. i. p. 71.

equilibrium." No psychological law appears to have higher evidence than this; and, little as the range of its consequences has been perceived, there are probably few who would dispute it when stated in a general form. Were it not true, the feeling of each moment, determined as it is by innumerable conditions in our organism, not one of which could change and leave our state the same, would seem to us, or must once have seemed, infinitely intricate. But the constancies of our system, however numerous, never disclose themselves till they break up; the functional sensibilities of the organic life first report their character when they go wrong; the muscles, blending in a state of rest, detach themselves by the permutations of motion, and acquire, as in learning the use of a keyed instrument, more and more delicate discriminations of feeling and action; and if the special senses less obviously converge upon one psychologic point, it is only because their relations are perpetually shifting *inter se*, and disappointing our experiments of the requisite statical conditions. But even now, after life has read us so many analytic lessons, in proportion as we can fix the attitude of our scene and ourselves, the sense of plurality in our impressions retreats, and we lapse into an undivided consciousness; losing, for instance, the separate notice of any uniform hum in the ear, or light in the eye, or weight of clothes on the body, though not one of them is inoperative on the complexion of our feeling. This law, once granted, must be carried far beyond Hartley's point. Not only must each object present itself to us integrally before it shells off into its qualities, but the whole scene around us must disengage for us object after object from its still background by emergence and change; and even our self-detachment from the world over-against us must wait for the start of collision between the force we issue and that which we receive. To confine ourselves to the simplest case: when a red ivory ball, seen for the first time, has been withdrawn, it will leave a mental representation of itself, in which all that it simul-

taneously gave us will indistinguishably co-exist. Let a white ball succeed to it; now, and not before, will an attribute detach itself, and the colour, by force of contrast, be shaken out into the foreground. Let the white ball be replaced by an egg: and this new difference will bring the form into notice from its previous slumber. And thus, that which began by being simply an object, cut out from the surrounding scene, becomes for us first a *red* object, and then a *red round* object; and so on. Instead, therefore, of the qualities, as separately given, subscribing together and adding themselves up to present us with the object as their aggregate, the object is beforehand with them, and from its integrity delivers them out to our knowledge, one by one. In this disintegration, the primary nucleus never loses its substantive character or name; whilst the difference which it throws off appears as a mere attribute, expressed by an adjective. Hence it is that we are compelled to think of the object as *having*, not as *being*, its qualities; and can never heartily admit the belief of any loose lot of attributes really fusing themselves into a *thing*. The unity of the original whole is not felt to go to pieces and be resolved into the properties which it successively gives off; it retains a residuary existence, which constitutes it a *substance*, as against the emerging quality, which is only its *phenomenal predicate*. Were it not for this perpetual process of differentiation,—of self from the world, of object from its scene, of attribute from object,—no step of Abstraction could be taken; no qualities could fall under our notice; and had we ten thousand senses, they would all converge and meet in but one consciousness. But if this be so, it is an utter falsification of the order of nature to speak of sensations grouping themselves into aggregates, and so composing for us the objects of which we think; and the whole language of the theory, in regard to the field of synchronous existences, is a direct inversion of the truth. Experience proceeds and intellect is trained, not by Association, but by *Disassocia-*

tion, not by reduction of pluralities of impression to one, but by the opening out of one into many; and a true psychological history must expound itself in analytic rather than synthetic terms. Precisely those ideas,—of Substance, of Mind, of Cause, of Space,—which this system treats as infinitely complex, the last result of myriads of confluent elements, are in truth the permanent simplicities of consciousness, whose stability the eddies and currents of phenomenal experience have left undisturbed. The same inversion of the real mental order has exercised, we think, an injurious influence on the whole Logic and Philology of the Association philosophers; the organism of speech requiring, for its due interpretation, to be read *downward* from its wholes into its parts; and, without this, being hardly capable of construction *upwards* from the atoms of predication to its life. We cannot at present expand these hints; but they will suffice to show the wide sweep which a fundamental psychological truth or error cannot fail to have, and how the whole configuration of philosophy may be affected by even a slight want of precision in its first lines. Mr. Bain often approaches very near the important principle (as it seems to us) of the Unity of original consciousness; speaking, for instance, of "the concurrence of Sensations in one common stream of consciousness, in the same cerebral highway";* and in the following passage not only recognizing, but enforcing, the necessity of differentiation by change:

"Were it not for the primitive shock that difference gives, there would be no basis for the intellect. All colours would be alike; sounds would not be distinct from touches or smells, and there would be no cognition possible in any sense. The feeling of difference, therefore, is the first step; the impressing of that, under the plastic property of the mind, into an enduring notion in the next. We begin by being alive to the distinctive shocks of red and green, of round and oval, small and large; by and by, we attain to the fixed notion of a rose

* The Senses and the Intellect, p. 359.

on its stem; thence we go on combining this with others, until the mind is full of the most variegated trains of imagery. The laws of association follow up, and do not necessarily imply, or contain in themselves, the primordial sense of difference, which is the most rudimentary of all the properties of our intellectual being. Analysis can descend no deeper, explanation can go no farther; we must make a stand upon this, as the preliminary condition of all intelligence, and merely seek to place its character in a clear and certain light." (*The Emotions and the Will*, p. 626.)

Whilst insisting, however, on the indispensableness of change of impression, Mr. Bain apparently thinks this condition sufficiently provided for by the mere co-existence of sensations through a plurality of Senses; the power of discriminating which he attributes to the Intellect as an ultimate and fundamental prerogative:

"The basis or fundamental peculiarity of the Intellect is discrimination, or the feeling of difference between consecutive *or co-existing* impressions. Nothing more fundamental can possibly be assigned as the defining mark of intelligence, and emotion as such does not imply any such property." (*The Emotions and the Will*, p. 614.)

"Consecutive impressions" involve change; but "co-existing impressions" do not: and if the discriminative power is equally related to both, it is not dependent on the occurrence of change. And conversely, if it demand change, it can do nothing with mere co-existing impressions. This last position we believe to be the true one; and we cannot assent to Dugald Stewart's statement: "Although we had never seen but one rose, we might still have been able to attend to its colour, without thinking of its other properties."* Mr. Bain, in concurring with this opinion of Stewart's, and attributing plurality to the original effect of a single object, appears to us to forget his own doctrine as to impossibility of any sense of difference

* Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, part ii. chap. iv. sect. 1.

without change, and to let slip a psychological clew already familiar to his hand.

We have lingered near the *incunabula* of the opposite psychologies in the hope that, by scrutiny of their development at its initial stage, some approximate lines might be found for them to prevent their rapid divergence. The only hope of improved mutual understanding lies at the beginning. To discuss the ulterior questions into which they run is a far easier and more attractive task; but, at the same time, utterly useless, till the logical preliminaries are determined,—a mere race from different starting-points over incommensurable fields. The enormous differences which open out as the two methods pursue their way suffice, for those who know them, to throw an interest around the finer distinctions at the commencement. If the dualistic method be admissible, we obtain at the fountain-head, unless our ultimate constitution be unveracious, direct authority for a few primitive cognitions, accurately corresponding with the most rooted and universal beliefs of mankind—viz., the substantial existence of ourselves as knowing Subject, and of the external world as known Object; the reality and infinity of Space as the seat of the latter with its contents, and the reality and infinity of Duration as containing the successions of the former; the origin of all phenomena from a causality not phenomenal. In such judgments, accepted as the inherent postulates of all intelligence, we have a few first truths to render experience possible, and to form a basis for reliable knowledge. If the monistic principle holds, if the only thing accessible to us is our own phenomena, if they are but transformed sensations, if, moreover, they are phenomena of nothing and nobody,—it is idle to speak of cognition at all; there is neither outer world to be known, nor any "we" to know it: the inner history alone is fact; and it can furnish no rational propositions, except about the groupings, the successions, or the resemblances *inter se*, of the feelings and ideas composing it. Body means

the experience of certain muscular sensations; Space, the experience of their absence; Infinity, the conception of their possibility; and what we say of these can be only autobiographical, without validity beyond. Causality denotes the constant priority of one of our states to another. Belief means an association of ideas and feelings, strong enough to stir muscular sensations. Perception is a very misleading word; pretending to refer some sensation to an object that gives it, but properly referring it only to the group that has it. Personality is the sum-total of all the feelings in any one conscious life up to its present moment,—in common language, rather aristocratically limited to human beings; and to say, "I committed this sin" is to tack on a new phenomenon at the end of a train and lengthen its thread. There can be no first truths; for we form no judgments till we have got language, and must have the parts of speech before we can predicate any thing; and then any stiff association of ideas, however arbitrary, is ready to set up for self-evidence. The propositions which assume this look are about nothing except empty abstractions of the mind's creation, yielding only an illusory certainty; and it is a rule that a Science, to be demonstrative, must be hypothetical; and to be pure, its hypotheses must be false. The steadiness with which the thorough paced Hartleyan walks through these startling paradoxes, —the rigour with which he follows out their lines, with a pleasant sense of beauty and discovery,—we cannot but regard as curiously expressive of the mind logical rather than psychological. The skill and ingenuity are often marvellous; but to a very large extent are expended, not in interpreting, so much as in explaining away, your actual consciousness; in converting it into some strange, uncomfortable coin, declared to be its change in full; in apologizing for the imperfect evidence of their equivalence, and showing that it could not well be greater, considering all that they have had to go through. Just as Mr. Darwin, on finding fossil species disinclined to help

him, fixes on them an *ex-parte* character, and urges that his genuine witnesses must have disappeared and become indistinguishably worked up into the very grain of the world; so does the Association psychologist feel no discouragement from the refractory look of mental facts as they are, whilst he can plead that the rudimentary forms are compelled by the very hypothesis to vanish, and lie mingled invisibly with the containing strata of the mind. There is obviously a limit beyond which this kind of plea cannot be carried without withdrawing the doctrine it is meant to benefit from all rational test: and the extent to which it is urged, measures the degree in which conjecture takes the place of the *vera causa*. Now, when it is remembered that almost every one of the *distinctively human* phenomena presents a *crux interpretum* to this school; that the points at which suspicion of psychological tampering arises include the Ideas of Space and Time, the ground of the Mathematics; of Substance and Causality, implied in Physics; of Personality and Obligation, the conditions of Morals; of Right, the basis of Law; of Beauty, the essence of Art; of Supreme Goodness, the inspiration of Religion; that whilst Memory and Conception and Habit are fairly explained, Belief and Volition are analysed out of their identity; the disproportion becomes striking between the assured value of the doctrine and its cost. At every one of these points, Mr. Bain's exposition has, to our feeling, the peculiar character of ingenious unreality which is so common in all the later writings of his school, and which so markedly distinguishes the subtle misconstructions of Brown and Mill from the faithful half-analysis of Locke. We find ourselves entangled continually in mere *quasi-psychology*, which does not in the least speak of any thing within; but shows how, under certain enumerated conditions, an equivalent to the actual state of mind might be produced. This is more especially the case in the second volume, where the author's description of the *moral* phenomena seems to us to be drawn from some quite imaginary

human nature; and to have no relation to the real experiences and faiths of tempted and struggling men. Highly significant of his method in this respect is his habitual discontent with the *language* in which men have embodied their ethical feeling and thought. The great question of Moral Liberty is got rid of by a wholesale objection to every one of its leading terms: "Freedom" is inappropriate; "Necessity" is an incumbrance; "Self-determination" is a bad name for motive pleasures and pains; "Choice" can mean nothing but the ending of suspense in a single line of activity; and so on. These terms "have weighed like a nightmare upon the investigation of the active region of the mind." Does the suspicion never cross Mr. Bain that to cancel the vocabulary of moral thought and feeling is to discharge the phenomena from his philosophy? We refrain, however, from following him at present into this great field; his elaborate treatment of which would require an independent discussion.

XIV.

IS THERE ANY "AXIOM OF CAUSALITY"?

Αλλο μὲν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ'ἐκεῖνο, ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον.—PLAT. *Phædo*, 99 B.

THE cultivation of the Natural Sciences has advantageously contracted the meaning of the word "*Cause*," which formerly was identified (as its derivative "*Because*" still is) with every answer to the question "*Why*"? and was said to lurk in the conditional clause of every hypothetical proposition. But now, we withdraw the word both from the *logical ground* of a belief (causa *cognoscendi*), and from the *interdependence* of mathematical magnitudes (causa *essendi*). We do not, with Aristotle, call the *premisses* of a syllogism the *causes* of the conclusion (An. Post. I. ii. 22), and, with Spinoza, the *essence* or *definition* of Substance, the *Cause* of its existence. And though we say, "*If* two circles touch each other internally, their centres and point of contact will be in the same straight line," we do not speak of the internal contact as the *cause* of straightness in the uniting line. The order of consecutive *thought* is expressed by the word "*Reason*." The relations with which mathematical truth is concerned have no origin or consecution *inter se;* but exist in *reciprocal* interdependence, which may be traversed in various orders. Were there only an unchanging universe, there would be in the modern sense, no Cause and Effect. Between "*Things*," as such, this relation cannot exist; it requires *Phenomena*. It is only with the causa *nascendi* that we have now to do.

We speak, no doubt, of objects,—a glacier, a coal-bed, an asteroid,—being caused by this or that; but only as having assumed their present form in time.

Change alone, however, does not suffice to give entrance to causality. A body existing in a state of uniform rectilinear motion would be always under change, but the change would not be an effect; nor for the body's movement through one segment of its course should we assign as cause its movement through the previous segments. Successive stages of continuous and unvaried change do not constitute the relation: the two terms must be *heterogeneous*. There are thus two marks of an *effect:* it must be a *phenomenon*, and not *homogeneous* with the Cause. Whatever carries these marks obliges us to look beyond itself; for what? for its origin in something different. This difference might be satisfied either by simply *another phenomenon*, or by what is *other than phenomenon*.

I. Suppose the Cause to be *another phenomenon;* in what does the relation between the two consist?

1. Is it in Time-succession? Is habitual antecedence tantamount to Causality? This hypothesis is already excluded by the rule of *heterogeneity* already given, for habitual antecedence, belonging equally to successions of the like and of the unlike, makes no provision for satisfying this rule. After using up the resources of habitual succession, we should therefore still have to set up a supplementary law of Thought, that every change must be referred to something other than its own prior stage.

2. Is it in *Sequence* + *Heterogeneity;* so that where two different phenomena are invariably successive in the same order, the prior is cause of the posterior? Not so, unless the blossoms of the almond are the cause of its leaves; and low water the cause of high; and the off fore leg of a horse moves his hind near one; and the fall of the leaf is the cause of winter; and (to recur to an old example not yet tortured to death) night the cause of day. Successions of this kind, constant yet independent of each other, we

can conceive multiplied to any extent. Suppose them to be universal, so as to occupy the whole field of observation. There would still be laws of invariable order; definite rules of co-existence and succession, securing the means of prediction; but no causality. Premonitory signs are still something short of causes.

3. Is the shortcoming remedied by stipulating that the sequence shall be "*unconditional*"? By decorating his "invariable antecedent" with this new mark, Mr. Mill completes its promotion to the rank of Cause. First, let us see whether we have got here a *new* mark at all. When does an antecedent become invested with this "unconditionality" of relation? When upon its presence, whatever else may be or not be, the second phenomenon regularly happens. Whether it has this character or not can be learned only by letting all other conditions absent themselves by turns, and so reveal their indifference to the result; and finding the residuary element to be the sole constant. What we discover thus, however, is nothing but our old acquaintance "invariableness," cleared by comparison with its inconstant companions. Or, in order to make "unconditionality" mean more than "invariableness," shall we insist that the antecedent is to be the sole condition "requisite," on the occurrence of which the second phenomenon is "*sure to happen*," and "*will follow in any case*"? How, then, am I to know such an antecedent when I see it? What test do you give me of this exclusive requisiteness,—this sureness to happen? If it be anything else than the old invariableness, it cannot be got out of your time-succession; but assumes a cognition of *necessity* other than that of habitual sequence, a certainty of the future other than lies in the juxtaposition of prior and posterior. In short, it is not from foreseeing its sequel in the future that we recognize anything as Cause; but from knowing it as Cause that we are sure of its sequel. Either, therefore, the mark "unconditional" is simply "invariable" over again; or else the rule given to

us is, "Take an antecedent: see that it is invariable: mind that nothing else is requisite: and you have the Cause,"—a prescription more prudent than instructive.

It is a vain attempt, then, as Sir John Herschel remarks, "to reason away the connection of cause and effect, and fritter it down into the unsatisfactory relation of habitual sequence."*

Yet between phenomenon and phenomenon, as occurring in time, no other relation is observable. Three things only can we notice about them; their resemblance or difference; their order in space; their order in time; and scrutinize them as we may under this last aspect, we can never (as Hume and Brown have adequately shown) make out anything more about them than "*which comes first*"? and "*which next*"? Higher magnifying powers, new refinements of discovery, may detect unsuspected intermediaries, and bisect and re-bisect the intervals, till a pair of seeming proximates is pulverized into a long series; as the light of Sirius, once regarded as a simple transaction between the star and the eye, cannot now be scientifically described without many a chapter on undulations, and refraction, and physiological optics, and the mental interpretation of the visual field. But the process only introduces more terms into the consecution, and reveals nothing other than consecution. Perceptive experience and observation, then, can never, it is plain, carry us beyond premonitory signs, laws of co-existence and succession; and if, as we have maintained, these fall short of Causality, Comte is so far right in expunging the quest of causes from the duties of Inductive Science, and confining it to the work of generalization, measurement, and deductive prediction. In this he seems to me to be more correct than Brown and the Mills, who continue to use the language of Causation, after it has been atrophied by reducing it to live on "habitual sequence."

And if premonitory signs are all that Science can *find*, so are they all that Science *wants*. It culminates in

* Treatise on Astronomy, ch. vii.

prevision and its counterpart, retrospection; and in order to read truly the past and future of the world, it is needful and it is sufficient to know the groups of concomitant and the order of successive phenomena. Were they all loose from each other as sand-grains, or as soldiers filing out of a barrack-gate, still, so long as they were regularly disposed and regimented, we should know what to look for behind, before, and around, and this would satisfy our scientific curiosity. But that there is something else which it does not satisfy is plain, from our not being content with the language of succession and premonition, but trespassing into terms of causation. We compel the antecedents to profess more than antecedence. We look on the perceptible conditions as *standing for* an imperceptible Causality, hiding within them or behind them. That they only *represent* it to our mind, and are not identical with it, is evident from the way in which the word "Cause" may be shifted about amongst them, settling now on this condition, now on that, and again upon the aggregate of them all; never absent, but always movable. For instance, the clock strikes 12: required the Cause. The answer may be,—the hands have reached that point; or, there is a bell for the hammer to hit; or, there is a hammer to hit the bell; or, the beats of the pendulum keep the time; or, the iron weight gives motion to the works; or, the earth's attraction operates on pendulum and weight. The principle on which we select among the conditions that which we designate as Cause has been variously stated. It has been often said that we pitch upon the most *active* element, and single it out in disregard of the passive conditions; but it would be a good account of a robbery to say that the safe was *not locked*. Mr. Mill thinks that we elect as cause "the proximate antecedent *event*," rather than any antecedent *state*. And it is, he says, in order to indulge this tendency, and escape the necessity of admitting permanent things, like the earth, into the list of causes, that we have set up the "logical fictions" of "*Force*" and "*Attraction*," and

stowed them away into the earth, to execute for us any jerks and pulls that we may require; for so I understand the statement, that we represent to ourselves the "*attraction*" of the earth "as exhausted by each effort, and therefore constituting at each successive instant a fresh fact, simultaneous with, or only immediately preceding, the effect."* This bold attempt to reclaim the province of dynamical language for the successional theory of causation seems to me to belong to the class of "heroic remedies," getting over a difficulty by adopting it, and formulating it as an advantage. Surely the earth's "attraction" is held to be no less "permanent" than the earth itself; and the spasmodic conception of it, as put forth *per saltum* wherever it has some new thing to do, is a peculiarity of Mr. Mill's imagination. To the idea of "*Force*" we resort, not to break down but to gain persistency, and fill the measure of power fully up to the durability of matter; so that, instead of being an escape into the phenomenal theory of Causality, it is precisely our method of deliverance from it.

To avoid the difficulty of singling out a cause from among the conditions, it is now usual to take them all in the aggregate, and to deny causality to anything short of the whole. This conception, in which Mr. Mill rests, is due to Hobbes, who says:—"When we seek after the Cause of any propounded effect, we must in the first place get into our mind an exact notion or idea of that which we call Cause, viz., that a cause is the sum or aggregate of all such accidents, both in the agent and the patient, as concur to the producing of the effect propounded; all which existing together, it cannot be understood but that the effect existed with them; or that it can possibly exist, if any one of them be absent."† However well this definition may work for the purposes of natural science, it does not satisfy the psychological con-

* Logic, B. III., ch. v., s. 3.

† Elem. Phil., P. I., ch. vi., s. 10.

dition of saying what *we mean* by "Cause," and why we habitually distinguish between *αἰτία* and *συναιτία*, and refuse to put the members of the "aggregate" upon a level. Is it not thus? In asking for a Cause, we ask always an *alternative* question,—why *this* phenomenon rather than *that*,—why *some* phenomenon rather than *none*: and whatever it be that upsets the equilibrium of conditions and turns the scale of this alternative is selected by us as the Cause. As the two members are not explicitly stated, the positive phenomenon inquired about may, in different hearers, undergo comparison with a different suppressed term; and hence they will not all alight upon the same condition as the cause. Why does the clock strike 12 (rather than 11)? because the hands have just reached that point: (rather than not strike)? because of the hammer and bell: (rather than not go at all)? because of the pendulum and weight. I believe that this principle gives an adequate account of the apparently random selection of a cause from among a host of indispensable conditions.

No phenomena, however, whether thus divided or left in group, can pass beyond the rank of premonitory signs, or give us more than the *nidus* of Causality, inasmuch as they disclose nothing but their order; and by causality we mean more than order.

II. The required heterogeneity, then, of Effect and Cause, must be sought on the remaining side of the alternative; the Cause, not being another phenomenon, must be *other than phenomenon, i.e.*, "*Noumenon*," or entity given by the very make of the intellect itself. The axiom, "Every phenomenon has a cause," instead of meaning "Every phenomenon invariably succeeds another phenomenon," really means, "Every phenomenon springs from something other than phenomenon." That this is a true account of the law of thought appears:—

1. From its *a priori* character. This character it plainly has. For how can the causal law be inductively gathered

by experience, when it is the *incunabula* of experience itself, the condition of the very scene in which we gain it? The external world springs up for us simply in answer to our intellectual demand for a Cause of our sensations; which, apart from that demand, could never present themselves to us as *effects*, with counterparts elsewhere in space. Why, but for this primary law, should we want any exit from our own immediate states? Why not take them as they come, stop with them where they are, and let them weave their tissue upon the inner walls? Moreover, as Helmholtz has observed, there is a clear indication of the logical character of the causal law in this,—that no experience is of the least avail to refute it. We often have occasion to discharge our long-established explanations of phenomena; but however often baffled, we can never raise the question whether perhaps they are without cause. In this persistency of search, however, there are, I think, two distinct beliefs involved,—one, in the uniformity of nature; the other, in the derivative origin of phenomena. These, I think, are not on the same footing. Of the former, Mr. Mill's inductive explanation seems to be sufficient; and it might perhaps be unlearned in such a world as he supposes, where all uniformity should be broken up. But the second belief would, I conceive, survive such experience; nor is there any tendency in the apparent lawlessness of phenomena to make us think that they issue from no power. Of these two beliefs,—often confounded together,—it is the second alone which I designate as the principle of Causality and claim as an axiom *a priori*. It has nothing to do with the consecution of phenomena. Amid order or disorder, we equally regard them as the outcome of power. The other belief,—not in causation, but in premonitions,—can only be copied from the successions which it attests, and it would be absurd to suppose that if their uniformity were broken up, the mind would be driven by intuitive necessity to rely upon it when it was gone.

If the principle of Causality is an *a priori* intellectual

law, the "Cause" which it obliges us to think will naturally be, not phenomenon, but noumenon.

2. From the indispensableness of *Dynamical* language for the proper expression of causal relations, and the confessed impossibility of translating the literature of science into terms of mere co-existence and succession among phenomena. The very writers who most rigorously limit us to laws of uniformity,—Comte and Mill,—are obliged, no less than others, to speak the dialect of "*Force*"; and in a single page I find the latter recognizing "the action of forces," "the propagation of influences," "instantaneous" and "continuous forces," "centres of force";* while the former, falling in with the phraseology of physical astronomy, tells how the equilibrium of the solar system is the "necessary consequence of gravitation"; and, in his anthropological exposition, assures us that, in *force and intensity*, each lower principle has the advantage of the higher. What is this idea of "Force," still clinging to those who insist that "all we know is phenomena"? Hume, admitting that we have it, treated it as a figment of customary association,—a subjective nexus of ideas turned into an illusory objective bond. The more recent representatives of his doctrine deny that such phrases are more than a shorthand compend for invariable succession, or carry any other meaning to the mind. This construction of the phrases evades the fact that *Force* is inconceivable without gradations, while *Succession* is inconceivable with them: and the difference between the more and the less, the difficult and the easy, the intense and the remiss, which intelligibly enters into dynamical facts, brings only nonsense to the relation of Prior and Posterior. Another device for recalling "Force" into the Time-field is to define it as "*Tendency to Motion.*" *Motion* I know as a phenomenon; but what sort of phenomenon is the "*Tendency*"? If it is outwardly there at all, is it anything else than just the dynamical element which it tries to expel?

* Logic, B. III., ch. v., s. 1.

The only way of construing it in harmony with the theory is to treat it as *not* outwardly there, but as intimating *our belief* that, under certain supposed conditions, there *would be* motion. This subjective interpretation puts into the language a meaning which will work; only it is not *our meaning;* for we intend to assert something, not about our hypothetical beliefs, but about the bodies outside us. Yet it is incumbent on one who accepts the construction to explain the objective character of the language, and why it is that, without mistake of phrase, we mean one thing and ought to mean another? On the whole, the language of *Agency*, with its measures of intensity, could never have sprung from an experience limited to successions. Laws of order are not yet causes; and if we know anything of causes, we know more than Laws.

The axiom, then, stands, that "Every phenomenon springs from something other than phenomenon"; and this *Noumenon* is *Power*.

III. It remains to find the form in which it is given to us.

1. The cognition of an external world is the most conspicuous primary application of the Causal law. In virtue of this law the understanding sets up in space before it the Cause of what is felt in the organs of Sense, and effects the transition from Sensation to Perception. In sensation itself there is nothing objective; and that we ever escape beyond our skin is due to the intellectual intuitions of Space, Time, and Causality. Physiologically, not less than psychologically, it seems, the distinction is marked between mere sense and perception. Flourens attests that the removal of a tubercle will destroy visual *sensation;* the retina becomes insensible, the iris immovable. The removal of a cerebral lobe leaves undisturbed the visual sensation, the sensibility of the retina, the contractibility of the iris; but it destroys *perception.** *Objectivity*, then, is given to us by the Causal law; and is not itself a phenomenon,

* De la Vie et de l'Intelligence; 2me Edit., p. 49.

but the construction which the Understanding puts upon phenomena.

2. Mere objectivity, however, or external existence, would still not appear in the form of Power, were it not introduced to us as the antithetic term (the non-Ego) to our own personality (the Ego). Two functions, fundamentally con-, co-exist in our nature;—a sensitive receptivity, in i. e of which we are the theatre of feelings;—and a spontaneous activity, in virtue of which we expend energy and effect movements. These are contraries, as taking opposite lines of direction; to the centre and from the centre; the initiative abroad, and the initiative at home; sensation arriving without notice, and sensation earned by executive act signalled from within. In the crossing lines of these functions do we first find ourselves, and, as distinguished from ourselves, the objective world. Had we only the passive receptivity, we should not *have* sensations, but *be* sensations; we should feel, without knowing that we feel. But with the exercise of living force or will, the self-consciousness arises; balanced, in the encounter with limitation and impediment, by the recognition of something other than self. This pair of existences becomes known to us merely in relation and antithesis: in whatever capacity we apprehend the one, in the same must we oppose to it the other. Now, in putting forth our Will (using the word for the whole activity which *may become* voluntary), we certainly know the Self as *Force;* we get behind the phenomena which we produce, and are let into the secret of their origin in a way which we should miss if we only looked upon them. In other words, we know ourselves as *Cause* of them. In this same capacity, then, *i.e.*, dynamically, is the other than Self known as our own opposite; and the universe falls into Causal polarity, in which the outer sphere is but the complement of our own Power. Concurrent with this dynamical antithesis is the geometrical or local antithesis by which the Ego is known as *here*, and the non-

Ego as *there*, and whatever is *foreign* to ourselves is planted out as *external* to ourselves. In virtue of the inseparable union of these two antitheses, as factors of Perception, Objectivity and Causality necessarily blend in our outer world; and we cannot separate Matter from Force, or Force from Matter.

The use frequently made of the "Muscular Sense" to explain our introduction to the outer world is unsatisfactory, because the muscular feelings occur *during the delivery* of the act, and happen to us just like the passive feelings of any other sense: whilst the Causal nisus *issues* the act, and may perform it, though, through sensory paralysis, the muscles do not feel at all.

Mr. Mill denies our self-knowledge of Causality, on the ground that, prior to experience, we have no foresight of what we can do. The question is not whether we can *foresee*, but whether we can *try*; and whether the putting forth of force, with or without success, is an experience *sui generis*. Frustration, from want of foresight, is indeed an important part of the lesson by which we learn the meaning of *Can* and *Cannot*.

It is, then, under the form of *Will* that we are introduced to Causality; and the axiom resolves itself into the proposition, "Every phenomenon springs from a Will." The universe, it is admitted, appears to men in simple times, to young eyes still, to poets in all times, as Living Objective Will. But it is supposed that, with the aids of Science we learn something better. And certainly we do learn to discharge the host of invisible powers once distributed through the world, and, as Law flings its arms more wide, to fuse the multiform life of nature into One. But no fresh way of access to the cognition of Power is opened to us. We have to reach it through the same representative type: and to this hour it has no meaning to us except what we take from Will. The scientific idea of Force is nothing but Will *cut down*, by dropping from it some characters which

are irrelevant for the purposes of classification and prediction. The idea of Will is not arrived at by the addition of Force + Purpose; but that of Force is arrived at by the subtraction of Will – Purpose. Such artificial abstractions supply a notation highly serviceable for the prosecution of phenomenal knowledge, but they can gain no authority against the original intuition on which they work, and to which they owe their own validity. The necessity may be disguised, but can never be escaped, of interpreting the universe by man.

THE END.

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